Davidson v. Stringer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI .

EASTERN DIVISION

DEAN BRYAN DAVIDSON, )

Plaintiff,

No. 4:20-cv-01478-DDN

MARK STRINGER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

_This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Dean Bryan Davidson for leave

to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2).

Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court finds

that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed

below, this action will be dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,

which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Jd. at 679. The

court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820

F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73

(8" Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not

required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit

of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction”

means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the

plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints

are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.

Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8"

Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just

because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition,

affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural

rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently committed to the Southeast Missouri

Mental Health Center (SMMHC) in Farmington, Missouri. He brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint names Missouri Department of Mental Health Director Mark

Stringer; Chief Operating Officer of the SMMHC Denise Hacker; Denise Boyd; Sonya Gammon;

Stephanie Hintz; Dewane Robertson; Jaime Walley; Janet Latty; and the Fulton State Hospital

(FSH). (Docket No. 1 at 1-2). Defendants are sued in their official capacities only. (Docket No. 1

at 1).

In his “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff states that his “rights were violated when [his] legal

mail was tampered with,” keeping him from following up with “legal matters for years.” (Docket

No. 1 at 8). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that “Denise Boyd confessed to opening, reading and

then [disposing] of [his] legal mail without allowing [him] to know of its contents.”

Plaintiff states his belief that he is entitled to restitution of at least $1,000,000 because he

could have gotten a settlement with regard to a medication called desmopressin that almost killed

him in 2007. According to plaintiff, in 2007, he suffered a seizure that led to a fall, causing a head

injury. (Docket No. 1 at 9). He was taken to the hospital where he was placed into a medically-

induced coma. Plaintiff was told his injury had been caused by “too much fluids,” but plaintiff

attributes it to taking desmopressin. He states that Dr. Sternberg did not report to the trauma center

that he was taking desmopressin, which he deems dangerous.

Following a period in which he was not taking desmopressin, plaintiff states that he was

again prescribed the medication from 2012-2018. During this time, he was put on fluid restrictions

and subjected to blood draws. However, since desmopressin has been discontinued, he states that

his sodium is “excellent,” and that “what they thought to be true about [his] fluids no longer is

[true].” Nevertheless, plaintiff claims that he was placed into a supervised living home because

“they thought [he] needed [his] fluids supervised,” even though his “illness has been in remission”

since it was learned that he is allergic to desmopressin. Since then, plaintiff states that he has had

! The Court notes that plaintiff has brought similar claims regarding mail tampering in previous cases before the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. See, e.g., Davidson v. Southeast Missouri Mental Health

Center, et al., No. 4:17-cv-2076-RLW (E.D. Mo.) (dismissed without prejudice on August 17, 2017); and Davidson

v. Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center, et al., No. 4:17-cv-2078-ACL (E.D. Mo.) (dismissed without prejudice

on July 31, 2017).

no delusions, and has been non-aggressive both physically and verbally. Plaintiff alleges that

because “they tampered with [his] mail [he] couldn’t learn what med almost killed [him] before.”

Plaintiff also contends that the purported tampering with his mail kept him from

corresponding with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. (Docket No. 1 at 8). He states

that the Patent Office “thought [he] had abandon[ed] [his] patent applications[,] costing [him] a

loss of money,” which he had spent applying for patents.

As a result of these incidents, plaintiff is seeking $1,000,000 in punitive damages to

compensate for his unsuccessful attempt at “getting a case in court.” (Docket No. 1 at 10).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is under commitment at the SMMHC. He brings

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the tampering of his mail denied him access

to the courts. For the reasons discussed below, this action must be dismissed without prejudice.

A. Official Capacity Claims Against Defendants Stringer, Hacker, Boyd, Gammon,

Hintz, Robertson, Walley, and Latty

Plaintiff has sued defendants Stringer, Hacker, Boyd, Gammon, Hintz, Robertson, Walley,

and Latty in their official capacities only. (Docket No. 1 at 1). In an official capacity claim against

an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson,

865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8" Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official

capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172

F.3d 531, 535 (8" Cir. 1999). See also Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8" Cir. 2018)

(explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit

against the County”); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8™ Cir. 2016) (stating

that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues

only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8 Cir. 2006) (stating

that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for

which the official is an agent”).

Here defendants are alleged to be employees of either SMMHC or FSH. Both are

institutions run by the Missouri Department of Mental Health. As such, plaintiff's official capacity

claims against these defendants are actually claims against the State of Missouri itself. Those

claims fail because the State of Missouri is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

because plaintiffs claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

i. State of Missouri is Not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Person

“Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law,

of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8 Cir. 2008). See also Deretich

v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8" Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides

a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8" Cir. 2017) (stating that a “State is

not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8" Cir. 2016) (stating

that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”).

Here, plaintiff has sued employees of the Missouri Department of Mental Health for money

damages. Those claims are treated as claims against defendants’ employer, which is the State of

Missouri. As noted above, a state is not a § 1983 “person” for purposes of such a claim. Because

the State of Missouri is not a person, plaintiff is missing an essential element under § 1983.

Therefore, these claims must be dismissed.

ii. Sovereign Immunity

“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.”

Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment

has been held to confer immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court

by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63

(1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8" Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh

Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); Dover

Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8" Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars

private parties from suing a state in federal court”); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d

615, 618-19 (8" Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one

of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh

Amendment”).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the

Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8" Cir. 1992). “The first

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such

immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Id. The second exception is when a state waives

its immunity to suit in federal court. Jd. at 65. A state will be found to have waived her immunity

“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the

text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways

& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this case.

The first exception is inapplicable, because the Supreme Court has determined that § 1983

does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491

U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established

immunity of a State from being sued without its consent”); and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,

341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe...that Congress intended by the general

language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). The second

exception is also inapplicable, because the State of Missouri has not waived its sovereign immunity

in this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.600 (explaining that sovereign immunity is in effect,

and providing exceptions).

Here, plaintiff has sued employees of the State of Missouri in their official capacities. Such

claims are treated as being made against the state itself. As noted above, however, the Eleventh

Amendment bars suit against a state, and no exceptions to sovereign immunity are present in this

case. Furthermore, while a state official may be sued in an official capacity for prospective

injunctive relief, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state official for monetary damages.

See Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8" Cir. 2007) (explaining that the

Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, not merely

monetary damages, but that a state official may be sued in an official capacity for prospective

injunctive relief); and Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8 Cir. 1999) (“A

claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the Eleventh

Amendment”). In this case, plaintiff is suing for money damages only, so sovereign immunity

applies to plaintiff's official capacity claims. Therefore, plaintiff's official capacity claims against

defendants must be dismissed.

B. Claim Against FSH

Plaintiff's claim against FSH must be dismissed for the same reason as plaintiffs official

capacity claims against defendants Stringer, Hacker, Boyd, Gammon, Hintz, Robertson, Walley,

and Latty. First, plaintiff's claim against a state hospital is a claim against the state itself. However,

a state is not a “person” for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. See Will, 491 U.S. at □□

(explaining that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under

§ 1983”); Calzone, 866 F.3d at 872 (stating that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and

Kruger, 820 F.3d at 301 (stating that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money

damages under § 1983”). Second, such a claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Monroe,

495 F.3d at 594 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies

for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages). As explained above, no exceptions to the

Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity are present in this case. For these reasons, plaintiffs

claim against FSH must be dismissed.

C. Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has clearly indicated on his complaint that he intends to sue defendants in their

official capacities only. As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to state an official capacity claim,

and the Court must therefore dismiss this action. Nonetheless, even if the Court were to assume

that plaintiff had intended to sue defendants in their individual capacities, such claims would still

be subject to dismissal.

In his complaint, plaintiff contends that while he was at SMMHC and FSH, defendants

tampered with his mail. According to plaintiff, this tampering blocked his access to the Courts,

keeping him from a lawsuit regarding the medication desmopressin, and preventing him from

corresponding with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Liability in a § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8" Cir.

2017). In other words, “[glovernment officials are personally liable only for their own

misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8" Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability

“requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v.

Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8" Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208

(8" Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8" Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff's □

excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff's bail, and therefore, “there can

be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged

deprivation” of plaintiffs rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the

defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8" Cir. 2019).

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Boyd “confessed to opening, reading and then

[disposing] of [his] legal mail without allowing [him] to know of its contents.” With regard to

Gammon, Hintz, Robertson, Walley, and Latty, he likewise states that they “all opened, read, and

then disposed of [his] legal mail without allowing [him] to know of its contents.” Plaintiff states

that Stringer and Hacker are liable because of their supervisory positions.

At no point in his complaint does plaintiff attempt to connect each of the individually listed

defendants with a specific violation of his constitutional rights. That is, he has not shown how each

defendant was personally responsible for hindering him in the pursuit of “a nonfrivolous and

arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 cs

Cir. 2008). Moreover, he has not shown how each defendant was personally responsible for

causing him an actual injury by demonstrating what legal claim they frustrated or impeded. See

White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8 Cir. 2007) (explaining that plaintiff must demonstrate

that a nonfrivolous legal claim as been frustrated or is being impeded); and Myers v. Hundley, 101

F.3d 542, 544 (8" Cir. 1996) (explaining that a plaintiff must assert that he suffered an actual injury

to pending or contemplated legal claims).

Instead of demonstrating each defendant’s personal responsibility, plaintiff has made a

generalized, conclusory allegation against all the defendants as a group, broadly asserting that his

malpractice claim and patent claims were frustrated by defendants’ actions. This is insufficient to

establish a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights

on the part of each defendant. See Mayorga, 442 F.3d at 1132.

The Court also notes that plaintiff's “Statement of Claim” fails to provide sufficient factual

allegations to raise his right to relief above the speculative level. See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666,

671 (8" Cir. 2017) (stating that “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level’). Instead, plaintiff has presented only labels and conclusions, and the

recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which is not adequate to state a claim. See Neubauer

v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8 Cir. 2017).

In particular, plaintiff generally claims that defendants “all opened, read, and then disposed

of [his] legal mail without allowing [him] to know of its contents.” However, plaintiff never

provides any factual support for the proposition that these purported actions hindered his access to

the courts. In other words, he never provides any facts demonstrating that a specific defendant

“tampered” with a specific piece of mail relating to a specific claim that plaintiff was trying to

pursue. Rather than providing such facts, plaintiff leaves it to the Court to speculate as to the nature

of the deductions that he has reached, to wit: that plaintiff would have received a malpractice

settlement and a patent if it were not for the tampering of his mail. This is not adequate to state a

claim. See Johnson vy. Precythe, 901 F.3d 973, 977 (8" Cir. 2018) (“A pleading must offer more

than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action to state a

plausible claim for relief). Therefore, even if plaintiff had sued defendants in their individual

capacities, such claims would be dismissed.

Accordingly,

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ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith. .

Dated sil” sy of PLAT 2021.

Sirvie LUTE

RONNIE L. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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