Thomas v. Watts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MENSAH THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

V.

DIRECTOR GAIL WATTS, Civil Action No. TDC-22-2375

DEPUTY DIRECTOR RENARD BROOKS,

SGT. DUPREE,

LT. T. DAVIS,

and

DIETARY SGT. G. CARTER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Mensah Thomas, a detainee previously confined at the Baltimore County

Detention Center (“BCDC”) in Towson, Maryland, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in which he alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he was

exposed to “toxic fumes” when the floor at the detention center was refinished. Am. Compl. at 2,

ECF No. 18. Defendants BCDC Director Gail Watts, BCDC Deputy Director Renard Brooks, Sgt.

Dupree, Lt. T. Davis, and Dietary Sgt. G. Carter have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint. Thomas was notified of his right to file a memorandum in opposition to the Motion,

but he has not done so. Having reviewed the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing

is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss

will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In the operative Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Mensah Thomas alleges that on March 3,

2022, while he was incarcerated at BCDC, a contractor retained by BCDC conducted refinishing

of the floor on Tier 3H that involved the use of “hundreds of gallons of acetone, and also epoxy to

strip the floor.” Am. Compl. 46. According to Thomas, BCDC’s ventilation, which recycles the

air, caused “toxic fumes” to move through the vents into Tier 2G, in which he was located. □□□ §

8. Although Thomas and others made multiple complaints to correctional staff, no action was

taken to resolve the issue or move the Tier 2G inmates further away. In Thomas’s view, all inmates

in the G and H Tiers should have been moved. He alleges that “BCDC deliberately subjected us

to cruel and unusual punishment,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. /d. § 12. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and

injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Defendants argue that Thomas has failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to any claim, and

that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

I. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. Although courts should construe pleadings of

self-represented litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), legal conclusions

or conclusory statements do not suffice, /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must examine the

complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the

factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

268 (1994); Lambeth y. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005),

I. Conditions of Confinement

Thomas alleges that his exposure to the fumes from the floor refinishing process violated

his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Although

Thomas asserted that he was a “prisoner” of the State of Maryland at the time of the incident, Am.

Compl. § 3, Defendants assert that Thomas was a pretrial detainee at that time, such that his claim

could arise only under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth

Amendment. Thomas’s specific detention status is immaterial to the resolution of his claim

because the result is the same under either standard.

The Eighth Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while

imprisoned.” /ko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77

F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). Conditions of confinement that “involve wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain,” or which “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981). In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on unconstitutional conditions

of confinement, a plaintiff must prove two elements: that “‘the deprivation of [a] basic human

need was objectively sufficiently serious,’ and that subjectively ‘the officials act[ed] with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.”” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)).

The objective prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim requires the prisoner to

““produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the

challenged conditions,’ or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the

prisoner’s unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.” Jd. (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at

1381). Thus, “a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and

needless suffering the next week or month or year” violates the Eighth Amendment, even if “the

complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33

(1993); see Webb v. Deboo, 423 F. App’x 299, 300 (4th Cir. 2011). For the subjective prong, to

establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence of deliberate indifference,

in that a known excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety was disregarded. See Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991) (applying the deliberate indifference standard to conditions-

of-confinement claims). “[T]he test is whether the guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious

danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown v. N.C.

Dep't of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

Cir. 2002)).

To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, a pretrial detainee must allege facts sufficient to show that the action taken was not

“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or is “excessive in relation

to that purpose.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399 (2015)). “[I]t is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the

defendant’s action or inaction was ... objectively unreasonable” in that the defendant acted or

failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious

that it should be known.” /d. (citations omitted).

Whether Thomas’s claim is analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, he has

failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Generally, for an individual to be held liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the

deprivation of the plaintiffs rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The

doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, does not apply on a § 1983 claim. See id.;

Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004). Other than naming Deputy Director

Brooks, Sgt. Dupree, Lt. T. Davis, and Dietary Sgt. G. Carter as defendants in the caption of the

Amended Complaint, Thomas does not provide any factual allegations of any acts or omissions by

any of them, much less any relating to the alleged toxic fumes. He has not even asserted facts

showing that any of these defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly

dangerous conditions arising from fumes that resulted from the resurfacing of the floor, that

Thomas was exposed to the fumes, or that they were aware or should have been aware that

exposure to the fumes would create a substantial risk of serious harm. He therefore has failed to

state a claim against any of these defendants.

Although Thomas asserts that Director Watts “is the Director for Baltimore County

Detention Center” and that “[s]he is legally responsible for the operation of BCDC, and for the

welfare of all the inmates in the Detention Center,” Am. Compl. § 4, he has failed to allege any

personal involvement by Director Watts in the incident. To hold a defendant liable as a supervisor,

a plaintiff must show that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that the

subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional

injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so

inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive

practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the

particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th

Cir. 1994). Thomas. has not alleged facts showing that Director Watts had any actual or

constructive knowledge of any of the conditions referenced in the Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is insufficient basis to support an Eighth or Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Director Watts. The Motion will therefore be granted, and the Court

need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED. A separate

Order shall issue.

Date: March 27, 2024 =—s—

THEODORE D. CHUA!

United States District Judge