federal courts are not required to “divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised”
How later courts described this case
- federal courts are not required to “divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Shawn Brown, Case No. 23-CV-1464 (WMW/LIB)
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER DISMISSING CASE
Jay H. Lucas, PhD., Northshore Forensic
Psychology, Dr. Travis Tomford, and
NuWay,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on review of Brown’s applications to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”), (Dkt. 3), and review of Brown’s Complaint, (Dkt. 1), pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff Shawn Brown has initiated over a dozen lawsuits in
this District over the past couple of weeks. This matter is one of those lawsuits.
The Court concludes that Brown qualifies financially for IFP status. However, an
IFP application will be denied, and an action will be dismissed, when an IFP applicant’s
complaint that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In
determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this Court
must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir.
2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court
may disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they
still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 364
F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Brown’s Complaint is nonsensical. As the Court understands it, Brown believes
that Defendant Lucas obtained a life insurance policy in his name and is now a member of
a group of individuals trying to stalk him. But Brown does not invoke any federal law in
his Complaint.1 Brown’s conclusory allegations of stalking, malpractice, and fraud more
squarely reference state tort law. But Brown has pled that all parties are citizens of
Minnesota. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over these state-law claims, as well.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). District courts, moreover, must dismiss state-law claims where,
as in this case, all federal-law claims are dismissed prior to trial. See Hervey v. County of
Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 726-27 (8th Cir. 2008). Because the federal-law claims fail to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, those claims will be dismissed without
1 Brown filed a 63-page exhibit along with his Complaint. To the extent that Brown invites
this Court to comb through this exhibit to discern a federal cause of action on his behalf,
the Court declines to do so. See Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 345 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir.
2004) (federal courts are not required to “divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that
are not clearly raised”).
prejudice. Further, because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the state-law claims, those
claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
Finally, defendants have a right to be free from abusive or meritless litigation, and
federal courts have an obligation to protect against improper litigation tactics. See In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court must also manage its own docket
and ensure the expedient disposition of justice for all litigants. Towards those ends, Brown
will be briefly restricted from initiating new litigation in this District absent judicial
authorization or representation by counsel. This restriction will be imposed until July 5,
2023. This pause will permit the Court to evaluate Brown’s many other pleadings and will
afford Brown the opportunity to determine whether any of his many grievances are
appropriate for litigation in federal court.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff Shawn Brown’s Civil Complaint, (Dkt. 1), is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. The application of Shawn Brown to proceed in forma pauperis, (Dkt. 3), is
DENIED.
3. Shawn Brown is restricted from initiating new litigation in this District unless
represented by counsel or authorized by a judicial officer of this District. This
restriction is imposed until July 5, 2023.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: May 31, 2023 s/Wilhelmina M. Wright
Wilhelmina M. Wright
United States District Judge