Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Central Appraisal District, by and Through Marya Crigler, Acting in Her Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of Travis Central Appraisal District

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 22-0620

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Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc.,

Petitioner,

v.

Travis Central Appraisal District, by and through Marya Crigler,

acting in her official capacity as Chief Appraiser of Travis

Central Appraisal District,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas

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JUSTICE BOYD, joined by Justice Devine, dissenting in part.

Section 42.02(a)(1) of the Texas Tax Code authorizes an appraisal

district’s chief appraiser to appeal an appraisal review board’s order

determining a property owner’s protest by filing suit against the

property owner in district court. The parties here dispute the scope of

the district court’s authority over that appeal. Agreeing with the

property owner, the Court concludes the statute “narrows” the trial

court’s review “to the protest the appraisal review board heard.” Ante at

10. Because the property owner protested and prevailed only on the

ground that the appraisal was not equal and uniform, the Court

concludes the chief appraiser cannot appeal the appraisal review board’s

new appraisal on the ground that it fails to reflect the property’s market

value. Id. The Court also holds, however, that this limitation is not

jurisdictional. Id. at 12. Because the chief appraiser appealed and

asserted a ground the property owner did not raise in the protest, the

district court must dismiss that claim, but not because it lacks

jurisdiction. Id. at 15.

I disagree with the Court on both points. Section 42.02(a)(1)

delineates a district court’s jurisdiction because it establishes and

defines a chief appraiser’s right to seek judicial review of an

administrative agency’s order. It does not merely constitute or impose a

“procedural” prerequisite or requirement for pursuing the appeal. But it

does not restrict the district court’s jurisdiction to grounds the property

owner raised in the protest. It authorizes an appeal from the appraisal

review board’s order, not from the property owner’s protest. And other

provisions—of both the Tax Code and the Texas Constitution—require

the district court to resolve all issues raised in the pleadings and ensure

that the appraised value is both equal and uniform and based on the

property’s market value.

I thus join the Court’s judgment to the extent it affirms the court

of appeals’ judgment. But to the extent the Court’s judgment prohibits

the district court from addressing the chief appraiser’s claim that the

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appraisal review board’s appraisal fails to reflect the property’s market

value, I respectfully dissent.1

I.

Jurisdictional Limitation

The chief appraiser of each Texas appraisal district is responsible

for appraising all taxable property within the district for ad valorem tax

purposes. TEX. TAX. CODE §§ 6.01, 25.01(a). A property owner who

disagrees with the chief appraiser’s appraisal may file a protest before

the local appraisal review board (ARB). Id. § 41.41(a). A protest may

challenge the “appraised or market value,” an “unequal appraisal,” or

1 The trial court granted the property owner’s plea to the jurisdiction in

this case because the court concluded that (1) any limit the Tax Code places on

a trial court’s authority over an appeal from an appraisal review board’s order

is jurisdictional, and (2) the Tax Code limits a trial court’s authority over such

an appeal to the ground the property owner raised in the protest. The court of

appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, agreeing that (1)

any limit the Tax Code places on the trial court’s authority is jurisdictional,

but concluding that (2) the Tax Code does not limit judicial review to the

ground the property owner asserted in the protest. See 684 S.W.3d 470, 477–

78 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022). The Court today affirms the court of appeal’s

judgment but disagrees with its reasoning. It disagrees with both lower courts’

conclusion that the Code’s limit is jurisdictional, but it agrees with the trial

court that the Code limits review to the ground asserted in the protest. Ante at

19. I agree with the court of appeals on both points.

Importantly, however, the Court ultimately concedes that, although the

Code limits the trial court’s authority to a review of the ground asserted in the

protest, it must nevertheless accept evidence of fair market value and consider

and address “all issues of fact” and all “new arguments and evidence” to arrive

at a de novo determination of the proper appraised value. Id. at 17 n.58. And

the Court further acknowledges that the property’s equal and uniform value

must “approach the property’s market value,” id. at 16, so a constitutionally

permissible de novo valuation necessarily must consider both. The parties and

lower courts should be careful not to miss this point on remand and in future

cases.

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several other specified errors. Id. § 41.41(a).2 When an owner protests

an appraisal, the ARB must conduct an evidentiary hearing and then

announce its determination through a written order. Id. §§ 41.45, .47(a).

If the ARB “finds that the appraisal records are incorrect in some respect

raised by the protest,” it must “correct the appraisal records by changing

the appraised value” or by making “other changes in the appraisal

records that are necessary to conform the records to the requirements of

law.” Id. § 41.47(b).

Both the property owner and the chief appraiser are “entitled to

appeal . . . an order of the [ARB] determining” a property owner’s

“protest.” Id. §§ 42.01(a)(1)(A), .02(a)(1). To appeal, the party must file a

petition for review in a local district court. Id. §§ 42.21, .22. The district

court must review the ARB order “by trial de novo,” resolving “all issues

of fact and law raised by the pleadings in the manner applicable to civil

suits generally.” Id. § 42.23(a).

Texas Disposal Systems Landfill (TDS Landfill) and Travis

Central Appraisal District (Travis CAD) dispute the extent to which

Section 42.02(a)(1)—which, to repeat, entitles a chief appraiser “to

appeal an order of the [ARB] determining” a property owner’s

2 A protest may also challenge the property’s inclusion on the appraisal

records, the denial of a partial exemption, a determination that the property

does not qualify for certain appraisal limitations, a determination that the

property does not qualify for appraisal, the identification of the taxing units in

which the property is taxable, a determination of who owns the property, a

determination that the use of land has changed, a failure to give the property

owner a notice the owner is entitled to receive, or “any other action of the chief

appraiser, appraisal district, or appraisal review board that applies to and

adversely affects the property owner.” TEX. TAX CODE §§ 41.41(a), .411.

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“protest”—limits the scope of the appeal it permits.3 But they agree that

the limits—whatever they are—are jurisdictional.4 So did the trial court

and the court of appeals in this case, and so do the twenty-four

interested parties who submitted amicus curiae briefs, including eleven

other appraisal districts,5 eight property owners or entities representing

property owners,6 three tax-policy research organizations,7 and two

Texas legislators.8 Despite the fact that no one in this case has raised

3 Because this case involves a chief appraiser’s (as opposed to a property

owner’s) appeal from an ARB order, the parties here disagree about the extent

to which Section 42.02 limits the scope of the appeal. But Sections 42.01 (which

grants a property owner a right to appeal) and 42.02 (which grants a chief

appraiser a right to appeal) use identical language to describe the scope of the

authorized appeal: an “appeal” from “an order of the [ARB] determining a

[property owner’s] protest.” Id. §§ 42.01(a)(1)(A), .02(a)(1). So whatever limit

this language imposes would apply to an appeal by a property owner as well as

an appeal by a chief appraiser.

4 Both parties agree that Section 42.02(a) establishes and defines the

scope of the district court’s jurisdiction.

5 Bexar Appraisal District, Denton Central Appraisal District, El Paso

Central Appraisal District, Gillespie County Central Appraisal District,

Gonzalez County Appraisal District, Harris Central Appraisal District,

Henderson County Appraisal District, Matagorda County Appraisal District,

Montgomery Central Appraisal District (through its Chief Appraiser, Janet

Jennings-Doyle), San Patricio County Appraisal District, and Williamson

Central Appraisal District.

Christopher Investment Company, Omni Hotels & Resorts, Texas

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Apartment Association, Texas Association of Manufacturers, Texas Building

Owners and Managers Association, Texas Realtors, Valero Refining-Texas, LP,

and Walgreen Co.

Texas Taxpayers and Research Association, Texas Public Policy

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Foundation, and Texas Association of Property Tax Professionals.

8 Texas Senator Paul Bettencourt and Texas Representative Hugh D.

Shine.

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the issue, the Court holds sua sponte that “the limits the Tax Code

imposes” on an appeal from an ARB’s order determining a protest “are

not jurisdictional.” Ante at 1–2. I agree with the parties, lower courts,

and amici.

The Texas Constitution broadly grants district courts jurisdiction

over all “actions, proceedings, and remedies” unless the Constitution or

“other law” confers jurisdiction on “some other court, tribunal, or

administrative body.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. The Texas Tax Code is an

“other law” that authorizes actions to challenge a chief appraiser’s tax

appraisal, and it grants ARBs exclusive, original jurisdiction over such

actions. Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex.

2006) (per curiam).

When a statute grants exclusive, original jurisdiction over an

action to an administrative agency, district courts lack jurisdiction to

address the claims unless, and only to the extent that, a statute grants

them such jurisdiction. See City of Amarillo v. Hancock, 239 S.W.2d 788,

791 (Tex. 1951). Parties have “no right to judicial review of an

administrative order unless a statute explicitly provides that right or

the order violates a constitutional right.” Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension

Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2007). A statute that provides

a right to judicial review of an administrative order governs the scope of

that right and of the court’s jurisdiction to decide the dispute. See id. at

159.

As the Court explains today, we have increasingly “embraced the

modern trend of declining to read statutory mandates to be

jurisdictional prohibitions, absent clear indication that failure to comply

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with the mandate also deprives a court of the power to decide the claim.”

Ante at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12

S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000)). Construing particular statutes, for example,

we have held that some procedural prerequisites and requirements—

like notice requirements, filing deadlines, venue requirements, and

dismissal deadlines—although mandatory, are not jurisdictional. See,

e.g., Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Tex. 2019); In re

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306–07 (Tex. 2010); City of

DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Tex. 2009).

In addressing these types of procedural prerequisites,

requirements, and mandates, we have preferred to hold that they are

not jurisdictional because that holding “strengthen[s] finality and

reduce[s] the possibility of delayed attacks on judgments.” City of

DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 394. But in each case, we have acknowledged that

we must construe a statutory provision to be jurisdictional when the

statute demonstrates “that was the Legislature’s clear intent.” Id.; see

In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d at 304 (“[W]e have been

‘reluctant to conclude that a provision is jurisdictional, absent clear

legislative intent to that effect.’” (emphasis added) (quoting DeSoto, 288

S.W.3d at 393)).

Chapter 42 of the Texas Tax Code imposes numerous procedural

prerequisites, requirements, and mandates on parties who desire to

appeal an ARB order. The chapter also explicitly addresses whether

some (but not all) of these requirements are jurisdictional. As one

example, a property owner who appeals an ARB order must nevertheless

pay the taxes due before the delinquency deadline, in an amount that is

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the lesser of (1) the amount the owner does not dispute is due, (2) the

amount due under the ARB order being appealed, or (3) the amount that

was due for the preceding tax year. TEX. TAX. CODE § 42.08(b).9 And an

owner who pays under the first option (the amount the owner does not

dispute is due) must file with the appeal a written statement “of the

amount of taxes the property owner proposes to pay.” Id. § 42.08(b-1).

An owner who fails to timely pay the required amount “forfeits the right

to proceed to a final determination of the appeal.” Id. § 42.08(b). But the

statute expressly provides that “[t]he failure to provide” the written

statement of the amount the owner proposes to pay “is not a

jurisdictional error.” Id. § 42.08(b-1) (emphasis added).

As a second example, a party who wishes to appeal an ARB order

must file a petition for review in the district court no later than sixty

days after the party received notice of the ARB’s order. Id. § 42.21(a).

An appeal filed by a chief appraiser must be brought against the

property owner, and an appeal filed by the property owner must be

brought against the appraisal district. Id. § 42.21(b). A party’s failure

“to timely file a petition bars any appeal” under Chapter 42. Id.

§ 42.21(a) (emphasis added). More specifically, the statute expressly

provides that the district court lacks “jurisdiction” over an appeal if

(1) the property was not “the subject of an [ARB] order,” (2) the party

failed to timely file the petition for review, or (3) the petition fails to

provide “sufficient information to identify the property that is the

9 A property owner may be excused from this payment obligation if he

adequately demonstrates that he is financially unable to pay. TEX. TAX. CODE

§ 42.08(b), (d).

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subject of the petition.” Id. § 42.21(h). But “so long as” these

requirements are satisfied, the property owner’s failure to correctly

identify the plaintiff or describe the property in the petition does not

deprive the court of “jurisdiction” and “may not be the subject of a plea

to the jurisdiction.” Id.

As a third example, the Tax Code expressly recognizes that the

district court lacks “jurisdiction” if the property owner “failed to

exhaust” its administrative remedies before the ARB. Id. § 42.231(b).10

But it expressly permits (though it does not require) the district court to

remand the action to the ARB so that the owner can cure the failure, “in

lieu of dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. And if the court

decides to permit a remand to the ARB, the statute allows the parties to

agree to waive the need for remand, subject to the court’s approval, and

10 This is true for any statutorily authorized appeal to the courts from

an administrative agency’s order, absent some statutory provision to the

contrary. See, e.g., CPS Energy v. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., 671 S.W.3d

605, 617–18 (Tex. 2023) (“If the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction is established,

the claimant must pursue and exhaust all available administrative remedies

before turning to the courts. ‘Until then, the trial court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction’ and must dismiss the claims with issues that come within the

agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.”) (quoting Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land &

Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 428 (Tex. 2017) (“As a rule, when an agency has

exclusive jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before

seeking judicial review of the agency’s action. . . . Until then, the trial court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the claims within the

agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.”)); Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid

Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002) (“Typically, if an agency has

exclusive jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before

seeking judicial review of the agency’s action. Until then, the trial court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the claims within the agency’s

exclusive jurisdiction.” (citing Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 15

(Tex. 2000))).

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elect to allow the court to resolve the appeal on the merits despite the

owner’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id. § 42.231(e).11

As a final example, Chapter 42 also provides that (1) a chief

appraiser may only appeal “[o]n written approval of the board of

directors of the appraisal district,” and (2) if “the protest involved a

determination of the [property’s] appraised or market value,” and the

ARB determined that the property’s value is less than $1 million, the

chief appraiser cannot appeal unless she alleges that the owner or his

representative “committed fraud, made a material misrepresentation,

or presented fraudulent evidence in the [ARB] hearing.” Id.

§ 42.02(a)(1), (b), (c). The statute does not explicitly address whether a

11 The Court suggests that this statutory grant of a right to waive the

exhaustion requirement “signals” that the exhaustion requirement is not

jurisdictional. Ante at 12. This suggestion misreads the statute. The statute

permits the district court to remand the action to the ARB, but if the court

chooses not to remand, it must “dismiss[] the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”

TEX. TAX. CODE § 42.231(b) (emphasis added). If the court chooses instead to

permit the remand and the parties agree to waive the remand, the waiver is

effective only if the court approves it. Id. § 42.231(e). As the Court notes,

“parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement.” Ante at 12 (citing PR Invs.

& Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. State, 251 S.W.3d 472, 476 & n.17 (Tex. 2008)).

True enough, but the Legislature can confer it by statute, Fed. Underwriters

Exch. v. Pugh, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1943) (“Jurisdiction of the subject

matter exists by operation of law only. . . .”), and nothing prohibits the

Legislature from permitting parties to waive a prerequisite that would

otherwise constitute a jurisdictional hurdle. In other words, the Legislature—

exercising its constitutional authority to define the courts’ jurisdiction—has

granted jurisdiction to the district court only if (1) the appealing party

exhausted its administrative remedies before the ARB, (2) the district court

remands to allow a party to cure its failure to exhaust, or (3) the district court

approves the parties’ agreement to waive the necessity of a remand. If none of

these requirements is satisfied, the district court lacks jurisdiction.

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chief appraiser’s failure to satisfy these procedural prerequisites

deprives the district court of jurisdiction.12

As these examples illustrate, Chapter 42 imposes numerous

procedural prerequisites, requirements, and mandates on a party who

desires to appeal an ARB order. But none of these procedural

prerequisites are at issue in this case. In fact, no procedural

prerequisites, requirements, or mandates are at issue in this case. What

is at issue is the meaning of Section 42.02(a)(1): A chief appraiser is

“entitled to appeal an order of the [ARB] determining” a property

owner’s “protest.” Id. § 42.02(a)(1). This provision does not impose

procedural requirements. It describes the “appeal” a chief appraiser is

“entitled” to take.

Chapter 42 indisputably defines and limits the scope of an appeal

the parties are entitled to take from an ARB order. Property owners, for

example, are “entitled to appeal” an “order of the [ARB] determining”:

(A) a protest by the property owner . . . ;

(B) a motion [to correct or change the appraisal roll]

filed under Section 25.25;

(C) that the property owner has forfeited the right to a

final determination [by] failing to comply with the

prepayment requirements . . . ;

12 The parties agree that these requirements are not at issue here as

TDS Landfill has abandoned any argument that the chief appraiser failed to

obtain written approval from the appraisal district’s board of directors and the

parties agree that the property at issue was appraised at an amount greater

than $1 million.

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(D) eligibility for a refund requested under Section

23.1243; or

(E) that the [ARB] lacks jurisdiction . . . because the

property owner failed to comply with a requirement

of . . . Chapter 41, or Section 25.25 . . . .

Id. § 42.01(a)(1). Chief appraisers, by contrast, are only “entitled to

appeal an order of the [ARB] determining: (1) a taxpayer protest . . . ; or

(2) a taxpayer’s motion to change the appraisal roll filed under Section

25.25.” Id. § 42.02(a).

The statute limits the parties’ right to appeal to ARB orders that

determine these specific matters. But these limits are nothing like the

statute’s procedural prerequisites, requirements, and mandates.

Sections 42.01(a)(1)(A) and 42.02(a)(1) define a district court’s

jurisdiction over an appeal from an ARB order because they do not

merely govern “the manner of judicial review;” they “grant a right of

judicial review.” Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs.,

19 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tex. 2000). Or as the United States Supreme Court

recently described the distinction, they do not merely seek “to promote

the orderly progress of litigation;” they “demarcate a court’s power.”

Harrow v. Dept. of Def., 144 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (2024) (quoting Henderson

v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011)).

Because Sections 42.01(a)(1)(A) and 42.02(a)(1) grant a right of

judicial review of an ARB order, define the types of appeals the parties

are permitted to take, and “demarcate a court’s power” over those

appeals, any limitation they place on the scope of a party’s right to

appeal an ARB order is a legislative limitation on the district court’s

jurisdiction over that appeal. Id.; see Cont’l Cas. Ins., 19 S.W.3d at 405

12

(“[B]ecause the Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide a right of

judicial review, the district court properly dismissed the suit for lack

of jurisdiction.”); Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d at 159 (“Because the Legislature

has not authorized the trial court to grant the relief sought, the trial

court lacks jurisdiction over the case.”). I thus agree with the parties,

lower courts, and amici that Section 42.02(a)(1)’s limitations are

jurisdictional.

II.

Grounds for Appeal

The issue the parties raise in this Court is not whether Section

42.02(a)(1)’s limitations are jurisdictional, but what those limitations

are. Specifically, TDS Landfill contends that, because the only ground it

advanced in its protest to the ARB was that the chief appraiser’s

appraisal was not “equal and uniform,” the chief appraiser cannot

appeal the ARB’s order resolving that protest on the ground that the

ARB’s appraisal does not reflect the property’s “market value.” The

Court agrees, ante at 15, but I do not.

In support of their position, the Court and TDS Landfill rely

primarily on Section 42.02(a)(1)’s reference to the taxpayer’s “protest.”

The Court, for example, states that “[t]he statute authorizes the trial

court to hear an appeal of the protest,” and grants “a de novo

determination of the taxpayer’s protest.” Id. at 10, 15. But that’s simply

not what the statute says. The statute says that a chief appraiser is

“entitled to appeal an order of the [ARB] determining . . . a taxpayer

protest.” TEX. TAX CODE § 42.02(a) (emphasis added). Section 42.02(a)’s

reference in subsection (1) to an ARB order “determining . . . a taxpayer

protest”—like its reference in subsection (2) to an ARB order

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“determining . . . a taxpayer’s motion to change the appraisal roll”—

describes the types of ARB orders the chief appraiser is entitled to

appeal. It does not restrict the scope of the court’s power to review the

orders it describes.

We recently rejected a very similar contention involving the

permissive-interlocutory-appeal statute in Elephant Insurance Co. v.

Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2022). That statute authorizes an

interlocutory appeal “from an order that is otherwise unappealable if

‘the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law’ and if ‘an

immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(d)) (emphases added by the Court in Kenyon). Applying that

statute in Kenyon, the court of appeals concluded “that its only

obligation in the permissive appeal was to” decide the “controlling

question of law” by “ascertain[ing] whether” the defendant owed a legal

duty “in the abstract,” and it refused to consider “whether the duty is

applicable to or fairly implicated by the facts and circumstances

presented.” Id. at 143, 147.

We rejected the court’s “disconcertingly cramped view of its

jurisdiction over the appeal” and held that courts must decide

permissive appeals, like “any other appeal,” by “addressing all fairly

included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to resolving

the controlling legal issue.” Id. at 147. We explained that, although

“‘involve[ment]’ of a controlling legal issue is essential to securing a

permissive appeal, the statute plainly provides that it is the order (or,

as the case may be, the relevant portion of the order) that is on appeal.”

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Id. Like the permissive-appeal statute, Section 42.02(a)(1) permits an

appeal from an ARB order, not from a taxpayer’s protest. That the ARB

order “determin[es] . . . a taxpayer protest” is “essential to securing” an

appeal under Sections 42.01(a)(1)(a) and 42.02(a)(1) because that is one

of the types of ARB orders the statute entitles a party to appeal. But “the

statute plainly provides that it is the order,” and not the protest, “that

is on appeal.” Id.

If Section 42.02(a)(1)’s authorization of an “appeal from an [ARB]

order” were not clear enough, numerous other statutory and

constitutional provisions confirm that a district court’s authority to

decide an ARB appeal is not limited to the grounds asserted in the

taxpayer’s protest.

First, several provisions of the Tax Code confirm that the

“subject” of an appeal under Section 42.02(a)(1) is the “appraised value”

of the property at issue, not the grounds on which the property owner

may have protested the valuation. When a property owner protests “the

appraised value of the owner’s property,” and the ARB “finds that the

appraisal records are incorrect in some respect raised by the protest,”

the ARB’s order resolving that protest “must state in the order the

appraised value . . . as finally determined by the [ARB]” and must

“correct the appraisal records by changing the appraised value [as]

necessary to conform the records to the requirements of law.” TEX. TAX.

CODE § 41.47(b), (c). If a chief appraiser elects to appeal the ARB’s order

stating “the appraised value . . . as finally determined by the [ARB],” the

chief appraiser must “indicate where appropriate those entries on the

appraisal records that are subject to the appeal.” Id. § 42.06(d). The

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“entries” that are “subject to the appeal” in such a case are the entries

that state the “appraised value” of the property at issue. Id. § 25.02

(describing entries included in appraisal records). The subject of the

chief appraiser’s appeal, in other words, is the appraised value as stated

in the ARB’s order, not the grounds on which the property owner

protested the chief appraiser’s appraised value.

Second, several provisions confirm that a district court that

decides a chief appraiser’s appeal must decide all issues raised in the

pleadings in order to determine the appraised value that Texas law

requires. The district court must review the ARB order “by trial de novo,”

resolving “all issues of fact and law raised by the pleadings in the

manner applicable to civil suits generally.” Id. § 42.23 (emphasis added).

As we recently explained, a “trial de novo is ‘[a] new trial on the entire

case—that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law—conducted as

if there had been no trial in the first instance.’” Willacy Cnty. Appraisal

Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 50 (Tex. 2018)

(quoting Trial de novo, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). “A

trial de novo is not confined to the same evidence that was presented

during the administrative phase,” and “in a trial de novo, a court may

consider arguments and evidence that are introduced afresh.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The nature of the relief the district court grants after conducting

a de novo trial will vary depending on the issues the pleadings raise, but

in all cases the relief must comply with all requirements of Texas law.

See TEX. TAX. CODE § 42.24. If “the appraised value is at issue,” the

judgment may “fix the appraised value . . . in accordance with the

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requirements of law.” Id. § 42.24(1). If “inequality in the appraisal . . . is

at issue,” the judgment may “enter the orders necessary to ensure equal

treatment under the law.” Id. § 42.24(2). And in any case, the court may

“enter other orders necessary to preserve rights protected by and impose

duties required by the law.” Id. § 42.24(3).

And third, the Texas Constitution and the Tax Code confirm that

Texas law requires that an appraised value must be both (1) “equal and

uniform,” and (2) based on the property’s “value.” As the Court notes,

ante at 3–4, the Constitution requires that all “[t]axation shall be equal

and uniform,” TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), and further provides that

“[n]o property of any kind in this State shall ever be assessed for ad

valorem taxes at a greater value than its fair cash market value,” id.

§ 20. The Court believes that, to “harmonize[] the[se] cumulative

constitutional mandates,” we must conclude that if “the fair market

value of the subject property deviates from its equal and uniform

appraised value,” the property owner is entitled to the benefit of being

taxed at the “lower of the two amounts.” Ante at 16.

But as the Court also acknowledges (although as if only in

passing), see id. at 2, the Constitution does more than merely prohibit

taxation based on an appraisal that exceeds the property’s fair market

value. In addition to that protection, the Constitution affirmatively

requires that all property, “unless exempt as required or permitted by

this Constitution, . . . shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which

shall be ascertained as may be provided by law.” TEX. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 1(b) (emphasis added).

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Section 1 of Article 8 thus requires that property must be taxed

based on appraisals that are both (1) “equal and uniform” and (2) based

on the property’s “value,” which must be ascertained as provided by law.

EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 554 S.W.3d 572,

574 (Tex. 2018) (“The Texas Constitution requires that taxation ‘shall

be equal and uniform’ and that property ‘shall be taxed in

proportion to its value.’”).13 We have already rejected the Court’s

suggestion that the Constitution allows an appraisal that is less than

the property’s value so long as the appraisal is equal and uniform: “A

property tax is equal and uniform only if it is in proportion to property

value.” In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 610, 620 (Tex. 2012)

(emphasis added). The Constitution requires that TDS Landfill’s

property be taxed based on an appraisal that is both equal and uniform

and reflects the property’s market value. Bosque Disposal Sys., LLC v.

Parker Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 555 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. 2018) (holding that

Article 8 Section 1(b) “obligated” appraisal district to account for

“market value added to the taxpayers’ real property”).14

13 Section 20 of Article 8, which prohibits taxation based on appraisals

that exceed the property’s fair cash market value, confirms that Section 1(b)

generally prohibits the taxation of property based on a value less than the

market value by expressly granting the Legislature the power to “pass

necessary laws” to authorize a “discount” on taxes owed if the owner pays the

taxes early. TEX. CONST. art VIII, § 1(b). This constitutional authorization of a

discount would not be necessary if the Constitution otherwise permitted the

Legislature to provide for taxation based on appraisals that are less than the

property’s value.

14 Although Section 1(b) does not necessarily require the Legislature to

equate “value” with “market value” for all purposes, see EXLP Leasing, 554

S.W.3d at 576, the Legislature has nevertheless declared that, with limited

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In light of Section 1(b) of Article 8, Section 42.02(a)(1) would be

unconstitutional if it permitted a district court to fix an appraised value

that is equal and uniform but not based on the property’s market value.

To the extent Section 42.02(a)(1) is ambiguous as to whether it grants

such permission, the canon of constitutional avoidance requires us to

interpret the statute to avoid that constitutional infirmity. See Paxton

v. Longoria, 646 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex. 2022).

Fortunately, however, we need not rely on that canon here. By

authorizing an appeal from an ARB’s “order,” TEX. TAX. CODE § 42.02(a),

confirming that the “subject” of the appeal is the “appraised value” of

the property at issue, id. §§ 41.47(b), (c), 42.06(d), requiring the district

court to review the ARB order “by trial de novo,” id. § 42.23(a), and

requiring the district court to grant relief that complies with all

requirements of Texas law, id. § 42.24, the Tax Code can only be

reasonably construed to require the district court to do what the Code

expressly requires the court to do: “try all issues of fact and law raised

by the pleadings” and “fix the appraised value . . . in accordance with

the requirements of law.” Id. §§ 42.23(a), .24(1). Because the chief

exceptions not applicable here, “all taxable property” must be “appraised at its

market value.” TEX. TAX. CODE § 23.01(a). “The market value of property shall

be determined by the application of generally accepted appraisal methods and

techniques,” considering “the individual characteristics that affect the

property’s market value,” id. § 23.01(b), and using either the “cost,” “income,”

or “market data comparison” appraisal method, whichever is “most

appropriate.” Id. § 23.0101. Although the Constitution permits some

“discrepancy between the actual value of the property and the value at which

it is assessed for taxes,” any discrepancy must be “reasonable,” and any

“distinctions in the manner in which market value of property is determined”

must not be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Enron Corp. v. Spring

Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 935–36 (Tex. 1996).

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appraiser’s pleadings challenged the ARB’s appraisal on the ground that

it fails to reflect the property’s market value, I conclude that the district

court must resolve that claim regardless of whether TDS Landfill

protested the chief appraiser’s appraisal on that ground.15

III.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained, I conclude that (1) any limitation that

Section 42.02(a)(1) imposes on the scope of a chief appraiser’s appeal

from an ARB order determining a property owner’s protest of an ad

valorem tax appraisal is jurisdictional, and (2) Section 42.02(a)(1) does

not limit the scope of a chief appraiser’s appeal to the grounds the

property owner asserted in its protest to the ARB. I thus concur in the

Court’s judgment affirming the court of appeals’ judgment remanding

the case to the district court, but I respectfully dissent to the extent the

Court’s judgment prohibits the district court from addressing and

resolving the market-value issue on remand.

Jeffrey S. Boyd

Justice

15 It seems worth noting that the chief appraiser’s pleadings in its

appeal to the district court provide the first and only opportunity for the chief

appraiser to raise the market-value issue. The chief appraiser initially

appraises the property at a value that—at least presumably—the chief

appraiser believes is both equal and uniform and based on the property’s

market value. If a property owner protests the appraisal only on the ground

that it is unequal, and the ARB agrees and fixes a value that is equal but

without regard to whether it is based on the property’s market value, the chief

appraiser has no reason or opportunity to complain about that appraisal until

it appeals the ARB’s order to the district court.

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OPINION FILED: June 21, 2024

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