Wilson v. Lorts

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY RUSSELL WILSON, II, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:19-CV-1196 CAS

)

STEVE LORTS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the amended complaint of self-represented litigant

Anthony Russell Wilson, II. Doc. 12. The Court previously granted plaintiff in forma pauperis

status and reviewed his § 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Doc. 9. Based on that review,

the Court directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided form and in

compliance with the Court’s instructions. The Court warned plaintiff that his amended complaint

would also be reviewed under § 1915. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will partially

dismiss the amended complaint and will order the Clerk to issue process or cause process to be

issued on the non-frivolous portions of the amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim for

relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which

is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.

When reviewing a self-represented litigant’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court

accepts the well-pled facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and liberally

construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible,

the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to

be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.

2015). However, even complaints filed by self-represented litigants are required to allege facts

which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286

(8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply

additional facts or to construct a legal theory for a self-represented plaintiff that assumed facts not

pleaded).

Background

Plaintiff was a federal pretrial detainee when he brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In his complaint, plaintiff named six defendants associated with Phelps County Jail, in both their

individual and official capacities: (1) Phelps County Jail Administration; (2) Sergeant Unknown

Lorts; (3) Sergeant Unknown Dowdi; (4) Correctional Officer Unknown Jones; (5) Correctional

Officer Unknown Reed; and (6) Lieutenant Unknown Shultz.

Plaintiff alleged that on or around May 3, 2018, Sergeant Lorts found plaintiff guilty of a

disciplinary violation based on accusations of Correctional Officer Jones without “any fair

evaluation of the facts.” Doc. 4 at 2. After the finding, plaintiff was locked in a suicide cell “with

no shower, no food and 24 hour lighting” for five days. Id. Plaintiff also asserted that while

confined at Phelps County Jail, he was “treated differently than the other inmates and taunted and

threatened by Sergeant Dowdi [and] Sergeant Lorts.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleged his five-day suicide

cell placement was in retaliation for the many grievances he had previously filed about the

conditions at Phelps County Jail. Plaintiff described his legal claims as: “cruel and unusual

punishment, deliberate indifference, and denied civil liberties and due process at Phelps County

Jail.” Id.

As to defendant Phelps County Jail Administration, plaintiff also alleged he was deprived

of his liberty and due process when it “violated their federal contract according to title 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 4013, title 18 U.S.C.A. § 4806, and also title 28 C.F.R. § 40 standards for Inmate Grievance

Procedure, Subpart A and Subpart B; where they have not exercised any firm effort to fully comply

with the standards.” Doc. 4 at 4.

The Court reviewed plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and found many

allegations failed to state a claim. See Doc. 9. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims were subject to

dismissal because he did not allege Phelps County Jail Administration had an unconstitutional

policy or custom, or was deliberately indifferent in failing to train its employees. Additionally,

Phelps County Jail Administration was subject to dismissal because a jail is not a suable entity.

As to plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, the Court found plaintiff did not clearly state which

specific factual allegations were being made against each individual defendant. Because the

plaintiff is self-represented, the Court directed him to file an amended complaint to cure the

pleading deficiencies.

Plaintiff filed his amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on October 22, 2019, against the

same six defendants with spelling changes and the inclusion of full names: (1) Sergeant Steve

Lorts; (2) Sergeant Scott Dowdy; (3) Correctional Officer Charlene Jones; (4) Correctional Officer

Sarah Reed; (5) Lieutenant Matt Shults; and (6) Phelps County. Defendants Lorts, Dowdy, Reed,

and Jones are named in their individual capacities only. Defendant Shults is named in both his

individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff asserts similar allegations as in his initial complaint. According to plaintiff, on

May 3, 2018, he was placed into a suicide cell by defendants Dowdy, Lorts, Reed, and an unknown

officer. Once there, Lorts read a disciplinary report to plaintiff accusing him of a conduct violation

based on accusations of defendant Correctional Officer Jones. Lorts “informed [plaintiff] that [he]

was guilty of the accusation(s) in the disciplinary report and immediately sentenced [him] to an

incalculable amount of days in disciplinary segregation and/or administrative segregation.” Doc.

12 at 5 ¶ 1. “Lorts demanded that [plaintiff] sign the accused disciplinary report or either be denied

the opportunity to appeal.” Id. Plaintiff requested and was denied a “fair evaluation of the facts.”

