The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SUSAN KWON, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:19CV2133 HEA
)
JOSHUA SADLER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Herman Reiser’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs have responded to the Motion and
Defendant has filed his reply.
Facts and Background
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, alleges the following:
For several months leading to these acts, a controversy had been brewing in
the private Terre du Lac subdivision, a development containing thousands of
homes and lots in northern St. Francois County and Washington County, Missouri.
Multiple Terre du Lac Association property owners (home and lot owners) had
been aligning politically with one side or another, and the individual defendants in
this case—three private security officers employed by the Association and a
homeowner—considered the three women who are plaintiffs in this case to be
aligned with the wrong side of the Association dispute.
Kwon, who, on and off for several years, has volunteered on the Events
Committee for the Association had recruited Connie Cathcart, Sharon Cathcart and
several other women to help organize the Association’s Fourth of July parade. For
many years, this committee had met in the board room at the Association, as did
the Finance Committee and other committees of the Association. On June 6,
several hours after notifying Association officials of her intent to do so, Kwon
convened four committee volunteers for the meeting in the boardroom. Upon
arrival, as a courtesy, she asked for and obtained permission of the Association
staff to use the board room.
Herman Reiser, a homeowner with no official status, heard about the
meeting. He drove to the Association building, burst through the door to the board
room and demanded the four women leave. He accused at least one of the women
of being aligned with a board member he opposed. When the women did not leave,
Reiser enlisted the support of two security officers, Senior Officer Joshua Sadler
and Captain Christopher Callender, who, under the direct supervision of Chief
Timothy Cook, proceeded to accost the three plaintiffs and arrest them. In doing
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so, they injured Sharon, causing her wrists to bleed, requiring administration of
medical help. They transported one of the women, while handcuffed, to the
county jail and chained the other two women to a metal bench in their security
guard office for hours while they awaited transport, also while handcuffed, to the
county jail. All three then had to wait for several more hours for their release by St.
Francois County law enforcement officials. No charges were issued, and no bond
was required.
On the morning of June 6, 2019, Plaintiff Kwon communicated
electronically with two Association board members, Adam Hector and Mike
Miller, stating her intention to convene the Events Committee meeting at the
Association board room, where the Events Committee meetings were normally
held. Neither board member objected. In the early afternoon, Plaintiffs, along with
Debra Whitener, another Association member whose husband had been president
of the Association board several years prior, arrived at the Association offices and,
as a courtesy, asked the staff there if it would be alright for them to use the board
room. Tammy Reeves, an employee of the association, stated her approval and said
she needed only to remove some papers from the table. None of the office staff
attempted to restrict the plaintiffs’ use of the board room or expressed
any concern about such use to the plaintiffs.
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The four women entered the board room, as the committee always had, and
proceeded to draw up plans for the Terre du Lac Fourth of July parade. After about
30 minutes, Defendant Herman Reiser, a Terre du Lac resident who at all relevant
times has had no official capacity with the Terre du Lac Association, Inc., opened
the door and barged into the room. He told the four women that they were not
supposed to be in the building behind locked doors where there was financial
information. The women were not meeting behind locked doors.
Reiser had no authority to order the women to leave the room, but he
pretended to have that authority. First, he ordered the women to leave, saying that
they were under a court order to do so. He said this, having no reason to believe
there was such a court order and knowing that there was no such existing court
order against anyone, much less the plaintiffs.
When asked why he was in the room, Reiser stated, “I was instructed to by
my lawyer. It’s OUR record room.” It was in fact no more his record room than the
record room of any Association member, including the women. Throughout the
entire incident, Reiser pretended to have authority to order the women to leave,
knowing full well that he did not possess such authority.
After ordering the women to leave, Reiser threatened that if they did not
leave, he was going to call the police and have the police arrest the women. Kwon
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responded by asking Reiser if he wanted to join the committee. The women did not
leave the room.
Reiser left the room and came back shortly thereafter with Defendant Sadler.
Reiser then took a seat across the conference room table from the women, from
where he would observe the women’s interactions with Defendants Sadler and
Callender, including the later handcuffing, arrest and removal of the women from
the room.
After entering the room, Sadler said, “Per court order, you guys can’t be in
here.” Like Reiser, Sadler had no reason to believe there was such a court order
and knew there was no court order in effect forbidding the women from being in
the room. Sadler continued, “Either leave or you’re going to be trespassing.”
Cathcart responded, “I’m not leaving.” Sadler responded, “Then you’re going to be
arrested.” Kwon asked Sadler if the door had been locked. He said, “No ma’am, it
was not.”
Defendant Callender entered the room and, referring to Reiser, told the
women that “an agent of the building told you to leave this building.” Defendants
Reiser, Sadler and Callender all knew that Reiser had no authority to order the
women out of the room but agreed to pretend that he had such authority. Callender
then directed, “I’m telling you right now you need to leave this building.” Cathcart
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asked, “But why?” Callender exclaimed, “Because I’m telling you to,” and later,
“Because I am an agent of this department.” Callender later states, “You have been
asked by an agent of this building whether it was Officer Sadler or anyone else
inside here.” The only other persons in the room were himself (Callender) and
Reiser, who was still remaining in the room.
Reiser and the two police officers, Defendants Sadler and Callender, all
agreed to falsely pretend that a court order existed that forbade their presence in
the room, and to falsely pretend that Reiser had authority to order the women to
leave the room, and that these things would form a basis for a false charge of
trespassing upon which the unlawful arrest of the women would be based.
Of the four women gathered for the Fourth of July planning meeting,
Plaintiffs Kwon, Connie Cathcart and Sharon Cathcart were forcefully arrested and
handcuffed by Defendants Sadler and Callender, with Defendant Reiser looking
on.
Plaintiff Sharon Cathcart, 68 years old, repeatedly told Callender that she
was leaving. He responded, “You had plenty of chances before,” and roughly
cuffed her, squeezing the cuff too tight. She recoiled in pain and ended up on the
ground, where Callender attached the other cuff. Plaintiff Connie Cathcart, had just
had major shoulder surgery, and she pulled her arm back, saying “Stop.” Callender
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responded by roughly grabbing her arm to cuff her. She was in pain. Defendants
Callender and Sadler then dragged her down the stairs to the police station.
Plaintiffs claim, on information and belief, and based on the circumstances
described above both before Defendant Reiser left the room and after he returned
with Officer Sadler, Reiser did what he told the women he was going to do before
he initially left the room, which was to get the police and have them arrest the
women.
After all, three Plaintiffs were taken downstairs to the Terre du Lac police
station, Connie was taken to one room where she remained for about an hour
before she was transported, handcuffed, to the St. Francois County jail in
Farmington, more than 15 miles away. Kwon and Sharon Cathcart were chained to
a metal bench in the Terre du Lac police department for about two hours, prior to
also being transported to the jail in Farmington.
While still at the Terre du Lac police station, Kwon and Sharon Cathcart
asked multiple times for water, but Callender refused. Medical attention was
requested multiple times as Sharon’s wrist continued to bleed. At one point, a wet
paper towel and a dry paper towel were provided. Kwon requested that Sharon’s
“wound needs to be cleaned and bandaged to stop the bleeding.” Callender ignored
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the requests. Kwon could not leave the bench, so she extended her foot far enough
to kick the door two times. The officers did not respond, so she called out, “She
[Sharon Cathcart] needs medical attention, she’s still bleeding!” After two more
kicks against the door, Callender opened it and asked if Sharon needed an
ambulance. Kwon said she just needed the wound cleaned and dressed with a
bandage to stop the bleeding. Callender said they did not have those supplies. After
more bleeding, an ambulance was requested. Someone came and used saline on the
bleeding wound and bandaged both wrists, at which point Sharon said she
did not need an ambulance. Kwon requested water multiple times, but Callender
ignored her.
When the women arrived at the St. Francois County jail, they were told they
would be held for 24 hours. The sheriffs at the jail were courteous and respectful as
the women were being processed. Their handcuffs were removed, and they walked
about freely, following instructions given to them, prior to being placed in a cell.
They were provided food and water.
After several hours, Plaintiffs were released by St. Francois County
authorities without being charged and without having to post bond.
Defendants Cook, Sadler and Callender have caused and allowed the
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dissemination of their body-cam videos of the foregoing events to friends,
acquaintances and neighbors of the Plaintiffs, causing Plaintiffs further
embarrassment and humiliation.
The arrests made of the three women by Callender, Sadler and Cook were
without a warrant and without probable cause to believe a crime had occurred or
was about to occur.
Defendants lacked legal authority to order Plaintiffs to leave the property
where they were arrested. No one with legal authority to do so ordered Plaintiffs
to leave the property where they were arrested. Defendants lacked the legal
authority to detain, handcuff, search, arrest, forcibly transport and confine
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were at all times lawfully present in the Association building and
conference room.
Count I is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983against all defendants for an
alleged violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures when they were detained, handcuffed,
searched, arrested, forcibly transported and confined. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants committed these acts of unlawful search and seizure jointly and in
concert and conspiracy with each other, and thereby acted under color of state
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law to deprive Plaintiffs of constitutionally protected rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
Plaintiffs further claim the actions of the defendant officers were the actions
of Defendant Terre du Lac Association, Inc. These actions were taken pursuant to
the policy of Defendant Terre du Lac Association, Inc., and the policy of
Defendant Terre du Lac Association, Inc., caused the actions taken by the
defendant officers. The policy of the Defendant Terre du Lac Association,
Inc. was that Plaintiffs be deprived of their constitutional rights and that the
defendant officers undertake the alleged unlawful actions against Plaintiffs on June
6, 2019.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Reiser is a state actor for purposes of this case by
reason of the fact that he was jointly engaged and in coordination, concert and
conspiracy with the other defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights as stated herein.
Count II alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from deprivations
of their liberty and property interests without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by reason of the alleged
wrongful detention, handcuffing, search, arrest, forcible transportation and
confinement.
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Plaintiffs claim the actions of the defendant officers, who hold commissions
as county sheriff deputies, constituted state action at all times relevant herein.
