THE RUMFORD FREE CATHOLIC LIBRARY v. TOWN OF RUMFORD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

THE RUMFORD FREE )

CATHOLIC LIBRARY, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 2:20-cv-00066-JDL

)

TOWN OF RUMFORD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

The Rumford Free Catholic Library, along with its president, Father Philip M.

Stark, and one of its founders, Peter Francis Tinkham (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek

a temporary restraining order enjoining the Town of Rumford and tax collector

Thomas Bourret from foreclosing on the Library’s property at 347 Pine Street,

Rumford, Maine (ECF No. 20).1 For the reasons that follow, I deny the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs assert that, on September 29, 2019, they received a notice from

Bourret, acting in his capacity as tax collector for the Town, indicating that the

1 This action was originally brought in the District Court for the District of Rhode Island. At the

outset of the litigation, the Plaintiffs moved for an identical temporary restraining order against the

Town of Rumford and Thomas Bourret. District Judge Mary S. McElroy denied the motion in an order

dated November 4, 2019. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of that order

(ECF No. 14), as well as two additional motions for a temporary restraining order (ECF Nos. 11, 20).

With these motions pending, the case was transferred from the District of Rhode Island to the District

of Maine pursuant to Judge McElroy’s order dated February 25, 2020. Because the Plaintiffs’ third

motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 20) contains factual allegations not included in its

first two motions, I consider the motion anew. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a

temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11) and their motion for reconsideration of the order denying

their first motion (ECF No. 14) are moot and are therefore denied.

subject property would be sold within 30 days due to the Library’s failure to pay

property taxes.2 The Plaintiffs contend that the Library did not owe taxes on the

property because it was entitled to a property tax exemption based on its status as a

501(c)(3) non-profit organization.

The allegations in the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint reflect a

longstanding and complicated dispute between the Library and the Town over the

tax-exempt status of the property. Specifically, the Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint alleges the following facts. The Library applied for a property tax

exemption from the Town in June 2014 and again in February 2015. The Library did

not receive a notice of denial of either application. In September 2015, the Library

received a notice of non-payment for two years of property taxes from Bourret. The

Library paid the tax bill in October 2015 and then successfully sued the Town in the

Maine Superior Court over its tax-exempt status. Afterward, the Town purportedly

refused to reimburse the Library or to grant a tax abatement on the grounds that the

Library had not made any use of the property—religious, charitable, or otherwise—

since taking ownership of the property in 2014, and on the grounds that the property

was derelict and unsuitable for any use.

The Library appealed the denial of the requested tax abatement to the Oxford

County Board of Assessment Review, which initially granted the abatement.

However, the Town appealed to the Maine Superior Court, and the matter was

2 Although the Town and Bourret filed a response in opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion, the response

did not contain any factual allegations. Thus, I summarize the Plaintiffs’ allegations as contained in

the amended complaint and the motions for a temporary restraining order.

remanded to the Board of Assessment Review for a determination of whether the

property was in use in 2014 and 2015. On remand, the Board denied the Library’s

request for a tax abatement on the grounds that the Library was not entitled to a tax

exemption. The amended complaint alleges that the Board justified its decision at

the hearing by finding that the Library had never applied for a tax exemption.

According to the amended complaint, the Board articulated a different rationale in

its written decision, explaining that the Library was not entitled to a tax exemption

because the property had not been in use during the specified period and was derelict.

The amended complaint alleges that, contrary to the findings of the Board of

Assessment Review, the Library has applied for a tax exemption on three separate

occasions and has consistently made substantial use of and improvements to the

property since 2014. The Plaintiffs challenge the Board’s determination for several

reasons. First, they assert that several Town employees perjured themselves before

the Superior Court and the Board of Assessment Review by testifying that the

Library had neither applied for a tax exemption nor used the property for any

charitable or other purpose. They further assert that the Library’s counsel was

negligent and that the Board erroneously granted the Town’s request to continue the

hearing on the requested tax abatement, both of which deprived the Library of the

opportunity to present certain evidence to the Board.

In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before the Board, the

Plaintiffs contend that the Town employees’ testimony, the Board’s decision to

continue the hearing, and the Board’s ultimate determination that the property was

derelict were motivated by “prejudice[]” and “bias[]” against the Library. ECF No. 9

¶¶ 74, 82. They assert that these incidents were only the latest in a longstanding

pattern of unjust treatment of the Library. In support of this contention, the

amended complaint alleges that the Town has previously enforced land use

ordinances against the Library in an arbitrary manner and conspired to prevent the

Library from purchasing additional property in Rumford in furtherance of its

religious mission. The amended complaint further alleges that Town employees and

others have repeatedly made “slanderous” and “defamatory” statements about the

Plaintiffs over the course of several years, both in connection with these previous

alleged incidents of unfair treatment and in unrelated legal proceedings involving

officers of the Library. Based on all these allegations, the Plaintiffs maintain that,

contrary to the Board’s determination, the Library is entitled to a tax exemption and

does not owe any taxes on the property.

The allegations in the amended complaint suggest that, in addition to bringing

this action, the Library has appealed the Board’s decision to the Maine Superior

Court. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that they made a payment to the Town in

the amount necessary to avoid foreclosure, as directed by the notice they received in

September 2019, in an effort to maintain the Library’s title to the property pending

the resolution of this action. They contend that the Town did not consider their

payment sufficient and that the Library therefore remains at risk of foreclosure.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the Town

and Bourret from foreclosing on the property.

II. DISCUSSION

The Town and Bourret argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the

temporary restraining order based on the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, which provides

that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or

collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may

be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2020). The Act generally

“deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of state taxes.”

Wal-Mart P.R., Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F.3d 110, 118 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing

Pleasures of San Patricio, Inc. v. Méndez–Torres, 596 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010), and

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 109 n.11 (2004)). However, the Act “contains an express

exception under which federal district courts can assume jurisdiction where state

courts do not provide a ‘plain, speedy and efficient remedy.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1341).

The jurisdictional bar created by the Tax Injunction Act applies to and is

dispositive of the Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The property

taxes imposed on the Library by the Town are state taxes within the meaning of the

Act: “Real estate taxes, although generally administered at the local level by

municipal officers, are state taxes imposed to raise revenue.” Belisle v. Rotondi, No.

1:16-cv-00451-JAW, 2016 WL 4919882, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 14, 2016) (citing 36

M.R.S.A. §§ 201, 251, 551); see also Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 100 n.1. And the tax foreclosure

that the Plaintiffs seek to enjoin is a method of “levying” or “collecting” taxes under

the Act. See Guertin v. City of Eastport, 143 F. Supp. 2d 67, 69−74 (D. Me. 2001)

(applying the Tax Injunction Act and the comity doctrine to dismiss an action arising

out of a tax foreclosure proceeding); Noone v. Town of Palmer, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2−3

(D. Mass. 2014) (same); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 9−10 (2015)

(considering the seizure of recalcitrant taxpayers’ property when providing

definitions of “levy” and “collection”).

Because the Plaintiffs’ motion falls within the Tax Injunction Act’s prohibition,

this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion unless the Plaintiffs establish that

Maine’s state courts “do not provide a ‘plain, speedy and efficient remedy.’” Wal-Mart

P.R., 834 F.3d at 118 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341); see also id. at 116 (noting that the

party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction

exists). A plain, speedy, and efficient remedy exists in state court so long as the

taxpayer has access to a “‘full hearing and judicial determination at which [it] may

raise all constitutional objections to the tax’ and may therefrom seek review before

the Supreme Court.” Pleasures of San Patricio, 596 F.3d at 7 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19

(1981)).

The Plaintiffs have not shown that the Library has been deprived of adequate

state-court remedies. It has previously been determined in this District that the

administrative and judicial remedies available to Maine taxpayers are “plain, speedy

and efficient.” Belisle, 2016 WL 4919882, at *2; see also Guertin, 143 F. Supp. 2d at

70−73, 71 n.4. Most relevant here, 36 M.R.S.A. § 844-M(6) (West 2020) provides that

a taxpayer may appeal the decision of a county board of assessment review to the

Maine Superior Court in accordance with Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B. Rule

80B provides for a hearing before the Maine Superior Court and appellate review by

the Maine Law Court. These provisions indicate that the Library has access to a full

hearing and judicial determination of its objections to the property taxes at issue.

Indeed, according to the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ filings, the Library has already

partially availed itself of these remedies and continues to litigate its tax-exempt

status in state court. Thus, absent any allegation that Maine’s state courts have

refused to hear the Library’s constitutional arguments, I conclude that a plain,

speedy and efficient remedy is available to the Library in Maine’s state courts.

The Plaintiffs suggest that the available remedies under Maine law are not

speedy or efficient, alleging that the dispute over the Library’s tax-exempt status has

been “deliberately drawn-out” over five years. ECF No. 11 at 3. But such delays are

not uncommon: “In normal course, one would not be surprised that it might take

several years to litigate a [tax] refund claim and collect the judgment.” Wal-Mart

P.R., 834 F.3d at 123. Accordingly, “a mere delay in recovery” does not render a state-

court remedy inadequate under the Tax Injunction Act. Id. Indeed, the Supreme

Court has held that a two-year delay does not render a state-court remedy

inadequate, see Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 520−21, and the First Circuit has reached the

same conclusion in the context of a four-year delay, see Parker v. Agosto-Alicea, 878

F.2d 557, 559−60 (1st Cir. 1989). More recently, the First Circuit suggested that even

a seven-year delay in state proceedings might not overcome the Tax Injunction Act’s

jurisdictional bar. Wal-Mart P.R., 834 F.3d at 123. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ allegation

that the Library has been litigating its objections to the taxes at issue for five years

does not alter my conclusion that Maine’s state courts provide a plain, speedy and

efficient remedy to the Library.

The Plaintiffs also implicitly challenge the adequacy of the remedy available

in Maine’s state courts by alleging that they have experienced unfair treatment in

certain administrative and judicial proceedings both related and unrelated to the

property at issue. But this alleged unfair treatment does not deprive the Library of

an adequate state-court remedy for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act. “[T]he

Supreme Court has specifically held that the words ‘plain, speedy and efficient

remedy’ are to be given a purely procedural interpretation.” Carrier Corp. v. Perez,

677 F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341). Thus, unless the

Plaintiffs establish that the alleged unfair treatment deprives the Library of the

“minimal” procedural guarantee of access to a hearing and judicial determination of

its constitutional arguments, id., the Tax Injunction Act bars this Court from

granting the relief they seek. If the Plaintiffs believe the Library has been treated

unfairly in proceedings before local administrative bodies or the Maine Superior

Court, they may seek appellate review by the Maine Law Court under Rule 80B, as

noted above. The Law Court “is capable of giving a full, impartial, speedy, and

efficient hearing” to the issues in this case. Butler v. State of Me. Supreme Judicial

Court, 767 F. Supp. 17, 20 (D. Me. 1991) (citations omitted). Should the Plaintiffs

conclude that the Law Court failed to do so, they “may seek a final review by the

United States Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v.

McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981)).

Finally, the Plaintiffs suggest that the Library lacks a plain, speedy, and

efficient remedy in Maine’s state courts because the Library did not receive adequate

notice of the its tax liability or of the foreclosure action. Some courts in this circuit

have concluded that the Tax Injunction Act does not prevent a district court from

exercising jurisdiction over challenges to state tax collection measures where the

taxpayers object only to the adequacy of the notice they received. See Kim v. Jordan

Realty, C.A. No. 19-83WES, 2020 WL 1482637, at *13 (D.R.I. Mar. 27, 2020); Burns

v. Conley, 526 F. Supp. 2d 235, 240–41 (D.R.I. 2007). The courts in those cases

reasoned that the Tax Injunction Act’s jurisdictional bar did not apply because the

taxpayers were not challenging the validity of the taxes assessed and therefore did

not seek to “avoid paying state taxes” or “frustrate the collection of state tax revenue.”

Burns, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 240−41; see also Kim, 2020 WL 1482637, at *13. Here, by

contrast, the majority of the Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to their claims that the taxes

at issue were unlawfully imposed. Thus, their motion for a temporary restraining

order, viewed as a whole, falls within the intended scope of the jurisdictional bar

contained in the Tax Injunction Act.

Even if this Court could exercise jurisdiction over the present motion based on

the Plaintiffs’ claims of inadequate notice—an issue which I do not decide—the

Plaintiffs’ motion must still be denied because they have not substantiated these

claims. The Plaintiffs allege that the Library never received a bill for the taxes

assessed on the property. They further assert that the notice of foreclosure the

Library received was untimely and contained an inaccurate cure amount. However,

the Plaintiffs have not provided any affidavits, documents, or other evidence

supporting these allegations. Thus, the Plaintiffs have not established that this case

falls within an exception to the jurisdictional bar contained in the Tax Injunction Act.

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of

proving that federal jurisdiction exists. See Wal-Mart P.R., 834 F.3d at 116. They

have not met that burden here. Accordingly, I conclude that the Court lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction to decide the present motion.

Even if I were to conclude that the Tax Injunction Act does not bar the exercise

of jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ motion, I would still decline to consider the motion

for a temporary restraining order under the doctrine of comity. Comity “serves to

ensure that ‘the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and

protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that

will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.’” Levin v.

Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 431 (2010) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 44 (1971)). In state taxation cases such as this one, comity “restrains federal

courts from entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax

administration,” even if the claims are not subject to the Tax Injunction Act’s

jurisdictional bar. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Alviti, 944 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2019)

(quoting Levin, 560 U.S. at 417).

As discussed above, the Plaintiffs primarily challenge the validity of the taxes

imposed, and the Library is engaged in ongoing legal proceedings at the state and

local levels regarding the same dispute. Federal court involvement in the Plaintiffs’

claims for injunctive relief at this stage would “unduly interfere” with Maine’s state

tax system. Levin, 560 U.S. at 431 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Thus, even if

I were to conclude that this Court has jurisdiction over the present motion after

applying the Tax Injunction Act, comity restrains me from exercising it.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Plaintiffs’ third motion for a temporary

restraining order (ECF No. 20) is DENIED. The Plaintiffs’ second motion for a

temporary restraining order (ECF No. 11) and their motion for reconsideration of the

order denying their first motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 14) are

DENIED as moot.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2020

/s/ JON D. LEVY

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE