“Courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
How later courts described this case
- “Courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
- when determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not consider only the complaint before it but may consider the plaintiff’s other litigious conduct
- “Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘persons’ only”
- noting that an action is malicious when it is a part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:20-cv-01917 SRC
)
CCA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Joseph Michael Devon Engel,
an incarcerated person at Missouri Eastern Correctional Center (MECC), for leave to commence
this action without pre-payment of the required filing fee.1 The Court will grant the motion and,
for the reasons stated below, will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1). Additionally, the Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her
prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's
account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month
period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
1 Like the over one hundred other civil rights cases Engel has filed in the Court in the past several months, he does
not include a separate motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Rather, on page one of his
complaint, he states “Application to proceed in District Court without prepaying fees and cost. I am at ERDCC. I only
get $5.00 dollars a month.” The Court construes this as a motion for leave to proceed in the district court without
prepaying fees and costs.
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly
payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until
the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Engel did not submit an inmate trust account statement along with the instant motion, as
required. He states, however, that he receives $5.00 per month at ERDCC. As a result, the Court
will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00, which is 20 percent of his average monthly deposit.
See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide
the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess a
“reasonable” amount).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An
action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when legal theories are
“indisputably meritless,” or when the claims rely on “clearly baseless” factual allegations. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). “Clearly baseless” factual allegations include those that are
“fanciful,” “fantastic,” and “delusional.” Id. at 32–33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327). “As
those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise
to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33.
An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named
defendants rather than vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461–
63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987). An action can also be considered
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F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir.
1996) (when determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not consider only the
complaint before it but may consider the plaintiff’s other litigious conduct).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–
51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the Court
must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950–51. This is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint “to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951. When faced with
alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in
determining whether the plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most plausible, or whether it is more
likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951–52.
The Complaint
Engel is a self-represented litigant, currently incarcerated at MECC in Pacific, Missouri.
He prepared his handwritten § 1983 complaint on the Court’s Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint.
Named as defendants are the following: CCA; CO1; SG; LT; Captain; Assistant Warden; Warden;
ERDCC; Corizon; Corizon Director; Director; Superintendent; MODOC; Assistant Attorney
General; Attorney General; Lieutenant Governor; Governor; and Senator for Missouri.
Engel’s allegations are stated in full as follows:
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the way around the board. Still don’t have my snack bags, may lay-ins, my lungs
hurt, they do nothing. I have severe back problems. Do nothing. It’s like there is no
medical staff at all. I have a lot of medical problems they do nothing.
Engel states that his legal theory is “freedom, life, mental health, and medical health.”
For relief, Engel seeks several trillion dollars. He also seeks to have smoking allowed back into
the Missouri Department of Corrections, as well as various stocks and currencies.
Discussion
The complaint is subject to dismissal. Engel has not established that he has a serious
medical condition requiring treatment. Furthermore, his allegations (1) do not identify which
defendant is responsible for the alleged constitutional violations, (2) are too vague to rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, and (3) wholly lack factual support and are not entitled to the
presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th
Cir. 2017) (“Courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level”). Even pro se plaintiffs are required to allege facts in support of their claims, and the Court
will not assume facts that are not alleged. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914–15 (8th Cir.
2004).
As to Engel’s medical condition, he has not alleged deliberate indifference on the part of
any defendant. To establish a constitutional violation, Engel must prove he suffered from an
objectively serious medical need, and that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded that
need. Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019). “A serious medical need is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114
F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997).
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problems. While some of these symptoms might indicate a serious medical need, Engel has not
alleged which defendant prison officials knew of and disregarded his medical condition.
Additionally, he has not sued any Corizon or Missouri Department Corrections official
individually in this action.2
Finally, the Court also dismisses this action because it appears to be malicious. See Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461–63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987) (an
action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the defendants rather than
vindicating a cognizable right). Engel has filed over one hundred other complaints in this Court
alleging that his civil rights have been violated by these defendants and other state and local entities
and officials. Engel submits the pleadings in bulk, and he specifies that he intends each set of
pleadings to be docketed as an individual civil action. The nature of those pleadings and Engel’s
claims for damages are roughly the same as those in the instant action. It therefore appears that
this action is part of an attempt to harass these defendants and others by bringing repetitious
lawsuits, rather than a legitimate attempt to vindicate a cognizable right. See Spencer, 656 F. Supp.
at 461–63; see also In re Billy Roy Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that an action is
malicious when it is a part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits). This
action is subject to dismissal for this reason, as well.
Engel is cautioned to avoid the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits. First, a
2The Missouri Department of Corrections is a state agency of the State of Missouri. Thus, Engel’s claims are
actually claims against the state. A state is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since the State of
Missouri and ERDCC are not § 1983 persons, Engel has failed to state a § 1983 claim against these two defendants.
See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Section
1983 provides a cause of action against ‘persons’ only”). Additionally, Engel’s allegations fail to state a viable claim
against Corizon. “A corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable under § 1983 for its own
unconstitutional policies.” Crumpley–Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Here, Engel fails to set
forth that Corizon acted according to any unconstitutional policies or procedures.
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stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which limits his future ability
to proceed in forma pauperis. Second, the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits can be
interpreted as an abuse of the judicial process, which can result in court-imposed limitations on
the ability to bring future lawsuits. This Court is “vested with the discretion to impose sanctions
upon a party under its inherent disciplinary power.” Bass v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842,
851 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). This includes the discretion to craft and impose sanctions
to deter litigants from engaging in “conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991); see also Tyler, 839 F.2d at 1292 (affirming the district
court’s sua sponte determination that a litigant should be limited to filing one lawsuit per month
pursuant to certain conditions precedent as a sanction for the litigant’s repeated abuse of the
judicial process). These powers stem from “the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. (quoting
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
Having considered Engel's abusive litigation practices and the manner in which he prepared
the instant complaint, the supplemental document, and other civil complaints, the Court concludes
that it would be futile to permit Engel leave to file an amended complaint in this action. The Court
will therefore dismiss this action at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Accordingly, the Court grants Engel’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 1. The
Court orders that Engel shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within thirty (30) days of the date of
this Order. The Court instructs Engel to make his remittance payable to “Clerk, United States
District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the
case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
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The Court further dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate
order of dismissal will be entered herewith. Lastly, to the extent Engel seeks counsel, the Court
denies his request as moot.
So Ordered this 8th day of April 2021.
ee ee FF CO. eS
STEPHEN R. CLARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE