Wilson v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

COURTNEY J. WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:18-CV-1957 CAS

)

JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint filed by defendant Jefferson County and defendants Oliver Boyer, Brock Bridges, and

Tenesa Cash in their individual capacities.1 Plaintiff Courtney J. Wilson opposes the motion and

it is fully briefed. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s federal

claims in Counts I, II, III, and IV will be granted. The Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims in Count V and VI and will dismiss those claims

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

I. Background

Plaintiff Courtney J. Wilson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Missouri

law to recover damages arising from events concerning her arrest, detention, and incarceration

after Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Brock Bridges responded to a domestic violence

call at her house.

1Previous versions of the complaint asserted claims against defendants Jefferson County Sheriff’s

Department, Officer John Doe, Officer Jane Doe, and Jailer Jane Doe. Plaintiff omitted these defendants

from the current Third Amended Complaint.

The Third Amended Complaint (“complaint”) (Doc. 49) and the police report attached

thereto and “incorporated [t]herein as if fully referenced” (Id. at 4, ¶ 16) (emphasis original)

allege that on April 5, 2016, plaintiff returned to her home in Fenton, Missouri after having dinner

with her mother and was physically assaulted by her then-husband, Charles DeGregorio, during a

domestic dispute. Plaintiff sustained injuries in the assault including a concussion, bruising to her

face and body, and a black eye. Plaintiff alleges her concussion, bruising, and black eye were

visible. Despite plaintiff being the victim and having visible injuries, DeGregorio called 911 and

claimed plaintiff attacked him and that she was intoxicated and belligerent.

Defendant Bridges responded to the 911 call and spoke with DeGregorio first. Bridges

later drafted the police report attached to the complaint. The report states that DeGregorio told

Bridges plaintiff came home intoxicated and states in pertinent part as follows:

Charles stated they had a verbal disagreement when she came home, based on taking

out the trash. Charles stated they began to exchange harsh words and he decided he

was going to leave the residence for the night. Charles stated after he made the

statement based on leaving, Courtney began to push him. Charles stated he felt

threatened due to her becoming physical. Charles stated he left the residence and went

to Walmart. Charles stated when he was at Walmart, Courtney called him to discuss

what happened. Charles stated he returned home with the intent to go to bed, but stated

he went downstairs to talk to Courtney. Charles stated they began to exchange harsh

words again. Charles stated Courtney began to follow him upstairs into their room,

where he was beginning to gather clothes to leave for the night. Charles stated Courtney

grabbed his bag as he was beginning to exit the room. Charles stated Courtney would

not let go, as he pulled the bag with her holding on, into the hallway. Charles stated he

went back into the bedroom to get his keys and Courtney tackled him onto the bed.

Charles stated he held her down and began to verbally yell stop. Charles stated when he

began to let go, Courtney grabbed his face and began to kick him in the chest. Charles

stated he verbally yelled “Get off of me” multiple times, meaning for her to stop trying

to hurt him. Charles stated when Courtney grabbed his face again, he hit her in her face

with his elbow. Charles stated he continued to hold Courtney down until she stopped

trying to hurt him.

I observed redness in both cheeks to Charles’s face.

I made contact to Courtney, who was laying down on the bed in the bedroom. I

observed the bedroom to be in disarray. I also observed Courtney to be in a confused

state at the time and stating she wasn’t feeling very good. Courtney stated around

1900-1930 hours, she went to dinner with her mother. Courtney stated at dinner, she

drank 2 glasses of wine. Courtney stated around 2000-2030 hours she arrived home

and began to have a verbal argument with her husband. Courtney stated she didn't

remember what the argument was about or what happened. Courtney stated she only

recalls arguing, fighting in the bedroom, and Charles hitting her in the face.

I observed a bruising below Courtney’s left eye.

Complaint, Ex. 1 (Doc. 49-1). DeGregorio voluntarily wrote a Domestic Violence Report

containing his version of the events. Id.

The complaint alleges DeGregorio had no injuries to substantiate his claim that he was a

victim of domestic violence, only redness in both cheeks as noted in the police report. Bridges did

not administer a field sobriety test or make any other assessment of plaintiff’s sobriety to

substantiate DeGregorio’s allegation that she was intoxicated but checked the “alcohol” box for

plaintiff in the police report under “Conditions Observed.” In addition, the Sheriff’s Office Event

Chronology log, which is incorporated by reference into the complaint, reflects that an officer

notified the dispatcher that DeGregorio had hit plaintiff in the face. Despite these facts, Bridges

arrested plaintiff for third-degree domestic assault, handcuffed her, and transported her to the

Jefferson County Jail for a twelve-hour hold. Plaintiff alleges that by arresting her, Bridges

violated her constitutional rights and Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office custom and practice that

calls for arresting both parties to a domestic violence incident or neither.

The complaint alleges that Bridges observed plaintiff’s disorientation, confusion, and black

eye, and the seriousness of her injuries should have been apparent to a trained peace officer.

Plaintiff repeatedly requested medical assistance from Bridges during the half-hour trip from

plaintiff’s home to the jail, but Bridges did not transport her to a medical facility for treatment and

obtain a release signed by competent medical authority as required by Sheriff’s Office policy No.

100.126.2 (complaint, Ex. 3). In addition, Bridges improperly applied handcuffs to plaintiff’s

wrists causing bruising and tissue damage and did not check the handcuffs for fit after placing

them on her, resulting in further pain and bruising to plaintiff’s wrists.

During booking and inmate intake processing at the Jefferson County jail, plaintiff

repeatedly requested medical assistance from defendant corrections officer Tenesa Cash. Under

Sheriff’s Office policy No. 100.126.1 (complaint, Ex. 4), “[n]o prisoner shall be booked into the

holding facility or otherwise held for interrogation or other purposes that has injuries or illnesses

that require hospitalization or attention of a health care professional.” (Id. § 4.a.) The arresting

deputy or sworn supervisor is responsible for transporting the prisoner to a medical care facility

before placing them in holdover or detention if it is unclear whether the prisoner is fit for

confinement. (Id. § 4.b.) Defendant Cash was responsible for directing Bridges to obtain medical

attention for plaintiff before booking and processing but she failed to do so.

During plaintiff’s incarceration at the Jefferson County jail she was suffering from

headaches, vertigo, nausea, and disorientation from the concussion caused by DeGregorio. No jail

staff member called for the facility nurse or took other steps to provide plaintiff with medical

assistance despite her repeated requests. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for medical care by using the

in-cell intercom to request medical assistance from jail staff. After several attempts by plaintiff to

use the in-cell intercom, defendant Cash responded to one of plaintiff’s calls. Plaintiff requested

medical attention and told Cash that “she may have a concussion” from DeGregorio hitting her.

Cash responded, “Can you even afford to see a doctor?” and failed or refused to answer any more

of plaintiff’s intercom calls.

Plaintiff was released from the Jefferson County jail the next morning at approximately

11:00 a.m. and went to the St. Clare Health Center Emergency Department. Medical staff

examined her and determined that plaintiff had suffered from an assault resulting in a concussion,

facial contusions, and body contusions. After plaintiff was discharged from the Emergency

Room, she went to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office to submit a statement relating to the

alleged domestic assault complaint filed by DeGregorio, as Bridges did not take plaintiff’s

statement during the initial encounter. The Sheriff’s Office advised plaintiff that because

DeGregorio had filed a criminal complaint against her, she was ineligible to submit her own

complaint or attach her own statement to the previously filed report.

Plaintiff alleges she lost her employment as a result of the unlawful arrest and, as a result

of Bridges and Cash’s failure to obtain medical care for her, she suffered long-term brain damage

including post-concussion syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety disorder,

panic attacks, worsened major depressive disorder, increased trouble sleeping because of PTSD,

short-term memory loss, and after the incident was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Plaintiff also

developed a crippling fear and mistrust of law enforcement as a result of the incident.

Plaintiff alleges that the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office under the leadership of

defendant former Sheriff Oliver Boyer has a history and custom of wrongfully arresting victims of

domestic violence, allowing perpetrator to walk free and causing criminal prosecution of battered

women on behalf of their abusers, citing Paula Strahan v. Jefferson County, No. 4:97-cv-00307.

The complaint asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Bridges, Boyer, Cash, and Jefferson

County. Count I asserts a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim against Bridges for

unreasonable seizure/arrest and use of excess force; Counts II and III assert Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Bridges and Cash, respectively, for failure to obtain medical

assistance; Count IV asserts a Monell municipal liability claim against Jefferson County for failure

to train, discipline, and supervise its deputies and for a custom of conducting unreasonable

seizures and using excessive force; Count V asserts a supplemental state law claim against Bridges

for false arrest; and Count VI asserts a state law false imprisonment claim against all defendants.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

for relief is plausible on its face where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” id., and

“raise[s] a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.2 A complaint

must offer more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action’” to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555).

On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in

the complaint, even if it appears that “actual proof of those facts is improbable,” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader

is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The principle that a court must accept

as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions, however.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Although legal conclusions can provide the

framework for a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id.

While courts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint in determining whether to

grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, they may also consider exhibits and documents attached to a

2Plaintiff argues the motion to dismiss should not be granted “unless it appears beyond a reasonable

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim entitling him or her to relief,”

Response at 3, citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). This assertion is meritless, as in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 554 U.S. 554 (2007), the Supreme Court overruled Conley and established a

“plausibility standard for motions to dismiss.” Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009)

(en banc). Plaintiff’s citation to this long-outdated legal standard is careless at best.

complaint. See Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 2016); Miller v.

Redwood Toxicology Lab, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). Here, the Court

considers the complaint’s exhibits, which plaintiff expressly incorporated into the complaint.

III. Discussion

A. Count I – Unreasonable Seizure/Arrest – Defendant Bridges

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant Bridges moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against him in Count I based on

qualified immunity. Bridges argues that a reasonable police officer would have concluded

probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff for third-degree domestic assault under § 565.074.1(1),

Missouri Revised Statutes, under the totality of the circumstances. Under the statute, a person

commits third-degree domestic assault if “[t]he person attempts to cause or recklessly causes

physical injury to [a] family or household member . . . .” “Physical injury” in turn is defined as

“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition . . . . “ § 556.061(2), Mo. Rev.

Stat. Bridges asserts that as long as the perpetrator attempts to cause physical pain of some kind to

the victim, sufficient evidence exists to convict for third-degree domestic assault. Here, Bridges

states that DeGregorio informed him plaintiff “grabbed his face and began to kick him in the

chest” (Doc. 49-1 at 4) and that DeGregorio desired that plaintiff “stop trying to hurt him.” (Id.)

Bridges argues that by “trying to hurt” DeGregorio by kicking him, plaintiff attempted to cause

DeGregorio physical pain, and thus comes within §565.074.1(1)’s definition of third-degree

domestic assault.

Plaintiff responds that the motion to dismiss must be denied because Bridges fails to accept

as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, and instead relies primarily on the police report which

does not include plaintiff’s statement. Plaintiff further responds that based on Bridges’ own

observations made in the police report, he found plaintiff in her bedroom, disoriented, confused,

and significantly bruised on her face. Plaintiff asserts that by Bridges’ own account and

description, she was suffering from a concussion as later confirmed by the St. Clare Health Center

Emergency Department. Plaintiff argues no reasonable probable cause existed to arrest her–as

opposed to DeGregorio, who admitted that he physically struck plaintiff–when she was in the

condition Bridges observed and when she told Bridges “she only recalls arguing, fighting in the

bedroom, and [DeGregorio] hitting her in the face.”3 Plaintiff contends that a reasonable officer

would have easily determined plaintiff was the victim of domestic violence and DeGregorio the

perpetrator in light of the visible bruising beneath plaintiff’s eye, the lack of visible injuries on

DeGregorio, and DeGregorio’s admission that he hit plaintiff in the face.

Plaintiff argues Bridges is not entitled to qualified immunity because arresting plaintiff

under the circumstances alleged in the complaint can only be described as incompetent, as Bridges

relied only on statements made by DeGregorio in deciding to arrest plaintiff and disregarded the

overwhelming physical evidence that to a reasonable police officer would indicate DeGregorio

was the suspect, not plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Bridges failed to conduct a reasonable

investigation before arresting her because he did not take her statement and consider all of the

evidence, including her statement and DeGregorio’s admission that DeGregorio struck her in the

face.

Bridges replies that while plaintiff claims he improperly recites facts taken primarily from

the police report to argue that probable cause existed for her arrest, the report is appropriately

considered on the motion to dismiss because plaintiff attached it to her complaint as an exhibit and

it is a part of the pleading for all purposes under Rule 10(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. Bridges contends that

plaintiff does not dispute the report’s accuracy as to oral statements she gave to him, and there is

3The Court notes plaintiff cites to the police report attached to her complaint as the source of the

statement she made to Bridges.

no contradiction between plaintiff’s statement in her response memorandum that she told Bridges

“she only recalls arguing, fighting in the bedroom, and [DeGregorio] hitting her in the face” and

the report’s statement that Wilson said prior to the incident “she arrived home and began to have a

verbal argument with her husband. [Plaintiff] stated she didn’t remember what the argument was

about or what happened. [Plaintiff] stated she only recalls arguing, fighting in the bedroom, and

[DeGregorio] hitting her in the face.” Bridges asserts that none of this is inconsistent with what

the report states DeGregorio told him – that Wilson attacked DeGregorio and in response he hit

her in the face. Bridges states that to the extent plaintiff was unable to give her own written

statement to him, the complaint and response memorandum do not indicate what she would have

written or how it would have differed from DeGregorio’s version of events, and do not

demonstrate how this negated the existence of probable cause at the time of her arrest.

2. Arguable Probable Cause Existed for Plaintiff’s Arrest

Determining whether qualified immunity should apply involves a two-step inquiry. First,

the court must determine whether a constitutional right has been violated. Ross v. City of Jackson,

Missouri, 897 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009). Then, “the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the

time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a right “to be secure in [her] person[]” and

warrants may not issue “but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “It is well established

that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an individual’s constitutional rights under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013)

(quoted case omitted).

A warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable

cause, and an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there is “arguable probable cause.”

Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 522-23 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Walker v. City of Pine Bluff,

414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005)). Probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest “when the

totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest ‘are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to

believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.’” Id. at 523 (quoting Fisher

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). Arguable probable cause exists if a

person’s arrest “was based on an objectively reasonable–even if mistaken–belief that the arrest

was based in probable cause.” Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013); see

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Stated another way, “If an officer arrests a

suspect under the mistaken belief that there is probable cause, arguable probable cause exists if the

mistake is ‘objectively reasonable.’” Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 837 F.3d 827, 932 (8th Cir.

2016) (quoted case and internal quotation marks omitted).

This standard provides “‘ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,

229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986)). Under this standard,

defendant Bridges is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his place would have

reasonably believed based on objective facts, even if mistaken, that plaintiff violated the Missouri

third-degree assault statute by attacking DeGregorio. See Thurairajah v. Cross, 925 F.3d 979, 983

(8th Cir. 2019). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be

drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Baribeau v. City of

Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152

(2004)).

The Court first examines the state statute on which plaintiff’s arrest was based. See id. at

474-78. Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 565.074.1(1) (2010), under

which a person commits third-degree domestic assault if “[t]he person attempts to cause or

recklessly causes physical injury to [a] family or household member[.]” United States v. Brown,

730 F. App’x 402, 403 (8th Cir. 2018) (unpublished per curiam). “Physical injury” is defined by

§ 556.061(20), Mo. Rev. Stat. (2010), as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical

condition[.]” “Missouri courts have consistently held that this requirement can be met by a

relatively minimal showing.” Johnson v. United States, No. 17-5753, 2019 WL 3779366, at *3,

__ F. App’x __ (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 2019) (unpublished per curiam). The statutory definition “does

not require that physical injury be substantial, merely that it be present.” State v. Barnes, 980

S.W.2d 314, 318-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). For example, in State v. Wells, the Missouri Court of

Appeals held the element of physical injury was satisfied in a third-degree assault case where a

female victim first said “that she was not hurt when she was pushed to the floor,” but later

answered “‘Yeah’” when “she was asked if it hurt when she hit the floor.” 754 S.W.2d 590, 592

(Mo. Ct. App. 1988). The Missouri Court of Appeals found it was sufficient to prove the

defendant had caused physical injury within the meaning of § 556.061(20) “when the victim

summarized her injuries as ‘[j]ust a few aches and pains.’” State v. Cole, 148 S.W.3d 896, 901

(Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Barnes, 980 S.W.2d at 319); see also State v. Fraga, 189 S.W.3d

585, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (sufficient physical injury existed under § 556.061(20) where victim

did not require medical attention but testified her neck and back ached as a result of a collision

caused by defendant).

The “determination of whether arguable probable cause exists is informed by [the]

assessment of what information the officer knew at the time that he made the probable cause

determination, and what ‘a reasonably thorough investigation’ would have uncovered about the

likelihood that a crime had been committed.” Ross, 897 F.3d at 921 (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173

F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)). “An officer need not conduct a mini-trial before making an

arrest,” but it cannot be said that even arguable probable cause is present where “a minimal further

investigation would have exonerated the suspect.” Id.

Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes it was objectively

reasonable for defendant Bridges to mistakenly believe that probable cause existed to arrest

plaintiff for third-degree domestic assault, and therefore arguable probable caused existed for the

arrest. The Court’s analysis starts with the scene to which Bridges responded. See Johnson v.

City of Minneapolis, 901 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff’s then-husband DeGregorio

called 911 and reported that plaintiff had attacked him and was “intoxicated, drunk, and

belligerent.” (Complaint ¶ 15.) Bridges arrived at the house in response to the call and was met

by DeGregorio, who was downstairs and told Bridges that he and plaintiff had a verbal argument

about taking out the trash after she came home, they exchanged harsh words, and he decided to

leave for the night. DeGregorio stated that plaintiff then began to push him and he felt threatened.

He went to Walmart and while he was there plaintiff called him to discuss what had happened.

DeGregorio returned home intending to go to bed but he and plaintiff again exchanged harsh

words and he went upstairs to gather clothes and a bag to leave. He stated that plaintiff grabbed

his bag as he was leaving the room and would not let go. DeGregorio stated he went back into the

bedroom to get his keys and plaintiff tackled him onto the bed. DeGregorio stated he then held

plaintiff down and yelled at her to stop, but when he began to let go, plaintiff grabbed his face and

began to kick him in the chest. DeGregorio stated he yelled, “Get off of me” at plaintiff several

times, meaning for her to stop trying to hurt him. DeGregorio stated that when plaintiff grabbed

his face again, he hit her in the face with his elbow and continued to hold her down until she

stopped trying to hurt him. Bridges noted that both of DeGregorio’s cheeks were red.

Bridges then went upstairs and met with plaintiff, who was laying on the bed in the

bedroom, which was in disarray. Bridges observed that plaintiff was in a confused state and said

she didn’t feel very good. Plaintiff told Bridges she had gone to dinner with her mother and drank

two glasses of wine, and said she arrived home around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. and began to have a

verbal argument with DeGregorio. Plaintiff told Bridges she didn’t remember what the argument

was about or what happened, but only recalled arguing, fighting in the bedroom, and DeGregorio

hitting her in the face.

Thus, at the time he arrested plaintiff, Bridges knew based on statements from DeGregorio

and plaintiff that they had been in a verbal argument that escalated into physical contact, and

based on statements by DeGregorio--which plaintiff was unable to refute because she could not

remember--that plaintiff “grabbed [DeGregorio’s] face and began to kick him in the chest” (Doc.

49-1 at 4), and DeGregorio desired that she “stop trying to hurt him.” (Id.) Because there was

evidence plaintiff was “trying to hurt” DeGregorio by kicking him, it was objectively reasonable

for Bridges to conclude that plaintiff attempted to cause DeGregorio physical pain, which comes

within § 565.074.1(1)’s definition of third-degree domestic assault as interpreted by Missouri

courts. Bridges observed that both of DeGregorio’s cheeks were red, which offered some

objective evidence to support DeGregorio’s assertions that plaintiff grabbed his face and was the

aggressor. (Doc. 49-1 at 4). That plaintiff was laying on the bed, looked confused, admitted she

had two drinks, and was unable to recall any information about the incident other than “arguing,

fighting in the bedroom, and [DeGregorio] hitting her in the face,” was evidence that could

reasonably support DeGregorio’s claim she was intoxicated and had attacked him. Further, the

fact that DeGregorio admitted hitting plaintiff in the face with his elbow but claimed he did so

only while struggling to fend off plaintiff’s attack was also evidence from which Bridges could

reasonably conclude plaintiff was the perpetrator and not the victim, particularly in the absence of

contradictory statements by plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s argument that Bridges’ motion to dismiss improperly relies on facts as stated in

the police report and fails to view the facts in the light most favorable to her lacks merit. First, by

attaching the police report to her complaint as an exhibit and expressly incorporating it, plaintiff

made the report part of the complaint. It is therefore properly considered in connection with the

motion to dismiss. See Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 2016)

(in reviewing amended complaint, it was proper for court to consider documents attached to it)

(citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2007); and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the

pleading for all purposes.”)); see also Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th

Cir. 2012) (“[D]ocuments necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the

pleading” and “include documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions” (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff cannot attach the police

report to her complaint, expressly incorporate it therein “as if fully referenced,” cite to it and rely

on its contents, and then ask that the Court not consider it.

Second, the Court considers the facts alleged in the complaint and attached police report in

the light most favorable to plaintiff and assumes for purposes of the motion to dismiss that

plaintiff was the victim of domestic assault by DeGregorio and that he falsely cast her as the

perpetrator by calling 911, claiming she attacked him, and describing her as intoxicated and

belligerent. Plaintiff contends the police report fails to include her statement and the facts alleged

in her complaint, Response at 4, but the Court considers the facts as alleged in the complaint.

There is no separate statement offered by plaintiff. The complaint contains relatively few facts

concerning the actual incident between plaintiff and DeGregorio. It alleges plaintiff came home

after dinner with her mother and was “physically assaulted by her then-husband, Charles

DeGregorio, during a domestic dispute” (complaint ¶ 12); plaintiff suffered injuries from the

assault including a concussion, bruising to her face and body, and a black eye (id. ¶ 13); and

DeGregorio “had no injuries, only ‘redness in both cheeks’ from the altercation” (id. ¶¶ 14, 17).

To the extent there is overlap between the complaint’s allegations and the narrative description in

the police report, these are largely consistent. The police report states that plaintiff came home

from dinner with her mother and she and DeGregorio argued verbally and then physically.

Although the report concludes plaintiff was the aggressor it states that DeGregorio struck plaintiff,

his cheeks were red but he had no other injuries, and plaintiff was confused and had a bruise

below her left eye. It states that plaintiff said she had two drinks at dinner and noted “alcohol” as

an observation about her.

Plaintiff’s contention is that a reasonable police officer should have realized she was the

victim of assault, not the perpetrator. Arguing for the absence of probable cause, plaintiff points

to the “overwhelming physical evidence” of her bruises and black eye, Response at 7,

DeGregorio’s admission to Bridges that he hit her in the face and his lack of visible injuries,

Bridges’ failure to take her statement at the scene, Bridges’ observation that plaintiff was laying

down on the bed in a “confused state,” and the fact that Bridges checked the “alcohol” box under

“Conditions observed” but failed to administer a sobriety test.4 Plaintiff argues Bridges failed to

conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting her and ignored exculpatory

evidence that plaintiff had not committed third-degree assault, specifically the statements of

plaintiff and DeGregorio that he struck her in the face, citing Kuehl, 173 F.3d 646.

In Kuehl, the Eighth Circuit held that “an officer who did not witness a crime did not have

arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect after speaking with her only for ‘twenty seconds’ when

4Plaintiff asserts in her opposition memorandum that by “Bridges’ own account and description

[she] was suffering from a concussion.” Pl.’s Response at 5. Later in the opposition, however, plaintiff

states, “Defendant Bridges, likely unbeknownst to him at the time, even described Plaintiff’s symptoms of

her later-confirmed concussion and indicated the bruising below her left eye.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

other eyewitnesses were present and would have exonerated her.” Johnson v. City of

Minneapolis, 901 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 648). Unlike the

situation in Kuehl, here there were no witnesses to the incident that Bridges could have

interviewed apart from plaintiff and DeGregorio. Although plaintiff complains that Bridges did

not take her written statement, she made oral statements to Bridges that he incorporated in the

police report. Plaintiff does not dispute those statements, nor does she allege what her written

statement would have been if Bridges had taken it.

“When deciding whether to arrest a subject, ‘[o]fficers may ‘rely on the veracity of

information supplied by the victim of a crime.’” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (quoting Fisher, 619

F.3d at 817); see also Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650 (“[A]n officer may make an arrest if a credible

eyewitness claims to have seen the suspect commit the crime[.]”). “In considering information

given by a victim of a crime, an officer need not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ before effectuating an arrest

although he cannot avoid ‘minimal further investigation’ if it would have exonerated the suspect.”

Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (quoting Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650). The Eighth Circuit has often stated

that “[a]n officer contemplating an arrest is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence[.]”

Kuehl, 173 F.3d at 650. However, “When an officer is faced with conflicting information that

cannot be immediately resolved . . . he may have arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect.”

Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523 (citing Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2008)).

In the context of an officer’s failure to adequately investigate, the Eighth Circuit has

instructed that “the paradigmatic case where arguable probable cause would not be found is where

an officer ‘[1] had spoken with the suspect for only twenty seconds, [2] ignored exculpatory

evidence, and [3] disregarded an eyewitness account.’” Johnson, 901 F.3d at 971 (quoting

Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523, and citing Clayborn v. Struebing, 734 F.3d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 2013)

(officers cannot “disregard plainly exculpatory evidence” and “ignore[] the only witness to the

entire altercation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, plaintiff does not allege facts to show that Bridges failed to speak with her, did not

speak with her long enough, or disregarded her account. Plaintiff also does not allege facts as to

what further investigation by Bridges would have revealed. Plaintiff argues Bridges ignored

exculpatory evidence–her bruising and black eye–but this evidence is included in the police report

along with the fact that DeGregorio struck plaintiff in the face and his explanation of why he did

so. The substance of plaintiff’s argument is that Bridges failed to correctly interpret the evidence

of her bruises and black eye, not that he ignored it; that he should not have believed DeGregorio’s

statements, and that by believing DeGregorio he failed to correctly determine that plaintiff was the

victim rather than the perpetrator. But Bridges was entitled to rely on the veracity of

DeGregorio’s statements, Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523, he did not disregard plainly exculpatory

evidence, plaintiff does not allege what further investigation by Bridges would have revealed, and

“an officer . . . faced with conflicting information that cannot be immediately resolved . . . may

have arguable probable cause to arrest a suspect.” Id. That Bridges mistakenly believed plaintiff

was the aggressor is not a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the circumstances of

this case.

Having considered the totality of the circumstances, the Court cannot conclude under the

applicable standard that by arresting plaintiff for Missouri third-degree assault Bridges was either

plainly incompetent or that he knowingly violated the law. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229. Bridges’

arrest of plaintiff under the mistaken belief that probable cause existed was objectively reasonable,

and therefore arguable probable cause exists. See Gilmore, 837 F.3d at 932. Plaintiff therefore

does not allege a violation of her constitutional rights, and Bridges is entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim.

B. Count I – Excessive Force – Defendant Bridges

Bridges moves for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity plaintiff’s secondary claim

in Count I that he used excess force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by

making her handcuffs too tight, resulting in bruising and tissue damage. Plaintiff does not respond

to this argument. Assuming plaintiff does not waive the claim by her failure to respond, Bridges is

entitled to qualified immunity.

“The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from being seized through excessive force by

law enforcement officers.” Thompson v. City of Monticello, Ark., 894 F.3d 993, 998 (8th Cir.

2008). However, “[p]olice officers undoubtedly have a right to use some degree of physical force,

or threat thereof, to effect a lawful seizure, and reasonable applications of force may well cause

pain or minor injuries with some frequency.” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 907 (8th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

The Court concludes defendant Bridges is entitled to qualified immunity because it is not

clearly established that the amount of force he used against plaintiff in handcuffing her is

excessive. Although the Eighth Circuit has stated generally that “the use of force against a suspect

who was not threatening and not resisting may be unlawful,” Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855,

864 (8th Cir. 2010), it has also explained that this proposition does not resolve whether a

particular use of force is de minimis and therefore insufficient to support a claim. Robinson v.

Hawkins, No. 18-1823, 2019 WL 4196347, at *4, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 2019). For

example, in Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1006-08 (8th Cir. 2003), a police officer

“did not violate a suspect’s clearly established rights when he ‘struck or pushed [the suspect]

approximately five times and then spun her around and handcuffed her,’ and where the suspect

suffered bleeding wrists as a result of being handcuffed.” Robinson, 2019 WL 4196347, at *4-5.

In Robinson, the plaintiff was shoved up against a trailer and handcuffed by a police officer and

she sustained “fairly minor” injuries as a result of the force used, including some pain and

bleeding from the wrists as a result of being handcuffed and pain in her shoulders from being

pushed against the trailer. Id. at *5. The Eighth Circuit concluded the officer was entitled to

qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that the amount of force she used was

excessive. Id.

The Robinson case controls plaintiff’s allegation here that she was subjected to excess

force because Bridges handcuffed her wrists too tightly and she sustained bruising as a result.

Defendant Bridges is entitled to qualified immunity because it is not clearly established that the

amount of force he used against plaintiff was excessive. Id.; see also Husain v. Missouri, 2019

WL 330874, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2019) (dismissing claim of excess force regarding use of

handcuffs for failure to state a claim).

C. Counts II and III – Failure to Provide Medical Care – Defendants Bridges and Cash

1. Defendant Bridges is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Bridges moves to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity plaintiff’s claim in Count II

that he violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to obtain medical attention for her

serious medical needs. The complaint alleges plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of

DeGregorio’s assault, specifically a concussion, bruising to her face and body, and a black eye.

Complaint ¶ 13. All of these injuries “were visible at the time of contact with the Jefferson County

Sheriff’s Department,” id. ¶¶ 13, 17, defendant Bridges reported plaintiff was in a “confused

state,” id. ¶ 17, and he knew DeGregorio had hit her in the face. Doc. 49-1 at 2, 4. The Event

Chronology log shows the comment “Female Needs EMS” at 9:55 p.m., but then “Disregard

EMS” at 10:15 p.m. Doc. 49-2 at 1-2. Plaintiff made “multiple requests for medical attention” at

the scene, Complaint ¶ 21, and “repeatedly requested medical assistance” from Bridges during the

transport to jail. Id. ¶ 28. In Count II, plaintiff alleges that based on these facts, the seriousness of

her injuries should have been obvious to a trained peace officer, and defendant Bridges violated

her constitutional rights by not obtaining medical care for injuries to her head prior to taking her to

jail.

As an arrestee, plaintiff=s constitutional claims based on failure to provide medical care

arise under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Eighth Circuit holds that

the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard applies to the claims of arrestees.

Hanson ex rel. Layton v. Best, 915 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Carpenter v. Gage, 686

F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012)). Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner plaintiff seeking relief

for claims relating to medical care must allege that a defendant prison official was deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976);

Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). Further, a plaintiff must allege she had

objectively serious medical needs, and the defendant officer actually knew of but deliberately

disregarded those needs. Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394, 396-97 (8th Cir. 2007); Johnson v.

Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 972-73 (8th Cir. 2006). “[S]ociety does not expect that prisoners will

have unqualified access to health care.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9. Consequently,

“deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those

needs are ‘serious.’” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04).

“An objectively serious medical need is one that either has been diagnosed by a physician

as requiring treatment, or is so obvious that even a ‘layperson would easily recognize the necessity

for a doctor’s attention.’” Jones v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoted case omitted). For the second element, “[T]o demonstrate that a defendant actually knew

of, but deliberately disregarded, a serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish a mental state

akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the inmate’s health.” Thompson v.

King, 730 F.3d 742, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoted case omitted). “This onerous standard

requires a showing more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, but less than

purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about a substantial risk of serious harm to the

inmate[.]” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

As the Eighth Circuit has explained,

“‘To establish a constitutional violation, it is not enough that a reasonable official

should have known of the risk.’ Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate the official

actually knew of the risk and deliberately disregarded it.” Vaughn v. Greene

County, Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2006), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The determination that prison officials had actual

knowledge of a serious medical need may be inferred from circumstantial

evidence or from the very fact that the risk was obvious. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842. If prison officials have actual knowledge of a serious medical need, and fail

to take reasonable measures to address it, they may held liable for deliberate

indifference. See id. at 847. “However, ‘[a] showing of deliberate indifference is

greater than gross negligence and requires more than mere disagreement with

treatment decisions.’ Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S.D., 452 F.3d 978, 983

(8th Cir. 2006), quoting Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2006).”

Jones, 512 F.3d at 481-82. “Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity for

discretionary decisions unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. at 484.

“Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright

lines.” Id.

Here, the complaint alleges plaintiff had a concussion, visible bruising on her face and

body, and Bridges noted she was confused. At the time Bridges responded to DeGregorio’s 911

call, plaintiff’s condition had not been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment. As a

result, she must allege facts from which it may be plausibly inferred that her condition was so

obvious a layperson would easily recognize the need for treatment. See Jones, 512 F.3d at 482.

The complaint’s allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are insufficient to

support such a plausible inference. It would not be obvious to a layperson that plaintiff needed

immediate medical treatment because she had a bruise below her eye and was confused, even

though Bridges knew she had been struck in the face and plaintiff repeatedly requested unspecified

medical assistance.5

Whether an objectively serious medical need exists is based on the attendant

circumstances, regardless of what the officer believes the cause to be. Barton v. Tabor, 820 Fl3d

958, 965 (8th Cir. 2016). Assuming for purposes of this opinion that a concussion is a serious

injury,6 it is not an obvious injury such that a layperson would necessarily recognize the need for

immediate medical attention. See, e.g., Carpenter, 686 F.3d at 650-51 (need for medical treatment

not obvious despite officer being told plaintiff was suffering a stroke); see also Grayson v. Ross,

454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (arresting officer entitled to qualified immunity on claim he failed to

take arrestee for medical treatment; no objectively serious medical need existed because it would

not have been obvious to a layperson that arrestee required immediate medical attention even

though his drug intoxication resulted in death and the officer had hit the arrestee in the head with

his service weapon);7 cf. Barton, 820 F.3d at 965 (complaint stated a facially plausible claim

against officer who failed to obtain medical treatment for arrestee he transported to jail where it

alleged officer knew plaintiff showed the following signs of a serious medical need: plaintiff fell

down and became unconscious at the scene of a vehicle accident, another officer checked

5The complaint’s allegations also reveal it is plausible that Bridges believed plaintiff’s confusion

was due to intoxication, as plaintiff alleges DeGregorio told the 911 operator and Bridges that she was

intoxicated, complaint ¶ 15; and that plaintiff was conscious, able to speak with Bridges, and admitted

drinking two glasses of wine at dinner but could not remember much of the incident. Doc. 49-1 at 4.

6See, e.g., Daugherty v. Armstrong, 2012 WL 3930325, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 7, 2012) (arrestee’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim asserting failure to provide medical care for alleged concussion survived

frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citing Harris v. Nielsen, 2010 WL 2521434, at *7 (D.N.J. June

15, 2010) (assuming without deciding that plaintiff’s potential concussion constituted a serious medical

need sufficient to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim)).

7In Grayson, the jailer initially refused to accept the arrestee and the arresting officer complained

that taking him to the hospital would “take a lot of time.” 454 F.3d at 806. The Eighth Circuit found the

arresting officer’s “admittedly callous remark” to the jailer about the amount of time involved in taking the

man to the hospital was not a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 809, n.1.

plaintiff’s pulse because he was not responsive, plaintiff could not stand or walk on his own, could

not answer questions, and fell off the bench onto the floor at the detention center); Pool v.

Sebastian County, Ark., 418 F.3d 934, 945 (8th Cir. 2005) (serious medical need was obvious

where inmate was pregnant, bleeding, and passing blood clots).

Here, the complaint viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to plausibly show it was obvious to a layperson that plaintiff required immediate

medical attention at the time Bridges transported her to jail. Therefore the complaint does not

adequately allege plaintiff had an “objectively serious medical need.” It also does not allege

sufficient facts to plausibly show that Bridges subjectively knew plaintiff required medical

attention such that he acted with a mental state akin to criminal recklessness in disregarding a

known risk to her health. Thus, it does not adequately allege that Bridges was deliberately

indifferent to her medical needs. Accordingly, the complaint does not allege a constitutional

violation in Count II, and defendant Bridges is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim.

Because the Court finds plaintiff did not allege a constitutional violation by Bridges in

Count II, her allegation that Bridges violated Sheriff’s Office policies and procedures by failing to

obtain medical care before transporting her to the jail does not compel a different result. An

officer’s failure to comply with internal policies and procedures does not by itself rise to the level

of a constitutional violation. See Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1122 (8th Cir. 2014).

2. Defendant Cash is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

In Count III, plaintiff alleges that defendant correctional officer Tenesa Cash violated her

Fourteenth Amendment rights and failed to follow jail written policy when she did not require

Bridges to take plaintiff for medical care and refuse to admit her to the jail, when she ignored

plaintiff’s repeated requests for medical attention after plaintiff was admitted to the jail, and when

she taunted plaintiff by asking if she could afford a doctor.

In Fourte v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, 746 F.3d 384, 388 (8th Cir. 2014), the Eighth

Circuit stated that jail “[a]dmittees have the same right as inmates: not to have known, objectively

serious medical needs disregarded. See Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 568-69 (8th Cir. 2009)

(applying deliberate indifference standard to arrival at detention center); McRaven v. Sanders, 577

F.3d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying deliberate indifference standard and denying qualified

immunity when officials ignored admittee’s slurred speech, poor coordination, and admission of

substance abuse).” In Fourte, the plaintiff claimed jail personnel disregarded his serious medical

need of high blood pressure and alleged his “lazy eye,” “sweating,” and difficulty “getting around”

were recognizable signs of a serious medical need. 746 F.3d at 388. The Eighth Circuit

disagreed, finding these were “less obvious signs of a serious medical condition” than in cases

where objectively serious medical needs were found, citing McRaven, 577 F.3d at 978-79; Nelson

v. Correctional Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 529 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (shackling a woman in

labor); Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2006) (“shortness of breath and chest pain”

when on high observation); Pool, 418 F.3d at 944-45 (pregnant inmate bled, passed blood clots,

and had difficulty eating and showering).

As discussed above, the complaint viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff does not

allege sufficient facts to plausibly show it was obvious to a layperson that plaintiff required

immediate medical attention at the time she arrived at the jail. Therefore, the complaint does not

adequately allege plaintiff had an “objectively serious medical need” that Cash disregarded by not

directing Bridges to take her for medical care and by admitting her into the jail. For the same

reason, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that Cash subjectively

knew plaintiff required medical attention at the time she was admitted to the jail such that Cash

acted with a mental state akin to criminal recklessness in disregarding a known risk to plaintiff’s

health.

The complaint also alleges plaintiff made repeated requests for medical attention while in

the jail but no jail personnel called for the facility nurse or took steps to provide her with medical

assistance. Complaint ¶ 36. This allegation is not specifically directed against Cash. Plaintiff

alleges that “despite her repeated requests” using the in-cell intercom and during her night in

custody had severe headaches, vertigo, nausea, and disorientation. Complaint ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff

alleges that when Cash responded to one of her intercom calls plaintiff requested medical attention

and “advised that she may have a concussion from Mr. DeGregorio’s assault on her,” but Cash

only responded, “Can you even afford to see a doctor?” and thereafter failed to respond. Id. ¶ 40.

The complaint does not allege facts that plausibly show plaintiff had an objectively serious

medical need while in the jail. For example, plaintiff does not allege that she told Cash of her

severe headaches, vertigo, nausea, and disorientation and instead alleges only that plaintiff told

Cash she “may have a concussion.” Complaint ¶ 40. The complaint also does not plausibly allege

facts to show that Cash was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs in that she was

subjectively aware of plaintiff’s serious medical need and acted with a mental state akin to

criminal recklessness in disregarding it. Cash’s response to plaintiff’s request for medical

treatment was callous and unprofessional, but the remark alone is not a constitutional violation.

See Grayson, 454 F.3d at 809, n.1.

Plaintiff therefore does not allege a constitutional violation and defendant Cash is entitled

to qualified immunity on the claim in Count III. Because the Court finds plaintiff did not allege a

constitutional violation by Cash, the allegations that Cash violated Sheriff’s Office policies and

procedures by failing to require Bridges to transport plaintiff for medical care before admitting her

to the jail, and by failing to call the jail nurse or to have plaintiff transported to a medical facility

in response to her requests for medical treatment, do not compel a different result. Failure to

comply with internal policies and procedures does not by itself rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See Walton,752 F.3d at 1122.

D. Count IV – Monell Claims against Defendant Jefferson County

In Count IV, plaintiff alleges that Jefferson County is liable to her under § 1983 for the

other defendants’ constitutional violations because the violations were caused by a policy,

practice, or custom of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office as follows: (1) “deputies routinely

arrest female victims of domestic violence when 9-1-1 calls are placed by male perpetrators

claiming to be victims;” (2) “deputies routinely fail to properly identify victims of domestic

violence and often identify callers as victims, even in the absence of evidence substantiating as

such;” and (3) the Sheriff’s Office “has a custom, policy, or practice of violating the Fourth

Amendment by regularly conducting seizures and arresting victims of domestic violence without

probable cause to do so.” Complaint ¶ 76.a.-c. The complaint also alleges Jefferson County “has

inadequately trained, supervised, and disciplined” Sheriff’s Office “deputies with respect to its

deputies’ failure to identify victims and suspects, unreasonable seizures and arrests of victims, and

use of force.” Id. ¶ 77. Jefferson County moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against it in Count

IV on the basis that she fails to state a claim because she never suffered a constitutional violation.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Jefferson County are expressly based on the alleged

violation of her constitutional rights by the individual defendants. The Court has found that

plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation against either defendant Bridges or defendant

Cash. See infra at §§ III.A.-C. Because plaintiff’s claims against Jefferson County are dependent

on her claims against the individual defendants, she cannot allege a prima facie case against the

County and her claims against it must fail. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978), “Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a

municipality if the violation resulted from . . . an ‘official municipal policy.’” Corwin v. City of

Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). The Eighth

Circuit “has consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach,

individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim.” McCoy v. City of

Monticello, 411 F.3d 902, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2005). It follows that absent allegations of a

constitutional violation by a Jefferson County employee plaintiff cannot successfully assert a

claim of § 1983 or Monell liability against the County. See Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d

738, 748 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (declaring “where arresting police officers are absolved of

liability to arrestees, the City ordinarily is not liable”); see also Whitney v. City of St. Louis, Mo.,

887 F.3d 857, 860-61 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017)

(“Because we conclude that Officer Hinman did not violate Malone’s constitutional rights, there

can be no § 1983 or Monell liability on the part of Chief Thomas and the City.”); Sitzes v. City of

W. Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 470 (8th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs’ claims “could not be sustained

absent an underlying constitutional violation by the officer”); Sanders v. City of Minneapolis,

Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Without a constitutional violation by the individual

officers, there can be no § 1983 or Monell . . . municipal liability.”)). Defendant Jefferson

County’s motion to dismiss should therefore be granted.

E. State Law Claims

The defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest against

defendant Bridges in Count V and false imprisonment against all of the defendants in Count VI.8

No federal claims remain in this action. It is within this Court’s discretionary authority to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims once it has dismissed “all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Hillesheim v. Holiday

8Count VI is the only claim asserted against defendant Oliver Boyer.

Stationstores, Inc., 903 F.3d 786, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2018); see generally Brown v. Mortgage Elec.

Registration Sys., Inc., 738 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In exercising its discretion, the district

court should consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”). The

Eighth Circuit has “stress[ed] the need to exercise judicial restraint and avoid state law issues

whenever possible” and the “necessity to provide great deference and comity to state court forums

to decide issues involving state law questions.” Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215,

220 (8th Cir. 1990). This case is in its early stages, no case management order has been issued,

and little or no discovery has taken place. The Court concludes that factors of judicial economy

and deference to state court forums weigh against its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims in this case, and it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claims will be denied as moot without prejudice to

being refiled in any future state court action by plaintiff.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendants Bridges and Cash are entitled to

qualified immunity on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them in Counts I, II, and III, as plaintiff

has failed to allege a constitutional violation by either defendant. Defendant Jefferson County’s

motion to dismiss the Monell claims against it in Count IV will be granted because these are

dependent upon plaintiff’s claims against Bridges and Cash, and in the absence of allegations of a

constitution violation by the individual defendants there can be no liability on Jefferson County’s

part. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims of

false arrest and false imprisonment in Count V and VI.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.

R. Civ. P., is GRANTED as to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted in Counts I, II, III, and

IV of the Third Amended Complaint, and DENIED as moot without prejudice as to the

supplemental state law claims in Counts V and VI. [Doc. 53]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs state law claims in Counts V and VI of the

Third Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice.

An appropriate order of dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

CHARLES A. Lg

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this _2nd_ day of October, 2019.

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