Further, Plaintiffs claim that in committing these acts, Defendants acted jointly and
in concert and conspiracy with each other, and thereby acted under color of state
law to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim the actions taken were pursuant to a
policy of Defendant Terre du Lac Association. Plaintiffs again allege Defendant
Reiser is a state actor for purposes of this case by reason of the fact that he was
jointly engaged and in coordination, concert and conspiracy with the other
defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
Count III is a state law claim for false imprisonment. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant Reiser encouraged, caused, promoted and instigated the unlawful
confinement of Plaintiffs.
Discussion
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant Reiser moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
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The Rooker–Feldman doctrine defines the extent to which a federal district
court’s jurisdiction over certain claims is limited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005).
Although federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all “civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” by operation
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Section 1257 modifies the original subject-matter jurisdiction
and vests jurisdiction over state-court judgments in the Supreme Court. Id.
(“[Section] 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court's
judgment solely in [the Supreme] Court....”).
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine encompasses four criteria that must be
satisfied before the federal district court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The criteria contemplate cases that have been brought by “[1] state-court losers [ 2]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the
[federal] district court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
Congress reserved review of state-court final decisions to the United States
Supreme Court, and such appeals cannot be taken in the lower federal courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1257. As a consequence, “a party losing in state court is barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
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United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005–06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). The Supreme Court has
expressed some disapproval of the lower federal courts’ extension of the doctrine
to “overrid[e] Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with
jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and supersed[e] the ordinary application of
preclusion law.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283. At the very least, courts are
reminded of the narrow application of the rule, “confined to ... cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. “Rooker–
Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
In this case, Defendant Reiser attempts to preclude this Court’s jurisdiction
because of an oral temporary restraining order that was adopted by the state court
after the incident that is the basis for this lawsuit. The argument fails for several
reasons. Initially, the oral TRO was not a final judgment, as evidenced by the fact
that it was adopted in a written Order and Judgment.
Secondly, the TRO was not entered against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were not
parties to the state court action giving rise to the entry of the TRO.
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The Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to
the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion
law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.
A more expansive Rooker–Feldman rule would tend to supplant
Congress' mandate, under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
that federal courts “ ‘give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments
that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which
the judgments emerged.’ ” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
246, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982));
see Exxon Mobil, supra, at 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Congress has directed
federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give
state-court judgments. Incorporation of preclusion principles into Rooker–
Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule
governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full
Faith and Credit Act.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464–67 (2006)(footnotes omitted).Plaintiffs were
not parties to the state action wherein Defendant Reiser secured a temporary
restraining order.
Further, Plaintiffs are not “complaining of an injury caused by the state-
court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 291(emphasis added). The injury they complain of, and seek
compensation for,—a violation of their constitutional rights—was the result of the
alleged action of Defendants, not a consequence of the state-court judgment.
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995–97 (8th Cir. 2010). The Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine does not apply herein. The Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction will be denied.
Failure to State a Claim
Defendant Reiser also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. To decide the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may
consider the complaint, some materials that are part of the public record, and
materials embraced by the complaint. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Inferences
are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d
1118, 1129 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585,
595 (8th Cir. 2009)).
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Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Reiser acted in
concert with and formed a conspiracy with the other defendants to deprive
Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and to falsely imprison Plaintiffs. The
sparse allegation regarding Reiser’s actions fail to state a claim that is plausible on
its face.
Although a § 1983 conspiracy claim requires proof of action under color of
state law, “[i]t is enough that [a private party] is a willful participant in joint action
with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Plaintiffs
must, however, allege sufficient facts, not conclusions, to satisfy the Twombly and
Iqbal requirements. “[T]here [must be] a mutual understanding, or a meeting of
the minds, between the private party and the state actor.” Mershon v. Beasley, 994
F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994).
Plaintiffs attempt to allege the requisite meeting of the minds by alleging
that defendants acted in concert and as part of a conspiracy when Reiser threatened
to call, and indeed did call the Terre du Lac police to arrest Plaintiffs. Initially,
the conclusory allegations that the actions constituted a conspiracy are not
sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.
Reiser’s calling the police does not satisfy the meeting of the minds
requirement of a conspiracy. “[A] private party’s mere invocation of state legal
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procedures does not constitute state action.” Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores,
Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, (2002); Hamilton v. City of
Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiffs plead nothing more than conclusory allegations with respect to the
alleged actions taken by Reiser vis a vis a conspiracy. Merely stating that
defendants acted in concert with each other does not bring their actions above mere
speculation. Without some facts upon which to base the claim, Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint lacks facial plausibility such that the Court is unable to draw
the reasonable inference that Defendant is liable for participating in a conspiracy
with the other defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and to
falsely imprison them. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The First Amended Complaint fails this
plausibility standard. Defendant Reiser’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action will therefore be dismissed.
Conclusion
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Plaintiffs claims based on an alleged conspiracy fail to set forth sufficient
facts which, taken as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, give rise to a
cause of action against Defendant Reiser.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Reiser’s Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is granted.
IT IS FURHTER ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED as to
Defendant Reiser.
Dated this 21‘ day of April, 2020.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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