Isgar v. State of Missouri

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM ISGAR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:20-CV-1594-NAB

)

STATE OF MISSOURI and )

AARON KOEPLAN, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon review of a civil complaint filed by William Isgar, a

pre-trial detainee at the Metro St. Louis Psychiatric Center (“MSLPC”). For the reasons explained

below, plaintiff will be given leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and this action will be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Background

On November 2, 2020, self-represented plaintiff William Isgar filed a handwritten letter

with the Court. ECF No. 1. Within the letter plaintiff alleged the State of Missouri and Judge Aaron

Koeplan forced him to undergo a “mental health evaluation to become competent and an automatic

6 months incarceration to go before tr[ia]l of in[n]ocent or guilty proceedings.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff

further asserted he is “being violated / raped of the 1st Amendments” because defendants are

preventing him from communicating with the courts, and he is being forcibly medicated.” ECF

No. 1 at 3.

On November 23, 2020, the Court reviewed the letter and construed it as a complaint

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Missouri and Judge Aaron Koeplan. ECF

No. 6. The Court further determined plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee subject to the requirements

of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Id. at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (“‘prisoner’

means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of . . . violations of

criminal law”)). The Court ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided

form pursuant to Local Rule 2.06(A), and to either pay the filing fee or submit an application to

proceed without prepaying fees or costs. The Order provided plaintiff with instructions on how to

properly submit an amended complaint and directed the Clerk of Court to provide plaintiff with

the appropriate blank forms. Id. The Court further noted that in addition to the complaint being

defective because it was not drafted on a Court form, plaintiff’s claims were subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as they did not appear to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. Id. at 3-4. The Court provided an analysis of why his claims against each

defendant were subject to dismissal on the merits. Id. Plaintiff’s amended pleading was due on

December 23, 2020. To date, plaintiff has not filed an amended pleading or submitted an

application to proceed in forma pauperis on Court-provided forms as directed, nor has he sought

additional time to do so.

Instead of complying with the Court’s Order, on December 1, 2020, plaintiff submitted a

five-page handwritten document with several pages of attachments. ECF No. 7. Within the

document, plaintiff asserts he “has no savings of any sorts[,] no income of any sorts[,] [and] was

on social security [prior to incarceration]” and “ask[s] to move ahead with in forma pauperis

permission[.]” Id. at 2. Plaintiff also appears to supplement his defective complaint with additional

handwritten facts, a copy of an “FDA Fact Sheet” regarding experimental drugs, and a one-page

state court docket sheet from 2001. The handwritten portion of the submission is difficult to

decipher as it consists of disjointed and incomplete sentences. For example, plaintiff writes

defendant Judge Koeplan “has overrid[d]en fed laws which he isn[’]t oathed/or suppose to be able

without con[s]ent of federal judges or proceedings. Laws such as the right to refuse treatment[.]”

Plaintiff further alleges the State violated “HIPA/‘Federa’ FDAX 3/Fed and normal constitutional

privacy laws/Patient’s Bill of Right/Privacy/Ye-Ne to Bring of going all the way beyond 3 years

of medical files to all the way back to 1998[.]” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff also states he has been

wrongfully medicated for “years” and has been subject to a “false guardi[a]nship.”

For relief, plaintiff appears to seek immediate release from MSLPC and damages in the

amount of 3.2 trillion dollars.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is

required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial

partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until

the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

When plaintiff initiated this action via a handwritten letter, he did not file a motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the required filing fee. Consequently, the Court directed

plaintiff to file such a motion on a Court form, which was provided to him, or to pay the full filing

fee. Plaintiff subsequently filed a handwritten document asserting he has no income and requested

“to move ahead with in forma pauperis permission[.]” Liberally construed, plaintiff can be

understood to ask the Court to grant him leave to commence this action without prepayment of the

required filing fee.

Although plaintiff has not filed a certified account statement, the Court will grant him leave

to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See

Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the

Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount

“that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”).

Any claim that plaintiff is unable to pay $1.00 must be supported by a certified copy of his inmate

account statement that details his inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding

the filing of the complaint.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if, inter alia, it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when legal

theories are “indisputably meritless,” or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are

“clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). “Clearly baseless” factual

allegations include those that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and “delusional.” Id. at 32-33 (quoting

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327). “As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is

appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33.

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the

complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-

51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must

determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint “to

determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951.

Discussion

A. Failure to Comply

On November 23, 2020, the Court issued an Order directing plaintiff to file an amended

complaint on a Court-provided form. The Court gave plaintiff meaningful notice of what was

expected, cautioned him that the instant case would be dismissed if he failed to timely comply,

and provided him with detailed instructions on how to submit an amended pleading on a Court

form which was provided to him by the Clerk. Plaintiff did not comply as directed. Consequently,

this action could be dismissed without prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure to comply with a Court

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1986) (a

district court has the power to dismiss an action for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with any court

order); Dudley v. Miles, 597 F. App’x 392 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal

without prejudice where self-represented plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint despite

being cautioned that dismissal could result from failure to do so).

The Court, however, in consideration of plaintiff’s self-represented status, will not dismiss

this action for lack of compliance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Instead, the Court will review

plaintiff’s handwritten complaint and supplement on its merits and will dismiss this action as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

B. Defendant State of Missouri

Plaintiff complaint is frivolous against the State of Missouri because it cannot be sued

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

“Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law,

of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Deretich

v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides

a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that a “State is

not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Because a

state is not a “person” under § 1983, it must be dismissed.

Moreover, “sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its

consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh

Amendment has been held to confer immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in

federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The

Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal

court”); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh

Amendment bars private parties from suing a state in federal court”); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing

Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in

which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by

the Eleventh Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for

any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591,

594 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state

university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the

Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1992). “The first

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated to such

immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Id. The second exception is when a state waives

its immunity to suit in federal court. Id. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity

“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the

text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways

& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this case.

The first exception is inapplicable because the Supreme Court has determined that § 1983

does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491

U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established

immunity of a State from being sued without its consent”); and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,

341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe . . . that Congress intended by the general

language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). The

second exception is also inapplicable because the State of Missouri has not waived its sovereign

immunity in this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.600 (explaining that sovereign immunity is

in effect and providing exceptions).

Therefore, as to the State of Missouri, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against it for both

monetary and injunctive relief. No exceptions to sovereign immunity are present in this case.

Therefore, for this reason as well, plaintiff’s claim against the State of Missouri must be dismissed.

C. Defendant Judge Aaron Koeplan

Plaintiff’s complaint is also frivolous against Judge Aaron Koeplan. “A judge is absolutely

immune from liability if (1) the judge has subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the acts complained

of were judicial acts. Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1983). “[W]hether an act by a

judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally

performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge

in his judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991).

Although plaintiff’s handwritten complaint and supplement are difficult to decipher, it

appears plaintiff is alleging his disagreement with Judge Koeplan’s determination to subject him

to a mental health evaluation before his criminal trial to determine competency. Such a decision is

within his jurisdiction and duties as a judicial officer. See e.g., Curtis v. Nichols, No. 4:19-CV-

1216-JAR, 2020 WL 418452, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding it was within a judge’s duties

to find plaintiff temporarily incompetent to stand trial and place speedy trial rights on hold during

the time period plaintiff was held by the Department of Mental Health).

While plaintiff also appears to claim he is being involuntarily medicated and denied access

to the courts, he does not allege Judge Koeplan ordered any individual or facility to provide him

with a specific medication or is preventing plaintiff from filing legal documents with any court.

Personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is required to support an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (liability under

section 1983 requires a casual link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights).

Plaintiff was previously warned by this Court that his claim against Judge Koeplan was

subject to dismissal and was given the opportunity to file an amended complaint on a Court-

provided form in order to clarify his allegations, but plaintiff failed to do so. Because this Court is

required to dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), plaintiff's claims against Judge Koeplan must be

dismissed for frivolousness and failure to state a claim.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate

order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within

thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to

“Clerk, United States District Court,’ and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original

proceeding.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

Dated this 8" day of January, 2021.

_— hakboed [lp

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE