Wilson v. Redington

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

DARNELL WILSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 4:18-CV-00932 JAR

)

DAN REDINGTON, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Darnell Wilson’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 2). The matter is fully briefed and ready for

disposition. For the following reasons, Petitioner’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED

and this action is DISMISSED.

I. Background

Following a plea of guilty on July 24, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms

of five (5) years for assault on a law enforcement officer in the second degree by placing the

officer in apprehension of serious physical injury by driving his vehicle in the direction of the

officer to escape arrest; two (2) years for stealing, third offense; and two (2) years for resisting

arrest. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri

Supreme Court Rule 24.035. An amended motion was filed on March 2, 2016. In his amended

motion, Petitioner alleged he was denied his rights to due process and effective assistance

counsel when the State court accepted his guilty plea without a sufficient factual basis to support

a finding of guilt on the charge of assault on a law enforcement officer in the second degree.

(Doc. No. 9-2 at 87). According to Petitioner, the dash camera video from his arrest, which he

asserted was “misplaced” by St. Louis County, showed that his vehicle never came straight

towards the officer in such a way that he would have been in apprehension of serious physical

injury. (Id. at 89, 93).

The motion court denied Petitioner’s post-conviction motion without an evidentiary

hearing, finding his plea was made intelligently and voluntarily with an understanding of the

charge and elements of the crime. Additionally, the motion court noted that Petitioner’s claim

that there was not a sufficient factual basis for the plea was clearly refuted by the record because

Petitioner admitted his guilt to the facts and elements and was aware of the nature of the charge.

(Id. at 104). The court further found Petitioner’s argument regarding any video evidence to be

irrelevant as the video evidence was never presented at his plea, and thus not a part of the plea

record. (Id.). The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. See Wilson v. State, No. ED

105447 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018) (per curiam). Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the

Ozark Correctional Center in Fordland, Missouri.

In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner alleges one ground for relief,

namely that there was an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea because the trial court

denied him his due process rights by “misplacing” the dash camera video. (Doc. No. 2 at 5).

Respondent argues that because Petitioner unsuccessfully raised this claim in his Rule 24.035

motion and appeal, his claim should be denied. (Doc. No. 9 at 4). In reply, Petitioner claims the

dash camera footage was misplaced to protect Sergeant Milberg, the officer in question, who

shot Petitioner during the arrest, and that without that footage, Petitioner was coerced to plead

guilty. (Doc. No. 13).

Petitioner has supplemented his claim with a police report that states that Milberg

attempted to approach Petitioner’s vehicle from the passenger side and then fired through the

driver’s side windshield and window. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 2-3). Respondent argues that Petitioner’s

suggestion that Milberg approached from the passenger side and then ended up on the driver’s

side of the vehicle when the car swerved to the sidewalk, that is neither impossible or

exculpatory. (Doc. No. 22). The photos Milberg includes show the vehicle heading in the

direction of the officer, and the officer pointing his weapon as the vehicle is in front of him and

then passes him. Id. This, Respondent asserts, is what Petitioner pled guilty to. Id.

II. Standard of review

Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a writ of habeas corpus

cannot be granted unless the state court’s adjudication:

1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Habeas review is limited to the record before the state court that

adjudicated the claim, Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), and the state court’s factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010).

III. Discussion

The requirement that there be a factual basis for a plea does not rest in the Constitution

and is non-cognizable in a federal habeas action. Williams v. Purkett, No. 4:07CV491 CDP,

2007 WL 4378151, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2007) (citing Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155, 157

(8th Cir. 1982) (factual basis requirement rests in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f), not the Constitution)).

Rather, the Constitution requires only that a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary. Id. (citing

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)). However, establishment of a factual basis

may be constitutionally required when the guilty plea is accompanied by claims of actual

innocence. Wabasha, 694 F.2d at 157.

In this case, Petitioner did not proclaim his innocence during his plea colloquy. Instead,

he agreed with the prosecutor’s statements that he “purposely placed Daniel Milberg, a law

enforcement officer, in apprehension of immediate serious physical injury, by driving his vehicle

in the direction of the officer to escape an arrest.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3). Petitioner reiterated his

responsibility for the crimes at the beginning of his sentencing hearing. (Id. at 4). Because

Petitioner’s guilty plea was not coupled with a claim of innocence, he has not made a cognizable

claim for federal habeas relief based on an insufficient factual basis.

Moreover, even if a factual basis were constitutionally required, such a basis was

established in this case; Petitioner’s sworn testimony during the plea colloquy that he was guilty

of the crimes charged provides a sufficient factual basis for the plea. See United States v. Brown,

331 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have held that facts gathered from the prosecutor’s

summarization of the plea agreement and the language of the plea agreement itself, a colloquy

between the defendant and the district court, and the stipulated facts before the district court are

sufficient to find a factual basis for a guilty plea.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Meza-

Lopez v. United States, 929 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 2019).

The Court notes that Petitioner references Brady1 for the first time in his reply in

connection with the “misplaced” dash cam video. (Doc. No. 13 at 1). In Brady, the Supreme

Court held that due process is violated where the State fails to disclose evidence that is favorable

to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 978

(8th Cir. 2004) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Evidence is material only when there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Williams v. Pash, No. 17-06041-CV-SJ-ODS, 2017 WL

3611992, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2017).

Brady only applies where the defense discovers information after trial that had been

known to the prosecution at trial. When “the existence of the allegedly suppressed evidence

bec[omes] known to the defense,” there is no Brady violation. Villasana, 368 F.3d at 979

(citations omitted). Here, Petitioner and his counsel were aware of the dash camera video’s

existence. For this reason alone, there was no Brady violation. Furthermore, Petitioner did not

show he was prejudiced by the misplacement of the dash camera footage. Petitioner argues he

would not have pled guilty to the charge of assault on a law enforcement officer had he been in

possession of the footage. However, this argument is without merit because Petitioner knew

about the evidence at the time he took the plea and admitted under oath that he deliberately

placed a law enforcement officer in apprehension of serious physical injury by driving his

vehicle in the direction of the officer to escape arrest. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Brady violation. Petitioner’s motion requesting the Court consider the allegedly false deposition

testimony of Detective Trent Koppel given in another case has no relevance to his habeas claim

herein and will therefore be denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Inconsistent Statement, False

Information Incident Report, and False Information in Trent Koppel Deposition in Support of

Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [21] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [2] is DENIED, and his claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that because Petitioner cannot make a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. See

Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998).

Dated this 4th day of February, 2020.

ists A. ROSS

NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE