The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CLEO WILLIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:19 CV 952 RWS
)
ROCK HILL MECHANICAL )
CORP., et al., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cleo Willis was employed by Defendant Rock Hill Mechanical
Corporation (Rock Hill) as a laborer. In his amended complaint, Willis alleged
that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on race at a job site run
by Defendant ACW Alliance (ACW). Willis also alleged his employment was
terminated based on race. Willis asserts that Rock Hill and ACW subjected him to
unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII. Rock Hill and ACW have moved
for summary judgment. Because Willis has failed to establish his claims of
employment discrimination I will grant Rock Hill and ACW summary judgment.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998)(citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial
responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those
portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a
motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on
his pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the
essential elements of his case on which he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 324. In
resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has an
affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy.
Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004).
Direct evidence of employment discrimination is rare, therefore, most cases
rely on circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination, courts employ the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)(Title VII case).
Under the burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;
Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff
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establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is established and
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 411 U.S. at 802. The
defendant need not persuade the court that the articulated reason was the basis of
the employer’s action; rather, it must simply provide some evidence of a non-
discriminatory reason or reasons for its action. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
Upon the proffer of such evidence, the presumption of discrimination
established by the prima facie case “simply drops out of the picture.” Id. at 510-
11. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated
by the employer was really a pretext for discrimination. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over
Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1995). A rejection of the
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason by itself or combined with
elements of the prima facie case may be enough to establish, but does not compel,
an inference of intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at
511.
The burden of proving discrimination remains on the plaintiff at all times.
Id. at 515-16. It is not enough to merely discredit defendant’s articulated reason
for the adverse employment action. A plaintiff must always establish that the real
reason for defendant’s action was impermissible discrimination. Id.; see also
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Huston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995). To avoid
summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence that, when viewed in its
entirety: (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reason is
pretextual, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that a discriminatory motive was
a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision. Rothmeier v.
Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996).
Background1
The incidents that give rise to Plaintiff Cleo Willis’s claims of race
discrimination arise from his employment as a laborer on a construction project at
the Washington University Medical Center Campus. Defendant ACW is a joint
venture made up of three entities: Clayco, Inc., S.M. Wilson & Co., and Alberici
Healthcare, LLC. BJC Healthcare retained ACW as the general contractor for the
construction project. One of ACW’s responsibilities was implementing BJC’s
safety regulations and rules for the project. ACW hired Defendant Rock Hill as a
subcontractor. The Subcontractor Agreement between ACW and Rock Hill
required Rock Hill to remove “any employee who creates an unsafe condition …
or who violates the Contractor’s Safety Procedures.” [Doc. # 16-3, ¶ 2.10] Rock
1 The following background information is taken from Defendant Rock Hill’s Statement of
Uncontroverted Facts, Defendant ACW’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, and Plaintiff Willis’s
Additional Uncontroverted Facts that the parties do not dispute.
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Hill hired Willis2 through a local union to work as a laborer on the project under
Rock Hill’s contract with ACW. Willis’s duties as a laborer included cleaning up
behind the tinners and pipe fitters, and in the areas where they worked, getting ice,
and taking trash from the floors to the dumpsters. Jeff Johnson worked for Rock
Hill and was Willis’s supervisor.
On October 4, 2016, Dwight Schofield, a white laborer for another
subcontractor, and Willis became involved in a confrontation. The incident started
when Willis noticed that Schofield was using Willis’s house broom. Willis
testified at his deposition that when he asked for his broom back, Schofield cursed
at him, approached him aggressively, and pushed / jammed the broom into Willis’s
stomach. Willis was not hurt but he was shaken. Willis testified he stepped back,
cursed at Schofield, grabbed a shovel from his cart, held it like a bat and yelled for
Schofield to get back or Willis would hit him with the shovel. [Doc. # 66-1, Ex. 1,
Willis Dep. 94:2-96:15, 132:3-134:6]
ACW’s Safety Manager Corey Hayes investigated the confrontation
between Willis and Schofield. Willis received a Written Safety Violation
Notification which stated that Willis was observed using aggressive language
during an interaction with another worker on site over a tool of the trade belonging
to Willis. [Id., Ex. 5] Schofield received a similar Written Safety Violation
2 Willis identifies himself as an “African American as well as black.” [Doc. # 66-1, ¶ 8:23-24, Willis Dep.]
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Notification for his part in the incident. [Id., Ex. 11] Neither Willis nor Schofield
were removed from the construction site over the incident.
Less than a month later Willis was involved in a second altercation with an
elevator operator. Some elevators on the job site were designated for employees
only to move manpower without material or carts. Other elevators were used to
move carts or equipment. On November 1, 2016, an elevator operator, Lela
Murrell, did not allow Willis to use the elevator she was controlling to transport a
cart because the elevator was designated for manpower only. The next day, on
November 2, 2016, Willis pushed his cart onto an elevator controlled by Murrell
that was designated for manpower only. Murrell submitted a statement that she
told Willis no carts were allowed on that elevator. She stated that Willis cursed her
loudly and refused to take the cart off. Willis told her he was going to stay.
Murrell called “the office” on her phone. She handed the phone to Willis and
while he was talking she removed his cart from the elevator. Willis returned the
phone and Murrell took the elevator to another floor. [Id., Ex. 9, pp. 11-12]
Willis denies that he raised his voice to Murrell. [Doc. # 71, Ex. A, Willis
Dep. 75:11-15] He testified at his deposition that he was carrying ice and water to
the floors and that he was allowed to use any elevator when transporting ice and
water. [Id.,118:1-25] This assertion was not supported by any other evidence.
After this incident was over, Jeff Johnson, a Rock Hill general foreman on
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the site, got a call from the ACW office to bring Willis to the office. Johnson
escorted Willis to the office where they were asked to come into a conference
room by Dean Froth, a manager from S.M. Wilson (the W in ACW). Dean told
Johnson to escort Willis off the project site. [Doc. # 66, Ex. 3, Johnson Dep. 45:3-
48:25] There is a dispute over whether Willis was told he was fired at that time or
simply escorted off the job site.3 Thereafter, ACW issued a Written Safety
Violation Notification to Rock Hill which required Rock Hill to remove Willis
from the project for a period of a year for repeated safety violations. [Doc. # 69,
Ex. 11] The notification stated that Willis was observed in violation of the
workplace harassment policy regarding the incident at the elevator. Rock Hill did
not have any other projects requiring laborers at the time.
Both ACW and Rock Hill have moved for summary judgement. Willis
opposes their motions.
Discussion
Willis’s disparate treatment claim
In his amended complaint Willis asserts a disparate treatment claim based on
race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. “Title VII prohibits
3 Rock Hill’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts states that “ACW told Willis he was fired, and asked Jeff Johnson
to escort Plaintiff from the project.” [Doc. # 66 ¶ 26] But two of the citations in support (Hayes and Johnson
depositions) do not the support statement that ACW told Willis he was fired. These deposition citations indicate that
the ACW manager told the Rock Hill Manager to remove Willis from the job site. In his deposition, Willis testified
that the ACW manager told him he was fired. [Id., Ex. 1, 59:7-18] ACW’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts
states that ACW requested Rock Hill to escort Willis from the property, citing Johnson’s deposition. [Doc. # 69, ¶
20]
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employers from discharging an employee because of race or gender and from
treating employees differently with respect to the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’
of employment.” Palesch v. Missouri Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 233 F.3d 560, 568
(8th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Willis asserts he suffered an
adverse employment action when his employment was terminated after the
incident on the elevator. He argues that he was treated differently than white
workers who were not terminated for their inappropriate workplace behavior.
To establish a prima facie case for a disparate treatment claim, Willis must
show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting the
legitimate expectations as to his duties; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination because
similarly situated employees, who were not members of the protected group, were
treated differently. Gilooly v. Missouri Dept. of Health and Senior Services, 421
F.3d 734, 737-739 (8th Cir. 2005).
As an African American, Willis is a member of a protected class. Before the
incidents that lead to Willis being removed from the job site he was generally
meeting the legitimate expectations as to his duties.4 It is undisputed that he
suffered an adverse employment action when he was removed from the BJC
project worksite and barred from returning for a year. But Willis has not identified
4 Although he was counseled for preaching his religious and political views to workers in other trades. [Doc. # 71,
Ex. 2, Johnson Dep. 17:7-18:13]
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a similarly-situated employee, who is not a member of a protected class, who was
treated more favorably. As a result, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment.
In support of his claim Willis argues that he was treated differently than the
white elevator operator involved in the water cart incident. He asserts that while
he was fired over the incident her job was not terminated. However, Willis does
not provide any evidence that they were similarly situated. Willis had been issued
two safety violations in a month, the first involving the broom altercation with
Schofield. Willis does not provide any information regarding the elevator
operator’s disciplinary record. Willis also argues that he was treated differently
than Schofield. However, both he and Schofield received the identical safety
violation for their altercation and there is not any evidence in the record that
Schofield received any other safety violations.
Willis argues that two white workers were involved in a fist fight on the BJC
but neither of them were terminated. This altercation involved two members of
separate trades, a drywaller and a sheet metal worker. One punched the other and
they were both removed from the job for three days. [Doc. # 71, Ex. 2, Johnson
Dep. 17:7-18:13] These workers were not similarly situated to Willis. Willis has
not produced any evidence that they received a second safety violation notification
like Willis had received. Moreover, these men worked in different trades for
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different supervisors. They were not similarly situated to Willis. See Bennett v.
Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 819 (8th Cir. 2011) (“In a case involving allegations of
discriminatory disciplinary practices, for example, this court explained that to be
similarly situated, the comparable employees must have dealt with the same
supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same
conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
Even if Wills established a prima facie case, ACW and Rock Hill have come
forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Willis’s removal from the
job. His two confrontations with other job site personnel led to the decision to
remove him from the project. At this point the presumption of discrimination
established by a prima facie case “simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). Willis argues that this ground
for his removal was a pretext. Willis makes an overarching argument that racial
animus in Willis’s termination can be inferred from the overall environment of
simmering racism at the construction site. He asserts there was racial tension due
to the 2016 election, that racial graffiti had been found in restrooms, that some
construction workers had made racially hostile statements, and that trash was being
strewn about by white workers for Willis to pick up. These allegations will be
addressed below in Willis’s hostile work environment claim. But these allegations
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fail to create a reasonable inference that a discriminatory motive was a
determinative factor in Dean Froth’s decision to remove Willis’ from the job site.
As a result, I find that ACW and Rock Hill are entitled to summary judgment on
this claim.
Willis’s hostile work environment claim
Willis asserts a claim for a hostile work environment under Title VII based
on race. “Hostile work environment harassment occurs when the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Palesch v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights,
233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). A court must keep in mind that
“[n]ot all unpleasant conduct creates a hostile work environment.” Id. at 567.
(cleaned up). The conduct at issue must not be merely rude or unpleasant or
involve a few isolated incidents. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir.
2016) (cleaned up). The harassment must be “so intimidating, offensive, or hostile
that it poisoned the work environment.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Gilooly
v. Missouri Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation omitted). The conduct at issue must be severe or pervasive
enough to be an objectively hostile environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993). “[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from
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the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the
circumstances.”
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)(internal
quotation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff must subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A court is required to look at
all of the attendant circumstances, including the frequency of the purported
harassment; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the
employee’s work performance. Willis v. Henderson, 262 F.3d 801, 809 (8th Cir.
2003).
In order to establish a claim of hostile work environment racial harassment
by non-supervisory co-workers, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he belongs to a
protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on race; (d) that the harassment affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment; and (e) that the employer knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. Palesch, 233 F.3d at
566.
Willis asserts the following evidence in support of his hostile work
environment claim. In an earlier elevator investigation (details and personnel
12
unknown) in which a worker commented in a written statement: “If we need to
remain professional, then the African-American workers need to do the same. It
feels like they are throwing the Michael Brown / Wilson shit in our face and we
don’t appreciate it.” [Doc. 69, Ex. 2, Hayes Dep. 36:19-37:5]5 The worker was not
disciplined for this statement. Willis does not present any other specific admissible
statement of racial animus. This statement appears to be an offensive utterance
that does not by itself, or in combination with Willis’s other assertions, create a
hostile work environment.
Willis asserts that the workplace had racial tension based on the 2016
election, the unrest in Ferguson, and the Colin Kaepernick controversy. [Doc. #
71, Ex. A, Willis Dep. 269:14-18, 287:24-25; 288:1-3, 243:9-15, 269:5-13] Willis
does not elaborate on how this racial tension created a workplace that was so
intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.
Willis presented evidence that there was racial graffiti in job site bathrooms
but that ACW had painting crews that removed the graffiti. [Id., 269:19-25-270:1-
25, 276:13-25] Willis’s deposition testimony states the bathrooms were checked
5 Willis also testified that he was told by a union official that Schofield had said, at some unspecified time, that
“[B]lacks do not deserve to work here.” [Doc. # 71, Ex. A, Willis Dep. 274:4-18] This statement is hearsay under
Fed. R. Evid. 801 and is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 802.
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every day and if any graffiti was found it was painted over. [Id., 276:13-25] ACW
did not ignore this issue and responded by addressing this issue on a daily basis.
Willis claims he was denied the use of the elevator that led to his removal
because he was black. However, in his deposition Willis was asked two times if he
was denied access to the elevator based on race and he demurred. [Id., 245:6-25 –
247:1-6] There is not any evidence in the record to support an allegation that
Willis was denied access to the elevators because he was black.
Willis asserts that he was forced to bend down and crawl to pick up trash
strewn across the ground by racially motivated co-workers. [Id., 65:12-25, 67:5-
10] Willis’s job as a laborer was to pick up the trash created by construction
workers at the job site. His subjective perception that the workers threw trash
down in a particular fashion as a racially motivated behavior is not supported by
any objective evidence.
Lastly, Willis claims that a noose was found on the site less than a month
after he was removed from work. [Id., 67:11-25-68:1-24] The fact that a noose
was found weeks after Willis left the project does not support his claim for a
hostile work environment while he worked at the job site. Moreover, management
swiftly responded to the noose incident offering a $20,000 reward for information
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about the incident. According to Willis, a carpenter was identified as the culprit.
[Id., 277:6-9]
Willis asserts that he complained to management about race discrimination.
[Id., Ex. D., Rock Hill’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrog. 16] On September 2 and 5, 2016,
Willis wrote two letters to management complaining about his interaction with
police / security guards in the parking garage. Willis was allegedly parking in the
hospital garage despite a direction that the site workers were supposed to park for
free in a lot down the street. Willis complained that this interaction was because of
his race. [Doc. # 69, Ex. 7, Johnson Dep. 41:21-25-42:1-24] Willis also
complained that he was mistreated in his October 4, 2016 altercation with
Schofield based on his race. After his altercation with the elevator operator, just
prior to learning that he was being removed from the job site, Willis advised
Johnson that he felt he was being treated differently because of his race. [Doc. #
71, Ex. D., Rock Hill’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrog. 16]
None of these complaints put ACW or Rock Hill on notice that Willis was
complaining about a hostile work environment. The complaint about the police /
security officers concerned Willis impermissibly parking the hospital BJC garage.
Willis complaint about Schofield was resolved when both men were given safety
violation notifications. Willis’s complaint that he felt he was being treated unfairly
15
because of his race over the elevator incident, when he was called to the office to
be removed from the project, did not put ACW and Rock Hill on notice that Willis
was making a hostile work environment complaint.
Based on the foregoing, I find that Willis has failed to present evidence
which would support his claim of a hostile work environment. As a result, I will
grant ACW and Rock Hill summary judgment on this claim.
ACW’s Alternative Grounds for Summary Judgment
ACW has also moved for summary judgment on the alternative grounds that
it was not Willis’s employer, and if it was, ACW is not a suable entity.
Willis admits in his deposition that he was not an employee of ACW. [Doc.
# 72, Pl.’s Resp. to ACW’s Stat. of Uncon. Facts ¶ 9] However, in his brief he
argues that ACW is a joint employer under common law. In a joint employer
relationship
there is no single integrated enterprise. The joint employer analysis
assumes separate legal entities exist, but that they have chosen to
handle certain aspects of their employer-employee relationships
jointly. A finding of joint employer is proper where one company has
retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees who are employed by the other
employer.
Scheidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (D. Minn.
2000)(cleaned up).
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It is undisputed that Willis was employed by Rock Hill. Rock Hill hired and
had the ability to terminate Willis’s employment. Willis received his pay and
benefits from Rock Hill. Rock Hill manager Jeff Johnson provided Willis with
daily supervision. Rock Hill provided the tools for Willis to perform his work.
Willis did not report to any manager at ACW for his daily work assignments.
After being removed from the BJC project Rock Hill did not have any other
projects that required laborers.
Willis agues several conditions support his joint employer claim including
that he had to comply with BJC’s safety protocols that were implemented by
ACW. The ACW safety manager Corey Hayes had the power to site Willis for
safety violations. ACW would occasionally request subcontractors to send their
labors to certain areas on the site so ACW could point out places where there was
trash or debris that needed to be cleaned up at the job site for safety concerns.
And, that ACW had the power to remove subcontractor employees from the project
over safety violations.
None of these conditions establish that ACW retained for itself sufficient
control of the terms and conditions of employment of the Willis to be deemed a
joint employer. There is not any evidence that ACW exercised daily control of the
manner and means that Willis performed his job. Willis was managed on a daily
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basis by his Rock Hill supervisor. The fact that an ACW could site Willis for
safety violations does not support the claim that ACW was his employer. And,
when ACW decided to remove Willis from the project ACW contacted Willis’s
Rock Hill supervisor, Jeff Johnson, and asked him to bring Willis to the office.
Then ACW requested Johnson to escort Willis from the job site. Willis was still
employed by Rock Hill, yet Rock Hill did not have any other projects that needed
laborers. Based on the foregoing, Willis has not presented sufficient evidence to
support his claim that ACW was a joint employer. As a result, I will grant ACW’s
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that ACW was not Willis’s joint
employer.
Finally, ACW asserts that it is not a suable entity because it was a joint
venture that is analogous to a partnership. Under Missouri law, a joint venture is
treated legally as a partnership and “is not regarded as a separate legal entity and
cannot sue or be sued.” Sarasohn & Co. v. Prestige Hotels Corp., 945 S.W.2d 13,
16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3)(A) permits a
partnership, with no capacity to sue or be sued under state law, to sue or be sued in
its own name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States
Constitution or laws. In the present case Willis is suing to enforce his civil rights
under Title VII. ACW contends that Rule 17 does not apply to it because state law
18
does grant partnerships the right to sue or be sued but mandates the capacity to do
so is held by the individual partners in the action. ACW cites to the case of
Lundquist v. Univ. of S. Dakota Sanford Sch. of Med., for this proposition. 705
F.3d 378, 381 (8th Cir. 2013). Such an interpretation of the holding in Lundquist
would completely undermine the express language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3)(A).
The Lundquist decision did not turn on the existence of a partnership. The party
challenging the capacity to be sued was the University of South Dakota Sanford
School of Medicine. The court found that the state legislature did not deny the
University and its School of Medicine the capacity to sue or be sued. Rather, the
state legislature mandated that the capacity to do so resided in the Board of
Regents, the unit of government that controlled the University. Id. at 381. In its
reply brief, ACW interpreted the holding as “the [Rule 17] exception does not
apply because state law specified how a partnership has capacity to be sued.”
[Doc. # 76 at 8] This is not the holding of Lundquist. Lundquist involved a state
legislature mandating how a state entity had the capacity to sue and be sued. It did
not hold that all partnerships can avoid the capacity exception of Rule 17 because
the partnership’s partners have the capacity to sue and be sued. As, a result,
ACW’s assertion that the exception of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3)(A) applies in this
case is without merit.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant ACW Alliance’s motion for
summary judgment [67] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER OREDER that Defendant Rock Hill Mechanical
Corporation’s motion for summary judgment [64] is GRANTED.
_________________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 30th day of September, 2021.
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