Rodwell v. Wicomico County, Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

:

TRACEY MICHAEL RODWELL

:

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 22-3014

:

WICOMICO COUNTY, MARYLAND

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil

rights action is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Wicomico

County, Maryland, et al. (ECF No. 36). The issues have been

briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed

necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the

motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background1

On or about October 13, 2022, Plaintiff suffered a seizure

while he was a pretrial detainee at Wicomico County Detention

Center (“the Detention Center”). (ECF No. 33 ¶ 17). Two other

detainees in the unit heard a noise coming from Plaintiff’s cell

and walked to his door to check on him. (Id. ¶ 20). They observed

him lying on the ground and believed he was having a medical

emergency. (Id.). Almost immediately, both men ran to the unit

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set

forth in the Second Amended Complaint and construed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff.

door and banged on it to get the attention of the correctional

officers in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 21). Officers Elmer Barrall,

Joseph Daly, Deniece Davis, Richard Elliott III, Zachary Emmert,

Preston Foreman, Sylvester Kellman, Jacob Skarson, James Sterling,

and Jonathan Watson (collectively, “Defendant Officers”) responded

to the unit.2 (Id. ¶ 22). About a minute later, several medical

staff members entered the unit. (Id. ¶ 23). They remained there

for approximately 30 minutes. (Id.). Two of the Defendant

Officers entered Plaintiff’s cell to attend to him. (Id. ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Lt. Davis

ordered at least two of the officers to remove Plaintiff from his

cell. (Id. ¶ 25). One officer grabbed Plaintiff’s ankles, another

grabbed his leg, and at least one more officer picked Plaintiff up

around his upper body area. (Id. ¶ 26). They laid him onto the

concrete floor in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff, still

suffering a seizure, involuntarily attempted to sit up several

times after being laid on his back. (Id. ¶ 28). In response, the

officers surrounding Plaintiff piled on top of him to force his

body back down to the floor. (Id. ¶ 29). For nearly 30 minutes,

the officers repeatedly forced Plaintiff to lie back down on the

ground while medical staff stood by and watched. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34).

2 On February 14, 2023, Defendants filed a letter they sent

to Plaintiff disclosing these names as the “individuals who may

have been involved in your alleged complaint.” (ECF No. 12-1, at

1).

Lt. Davis ordered that Plaintiff be restrained. (Id. ¶ 32). The

handcuffs were placed on Plaintiff so tightly that they caused

damage to his wrists and hands. (Id.). The handcuffs were

connected to a secondary chain that was wrapped around Plaintiff’s

waist. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff was then hoisted onto a stretcher

by his wrists and pant legs. (Id. ¶ 34).

Plaintiff regained consciousness while being transported to

Tidal Health Peninsula Regional Hospital in Salisbury, Maryland.

(Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff asked the transport officer, Officer

Burrell,3 what happened to him and why his arm hurt. (Id. ¶ 36).

Officer Burrell informed Plaintiff that he had a seizure, but did

not have any additional information for him. (Id.). Plaintiff

was examined by doctors upon arrival at the hospital but was not

informed of his injuries or any care or treatment that needed to

be administered upon his return to the Detention Center. (Id.

¶ 37). When he arrived back to the Detention Center, he was taken

to the medical tier where he complained of pain in his left arm,

left shoulder, left side of his neck, left elbow, and right hand.

(Id. ¶ 38). He received only Motrin to address his injuries. (Id.

¶ 39).

Plaintiff was released from the Detention Center

approximately 11 days later. (Id. ¶ 41). Upon release, he sought

3 It is possible Plaintiff meant to refer to Officer Elmer

Barrall, one of Defendant Officers involved at the scene.

medical treatment from an orthopedic specialist at Peninsula

Orthopedic Associates. (Id. ¶ 42). His MRI showed a torn rotator

cuff and a buildup of scar tissue that caused him additional pain.

(Id. ¶ 42, 57, 111). A secondary MRI also showed multiple sprains

to his left hand. (Id. ¶ 43). Currently, Plaintiff wears a brace

for pain management. (Id. ¶ 44). Although he was self-sufficient

before this incident, his injuries made it difficult to return to

work and he is now dependent on others for assistance with most

daily tasks. (Id. ¶ 45).

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint in light of a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “the court should

accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the

complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan

Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating

that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading

standard” of Rule 8(a)).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Nonetheless, the

complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive

a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, “once a claim has been stated

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts

consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563.

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader

is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2)).

III. Analysis

A. Group Pleading

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed because Plaintiff engaged in impermissible group

pleading. (ECF No. 36-1, at 6-7) (citing Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550

F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (dismissing superintendent of jails

because plaintiff “failed to allege any personal connection

between [the superintendent] and any denial of [plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights”); Thomas v. Maryland, No. 17-cv-1739-GJH,

2017 WL 6547733, at *6 (D.Md. Dec. 20, 2017) (dismissing officers

because plaintiffs “are unable to identify even a limited group of

officers actually responsible for the alleged harms”); Calhoun v.

Prince George’s Cnty., Md., No. 12-cv-2014-DKC, 2013 WL 3873224,

at *3 (D.Md. July 24, 2013) (dismissing three officers and

providing plaintiff an opportunity to file a second amended

complaint with more factual detail where plaintiff “does not

differentiate among the . . . three, but merely alleges

that . . . he was apprehended [and beaten] by all of them”); Krell

v. Queen Anne’s Cnty., No. 18-cv-637-JKB, 2018 WL 6523883, at *20

(D.Md. Dec. 12, 2018) (dismissing an officer where plaintiff

“refer[s] to unidentified officers and make[s] conclusory

statements” including that they “refused to timely render

appropriate medical assistance” and “participated in and enabled

the pattern or practice and conduct which interfered with

[Plaintiff’s] medical treatment”)).

As Plaintiff argues, each case Defendants cite is

distinguishable. (ECF No. 41, at 9-11). In Vinnedge, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the

superintendent of jails but remanded to the district court to

determine whether dismissal was proper as to the individual

detectives, who “clearly were in custody of the plaintiff during

some period of time[.]” Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 929.

In Thomas, the plaintiffs attributed all claims to 28

individual police officers, and “seemingly list[ed] every possible

officer they [could] find, potentially including officers that

were not present on the scene or omitting others that were.”

Thomas, 2017 WL 6547733, at *6. Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff

named only the ten officers that Defendants provided to Plaintiff

as individual officers involved in the alleged use of force against

Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 12-1; 33 ¶¶ 7-16).

In Calhoun, the plaintiff’s sole allegation was that he “was

apprehended by the aforesaid police officers, and was beaten, about

the head, body, and limbs, assaulted, battered, falsely

imprisoned, and falsely arrested, by the defendants OFC

SCHWEINSBURG # 3331, OFC LACOMBE # 3110, OFC BURROUGHS # 2879, OFC

AVERY # 2401.” Calhoun, 2013 WL 3873224, at *3. This court found

the plaintiff’s allegations “far too conclusory to state an

excessive force claim adequately[]” and provided the plaintiff “an

opportunity to supply enough factual detail to state a claim” in

a second amended complaint. Id. Here, although Plaintiff

similarly does not distinguish among the ten individual officers,

his allegations are more specific than simply alleging excessive

force.

Finally, in Krell, Judge Bredar dismissed one individual

officer who had been grouped in with the other “Defendant

Corrections Officers” in the complaint. Krell, 2018 WL 6523883,

at *20 (citation omitted). The plaintiff alleged that the

individual officer was “responsible for a pattern and practice of

misconduct[]” but provided “no additional facts . . . as to her

actions, omissions, or, even, presence.” Id. Unlike the

“conclusory allegations made against a group of individuals” that

were “not specific enough to state a § 1983 claim” in Krell, here

the complaint includes specific allegations about the ten

officers’ actions, omissions, and presence. Id.

A case that neither party identified, J.A. v.

Miranda, No. 16-cv-3953-PX, 2017 WL 3840026 (D.Md. Sept. 1, 2017),

is more akin to this case. There, the plaintiff “could not

specifically identify by name each particular Officer” involved in

an alleged use of excessive force because “he was being beaten.”

Id. at *1. Instead, he alleged against all officers involved in

the beating that “one or more of the officers hit and kicked [him]

in the face and/or mouth” and “placed a bag over [his] head and

zip-tied the bag around his neck.” J.A., 2017 WL 3840026, at *1.

Acknowledging that “[g]roup pleading is not ideal,” Judge Xinis

ruled that “at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not expected to

possess complete knowledge of the defendant’s alleged wrongful

conduct, but need only submit facts sufficient to plead a plausible

claim for relief.” Id. at *3. Judge Xinis provided the following

reasoning in denying the officers’ motion to dismiss:

That the complaint does not specify by name

those officers who specifically kicked [the

plaintiff] in the face or put a bag over his

head is hardly fatal. [The plaintiff], as the

person experiencing the beating, would not

plausibly be able to identify the officers

with particularity. But at the same time,

those officers at the scene are identified,

thus placing them on sufficient notice of the

claims and the nature of the alleged jointly

undertaken group misconduct.

Id.

The same is true here. Plaintiff limits his allegations to

the ten officers Defendants confirmed “may have been involved” at

the scene. (ECF Nos. 12-1, at 1; 33 ¶¶ 7-16). Because he was

unconscious, it is not fatal that he cannot distinguish by name

which officers allegedly “grabbed [his] ankles,” “grabbed his

leg,” “picked [him] up around his upper body area[,]” “laid [him]

onto the concrete floor[,]” “piled on top of him in order to force

his body back down to the floor[,]” “repeatedly forced [him] to

lay back down on the ground[,]” placed handcuffs on him “so tightly

that they caused damage to his wrists and hands[,]” or “connected

[the handcuffs] to a secondary chain that was wrapped around [his]

waist.” (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33); see also

J.A., 2017 WL 3840026, at *3 (holding that group pleading is

sufficient “where the injured party was the alleged victim of a

group beat down which, no doubt, severely disadvantaged him and

any onlookers in identifying precisely which officers committed

which bad acts”); Bailey v. Campbell, No. 522-cv00052-KDB, 2024 WL

482211, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (finding that plaintiff

who alleged that six deputies waited for him outside the holding

cell and three grabbed him and shoved him into the unmonitored

room alleged enough specific factual allegations to survive a

motion to dismiss). Although Plaintiff cannot—at this point—

identify which officer committed which alleged acts, his

allegations are targeted at only the officers present at the cell

extraction and specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss on

the ground of group pleading.

B. Common Law Tort Claims

Plaintiff brings claims for negligence (Count I) and gross

negligence (Count II) against all Defendants, and battery (Count

V) against Defendant Officers.

1. Governmental Immunity

Defendants contend that Defendant County4 should be dismissed

from Count I (negligence) and Count II (gross negligence)5 because,

as a municipality, it is immune from suit based on the tortious

4 Defendants mistakenly refer to Wicomico County as the Town.

(ECF No. 36-1, at 7).

5 Defendants also mistakenly assert that Plaintiff seeks to

hold Defendant County liable for Count V—battery. (ECF No. 36-1,

at 7). In fact, Plaintiff only alleges Count V against Defendant

Officers.

acts of its employees. (ECF No. 36-1, at 7-11). Plaintiff argues

that Defendant County is not immune from liability “where the

officer acted within the scope of his or her duties and without

malice” because the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”)

“provides an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for

tortious conduct[.]” (ECF No. 41, at 12, 13) (citing DiPino v.

Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49 (1999)). Plaintiff asserts that “[a]s the

application of the LGTCA turns on questions of intent and

motivation, a highly nuanced and fact-specific determination, this

issue is best reserved for the trier of fact and is inappropriate

for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” (ECF No. 41, at

14) (citing Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 424 (1968)). In the

alternative, Plaintiff contends that even if sovereign immunity

applies, Defendant County “is still a necessary party to this case

as a potential indemnitor.” (ECF No. 41, at 16). Defendants

respond that Plaintiff misreads DiPino and Defendant County cannot

be sued directly solely because of its defense and indemnification

responsibilities. (ECF No. 44, at 4-6).

Plaintiff conflates Defendant County’s duties to defend and

indemnify its employee in a tort suit with a waiver of sovereign

immunity. “[M]unicipalities are generally immune from common law

tort suits when engaged in governmental, as opposed to proprietary,

acts.” Devi v. Prince George’s Cnty., No. 16-cv-3790-DKC, 2017 WL

3592452, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 21, 2017) (citing Nam v. Montgomery

Cnty., 127 Md.App. 172, 182 (1999); DiPino, 354 Md.App. at 47).

“[T]he operation of prisons and jails is a government function.”

Jones v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 1910 Sept. term 2014, 2016 WL

1321396, at *4 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. Apr. 5, 2016) (citing Jones Hollow

Ware Co. of Baltimore City v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 115 (1919)).

Thus, Defendant County is immune as to common law tort claims

asserted against it based on torts committed by employees of its

prisons and jails.

Plaintiff is correct that § 5-303(b) of the LGTCA requires

Defendant County to indemnify a judgment against its employee for

damages resulting from a tortious act committed by the employee

without malice or gross negligence in the scope of employment.

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(b)(1); see also Hansen v.

City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 689 (2011) (quoting Ashton v.

Brown, 339 Md. 70, 104 (1995)) (noting that the LGTCA “shifts

financial liability for wrongs committed by local government

officials, acting in the scope of their employment and without

malice, from the public officials to the local government entity

itself”). The LGTCA, however, “does not permit a plaintiff to

name Defendant County directly in a common law tort suit.” Devi,

2017 WL 3592452, at *2 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

§ 5-303(b); Martino v. Bell, 40 F.Supp.2d 719, 722 (D.Md. 1999)).

Plaintiff relies on Baltimore City Police Department v.

Esteppe, 247 Md.App. 476 (2020), aff’d, 476 Md. 3 (2021), for the

proposition that a “local government’s liability for any judgment

can be appropriately addressed within the underlying tort action

against the employee.” (ECF No. 41, at 18). Plaintiff argues

that it would be more “efficient” for Defendant County to remain

in this suit rather than requiring Plaintiff to bring another suit

to enforce Defendant County’s obligation to pay an underlying

judgment. (ECF No. 41, at 18) (quoting Estepp, 247 Md.App., at

511). In Esteppe, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against a

former police officer. Id. at 486. In the same action as the

underlying tort suit, the plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory

relief to recover the judgment from the police department and the

city, who had previously been dismissed from the suit. Id. at

494.

The state courts ruled that, if indemnification is disputed

after a favorable verdict in the underlying tort action, a tort

plaintiff may proceed to establish a local government’s liability

under the LGTCA either in the underlying tort action or in a

separate action at a later date. Whichever mechanism is chosen,

however, two requirements must be met: (1) the local government

must be a party to the proceeding, and (2) plaintiff must make a

claim to enforce the obligation. Id. at 500-06.

Here, Defendant County is a party to the suit. Plaintiff’s

current complaint does not seek a declaration that Defendant County

would be liable to pay a judgment entered against one of its

employees. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint seeks to hold

Defendant County directly liable for damages resulting from torts

committed by its employees. Because “the LGTCA does not permit a

plaintiff to sue the local government directly” in a common law

tort suit, Doe v. Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore Cnty., 595 F.Supp.3d

392, 411 (D.Md. 2022), the claims against Defendant County will be

dismissed without prejudice from Counts I and II, but Defendant

County will not be dismissed from the action. Plaintiff will have

the opportunity to file a third amended complaint seeking a

declaration that, if Defendant Officers are found liable for any

of the tort claims, Defendant County must pay the judgment.

2. Public Official Immunity

Defendants argue that Defendant Officers have common law and

statutory public official immunity against all state common law

claims not based on malice or gross negligence, and that Plaintiff

has not pled facts that would support a plausible claim for either

malice or gross negligence. (ECF No. 36-1, at 11-12). Plaintiff

counters that “public official immunity does not apply to the vast

majority of Plaintiff’s claims” because “immunity does not apply

where: (1) the plaintiff asserts a constitutional tort, (2) the

plaintiff asserts an intentional tort, (3) a jury determines that

the official acted with gross negligence, or (4) a jury determines

that the official acted with malice.” (ECF No. 41, at 20).

Plaintiff maintains he pled sufficient facts to demonstrate gross

negligence because

[a] reasonable juror could conclude either

that the Defendant Officers (1) did not know

what medical emergency Plaintiff was suffering

and did not know the proper treatment, but

nevertheless rendered significantly deficient

medical aid despite trained medical

professionals standing nearby or (2) knew that

Plaintiff was suffering a seizure, knew that

restraining a seizing person could, and likely

would, result in stress injuries caused by the

involuntary movements, and nevertheless

proceeded to forcibly restrain Plaintiff while

he was still undergoing the seizure.

(ECF No. 41, at 24). Plaintiff also asserts that a special

relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants defeats public

official immunity because Plaintiff was in Defendants’ custody.

(ECF No. 41, at 21) (quoting Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306

Md. 617, 631 (1986)). Defendants respond that “without any

differentiation or specification of wrongdoing, there is not a

plausible basis to claim the individual officers acted with gross

negligence or malice[.]” (ECF No. 8).

“[A] governmental actor enjoys a certain public official

immunity for his or her non-malicious acts if it is determined

that: (1) he is a ‘public official,’ and (2) his tortious conduct

occurred while he was performing discretionary acts in furtherance

of his duties.” Dunbar v. Biedlingmaier, No. 20-cv-0738-DKC, 2022

WL 814293, at *8 (D.Md. Mar. 17, 2022) (quoting Ashburn, 306 Md.

at 622). Here, Defendant Officers are public officials. Cooper

v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 713 n.13 (2015) (“Prison guards or

correctional officers are public officials.”). Plaintiff does not

dispute that Defendant Officers’ alleged negligence occurred while

they were performing discretionary acts in furtherance of their

duties. Indeed, Defendant Officers exercised their personal

judgment in determining how to respond to Plaintiff’s seizure.

See Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 17 (2004) (holding that

corrections officer performed discretionary act when he

“commence[d] direct lifesaving measures” in response to

incarcerated person’s suicide attempt).

To defeat public official immunity, a plaintiff must allege

that the defendant acted with malice or gross negligence or

committed an intentional tort or state constitutional tort.

Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 452 F.Supp.3d 283, 297-98

(D.Md. 2020). “Actual malice is established by proof that the

defendant-officer intentionally performed an act without legal

justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive

influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully

injure the plaintiff.” Id. at 298 (quoting Bord v. Baltimore

Cnty., 220 Md.App. 529, 557 (2014)) (internal citation marks

omitted). “A plaintiff cannot ‘rely on bare allegations that a

particular act raises an inference of malice.’” Koon as next

friend of Glay v. Prince George’s Cnty., MD, No. 17-cv-2799-DKC,

2019 WL 1317401, at *7 (D.Md. Mar. 22, 2019) (quoting Hines v.

French, 157 Md.App. 536, 563 (2004)). “Instead, a plaintiff

asserting malice ‘must point to specific evidence that raises an

inference that the defendant’s actions were improperly motivated

in order to defeat the motion.’” Id. (quoting Hines, 157 Md.App.

at 563).

Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to raise an inference

of malice. He pled that while he “convuls[ed] uncontrollably”

during his seizure, Defendant Officers “piled on top of him in

order to force his body back down to the floor[,]” “repeatedly

shoved [him] to the ground for nearly 30 minutes . . . while

medical staff stood mere inches away[,]” and applied handcuffs “so

tightly that they caused damage to his wrists and hands.” (ECF

No. 33 ¶¶ 19, 29, 32, 34). He alleged that Defendant Officers’

actions caused a torn rotator cuff, buildup of scar tissue that

causes pain, and multiple hand sprains. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 42, 43,

57). Plaintiff has not “‘[m]erely assert[ed] that an act was done

maliciously’ but rather . . . ‘allege[d] with some clarity and

precision those facts which make the act malicious.’” Cooper v.

Doyle, No. 22-cv-0052-DKC, 2022 WL 16923857, at *3 (D.Md. Nov. 14,

2022) (quoting Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md.App. 510, 528 (1984)).

Even if Plaintiff convulsed uncontrollably during his seizure,

there is no indication that he was combative or violent toward the

correctional officers, or that he was attempting to evade

restraint. See Layden v. Stanley, No. 4:22-cv-61-FL, 2023 WL

3733903, at *4 (E.D.N.C. May 30, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs

sufficiently alleged malice where they pled that the plaintiff

“had not been combative, or otherwise violent toward the officers”

and had been “handcuffed, possessed no weapon, and did not try to

flee”). Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant

Officers’ decision to pile on top of him and repeatedly shove him

to the ground constituted an “[u]njustified application of

malignant force,” which courts in this district have held “may

give rise to a reasonable inference that [an officer] was motivated

by ill will toward or an affirmative intent to injure Plaintiff.”

Est. of LeRoux v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, No. 8:22-cv-00856-

AAQ, 2023 WL 2571518, at *20 (D.Md. Mar. 20, 2023) (quoting Solis

v. Prince George’s cnty., 153 F.Supp.2d 793, 805 (D.Md. 2001)).

Plaintiff has also alleged facts sufficient to support an

inference of gross negligence. Gross negligence is

An intentional failure to perform a manifest

duty in reckless disregard of the consequences

as affecting the life or property of another,

and also implies a thoughtless disregard of

the consequences without the exertion of any

effort to avoid them. Stated conversely, a

wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or

acts wantonly and willfully only when he [or

she] inflicts injury intentionally or is so

utterly indifferent to the rights of others

that he [or she] acts as if such rights did

not exist.

Cooper, 443 Md. at 708. Defendant Officers’ alleged decision to

shove Plaintiff to the floor repeatedly for nearly 30 minutes

instead of instructing the medical staff, who stood watching, to

provide medical attention “‘implies a thoughtless disregard of the

consequences’ (i.e., [Plaintiff’s] injuries) ‘without the exertion

of any effort to avoid them.’” Shields v. Prince George’s Cnty.,

Maryland, No. 15-cv-1736-GJH, 2019 WL 3536800, at *13 (D.Md.

Aug. 2, 2019) (quoting Cooper, 443 Md. at 708). The claims against

Defendant Officers in Counts I (negligence) and II (gross

negligence) will therefore proceed to discovery.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Officers committed the

intentional tort of battery. “Under Maryland law, ‘[a] battery

occurs when one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another

without that person’s consent.’” Young v. Prince George’s Cnty.,

Maryland, 355 F.3d 751, 759 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Nelson v.

Carroll, 355 Md. 593, 600 (1999)). Plaintiff has alleged facts

that, if proven, would establish that Defendant Officers battered

him by piling on top of him and repeatedly shoving him to the

ground. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 29, 31). Public official immunity does

not apply to his battery claim. It is well settled that “public

official immunity does not apply in the case of intentional torts,

such as battery.” Touko v. United States, No. 20-cv-1113-GJH,

2021 WL 2685328, at *3 (D.Md. June 29, 2021) (citing Cooper, 443

Md. at 713 n.14) (“A public official is not entitled to common law

public official immunity where the official committed an

intentional tort[.]”); Ashton, 339 Md. at 117 (“Public official

immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts.”); Cox v.

Prince George’s Cnty., 296 Md. 162, 169 (1983) (“[A] police officer

does not enjoy this immunity if he commits an intentional

tort[.]”); Johnson v. Prince George’s Cnty., Maryland, No. 10-cv-

0582-DKC, 2011 WL 806448, at *7 (D.Md. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Public

official immunity would not apply to [the plaintiff’s] intentional

tort claims.”)). Therefore, the claim against Defendant Officers

in Count V (battery) will proceed to discovery.

C. Excessive Force Claims

Plaintiff brings claims for excessive force against Defendant

Officers in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) and Articles

16, 24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count

IV).

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s excessive force claims should be

dismissed because “there is no basis to draw an inference that any

actions present a plausible claim that punishment occurred, only

attempts to care for someone experiencing a medical issue.” (ECF

No. 36-1, at 14). Plaintiff responds that Defendant Officers’ use

of force was objectively unreasonable because: (1) “[t]here was

no need for the use of any force”; (2) Plaintiff did not pose a

threat to anyone because he “was suffering a medical emergency in

his cell”; (3) Defendant Officers made no effort . . . to temper

or limit the amount of force that they were using”; (4) “no

security issue [was] present and none of the Defendant Officers

could have reasonably perceived any threat” because “Plaintiff was

actively seizing the entire time”; and (5) “Plaintiff, who was

undergoing a medical emergency, was certainly not resisting in any

manner.” (ECF No. 41, at 26). Defendants reply that “[t]he

failure to specify allegations against any of the Defendants is

fatal to this claim[.]” (ECF No. 44, at 9).

In his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

Officers’ use of force violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. (ECF No. 33, at 15, 16). The Fourth Amendment

prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual

punishments[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Finally, the Fourteenth

Amendment’s “Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from

the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment does not govern

claims brought by pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Wallace v. Moyer,

No. 17-cv-3718-CCB, 2020 WL 1506343, at *8 (D.Md. Mar. 30, 2020)

(citing Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., Maryland, 302 F.3d 262,

268 (4th Cir. 2002)) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claim for

excessive force because “the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected

the idea that the Fourth Amendment governs claims brought by

pretrial detainees”); Brown v. Warden, No. 17-cv-3231-GJH, 2019 WL

1409694, at *5 (D.Md. Mar. 28, 2019) (quoting Riley v. Dorton, 115

F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010)) (“[T]he protection of the

Fourth Amendment ‘does not extend to the alleged mistreatment of

arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody.’”); Ragins v. Co

Lieutenant Derrick Burman, No. 15-cv-2471-GJH, 2017 WL 5466675, at

*3 (D.Md. Nov. 13, 2017) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply

to claims of excessive force against pretrial detainees.”). Thus,

Count III will be dismissed as to the Fourth Amendment claim.

Courts have consistently held that the Fourteenth Amendment

protects pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment protects

convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Wallace, 2020 WL 1506343, at *9

(citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400-01) (“The Supreme Court has

explained that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishment applies only to convicted prisoners, and that

a pretrial detainee’s claims of mistreatment while detained are

instead governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

clause.”); Brown, 2019 WL 1409694, at *4 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 395 n.10) (noting that “the Due Process Clause protects a

pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to

punishment[]” and that “[a]fter conviction, the Eighth Amendment

serves as the primary source of substantive protection . . . in

cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as

excessive and unjustified[]”); Thompson v. Opoku, No. 18-cv-1022-

ELH, 2020 WL 978681, at *15 (D.Md. Feb. 28, 2020) (quoting Brown

v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001)) (“[T]he State does

not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is

concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt

in accordance with due process of law.”). Because Plaintiff was

not a convicted prisoner at the time of the incident giving rise

to his complaint, Count III will be dismissed as to his Eighth

Amendment claim.

To state an excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a pretrial detainee must show only

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was

objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. A

pretrial detainee need not show subjective intent. Id. at 396-

97. The determination is made “from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew

at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 397.

In evaluating the reasonableness of the force used, courts may

consider:

the relationship between the need for the use

of force and the amount of force used; the

extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort

made by the officer to temper or to limit the

amount of force; the severity of the security

problem at issue; the threat reasonably

perceived by the officer; and whether the

plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id.

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Officers repeatedly

shoved Plaintiff to the ground while he was seizing indicate that

their use of force was “deliberately (not accidentally or

negligently) used.” Id. at 396. “[F]rom the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene,” Plaintiff has also alleged facts

showing that Defendant Officers’ use of force was excessive. Id.

at 397. He alleged that he was unconscious, suggesting Defendant

Officers’ use of force was entirely disproportionate to the minimal

security threat a reasonable officer would have perceived. Even

if Plaintiff was convulsing and could not follow Defendant

Officers’ commands, his allegations do not support any inference

that he was intentionally resisting, violent, combative, or

attempting to flee. Plaintiff’s allegations indicate Defendant

Officers did not attempt to temper their use of force; rather, he

alleges they repeatedly shoved him to the ground for nearly 30

minutes and handcuffed him tightly while he was seizing. Finally,

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officers caused severe injuries

including a torn rotator cuff and multiple hand sprains, which

have caused significant pain, prevented him from completing most

daily tasks independently, and made it nearly impossible for him

to work. Thus, it was objectively unreasonable to shove Plaintiff

repeatedly to the ground and apply handcuffs so tightly they caused

damage to his wrists and hands while Plaintiff was seizing. A

reasonable officer in the same situation would likely have

stabilized Plaintiff in a position that would minimize injuries

resulting from his convulsions and directed the medical staff to

provide medical care or transport him to a hospital immediately.

Plaintiff can proceed on his claim for excessive force under

§ 1983. See, e.g., Thompson, 2020 WL 978681, at *17-18 (denying

correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment where plaintiff

argued he was not combative and dropped down to the floor when

officers extracted him from his cell).

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Officers’ use of

excessive force violates Articles 16, 24, 25, and 26 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights. (ECF No. 33, at 18). Article 24

is construed in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment, Article

26 is construed in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment, and

Articles 16 and 25 are construed in pari materia with the Eighth

Amendment. Karn v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 16-cv-3261-GJH, 2017 WL

4162251, at *9 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2017) (noting that “the cases are

legion in which Maryland Courts have construed Article 26 in pari

materia with the Fourth Amendment” and “Article 24 is the state

analog to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”); Wallace,

2020 WL 1506343, at *9 (“Maryland courts read Articles 16 and 25

as in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment.”).

Because Plaintiff has stated a claim for excessive force under

the Fourteenth Amendment, his Article 24 claim will also proceed

to discovery. His Article 16, 25, and 26 claims will be dismissed

because they, like the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, do not apply

to pretrial detainees. See Wallace, 2020 WL 1506343, at *8, *9

(dismissing Article 16, 25, and 26 claims because they do not apply

to pretrial detainees).

D. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care Claims

Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide adequate

medical care in violation of § 1983 (Count VI) and Articles 16,

24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VII).

Defendants assert that these claims should be dismissed

because Plaintiff’s allegations are “facially implausible in light

of facts that are alleged.” (ECF No. 36-1, at 17). Specifically,

Defendants contend that medical staff were present at the scene

immediately, nothing suggests Defendant Officers acted at odds

with the medical staff, Plaintiff does not allege that the medical

staff should have done anything differently, and Plaintiff was

transported to the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff responds that he

in fact pled that “Defendant Officers arrived on scene first,

ignored the medical personnel, and determined their own course of

action—a dangerous and grotesquely insufficient response to a

seizure—preventing medical personnel from acting.” (ECF No. 41,

at 28). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Officers “(1) disregarded

the substantial risk of serious injury that would result from

immobilizing a person suffering from involuntary muscle spasms,

and (2) ignored Plaintiff’s serious need for medical care during

a seizure, which was readily available in the medical personnel

who stood nearby but were not permitted to render aid.” (Id. at

29). Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s allegations “are too

non-specific and undifferentiated to state a plausible claim.”

(ECF No. 44, at 10).

In his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’

failure to provide adequate medical care violated the Fourth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment portion

of Count VI and the Maryland Declaration Article 26 portion of

Count VII will be dismissed for the same reason that they were

dismissed in Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. See, e.g., Fisher

v. Fernandez-Casas, No. 3:20-cv-846-HEH, 2022 WL 1227998, at *2

(E.D.Va. Apr. 26, 2022) (quoting Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295,

300 (4th Cir. 2021)) (“Although [Plaintiff] contends that

Defendant[]’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment, because

[Plaintiff] was likely a ‘pretrial detainee and not a convicted

prisoner,’ the Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims of

inadequate medical care.”).

The Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual

punishment” requires prison officials to provide medical care to

convicted prisoners. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th

Cir. 2016). “When a prison official demonstrates ‘deliberate

indifference” to an inmate’s serious medical needs, a

constitutional violation occurs under the Eighth Amendment.”

DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Scinto, 841 F.3d at 236). “[P]retrial detainees, like inmates

under active sentence, are entitled to medical attention, and

prison officials violate detainees’ rights to due process when

they are deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.”

Tarashuk v. Givens, 53 F.4th 154, 1635 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1094 (4th Cir. 1992)). Because a

pretrial detainee’s right to medical attention arises under the

Due Process Clause, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that “the

Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment, governs” a

pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. Mays, 992 F.3d at 300; see also Brown, 240 F.3d at

388 (quoting Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992))

(“[I]f [plaintiff] was a pretrial detainee rather than a convicted

prisoner, then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

rather than the Eighth Amendment, ‘mandates the provision of

medical care to detainees who require it.’”). Thus, the Eighth

Amendment portion of Count VI and the Maryland Declaration Articles

16 and 25 portion of Count VII will be dismissed.

The Fourth Circuit recently held that “Kingsley’s objective

test extends to all pretrial detainee claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk

of harm.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 610 (4th Cir. 2023).

Accordingly, it articulated the standard for claims alleging

deliberate indifference to a medical need:

To state a claim for deliberate

indifference to a medical need, . . . a

pretrial detainee must plead that (1) they had

a medical condition or injury that posed a

substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the

defendant intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly acted or failed to act to

appropriately address the risk that the

condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or

should have known (a) that the detainee had

that condition and (b) that the defendant’s

action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high

risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee

was harmed.

Id. at 611.

Under this objective standard, a “plaintiff no longer has to

show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s

serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk

that their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id.

Rather, “it is sufficient that the plaintiff show that . . . the

defendant should have known of that condition and that risk, and

acted accordingly.” Id. The Fourth Circuit advised, however,

that “it is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the

defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the

detainee.” Id. at 611-12.

Plaintiff has stated a claim for failure to provide adequate

medical care under § 1983 and Article 24 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights. First, he alleged that he experienced a

seizure during which he convulsed involuntarily—certainly a

medical condition that could pose a substantial risk of serious

harm. (ECF No. 33 ¶ 19); Wise v. C. Maruka, No. 1:20-cv-00056-

OJA, 2021 WL 1603819, at *21 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 5, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Wise v. Maruka, No. 1:20-cv-00056,

2021 WL 1146002 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 25, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-6816,

2023 WL 1519515 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (presuming a seizure

condition subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious

harm).

Second, by asserting that Defendant Officers “repeatedly

shoved [him] to the ground for nearly 30 minutes . . . while

medical staff stood mere inches away,” Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged both that Defendant Officers’ state of mind was at least

reckless and that Defendant Officers failed to address the risk

that Plaintiff’s seizure presented. (ECF No. 33 ¶ 34). Taken as

true, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant Officers

recklessly risked further harm by repeatedly shoving him to the

ground and restraining him while he was actively seizing, and

failed to address the risk that Plaintiff’s seizure presented by

failing to provide, or failing to direct the medical staff present

to provide, medical care.

Third, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Officers knew or

should have known he was seizing because he pled that (1) two

detainees, believing Plaintiff was experiencing a medical

emergency, banged on the unit door to get the attention of the

correctional officers in the hallway; (2) Defendant Officers

observed him convulsing; (3) medical staff also responded to the

cell; and (4) while being transported to the hospital, Officer

Burrell informed Plaintiff he had a seizure. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 20,

21, 23, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36). Plaintiff also plausibly alleged

that Defendant Officers’ decision to force him to the ground

repeatedly and failure to provide or direct the provision of

medical care for nearly 30 minutes posed an unjustifiably high

risk of harm.

Fourth, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Officers’

conduct caused harm including a torn rotator cuff, buildup of scar

tissue that causes pain, and multiple hand sprains. (ECF No. 33

¶¶ 42, 43, 57).

Thus, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant Officers were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant Officers for failure to provide adequate medical

care under § 1983 and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of

Rights will proceed to discovery.6

6 Plaintiff also names Defendant County in Counts VI and VII.

Because Plaintiff does not include any allegations specific to

Defendant County in Counts VI or VII, however, Defendant County’s

liability for failure to provide adequate medical care is more

appropriately addressed in the Monell and Longtin analysis below.

E. Monell and Longtin Claims

Plaintiff brings Monell and Longtin claims in Counts VIII and

IX respectively. In his Monell claim, he alleges that Defendant

County engaged in a pattern and practice of continually delegating

its non-delegable duty to ensure the safety of inmates and

detainees. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 122-125). He also alleges that by

failing to establish effective procedures, rules, orders,

guidelines, and practices to ensure that violations of the rights

of citizens do not occur, and by failing to ensure that allegations

of such violations will be thoroughly investigated and

appropriately punished, Defendant County instituted and maintained

formal and informal customs, policies, and practices that foster,

promote, and encourage employees to violate the rights of citizens.

(Id. ¶¶ 128, 129). Plaintiff’s Longtin claim is similar, although

in it, he also (1) specifies that the right Defendant County

violated was the right to receive adequate medical care; (2)

includes a failure-to-train claim; and (3) alleges that Defendant

County has been sued in the past for failing to provide adequate

mental health care and accommodations for detainees with

disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 139-141, 146, 147).

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Monell and Longtin claims should

be dismissed because Plaintiff (1) does not specify which duties

relating to the health and safety of inmates Defendant County

violated; (2) does not identify a particular policy, pattern, or

practice Defendant County maintained; and (3) does not identify a

single example of unconstitutional conduct other than the one

Plaintiff allegedly experienced. (ECF No. 36-1, at 19-21).

Plaintiff responds that he stated a Monell claim by

demonstrating a custom by condonation, which does not require him

to point to any express written policy or policymaker’s decision,

and instead requires him to point to the government’s actual or

constructive knowledge of the conduct and failure to correct it

due to deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 41, at 31). Plaintiff

argues he met this standard because Defendant County

unconstitutionally permitted lay individuals to provide medical

care, which demonstrates a gross disregard for the health and

safety of detainees. (Id. at 31-32). Plaintiff also contends

that the Fourth Circuit has found that plaintiffs have pled

sufficient Monell claims where they alleged that other cases

existed, without identifying any prior incident. (Id. at 30-31)

(citing Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379,

403 (4th Cir. 2014)). Finally, Plaintiff maintains that because

he has met the pleading standard for a Monell claim, he has also

satisfied the pleading standard for a Longtin claim, which is

broader in nature because the protections of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights extend beyond federal constitutional

protections. (Id. at 32).

Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s allegations of previous

cases “lack the similarity and pervasiveness” required by Owens

and “appear as isolated incidents at best, without any description

that those cases were even meritorious.” (ECF No. 44, at 11).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a claim against a

municipality if the municipality maintained a policy or custom

that caused violation of a constitutional right. Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-91 (1978).

A plaintiff can show the existence of a policy or custom in four

ways:

(1) through an express policy, such as a

written ordinance or regulation; (2) through

the decisions of a person with final

policymaking authority; (3) through an

omission, such as a failure to properly train

officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate

indifference to the rights of citizens”; or

(4) through a practice that is so “persistent

and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or

usage with the force of law.”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter

v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). Here, Plaintiff

does not allege the existence of an express policy or decision of

a person with final policymaking authority. Plaintiff attempts to

allege the existence of a policy or custom by (1) arguing Defendant

County failed to train its correctional officers and (2)

identifying a custom by condonation of failing to provide adequate

medical care.7 (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 140-147).

1. Failure to Train

A municipality can only be held liable for a failure to train

under § 1983 where the failure reflects a “deliberate” or

“conscious” choice on the part of the municipality. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Thus, a

“complaint should contain facts revealing: (1) the nature of the

training, (2) that the training was a ‘deliberate or conscious’

choice by the municipality, and (3) that the officer’s conduct

resulted from said training.” Peters v. City of Mount Rainier,

No. 14-cv-00955-GJH, 2014 WL 4855032, at *5 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2014)

(quoting Lewis v. Simms, No. 11–cv-2172-AW, 2012 WL 254024, at *3

(D.Md. Jan. 26, 2012)).

Plaintiff has not alleged such facts. He alleges solely that

Defendant County’s “training and supervision do not effectively

protect detainees which has resulted in the repeated injury of

detainees like Plaintiff[]” and “Defendants have failed to

properly train, supervise, and discipline their officers with

respect to the proper response to a detainee experiencing a medical

7 These allegations are included in Count IX, which Plaintiff

labels as his Longin claim, but not in Count VIII, which Plaintiff

labels as his Monell claim. Because Monell and Longin claims are

treated the same, Palma v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, 598

F.Supp.3d 288, 297 n.5 (D.Md. 2022), the court will consider

Plaintiff’s allegations in both counts in its analysis.

emergency.” (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 140, 141). Plaintiff does not allege

any detail about Defendant County’s training practices or how they

led to a pattern or practice of providing inadequate medical care.

Without more, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly

state a claim for municipal liability based on Defendant County’s

failure to train its correctional officers. See, e.g., Grim v.

Baltimore Police Dep’t, No. 18-cv-3864-ELH, 2019 WL 5865561, at

*18 (D.Md. Nov. 8, 2019) (dismissing claim where “plaintiff

allege[d] that the BPD failed properly to train officers, but she

does not identify any particular BPD training practices or any

specific defect or omission in the BPD training program”); Devi,

2017 WL 3592452, at *3 (dismissing claim where “Plaintiff merely

state[d] in conclusory terms that Defendant County failed to

adequately train, supervise, and discipline its officers against

the use of excessive force, thereby demonstrat[ing] a gross

disregard for the constitutional rights of the public and

[Plaintiff]”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Peters, 2014 WL

4855032, at *5 (dismissing failure-to-train allegation that “is

nothing more than a bare-bones generalization that a legal element

(i.e. the policy[-]or-custom element) is met”).

2. Custom by Condonation

Under the custom by condonation theory of liability, “a city

violates § 1983 if municipal policymakers fail ‘to put a stop to

or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.’”

Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,

1389 (4th Cir. 1987)). In a custom by condonation claim, a

“plaintiff must point to a ‘persistent and widespread practice[ ]

of municipal officials,’ the ‘duration and frequency’ of which

indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive

knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their

‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386-

91). “Both knowledge and indifference can be inferred from the

‘extent’ of employees’ misconduct.” Id. at 402-03 (citing

Spell, 824 F.2d at 1391). “Sporadic or isolated violations of

rights will not give rise to Monell liability; only ‘widespread or

flagrant’ violations will.” Id. at 403 (citing Spell, 824 F.2d at

1387).

The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that the pleading standard

on a Monell claim is low. Id. Indeed, “[t]he recitation of facts

need not be particularly detailed, and the chance of success need

not be particularly high.” Id. “A plaintiff fails to state a

claim only when he offers ‘labels and conclusions” or formulaically

recites the elements of his § 1983 cause of action.” Id. (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Accordingly, the Owens court determined

that the plaintiff sufficiently pled a custom by condonation claim

where he alleged that other cases existed but did not name them.

Id. at 403 (“The assertions as to ‘reported and unreported cases’

and numerous ‘successful motions’ are factual allegations, the

veracity of which could plausibly support a Monell claim.”).

Here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant County “has been sued

on at least two separate occasions for failing to provide adequate

mental health care, leading to the untimely deaths of at least two

detainees[]” and “has been sued on at least one prior occasion for

failing to provide accommodations for detainees with

disabilities.” (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 146, 147). These allegations do

not satisfy even the low pleading standard for Monell claims

articulated in Owens. The instant suit alleges Defendants failed

to provide adequate medical care, not mental health care, and does

not allege that Defendants failed to provide disability

accommodations for Plaintiff. Because the lawsuits Plaintiff

relies upon do not allege the same kind of misconduct of which

Plaintiff complains here, the three examples do not indicate a

“persistent and widespread practice” of failing to provide

adequate medical care. Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (quoting Spell

v, 824 F.2d at 1389). Nor has he alleged that any of the cases

involved conduct—and adverse adjudication—prior to the conduct in

this case. Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Defendant

County engaged in a custom by condonation of tolerating

constitutional violations of detainees’ right to receive adequate

medical care.

Plaintiff’s Monell claim will be dismissed, as will his

Longtin claim. “Courts in this district have stated that ‘Longtin

claims are essentially Maryland’s version of Monell claims.’”

McCullough, 2020 WL 836235, at *6 (quoting Krell, 2018 WL 6523883,

at *16); see also Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty., Md.,

No. 8:11-cv-02873-AW, 2012 WL 3715331, at *9 (D.Md. Aug. 27, 2012).

“Thus, Monell and Longtin claims rise or fall together, and the

Court need not undertake an independent analysis of the sufficiency

of the latter.” Palma, 598 F.Supp.3d at 297 n.5 (citing Krell,

2018 WL 6523883, at *15).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be granted as to (1) Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence

claims against Defendant County, with leave to amend to add a

request for a declaration that Defendant County is obligated to

indemnify Defendant Officers (Counts I and II); (2) the portion of

Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to provide medical care

claims alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment, Eighth

Amendment, and Articles 16, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration

of Rights (Counts III, IV, VI, VII); and (3) Plaintiff’s Monell

and Longtin claims (Counts VII and IX). Defendants’ motion will

be denied as to all other claims. A separate order will follow.

/s/

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge