The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
QUANTEL LOTTS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:18-CV-1087 RWS
)
STANLEY PAYNE, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Quantel Lotts seeks a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, arguing that his due process rights have been violated. ECF No. [1]. After
careful consideration of Lotts’ petition. ECF No. [1], and respondent’s brief ECF
No. [17], I will deny Lotts’ petition.
BACKGROUND
Lotts was indicted by a St. Francois County grand jury on April 25, 2000, on
one count of murder in the first degree and one count of armed criminal action
related to the death of his stepbrother, Michael Barton. Lotts was convicted of both
charges on November 6, 2002. On January 17, 2003, Lotts was given the
mandatory sentence for murder in the first degree, life without parole. He was also
sentenced to a consecutive term of life imprisonment for his conviction of armed
criminal action. At the sentencing hearing the victim’s mother spoke on Lotts
behalf, but because of the mandatory nature of the sentence her testimony could
not be considered, nor could Lotts’ age. Lotts was 14 at the time of the murder.
Lotts appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by
overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal due to lack of evidence of
deliberation, overruling his hearsay objection, and failing to correct the prosecutors
improper closing. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision on January 20, 2004. Lotts timely filed a motion for post-conviction relief
arguing that trial counsel was ineffective. The motion was denied on March 14,
2005, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on April 4, 2006.
Lotts then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Missouri Circuit Court
for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial Circuit. The petition was dismissed on March 25,
2009. He subsequently filed Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Missouri
Court of Appeals and Missouri Supreme Court, which were also denied. Lotts then
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court, which was denied on
February 22, 2010.
After Lotts exhausted all of his remedies, the United States Supreme Court
issued two decisions impacting the constitutionality of Lotts conviction. In June
2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), that “mandatory life without parole for those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’” Id. At 465. And in January 2016,
the Supreme Court issued Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718,
193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016), which held that “Miller
announced a substantive rule of constitutional law,” which under Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S, 1060 (1989), must be applied retroactively to all cases on collateral
review. Based on the new ruling in Miller, Lotts filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Missouri Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its order in
Montgomery, Lotts filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in his Habeas case,
requesting resentencing under State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. Banc 2013).
The Missouri Supreme Court initially sustained Lotts petition, granting him
eligibility for parole after 25 years. Lotts filed a Motion for Reconsideration in
March 2016. Then in July 2016 the Missouri legislature enacted Missouri
Annotated Statute § 558.047, which made juveniles serving life without parole
eligible for parole after serving 25 years of their sentence. After this law was
enacted, the Missouri Supreme Court withdrew its previous order and dismissed
Lotts’ petition as moot.
In April 2017, Lotts once again sought habeas relief in state court, arguing
that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 was insufficient under Miller and Montgomery
because it does not provide a meaningful opportunity for release and fails to
provide individualized sentencing as discussed in Miller. The state court denied his
petition. He then filed petitions in the Missouri Court of Appeals and the Missouri
Supreme Court, both of which were denied. Lotts then filed this petition on July 3,
2018. He simultaneously filed a request for authorization to file a successive
habeas petition, which the Eighth Circuit denied on November 1, 2018.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal
habeas relief is available to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir.
1990).
Prior to bringing a § 2254 petition a prisoner of the state must exhaust the
state law remedies available to them. In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, the Supreme Court
of the United States determined that for purposes of exhaustion a “state prisoner
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues
by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review
process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed.
2d 1 (1999). In Missouri, because it is considered an extraordinary measure, a
prisoner need not appeal their claim to the State Supreme Court to exhaust their
remedies under § 2254. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 83.04; see also Randolph v. Kemna,
276 F.3d 401, 404 (8th Cir. 2002).
A federal court reviewing a state conviction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254
proceeding may ordinarily only consider those claims the petitioner exhausted.
Beaulieu v. Minnesota, 583 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gilmore v.
Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1988)). If the petitioner failed to
properly exhaust the claim in state court, and no adequate non-futile remedy is
currently available by which he may bring the claim in that forum, the claim is
deemed procedurally defaulted and cannot be reviewed by the federal habeas court
“unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991), see also
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012).
Where the state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, federal habeas relief
can only be granted if the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2);
see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389
(2000). The federal law must be clearly established at the time petitioner's state
conviction became final, and the source of doctrine for such law is limited to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 380–83.
“A state court's decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court
precedent when it is opposite to the Supreme Court's conclusion on a question of
law or different than the Supreme Court's conclusion on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Carter v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13). “A federal court may grant relief under the
‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly identified the
governing legal principle, but unreasonably applied it to the facts of the particular
case.” Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002)). “A state court's
application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable,
and not merely incorrect, to warrant the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Jackson, 651 F.3d at 925 (citing Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).
Finally, when reviewing whether a state court decision involves an
“unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceedings, state court findings of basic, primary, or historical facts are
presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 423
(8th Cir. 2007). “[E]ven erroneous fact-finding by the [state] courts will not justify
granting a writ if those courts erred ‘reasonably.’ ” Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d
1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2001).
The federal court is “bound by the AEDPA to exercise only limited and
deferential review of underlying State court decisions.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d
748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003). To obtain habeas relief from a federal court, the
petitioner must show that the challenged state court ruling “rested on an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 358, 133 S. Ct.
1781, 185 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–
03, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)). This standard is difficult to meet.
Metrish, 569 U.S. at 357–58.
ANALYSIS
A. Successive
Lotts’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not second or successive.
Although the Eighth Circuit denied Lotts’ request to file a second or successive
habeas petition, it did so summarily, so it is unclear why it denied the request.
Lotts v. Steele, No. 17SF-CC00087 (St. Francios Cty. March 9, 2018) (denying
petition); State ex rel. Lotts v. Steele, No. ED106459 (Mo. App. E.D. March 12,
2018)(denying petition); State ex rel. Lotts v. Steele, No. SC97025 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
July 3, 2018) (denying petition). The Eighth Circuit has denied applications for
authorizations to file a second or successive habeas petition because they are
unnecessary. See Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2001). In his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lotts relies on Miller v. Alabama, which held
that the Eighth Amendment protects juvenile offenders from being sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. Lotts filed his first
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2007, which I denied in 2010. Lotts v.
Larkins, No. 4:07-CV-610 RWS (E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 34). Miller was
decided in 2012, and it was made retroactive as a new rule of constitutional law in
2016 by Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. Lotts “could not have raised a claim” that
his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller at the time he filed his
original petition. Therefore, his petition is not second or successive.
B. Lotts is not entitled to an individualized sentencing and Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 558.047 resolved his claim under Miller
Three of Lotts’ claims attack the constitutionality of his sentence and
Missouri’s “Miller-fix” statute. Specifically, Lotts argues that his life without
parole sentence is unconstitutional under Miller and Montgomery and that Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 558.047 fails to provide Lotts a meaningful opportunity for release and
deprives him of an individualized sentencing. The State argues that Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 558.047 moots Lotts’ claims and satisfied the requirements of Miller.
Montgomery expressly held that “[a] State may remedy a Miller violation by
permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by
resentencing them.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Therefore, it was not
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established law for the state court to deny
Lotts’ claims.
Lotts’ argument that he is not eligible for parole because he is serving
consecutive life sentences and the Missouri parole board has discretion to decline
to consider him for parole is not persuasive. First, the State filed an affidavit
indicating that Lotts would be eligible for parole after serving 28 years —25 years
on his life without parole sentence and 3 years on his consecutive life sentence.
ECF No. [17-7]. Second, Miller and Montgomery do not require that Lotts be
released or have a parole hearing by a certain date, rather it requires that Lotts be
given a meaningful opportunity for release. Granting Lotts parole eligibility, which
will be executed in accordance with the laws of the state, is sufficient. See e.g.,
Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137, S.Ct. 1726 (2017), Bowling v. Dir., Virginia Dep't of
Corr., 920 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Bowling v. Clarke, 140
S. Ct. 2519, 206 L. Ed. 2d 469 (2020). Alleged constitutional deficiencies that exist
within the parole process itself are being addressed in Brown v. Precythe,
No. 2:17-CV-04082-NKL, 2018 WL 4956519 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018), which is
currently pending before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. Those claims were
properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and I will not address them here.
Additionally, the constitutionality of the parole process is not an appropriate issue
to be addressed in this case because Lotts is not currently eligible for parole. See
Hack v. Cassady, No. 16-04089-CV-W-ODS, 2019 WL 320586, at *7 (W.D. Mo.
Jan. 24, 2019); Stewart v. Bowersox, 2019 WL 2173448 at *3 (May 20, 2019);
McCombs v. Lewis, No. 4:16 CV 356 CDP, 2019 WL 1275066 (E.D. Mo. Mar.
20, 2019).
C. Lotts’ sentence is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous
Lotts’ final argument is that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 renders his sentence
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. According to the Missouri Department of
Corrections website, Lotts is currently sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole, but under the statute he is eligible for parole.1 Lotts argues that this renders
the sentence so ambiguous that it can be interpreted and executed as a sentence of
life without parole. The State argues that Lotts’ sentence is not ambiguous or
vague and that based on the current parole regulations in Missouri, he will be
eligible for parole after serving 28 years.
Courts reviewing the issue have held that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 is a
constitutionally sufficient remedy for Miller errors. See Hicklin v. Schmitt, 613
S.W.3d 780, 789 (Mo. Banc 2020); Burris v. Cassady, No. 4:16-CV-01565-JAR,
2021 WL 1380271, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 12, 2021); cf Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
1Lotts will be eligible for parole in 2028. ECF No. 17-7.
736. But I have been unable to find any courts that have addressed the specific
issue presented by Lotts. Not even the courts reviewing his habeas petition
addressed this claim. Unlike other cases, which directly challenge the remedy
provided by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047, Lotts is challenging the ambiguity created
by the legislation. He is not arguing that granting him parole eligibility fails to
satisfy Miller. Rather, he is arguing that because the statute did not require his
sentence to be changed, it created an ambiguity that has allowed the State to
continue to execute his sentence as if he were serving life without parole.
Although the state courts reviewing Lotts habeas petition did not address his
ambiguity claim, he still must meet his burden “by showing there was no
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. “A
state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief
so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's
decision.” Id. (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140,
158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). In this case, Plaintiff has not met that burden.
The only Supreme Court case Lotts cites to support his argument is United
States v. Daugherty, which states that “sentences in criminal cases should reveal
with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions
by those who must execute them.” United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363,
46 S. Ct. 156, 70 L. Ed. 309 (1926). While this language supports Lotts’ argument
that his sentence is ambiguous, it is not clear that the case articulates a
constitutional standard applicable to the states. See Costantino v. Filson, 2018 WL
233794 at n. 7 (D. Nev. May 23, 2018).
Even if Daugherty did establish a constitutional standard, “fairminded jurists
could disagree” about whether Lotts sentence is ambiguous. Although the
Department of Corrections website says that Lotts is serving a sentence of life
without parole, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 makes him eligible for parole after 25
years.2 While this inconsistency makes his sentence seem ambiguous, it is not.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047 provides clear direction to those executing his sentence
that he is now eligible for parole. While it is disappointing that the State of
Missouri has granted Lotts parole eligibility but has not taken the necessary steps
to ensure he has access to appropriate programing and living conditions, I am
bound by AEDPA to exercise only a limited and deferential review. I can only
grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court’s application of the law is
“objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect.” Jackson, 651 F.3d at 925.
Although I disagree with the state court’s decision, it was not objectively
unreasonable. Therefore, I must deny Lotts’ petition as to this claim.
2 The State filed an affidavit stating that Lotts would be eligible to apply for parole after serving 28 years of his
sentence of life without parole, 25 years on his conviction for first degree murder and three for his conviction for
armed criminal action. See ECF No. 17-7.
CONCLUSION
The Missouri Court’s decision was not contrary to and did not involve an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor “was [it] based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 379.
Therefore, I must deny Lotts’ Petition.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Petition of Quantel Lotts for a writ of
habeas corpus is DENIED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of July 2021.
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