Albert v. Franchot

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STEVEN G. ALBERT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 1:22-cv-01558-JRR

v.

PETER FRANCHOT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court is Defendant’s1 (the “Comptroller”) Motion for Reconsideration

(ECF No. 16; the “Motion”). No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the

reasons that follow, by accompanying order, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Steven Albert and Barry Diamond initiated this class action against the

Comptroller challenging the Maryland abandoned and unclaimed property statute, MD. CODE

ANN., COM. LAW §§ 17-101, et seq., (the “Act”). Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of

themselves as owners of property governed by the Act and “all current owners of property held by

the Comptroller in the form of money.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the

Act allows for a “taking” without just compensation. The Complaint contains two counts: Claim

for Declaratory and Prospective Injunctive Relief under the Fifth Amendment (Count I); and Claim

1 The Comptroller of Maryland is the Defendant in this case. Brooke Lierman is the current Comptroller of Maryland

and is sued in her official capacity; when filed, the Complaint named then Comptroller Peter Franchot.

for Declaratory and Prospective Injunctive Relief under Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland

Constitution (Count II). (ECF No. 1.)

On August 22, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 5.) Defendant

argued that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because Defendant

enjoys Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims seek retroactive

relief; Plaintiffs lack standing; and the claims are not ripe. (ECF No. 5-2 at 2-3.) Additionally,

Defendant argued that the Complaint fails to allege a facial challenge to the constitutionality of

the Act. Id.

On June 16, 2023, the court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant timely filed the

instant Motion. (ECF No. 16.) Thereafter, Defendant filed four supplements. (ECF Nos. 23, 24,

29, and 32).2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that an interlocutory order “may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and

liabilities.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). See also Fayetteville Inv’rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936

F.2d 1462 (4th Cir. 1991) (“An interlocutory order is subject to reconsideration at any time prior

to the entry of a final judgment.”); and Local Rule 105.10 (permitting a motion for reconsideration

within fourteen days of the subject order). Reconsideration is appropriate “(1) to accommodate an

intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3)

to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076,

2 Defendant filed her most recent supplement on January 18, 2024 (ECF No. 32) to which Plaintiffs have not yet

responded. The fourth supplement reiterates Defendant’s arguments set forth in the Motion and the first three

supplements.

1083 (4th Cir. 1993).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant moves this court to reconsider its decision regarding subject matter jurisdiction

on grounds of sovereign immunity, standing, and ripeness. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack

standing because there was no constitutional “taking.” (ECF No. 16.) The supplements reiterate

the arguments set forth in the Motion and raise additional arguments based on sovereign immunity

and ripeness and commend the court’s attention to several opinions of sister courts issued after the

court denied the motion to dismiss: (1) Maron v. Patronis, Case No. 4:22-cv-00255-RH-MAF

(N.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2023); (2) Garza v. Woods, Case No. 2:22-cv-01310-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL

5608414 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2023); (3) Light v. Davis, 1:22-cv-00611-CJB, 2023 WL 6295387 (D.

Del. Sept. 27, 2023); and (4) James v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076 (5th Cir. 2023). The court discusses

these cases below.

A. Sovereign Immunity

1. State Constitutional Claim (Count II)

Defendant, by way of a footnote in her first supplement, asserts that Plaintiffs’ claim for

violation of the Maryland Constitution (Count II) is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity by operation of the holding in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89 (1984).3 (ECF No. 23 at 3 n.3.) Plaintiffs counter that the Ex parte Young exception (209

U.S. 123 (1908)) applies to state law claims seeking prospective relief against state officials

3 Defendant proffers that her motion to dismiss sought dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claim based on

sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 23 at 3 n.3.) While Defendant did raise sovereign immunity in her motion to dismiss,

the argument focused on the relief sought, not whether Plaintiffs’ claims were rooted in federal or state law. See ECF

No. 5-2 at 9 (stating that “Defendant interprets plaintiffs’ complaint as not seeking damages but only prospective

injunctive and declaratory relief. If the court were to construe the complaint as including a claim for damages or

retroactive relief, those claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment because states are immune from claims

for damages brought in federal court.”) Normally, it is improper to raise novel arguments in a motion for

reconsideration; however inasmuch as the Motion bears on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is appropriately

raised at any time.

asserted in federal court.

In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against

state officials on the basis of state law regardless of whether the requested relief is prospective or

retroactive. 465 U.S. at 106. In so holding, the Court examined the doctrine born of Young and

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court explained that Young held that “a suit

challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one against the State,” and that

“the theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is ‘void’ and therefore does not

‘impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United

States.’” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102 (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 160) (alterations in original).

The Court further explained that Edelman held that claims for violation of federal law seeking

retroactive relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 102-103 (explaining that

“Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the

federal court may award an injunction that governs the official’s future conduct, but not one that

awards retroactive monetary relief.”) Against the backdrop of Young and Edelman, the Pennhurst

Court reasoned that when a plaintiff alleges that a state official violated state law, “the entire basis

for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears.” 465 U.S. at 106. The Court held that “Young

and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims set forth in Count II cannot survive the holdings of

Pennhurst. The Supreme Court expressly rejects Plaintiffs’ position that Ex parte Young applies

to state law claims for prospective relief. Ex parte Young is inapplicable to state law claims against

state officials no matter the relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims are barred

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and will be dismissed. See Spoklie v. Montana, 411

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing the plaintiff’s state constitutional claims and holding

that “Pennhurst dictates that the claim must be dismissed” because “Ex parte Young allows

prospective relief against state officers only to vindicate rights under federal law”); Alleyne v. New

York State Educ. Dep’t., 691 F. Supp 2d 322, 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s state

constitutional claims pursuant to the holding in Pennhurst.)

2. Retroactive Money Damages

Despite Defendant’s assertion in her motion to dismiss that “Defendant interprets

plaintiffs’ complaint as not seeking damages but only prospective injunctive and declaratory

relief,” (ECF No. 5-2 at 9) on reconsideration, she now argues that Plaintiffs seek “specific

monetary relief” which “would require payment from the State’s general fund,” and “such relief

is clearly retroactive and not prospective.” (ECF No. 28 at 8-9.) Defendant relies on the holding

in Gaza v. Woods that “because the monies sought by Plaintiffs and the putative class in the action

would be monies coming principally from the State’s general fund, Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary

compensation are at odds with the Eleventh Amendment, and Defendants are entitled to sovereign

immunity for those claims.” Gaza, at *9-10

This court addressed Defendant’s argument in its memorandum opinion on the motion to

dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) Specifically, this court explained:

In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., the Supreme

Court held that “when the action is in essence one for the recovery

of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in

interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit

even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” 323 U.S.

459, 464 (1945). That notwithstanding, “[t]he Supreme Court has []

repeatedly recognized that “relief that serves directly to bring an end

to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh

Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary

effect on the state treasury.” Virginia Hosp. Ass’n v. Baliles, 868

F.2d 653, 662 (1989).

(ECF No. 12 at 10.) Based on these well-settled legal principles, this court concluded:

The court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint seek

prospective injunctive and declaratory relief as allowed under the Ex

parte Young doctrine. Plaintiffs’ requested relief seeks, to their way

of seeing it, to bring the Act into compliance with the Takings

Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maryland

Constitution. That Defendant may have to spend state funds to

effect compliance with federal law does not remove Plaintiffs’

claims from the Ex parte Young exception.

Id.

Although the court will dismiss Count II, its analysis regarding sovereign immunity as to

Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims (Count I) remains intact. The court declines to reconsider

or disturb its ruling on the basis that another court in a separate jurisdiction reached a different

conclusion. The Gaza case is persuasive authority and not binding on this court. Gaza reveals

neither a “change in controlling legal precedent” nor “clear error of law.” Hutchinson, 994 F.2d

at 1083. Accordingly, the Motion will be denied on this basis.

B. Standing

1. Texaco Inc. v. Short

Defendant asserts that this court’s ruling that Plaintiffs allege a “taking” of their property

and therefore have Article III standing is based on “clear legal error and would work manifest

injustice.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 1.) Specifically, Defendant avers the court’s ruling is “contrary to

binding Supreme Court precedent in Texaco Inc. v. Short., 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982), which holds

that there is no ‘taking’ when the government rescinds an owner’s rights in abandoned property.”

(ECF No. 16-1 at 1.) Plaintiffs counter that Texaco is inapposite because it “is not a takings case.”

(ECF No. 21 at 6.) Texaco involved termination of mineral rights by operation of statute following

a period of non-use (the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act), whereas the instant case involves an

unclaimed property statute. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant fails to appreciate the

difference between property that is considered “abandoned” because the ownership interest ceases

and property that is “presumed abandoned” and taken into State custody under unclaimed property

statutes like the Act. Id. (citing Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 582-83 (7th Cir. 2013)).

The Supreme Court in Texaco addressed the constitutionality of a state mineral lapse statute

that automatically reverted a mineral interest to a third-party upon failure to comply with

requirements of the statute. 454 U.S. at 518-19. The Indiana Mineral Lapse Act provided:

Any interest in coal, oil, gas, and other minerals, shall, if unused for

a period of 20 years, be extinguished, unless a statement of claim is

filed in accordance with section five hereof, and the ownership shall

revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it was carved.

Id. at 518 n.3. Based on the statute, the appellants’ mineral interest lapsed and ownership of the

same reverted to the appellees. Id. at 522. The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the

mineral lapse statute on three bases, only one of which is relevant to the court’s resolution of the

Motion — whether the statute “effected a taking of private property for public use without just

compensation.” Id. The Court held that the mineral lapse statute did not constitute a Fifth

Amendment “taking” requiring just compensation. Id. at 528.

The thrust of Defendant’s argument rests on the Texaco Court’s discussion regarding a

property owner’s neglect or failure to use the interest, thereby resulting in abandonment.

Importantly, the Texaco Court’s analysis hinges upon the plain language of the statute. The Court

explained that “in ruling that private property may be deemed to be abandoned and to lapse upon

the failure of its owner to take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has never required

the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect.” 454 U.S. at 530. The

“neglect” is an owner’s failure to take the actions imposed by law; and the “law” at issue in Texaco

was the mineral lapse statute.

The Court held, “[w]e have concluded that the State may treat a mineral interest that has

not been used for 20 years and for which no statement of claims has been filed as abandoned; it

follows that, after abandonment, the former owner retains no interest for which he may claim

compensation.” Id. The criteria for abandonment are set by the statute (20 years without use and

failure to file a statement of claims); and the fact that the former owner retains no interest for which

he may claim compensation arises from the statute’s automatic reversion provision. Because the

Court found the statute to be constitutional and the former owner’s property interest automatically

lapsed, pursuant to the statute, there was no property (or interest) that could be subject to a taking,

which led the Court to conclude that “there is no ‘taking’ that requires compensation.” Id. at 530.

Here, the plain language of the Act does not implicate the holding in Texaco. The Act, by

its plain terms, does not extinguish an ownership interest in presumed abandoned or unclaimed

property. Sections 17-301 through 17-307.1 address when different types of personal property are

“presumed abandoned.” Sections 17-312 and 17-313 govern the delivery of abandoned property

to the Comptroller, and the Comptroller’s custody and safekeeping of the same. Section 17-318

allows for “any person who claims a legal interest in any property delivered” under the Act to file

a claim to the property or proceeds from its sale.

The statute at issue in Texaco automatically extinguished a mineral ownership interest after

a specified period of unuse. Importantly, here, the Act does not by any construct or operation

terminate or extinguish an ownership interest in property that is “presumed abandoned” or

otherwise in the custody of the Comptroller. To the contrary, the Act would appear to allow that

individual’s legal interest in personal property in the State’s custody may persist undisturbed

indefinitely.

The statutory scheme challenged in Texaco is materially distinguishable from the Act. The

court will deny the Motion on this basis and the court’s standing analysis and ruling as to the

federal constitutional claim remains undisturbed.

2. Persuasive Authority

Defendant offers several cases from other jurisdictions to persuade the court that Plaintiffs

lack standing.4 None avails to Defendant’s interest.

In Maron v. Patronis, the plaintiffs learned they owned unclaimed property held in the

state’s custody. Case No. 4:22-cv-00255-RH-MAF (N.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2023). They brought suit

because, pursuant to the state unclaimed property statute, they would only be paid a principal

amount without interest or other compensation. The District Court for the Northern District of

Florida held that it is constitutionally sufficient for Florida to return the plaintiffs’ unclaimed

property without interest or other compensation. In so holding, the court relied on Texaco: “The

theory is that property that is unclaimed for a sufficient period is effectively abandoned — and that

a state may assume ownership of abandoned property without effecting a constitutional taking for

which it must pay just compensation.” Maron Order of Dismissal at p. 10. Despite the court’s

acknowledgement that property is abandoned after a “sufficient period,” pursuant to Texaco, the

court noted that the Florida Statute gave an owner an unlimited amount of time to assert rights to

the property. Id.

The Maron court further reasoned that:

If, as is settled, it would have been constitutional for the State to take

the property entirely, without redress, it is difficult to discern why it

should be unconstitutional for the State to give back to the owner

the principal only, without interest or other compensation.

Id.

Maron is unpersuasive. First, the court disagrees with the Maron court’s application of

4 Maron v. Patronis, Case No. 4:22-cv-00255-RH-MAF (N.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2023); Garza v. Woods, Case No. 2:22-

cv-01310-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL 5608414 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2023); Light v. Davis, 1:22-cv-00611-CJB, 2023 WL

6295387 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023); and James v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076 (5th Cir. 2023).

Texaco for the reasons articulated above. Second, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the

Maron court’s logic that there was no taking because Florida could have gotten to the same

economic end by other (constitutional) means. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 362

(2015) explaining:

The Government thinks it “strange” and the dissent “baffling” that

the Hornes object to the reserve requirement, when they nonetheless

concede that “the government may prohibit the sale of raisins

without effecting a per se taking.” Brief for Respondent 35; post, at

388, 192 L. Ed. 2d, at 415 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But that

distinction flows naturally from the settled difference in our takings

jurisprudence between appropriation and regulation. A physical

taking of raisins and a regulatory limit on production may have the

same economic impact on a grower. The Constitution, however, is

concerned with means as well as ends. The Government has broad

powers, but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be

“consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the

constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). As

Justice Holmes noted, “a strong public desire to improve the public

condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter

cut than the constitutional way.” [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).]

In Garza v. Woods, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s unclaimed

property statute. Garza v. Woods, Case No. 2:22-cv-01310-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL 5608414 (D. Ariz.

Aug. 30, 2023). Specifically, the Garza plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona unclaimed property

statute was facially unconstitutional, and the defendants’ enforcement of the statue violated their

rights under the Takings Clause. Here, Defendant relies on Garza because the District of Arizona

dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Takings Clause based on the holding in Texaco.

Defendant, however, overlooks a material distinction between the Maryland and Arizona

unclaimed property statutes. The Arizona statute provides: “. . . a person may file a claim. . .

within thirty-five years after the final day of the fiscal year in which the department received the

unclaimed property.” A.R.S. § 44-317(E). Under the Arizona statute, an individual’s interest in

unclaimed property in the State’s custody automatically lapses after thirty-five years; at that

moment, the property is considered abandoned as contemplated by Texaco. The Garza court

concluded that “[t]he State’s ultimate termination of a claimant’s rights to compensation for

abandoned property — presumptively after a period of 35 years under AUPA — does not

constitute a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Garza, at *12.

Relying on Texaco’s holding that 20 years was a sufficient period of time to support

abandonment, the District of Arizona concluded that the 35 years was adequate to support

abandonment. Based on these principles, the District of Arizona concluded that enforcement of

the statute did not violate the Takings Clause because it was not constitutionally unreasonable for

property to be considered abandoned and ownership interest extinguished after 35 five years.

In contrast, the Maryland Act does not set forth a time period for a person with legal interest

to make a claim. Further, unlike the plaintiffs in Garza, Plaintiffs do not allege that the State’s

manner or method of enforcing the statute is unconstitutional; rather, Plaintiffs allege that the Act

is unconstitutional on its face because it usurps private property for the benefit of the public without

just compensation by offering no means of avenue through which the true owner can seek or be

paid interest or other just compensation. Garza does not persuade this court to disturb its ruling

as to standing.

In James v. Hegar, the plaintiffs were Texas residents whose assets escheated to the State

pursuant to Texas’ unclaimed property statute. 86 F.4th 1076 (5th Cir. 2023). In James, the

plaintiffs’ claims were largely based on allegations that they did not receive proper notice before

their property escheated to the state. The Fifth Circuit held that a past harm (i.e. failure to give

proper notice before the property escheated) was insufficient to confer standing. The Fifth Circuit

further held that because the plaintiffs alleged a past harm, they lacked standing to seek prospective

relief, which would bring the claims within the scope of Ex parte Young. As discussed herein, and

in the court’s memorandum opinion addressing Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ claims

hinge upon the Act’s mandate that unclaimed property be used for public benefit without just

compensation to the owner. As long as an owner’s property is being used by the State for public

benefit and the owner has not been justly compensated, the harm is ongoing; Plaintiffs’ requested

prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, if granted, would redress the same. James does not

persuade this court to disturb its ruling as to Plaintiffs’ standing.

C. Ripeness

Defendant asserts that the court should reconsider its ruling that Plaintiffs’ federal

constitutional claim is ripe. In support, Defendant implores this court to adopt the reasoning of

the District of Delaware in Light v. Davis, and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim as unripe. In Light, the

plaintiff alleged challenged the Delaware unclaimed property statute based on the state’s custody

and use of property alleged to belong to the plaintiff. Light v. Davis, 1:22-cv-00611-CJB, 2023

WL 6295387 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023). The plaintiff did not submit a claim for the unclaimed

property or provide evidence to the State Escheator that would enable the escheator to confirm that

the plaintiff was the rightful owner. The District of Delaware dismissed the claims for lack of

ripeness. In so holding, the Light court reasoned that because the plaintiff failed to file a claim for

the property, too many contingencies were left open (including whether the plaintiff could prove

he was a viable claimant to begin with); therefore, the court found the claim was not ripe. Id. at

*13.

Here, Plaintiff counters that Light is at odds with Knick v. Twp. of Scott, in which the

Supreme Court held that “a property owner has a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as

soon as a government takes his property for public use without paying for it.” 139 S. Ct. 2162,

2170. This court discussed at length in its memorandum addressing the motion to dismiss the

holding in Knick and noted that the Knick Court overruled its holding in Williamson Cty. Reg’l.

Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). (ECF No. 12 at 15-

15); see Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (announcing “[w]e now conclude that the state-litigation

requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our

takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled. A property owner has an actionable Fifth

Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it”).

Defendant asserts Knick did not overrule the finality requirement set forth in Williamson

Cty. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the finality prong because the

“contingencies” articulated by the District of Delaware in Light are present in this case. (ECF No.

28 at 12.) Plaintiffs counter that Defendant “seeks to impose a ‘finality’ requirement” beyond that

required by the Supreme Court. (ECF No. 27.)

In Pakdel v. City & Cty of San Francisco, the Supreme Court explained:

“The finality requirement is relatively modest. All a plaintiff must

show is that ‘there [is] no question . . . about how the regulations at

issue apply to the particular land in question.’”

141 S. Ct. 2226, 2230 (2021) (quoting Suitum, 520 U. S. 725, 739 (1997) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court further explained the scope of the finality requirement in the context

of a regulatory taking:

The rationales for the finality requirement underscore that nothing

more than de facto finality is necessary. This requirement ensures

that a plaintiff has actually “been injured by the Government’s

action” and is not prematurely suing over a hypothetical

harm. Horne, 569 U. S., at 525. Along the same lines, because a

plaintiff who asserts a regulatory taking must prove that

the government “regulation has gone ‘too far,’ ” the court must first

“kno[w ] how far the regulation goes.” MacDonald, Sommer &

Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 348 (1986). Once the

government is committed to a position, however, these potential

ambiguities evaporate and the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution.

Id.

Moreover, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view of finality, explaining:

The Ninth Circuit’s contrary approach—that a conclusive decision

is not “final” unless the plaintiff also complied with administrative

processes in obtaining that decision—is inconsistent with the

ordinary operation of civil-rights suits. Petitioners brought their

takings claim under §1983, which “guarantees ‘a federal forum for

claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.’

” Knick, 588 U. S., at ___, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558, at

567. That guarantee includes “the settled rule” that “exhaustion of

state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under . .

. §1983.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, one of the

reasons Knick gave for rejecting Williamson County’s state-

compensation requirement is that this rule had “effectively

established an exhaustion requirement for §1983 takings

claims.” Knick, 588 U. S., at ___, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d

558, at 573.

Id.

The contingencies identified by Defendant and the Light court speak to a plaintiff’s

compliance with the administrative procedures set forth in the unclaimed property statutes at issue.

Whether a plaintiff has sufficient evidence or basis to assert a claim and whether a claim will be

granted by the applicable authority contemplate exhausting a certain process for a claim to be ripe.

According to Pakdel, such exhaustion surpasses the modest finality threshold.

Here, Plaintiffs satisfy the modest finality requirement. Plaintiffs’ position is that just

compensation for a taking includes interest and other fruits of the property – but the statute only

allows for payment of the principal amount, which is to say that the Act communicates plainly that

only the principal amount is to be paid, because no means exist by which a property owner can

request, demonstrate entitlement to, or otherwise demand payment of, interest or other value in

connection with the state’s use of private property for public benefit. The Motion will be denied

on this basis.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, by separate order, the Motion for Reconsideration will be

granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is granted as to Count II of the Complaint and

Count II will be dismissed. The remainder of the Motion is denied. The case will proceed as to

Count I of the Complaint.

/s/

Julie R. Rubin

United States District Judge

January 26, 2024