Id. Subsequently, plaintiff was locked in a suicide cell for “approximately 5 days with no bedding,

no property (other than the clothes [he] was wearing at the time [he] was placed in the suicide

cell), no hygiene, no toilet, no sink, no shower, no food, and a 24 hour lighting with nothing but a

sewage hole in the floor.” Id. Plaintiff states he was allowed out of the suicide cell on the third

day when Lorts brought him upstairs to the Sheriff’s Department to be interviewed by a Deputy

Sheriff Jones.1 Id. at 6 ¶ 2. Plaintiff was then placed back in the suicide cell under the same

1 The Court notes plaintiff’s initial complaint describes being interviewed by “Police Officer

Jones,” which the Court interpreted as defendant Correctional Officer Jones. See Doc. 4 at 2. It

is now clear that the officer Jones who was questioning plaintiff is a different person and not a

named defendant in this matter.

cell. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 2a-3. Approximately two weeks and two days later, plaintiff was moved to a cell

“within the closet area of housing unit G,” so defendants Lorts and Jones could allegedly “keep

him isolated outside the normal operations of Phelps County Jail.” Id. at 7 ¶ 4a.

Plaintiff alleges Lorts violated his due process rights by finding him guilty on the

disciplinary violation “without a hearing,” where plaintiff could have prepared or presented

exculpatory evidence in his defense, presented witnesses in his defense, and possibly presented the

Phelps County Jail’s videotaped footage of the event in question. Id. at 5 ¶ 1b, 7 ¶ 4. As for his

five days in the suicide cell, plaintiff alleges the conditions were “serious deprivations of basic

human needs and the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such that the conditions

constituted an “atypical and significant hardship.” Id. at 5 ¶ 1a.

Plaintiff’s allegations as to the “deliberately indifferent” five-day suicide cell placement

are directed at all five of the individual defendants despite the fact defendant Shults was not present

when plaintiff was initially found “guilty” of the violation and placed in the cell. Id. at 5 ¶ 1-1a, 6

¶ 2a. Plaintiff alleges Shults and the other four individual defendants were aware of the

deprivations he was suffering and none of them did anything to “remedy the unconstitutional

conditions.” Id. at 6 ¶ 2a. Plaintiff also alleges Shults violated his “liberty interest” by

“establish[ing] disciplinary hearing procedures for Phelps County Jail that allow[] Correctional

Officers, Corporals and Sergeants to force and enforce inmates to sign admissions of guilt or be

refused the right to appeal.”2 Id. at 6 ¶ 1c.

Plaintiff also alleges his right to equal protection of the law was violated by Phelps County

and defendants Shults, Lorts, and Dowdy because they did not comply with the “inmate grievance

2 Although plaintiff asserts a claim against Shults and his “procedure” of using “force” to get

inmates to sign disciplinary reports, it does not appear that plaintiff signed his disciplinary report

as “Lorts demanded.” Doc. 12 at 5 ¶ 1, 6 ¶ 1c, 7 ¶ 4; see also Doc. 12-1 at 15.

the grievance procedure to be conducted and misused outside of code established by Title 18

U.S.C.A. § 4013 and Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 4086 when fulfilling a federal government contract to

house federal detainees.”3 Id. at 7 ¶ 4a. Plaintiff argues the actions and procedures used for

responding to grievances are “not fair nor effective.” Id. In addition, plaintiff argues the grievance

process is unfair because it is under the control of Lorts who answers grievances containing

allegations against himself. Id. at 7 ¶ 4, 9 ¶ 10. Plaintiff states Shults is aware of the unfairness

of this system but does nothing to change it. Id. at 9 ¶ 10a.

As to defendants Lorts and Dowdy, plaintiff also alleges they threatened to physically harm

him if he continued to file grievances and warned him about acting inappropriately towards female

defendant Correctional Officer Jones. As to Jones, plaintiff asserts she regularly taunted and

provoked him when she brought meals to him in his cell. Plaintiff further asserts Jones admitted

to fabricating the initial disciplinary report allegations at the suggestion of Lorts. Id. at 7 ¶ 6.

According to plaintiff, defendants Lorts, Dowdy, Jones, and Reed “blatantly” treated him

differently than other inmates at the Jail. Specifically, these defendants denied him his personal

mail; opened his legal mail outside his presence; turned away his visitors or only allowed them to

stay 10 minutes; and, on one occasion, his attorney was not allowed to see him. Id. at 7-8 ¶¶ 6-6a.

Plaintiff also alleges Lorts, Dowdy, and Shults denied him recreation outside his cell, medical and

psychiatric treatment, access to the Jail’s law library, and access to the courts. Id. at 8 ¶ 7-7a.

3 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4086, the U.S. Marshals “shall provide for the safe-keeping of any person

arrested, or held under authority of any enactment of Congress pending commitment to an

institution.” In broad terms, the Attorney General has delegated responsibility for the safe-keeping

of federal pretrial detainees, like plaintiff, to the United States Marshal Service which, in turn, may

enter into intergovernmental agreements with state and local facilities and contracts with private

entities for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of prisoners. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4013.

destroyed many of his personal books and papers without compensation. Id. at 8 ¶ 8.

Plaintiff asserts the mistreatment he received by the individual defendants was punishment

for using the grievance procedure and the court system. Id. at 8 ¶ 7a. He asserts that prior to the

five-day suicide cell placement, he filed multiple grievances at the Phelps County Jail. Id. at 8 ¶ 9.

Plaintiff attached twenty-four pages of grievance filings to his complaint which contain complaints

about numerous aspects of incarceration. See Doc. 12-1.

For relief, plaintiff seeks money damages. He also requests that the individual defendants

be criminally charged and terminated from their employment, and Phelps County Jail be

investigated.

Discussion

Having carefully reviewed and liberally construed plaintiff’s allegations, the Court will

dismiss the official capacity claim against defendant Shults as duplicative of the claim against

Phelps County. The Court will also dismiss plaintiff’s claim against Phelps County for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, direct the Clerk of Court

to issue process on defendants Sergeant Lorts, Sergeant Dowdy, Correctional Officer Jones,

Correctional Officer Reed, and Lieutenant Shults, in their individual capacities, on plaintiff’s

claims of violations of the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and First Amendment

retaliation.

A. Official Capacity Claim against Shults

In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the

governmental entity itself.” White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit

against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public

employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). See also

against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of

Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating a “plaintiff who sues public employees

in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”). In order to

prevail on an official capacity claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability

for the alleged conduct. Id. at 1075.

Individual defendant Shults is employed by the Phelps County Jail. As such, plaintiff’s

official capacity claim against him is actually a claim against his employer, Phelps County.

Because “a suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a

suit against the employing governmental entity,” plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Shults

is duplicative or redundant of his claim against Phelps County, and therefore subject to dismissal.

See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s claims

brought against defendant Shults in his official capacity will be dismissed.

B. Claims against Defendant Phelps County

A local governing body, like Phelps County, can be sued directly under § 1983. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Liability may attach if the

constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom,

or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079

(8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing

“claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate

training, which is an extension of the same”).

Here, plaintiff mentions defendant Phelps County only once in his complaint. He alleges

a violation of his right to equal protection based on a failure to comply with federal requirements

for the provision of sufficient minimum grievance procedures in facilities holding federal

inmate grievances is unfair and ineffective because, in some cases, the person responding to the

grievance is the same person that the grievance is against.

To the extent plaintiff seeks to assert a § 1983 claim against Phelps County based on its

handling of grievances, such allegations fail to state a constitutional violation. It is well established

there is no federal constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure and if a state

elects to provide a grievance mechanism, violations thereof will not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (grievance procedure is procedural right

only and does not confer substantive right on inmate); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir.

1991) (“[T]he federal regulations providing for a[] [prison] administrative remedy procedure do

not in and of themselves create a liberty interest in access to that procedure. When the claim

underlying the administrative grievance involves a constitutional right, the prisoner’s right to

petition the government for redress is the right of access to the courts.”). See also Booker v. South

Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75

(4th Cir. 1994)) (stating “a clear rule: inmates have no constitutional entitlement or due process

interest in access to a grievance procedure.”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to an effective grievance or appeal procedure).

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the handling of his grievances fail to give rise to a federal civil

rights claim against Phelps County and are therefore subject to dismissal. Plaintiff’s claims against

defendant Phelps County will be dismissed.

C. Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiff was a federal pretrial detainee when the incidents complained about in his

amended complaint occurred. When evaluating the constitutionality of pretrial-detainee

conditions, “the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”

not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Id.

Furthermore, “the Government concededly may detain him to ensure his presence at trial and may

subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions

and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-

37. See also Smith v. Conway Cnty., Ark., 759 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating “the Due

Process Clause prohibits any punishment of a pretrial detainee, be that punishment cruel-and-

unusual or not”). Although some loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent aspects of

confinement, “if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal – if it is

arbitrary or purposeless – a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action

is punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.

Plaintiff also has the Constitutional protection of the Eighth Amendment which prohibits

cruel and unusual punishment and limits conditions of confinement. Robinson v. California, 370

U.S. 660 (1962); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Supreme Court has explained

this limit as a prohibition on punishments that “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain” including those that are “totally without penological justification.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976)).

According to plaintiff’s allegations, all five individual defendants were aware of the

conditions and length of plaintiff’s multi-day confinement in the suicide cell and deliberately

disregarded the excessive risk to plaintiff’s health and safety caused by five days without food.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (“a prison official may be held liable under the

Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates

face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.”). Although Lieutenant Shults was not present when plaintiff was initially

to or tacitly authorized the offending acts. See Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir.

2001) (standard for supervisor’s individual liability under § 1983). As to defendants Lorts,

Dowdy, and Shults, plaintiff alleges these defendants denied his requests for medical and

psychiatric treatment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violation may be demonstrated by prison officials

who intentionally deny or delay access to medical care). These allegations as to conditions of

confinement are sufficient to state a claim of punishment under the Due Process Clause and the

Eighth Amendment. See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (Supreme Court noted

in dicta it could be an Eighth Amendment violation to deny a prisoner food); Simmons v. Cook,

154 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding Eighth Amendment violation where prisoner denied

four consecutive meals over two days).

In addition, plaintiff’s complaint alleges equal protection violations by stating the five

individual defendants treated plaintiff differently than other inmates. The Equal Protection Clause

provides, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure

every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly

constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918). Unequal

treatment of “those who are entitled to be treated alike[] is not a denial of equal protection unless

there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Batra v.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Snowden v. Hughes,

321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). Plaintiff seems to allege that the reason for his disparate treatment by the

individual defendants is because he filed multiple grievances at the Phelps County Jail. He does

his grievance filings. The Court finds plaintiff’s equal protection claims do not survive frivolity

review and will be dismissed.

“[T]he First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under

established prison grievance procedures.” Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379, 379 (8th Cir. 1994)

(citing Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989)). “Although the filing of a false

disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes

actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate’s filing of a grievance.” Id. In this case, plaintiff

alleges he was accused and found guilty of a false disciplinary charge that resulted in him being

confined in a suicide cell for five days. He asserts that this disciplinary charge, and other

threatening, taunting, and discriminatory treatment he received from the five individual defendants

was in retaliation for the filing of many grievances. Plaintiff sufficiently states a First Amendment

retaliation claim against the individual defendants.

However, to the extent plaintiff attempts to state a First Amendment claim for violation of

his right to access the courts, such a claim fails. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that when

bringing an access to courts claim, it is insufficient to merely allege a denial of access to a law

library or other resources, even if the denial is systemic. Sabers v. Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th

Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.4 (1996)). Instead, the plaintiff

must plead that the lack of the library or other resource deprived him of some specific opportunity

to defend himself, or advance a viable legal claim, in a criminal appeal, post-conviction matter, or

civil rights action seeking to vindicate constitutional rights. Id. Speculation that injuries might

occur or could have occurred is insufficient. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 833 (8th

Cir. 2008) (“[a]bsent an articulation of how the alleged wrongful conduct actually blocked [the

prisoner’s] access to filing a complaint, or caused a filed complaint to be deficient, [the prisoner’s]

must assert they suffered an actual injury to pending or contemplated legal claims. See Myers v.

Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, plaintiff merely alleges a denial of access

to the law library and claims it has “interfered with the requisite legal research for litigation and

appeal(s).” Doc. 12 at 8 ¶ 7. Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to state a First Amendment

claim for denial of access to courts.

Pretrial detainees are afforded greater protection than convicted inmates in the sense that

the Due Process Clause prohibits the detainee from being punished. Bearing that in mind, and

accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Sergeant

Lorts, Sergeant Dowdy, Correctional Officer Jones, Correctional Officer Reed, and Lieutenant

Shults are sufficient to survive initial review pursuant to § 1915, except as to his equal protection

and access to the courts claims. Therefore, the Clerk of Court will be directed to issue process

against these defendants in their individual capacities as to plaintiff’s Due Process, Eighth

Amendment, and First Amendment retaliation claims.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s official capacity claims against defendant

Matt Shults are DISMISSED without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to

issue upon the complaint as to defendant Phelps County because, as to this defendant, the amended

complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or both.

Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Phelps County are DISMISSED without prejudice. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s equal protection claims and First

Amendment access to the court claims against defendants Steve Lorts, Scott Dowdy, Charlene

Jones, Sarah Reed, and Matt Shults, in their individual capacities, are DISMISSED without

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to issue

upon the amended complaint as to defendants Steve Lorts, Scott Dowdy, Charlene Jones, Sarah

Reed, and Matt Shults, in their individual capacities, with regard to plaintiff's allegations of

violations of the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and First Amendment retaliation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the Clerk of the Court shall

amend the caption of this case to read as follows:

Anthony Russell Wilson II, plaintiff, v. Steve Lorts, et al., defendants, Case No.

4:19-CV-1196 CAS.

The parties shall use the amended caption on all future filings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall change the short title of

this case to read Wilson v. Lorts, et al.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this partial dismissal would not be

taken in good faith.

An Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 6th day of January, 2020.

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