holding that an inmate “must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”
How later courts described this case
- holding that an inmate “must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERRANCE A. MILES,
Plaintiff,
V. Civil Action No. TDC-23-2666
GAIL WATTS, Director, and
RENARD BROOKS, Deputy Director,
Defendants. .
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Terrance A. Miles, who was a pretrial detainee at the Baltimore
County Detention Center (“BCDC”) in Towson, Maryland at the time of the relevant events in this
case, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants BCDC Director
Gail Watts and BCDC Deputy Director Renard Brooks, in which he alleges that his conditions of
confinement during his pretrial detention at BCDC were “deplorable.” Am. Compl. at 4, ECF No.
6. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 12. Though informed of his right to
respond, Miles has not filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion. Having reviewed the
submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In the Amended Complaint, Miles alleges that he lacks a place to store food purchased
from the commissary; that mice eat his food and leave feces on his bed; that mold is present on his
drinking faucet, in the shower, and on his sleeping mattress, which is also infested with mites; and
that the mop head is not changed and fruit flies are everywhere. Miles also alleges that correctional
staff use the same gloves to serve food and to search inmates and cells, that both dead and living
mice are rampant in the kitchen, and that he has advised several officers regarding the conditions.
Miles states that he has been ill several times and has lost money because he has had to discard his
commissary items.
DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Defendants argue that (1) Miles did not exhaust administrative remedies; (2) BCDC is not an entity
amenable to suit; (3) Miles has pleaded insufficient facts to support his claims; and (4) Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity.
I. Legal Standard
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts
to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. Although courts should construe pleadings of
self-represented litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), legal conclusions
or conclusory statements do not suffice, Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must examine the |
complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994): Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court generally may consider
only the complaint and any attached documents. Sec’y of State for Def v. Trimble Navigation
Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider documents attached to the
motion if they are integral to the complaint and authentic. /d. Here, Defendants have attached
exhibits to the Motion, including a printout from an BCDC Housing Location History database
and an affidavit by BCDC Management Analyst Stephen Verch, in which Verch asserts that he is
responsible for processing any complaint forms filed by individuals detained at BCDC, that he
keeps a record of all such complaints, and that he has searched the relevant files and found no
administrative complaints filed by Miles from November 18, 2022 to January 19, 2024. Because
such exhibits cannot fairly be deemed to be integral to the complaint, the Court may not consider
them without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
While the Court may do so under certain circumstances, Defendants have not filed the Motion,
even in the alternative, as one seeking summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court may not
consider the exhibits in resolving the Motion.
Il. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants assert that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Miles has not
exhausted administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 803, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)):
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2018). Inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before they bring any
“suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532
(2002).
Exhaustion is mandatory and generally may not be excused unless the administrative
procedure is not available. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (holding that an inmate
“must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”). “[A]n administrative
3 .
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was
prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). In
Ross, the United States Supreme Court identified three circumstances when an administrative
remedy is unavailable: when officers are “unable or consistently unwilling to provide relief to
aggrieved inmates,” when the procedure is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,
incapable of use,” or when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a
grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at
643-44.
Although Defendants argue that Miles was required to but failed to plead that he exhausted
administrative remedies, such exhaustion is an affirmative defense, so it is Defendants who must
establish that Miles has not met this requirement. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007);
Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017). Here, where Defendants’ assertion of a failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is based on an affidavit that the Court may not consider on a
Motion to Dismiss, the Court will not grant the Motion on this basis.
Ill. ‘Failure to State a Claim
Defendants also seek dismissal on the grounds that the allegations in the Amended
Complaint fail to state a plausible claim for relief against either Director Watts or Deputy Director
Brooks. Generally, for an individual to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it must be
“affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff s
rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior,
or vicarious liability, does not apply on a § 1983 claim. See id.; Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d
766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004). Other than naming Director Watts and Deputy Director Brooks as
defendants, Miles does not provide any factual allegations of any acts or omissions by either of
them that would support personal liability.
A supervisory official such as Director Watts or Deputy Director Brooks may be held liable
under a theory of supervisory liability, under which a plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor
had actual or constructive knowledge that the subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the
supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or
tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Miles has not alleged facts
showing that the Defeadants had any actual or constructive knowledge of any of the conditions
referenced in the Amended Complaint, or that Miles was subjected to such conditions. He
therefore has failed to state a claim against Defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk shall send a copy of this Order to Miles.
3. The Clerk shall close this case.
Date: March 29, 2024
THEODORE D. CHUANS
United States District J fe