Stevens v. Baltimore HUD Field Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

)

SHERLENE STEVENS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 23-cv-01265-LKG

)

v. ) February 28, 2024

)

BALTIMORE HUD FIELD OFFICE, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this civil action, Plaintiff pro se, Sherlene Stevens, asserts breach of contract and

defamation claims against Defendant, the Baltimore Field Office of the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), related to a decision to terminate

her participation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”). See generally ECF No.

5. The Defendant has moved to dismiss this matter pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). ECF No. 12. The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 12, 14, 16.

No hearing is necessary to resolve this motion. L.R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the

Court: (1) GRANTS the Defendant’s motion and (2) DISMISSES the complaint.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel, and her

complaint is somewhat difficult to follow. See generally ECF No. 5. But, generally, it appears

that Plaintiff brings this action to challenge a February 2021 decision to terminate her

participation in the Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”). Id.

1 The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the complaint, the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, and the memorandum in support of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 5, 12, 12-1.

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against the Defendant: (1) Breach

of Contract and (2) Defamation. Id. at 6; 8 ¶¶ 19, 20. As relief, Plaintiff seeks to recover

monetary damages and to obtain mortgage assistance from the Defendant. Id. at 8-9 ¶¶ 22-29.

Plaintiff is a resident of Maryland. ECF No. 5 at 1.

Defendant, the Baltimore Field Office of the United States Department of Housing and

Urban Development, is a regional office of HUD that is managed by a Field Office Director,

who reports to the Regional Administrator. See HUD’s Local Office Directory, U. S. DEP’T. OF

HOUS. AND URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/local (last visited February 29, 2024).

The Housing Choice Voucher Program

As background, the United States Housing Act of 1937 authorizes HUD to make loans

to local public housing authorities (“LPHAs”) to help finance the operation of low-income

housing projects and programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(a); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1. LPHAs have the

primary responsibility of administering these projects and programs. 42 U.S.C. §

1437(a)(1)(C) (stating that the policy of the United States is to “vest in public housing

agencies . . . the maximum amount of responsibility and flexibility in program

administration[.]”).

The HCVP, formerly known as “Section 8,” is a HUD-funded low-income housing

program that enables LPHAs to help eligible families afford housing. See 24 C.F.R. §

982.1(a)(1). HUD provides funding to LPHAs for the HCVP, pursuant to a standard contract

known as the Annual Contributions Contract (“ACC”). 24 C.F.R. § 982.151.

In administering the HCVP, LPHAs make eligibility determinations, approve housing

units, enter into housing assistance payments contracts with landlords, decide whether to

terminate assistance, and conduct hearings at the request of participants who challenge its

decisions. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.201, 982.302, 982.305, 982.308, 982.311, 982.451,

982.554 and 982.555. Given this, HUD’s role in implementing the HCVP is limited to four

primary responsibilities: (1) developing policy, regulations and guidance; (2) allocating housing

assistance funds to the LPHAs; (3) providing technical assistance and training to the LPHAs;

and (4) monitoring LPHA compliance with program requirements and performance goals. See

Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook, U. S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. AND URB. DEV,

https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_35611.pdf (last visited February 29, 2024). And

so, HUD neither awards, nor terminates, housing assistance payments. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.201

and 982.552.

When a family applies to the HCVP, the LPHA determines the family’s eligibility. 24

C.F.R. § 982.201. If a family is accepted into the HCVP, then the family selects a housing unit

for the LPHA’s approval. 24 C.F.R. § 982.302. Once the housing unit is approved, the family

enters into a lease with the landlord for that housing unit, and the landlord and the LPHA enter

into a housing assistance payments contract for the term of the lease. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.302,

982.305, 982.308(b)(I), 982.311 and 982.451. If necessary, the LPHA determines whether to

terminate housing assistance payments. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552.

Plaintiff’s Claims

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she participated in the HCVP while living in

Delaware, Georgia, and Washington, D.C. ECF No. 5 at 6 ¶¶ 7, 13. Plaintiff also alleges that

her rental subsidy under the HCVP was later transferred to the City of Annapolis, Maryland in

July 2017, where the program is supervised by the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis

(“HACA”).2 Id. at 6, ¶¶ 6-7.

Plaintiff alleges that when her rental subsidy was reassigned to HACA, HACA required

that she exchange her 3-bedroom unit located in Washington, D.C. for a one-bedroom unit

located in Maryland. Id. at 7, ¶ 16. Plaintiff also alleges that, on February 18, 2021, HACA

denied her request for a transfer of her housing benefits, because she was “not current in all

rental payments” to her landlord. ECF No. 5-4. And so, Plaintiff challenges the HACA

required exchange, the HACA termination decision, and the Baltimore HUD Field Office’s

alleged “recent action” of refusing to allow “any of Maryland’s housing authority offices’ to

consider her application for housing benefits.” ECF No. 5 at 8 ¶ 19.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks to recover “reimbursement of relocating and housing expenses

from January 29, 2020 to present[;]” “expenses incurred during relocation from Georgia to

Maryland;” housing expenses for her and her children (estimated to total $175,000); public

housing benefits of $1,570 per month; and, mortgage assistance for her and her children. Id. at

2 Plaintiff alleges that the “Baltimore HUD Field Office . . . oversees the Annapolis housing authority”

and all HCVP in “housing-authority jurisdictions” in Maryland. ECF No. 5 at 6 ¶ 8. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges that, since October 2019, HACA has expressed “publicly” that she owed “an

outstanding rent balance . . . as the reason for her eviction. Id. at 8 ¶ 20.

8-9 ¶¶ 22-29.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff originally filed this matter before the Circuit Court of Queen Anne’s County,

Maryland. ECF No. 1. On May 12, 2023, Defendant removed the case to this Court. Id.

On July 11, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support

thereof, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). ECF Nos. 12, 12-1. On

August 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Defendant’s motion. ECF No. 14.

On August 23, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief. ECF No. 16.

The Defendant’s motion to dismiss having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the

pending motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Jurisdiction And Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), is a challenge to the Court’s “competence or authority to hear the

case.” Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). The United States Supreme

Court has explained that subject-matter jurisdiction is a “threshold matter” that is “inflexible and

without exception.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1995) (quoting

Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). And so, an objection that the

Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own

initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v.

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also explained that the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F.

Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac

R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). Given this, the Court “regard[s]

the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue[] and may consider evidence outside the pleadings

without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment,” when deciding a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Id. (citation omitted). And so, if a plaintiff “fails to allege

facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction,” then the Court should grant a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 799.

B. Pro Se Litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel. And so, the Court

must construe the complaint liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980). But, in

doing so, the Court cannot disregard a clear failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable

claim. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Bell v. Bank of

Am., N.A., No. 13-0478, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se

plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court

is not obliged to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or

otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (quotations omitted).

And so, if plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts setting forth a cognizable claim, the Court must

dismiss the complaint.

C. Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and

“controversies,” the “core component of [which is] standing.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, a Plaintiff must show: (1) that she suffered an

“injury in fact”– or an “invasion of a legally protected interest” which is “concrete and

particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) a “causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” as the “the injury has to be

“fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant” and not the result of

“independent action of some third party not before the court[;]” and (3) that it is “likely,” as

opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.

at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of

injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to establish standing, because in

resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court “presum[es] that general allegations embrace those

specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,

497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3189, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). As the party invoking

federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 561. A failure to establish any one of the elements of standing deprives the Court

of jurisdiction and requires dismissal of the claim. See id. (explaining that the elements of

standing are not “mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's

case[.]”)

IV. ANALYSIS

The Defendant has moved to dismiss this matter, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), upon the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her

breach of contract and defamation claims against HUD; (2) the Court does not possess subject-

matter jurisdiction to consider those claims; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state plausible breach of

contract and defamation claims in the complaint. See generally ECF No. 12-1. Specifically,

the Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action, because she has not

alleged facts in the complaint to show either that her termination from HCVP and related

injuries are traceable to HUD, or that her injuries are the result of actions by HUD. ECF No.

12-1 at 6-9. In addition, the Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that

the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider her claims, because she fails to

establish a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow for such claims against HUD. Id. at 9-11.

Lastly, the Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim,

because the complaint “contains no concrete factual averment of wrongdoing on the part of

HUD.” Id. at 12. And so, the Defendant requests that the Court dismiss this matter. Id.

Plaintiff does not substantively address the Defendant’s arguments in support of the

dismissal of this matter in her response in opposition to the Defendant’s motion. See generally

ECF No. 14. But Plaintiff generally argues that the Court should not dismiss the complaint.

ECF No. 14 at 10.

For the reasons that follow, a careful reading of the complaint shows that Plaintiff lacks

standing to pursue her breach of contract and defamation claims against HUD, because she fails

to show that her alleged injuries are either traceable to, or redressable by, HUD. Plaintiff also

has not met her burden to show that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider

her claims. And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Defendant’s motion and (2) DISMISSES the

complaint.

A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Pursue Her Claims

As an initial matter, the Defendant persuasively argues that the Court should dismiss this

matter, because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her breach of contract and defamation claims in

this action. To have standing, Plaintiff must establish an injury-in-fact, causation, and

redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations

omitted).

Relevant here, the causation element of standing is satisfied when a plaintiff can show a

“causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” as the “the injury has to

be ‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’ and not the result of ‘independent

action of some third party not before the court.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). In addition,

Plaintiff can establish the redressability element of standing by showing show that it is “likely,”

as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Id. at 561. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that a redressable injury “result[s] from the

actions of the [defendant], not from the actions of a third party beyond the Court’s control.” Doe

v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir. 2013). For the reasons discussed below,

Plaintiff has not shown that she has standing to pursue her claims against the Defendant.

First, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in the complaint to establish that any

injuries she has suffered are traceable to Defendant. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her

injuries in this case—the alleged termination of her benefits and defamation—are the result of

decisions HUD made in response to her requests with regards to her housing assistance benefits

under the HCVP. See ECF No. 5 at 6 ¶ 8; 7 ¶¶ 15-16; 8 ¶¶ 19-20. But the complaint is devoid of

any facts to show that HUD made any individualized determinations about Plaintiff’s housing

benefits. See generally ECF No. 5; ECF No. 5-4. In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges in the

complaint that HACA, which is a local public housing authority, “supervised” her housing

benefits. ECF No. 5 at 6 ¶ 7.

Given this, the allegations in the complaint make clear that Plaintiff cannot establish that her

alleged injuries are traceable to HUD. And so, Plaintiff has not shown that her injury is traceable

to Defendant to establish standing.

Plaintiff similarly fails to allege facts in the complaint to show that her injuries are

redressable by HUD. Plaintiff can satisfy the redressability element of standing by showing

show that it is “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that her injury will be “redressed by

a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. But the Fourth Circuit has made clear that a

redressable injury “result[s] from the actions of the [defendant], not from the actions of a third

party beyond the Court’s control.” Doe, 713 F.3d at 755.

In this case, the complaint makes clear that HACA, rather than HUD, administers the

HCVP and that HACA made the decisions related to Plaintiff’s housing benefits. See ECF No. 5

at 6 ¶ 7; ECF No. 5-4. While Plaintiff alleges the Baltimore HUD Field office “oversees the

Annapolis housing authority,” the parties do not dispute that HUD and HACA are separate

entities. See ECF No. 5 at 6 ¶ 8; ECF No. 12-1 at 2-3. There is also no dispute that HUD’s only

involvement with the HCVP is to provide funding for this program. See ECF No. 12-1 at 2-3.

Given these undisputed facts, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries in this action could not have

resulted from HUD’s actions. As a result, any relief that the Court could grant in this case would

not redress the alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiff. And so, Plaintiff also cannot show that it is

likely that her injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court to establish standing.

Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show that her alleged injuries are either traceable

to, or redressable by, HUD, she lacks standing to pursue her claims against the Defendant. And

so, the Court must DISMISS the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1).

B. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiff’s Claims

Even if Plaintiff could establish standing to pursue her claims, she also fails to show that

the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider her breach of contract and defamation

claims against HUD.

As the Defendant correctly observes, the doctrine of sovereign immunity removes

subject-matter jurisdiction from the Court for suits against the United States, unless the United

States has clearly, expressly, and unambiguously consented to suit. United States v. Mitchell,

463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Lane v. Pena,

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). Given this, the Court has held that: (1) any waiver of sovereign

immunity must be “‘unequivocally expressed in statutory text,’” and (2) “absent a statutory

waiver of . . .sovereign immunity,” the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [a] matter

and must dismiss [the] case. Potomac Constr. Co., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Tr. Auth.,

2021 WL 1516058, at *13 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2021).

Here, Plaintiff neither identifies a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity that

would allow her to bring her claims against HUD, nor shows that her claims are appropriate for

review under the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) limited waiver of sovereign

immunity. See generally ECF No. 5. Notably, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for the

claims asserted in this action under either 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f), or 24 C.F.R. § 982, which govern

the HCVP. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f); 24 C.F.R. § 982.

Plaintiff also has not established jurisdiction under the APA, because the complaint lacks

factual allegations to show that HUD was involved in any of the decisions related to the

termination of her housing benefits. See ECF No. 5 at 7 ¶ 16. Given this, there is no action, or

decision on the part of HUD alleged in the complaint for the Court to review under the APA’s

limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

Because Plaintiff has neither established that the Government has waived its sovereign

immunity from suit for the claims alleged in this matter, nor that her claims may be brought

pursuant to the APA, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the Court possesses subject-

matter jurisdiction to consider her claims. And so, the Court also DISMISSES the complaint for

these reasons, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).3

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, a careful reading of the complaint shows that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue

her breach of contract and defamation claims against HUD, because she fails to show that her

alleged injuries are either traceable to or redressable by HUD. Plaintiff also has not met her

burden to show that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider her claims. And

so, the Court:

3 Because the Court determines that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims, and that the Court does

not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims, the Court does not reach the issue of

whether Plaintiff fails to state plausible claims for relief in the complaint.

1. GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and

2. DISMISSES the complaint.

A separate Order shall issue.

s/Lydia Kay Griggsby

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY

United States District Judge