El-Bey v. Morman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BRO. STEPHEN MICHAEL EL-BEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: JRR-24-68

DEBORA MORMAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Stephen Michael El-Bey filed the above-entitled lawsuit on January 11, 2024. El-Bey is a

prisoner incarcerated at the Metropolitan Transition Center (“MTC”) in Baltimore, Maryland.

Although he did not pay the full filing fee and did not file a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis,

El-Bey will not be required to correct the deficiency as the complaint must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

El-Bey accompanies his complaint with a ten-page statement regarding his beliefs as to

why and how persons identifying themselves as Moorish Americans are not subject to the

jurisdiction of the State courts for criminal prosecution. He explains:

Public hazard bonding of corporate agents, agencies Public Servants Public

Subjects Public Officials are all required by federal state and municipal law to

provide the names, addresses and the telephone numbers of their public hazard

and malpractice bonding company and the policy number of the bond and if

required a copy of the policy describing the bonding overage of their specific

job performance and failure to provide this information constitute[s] corporate

limited liability insurance fraud (15 USC.) and is prima facie evidence and

grounds to impose a lien upon the official personally to secure their public oath

and service of office (18 USC 912).

ECF No. 1-1 at 1. He further asserts that once jurisdiction is challenged it “cannot be assumed

and must be decided.” Id. at 2. He then states that “all Government Entities and alleged private

for Profits corporations must be a creature of the American Constitution and this is a formal request

and command for above listed corporations and Agents Agencies Officers Public Servants Public

Subjects to produce for the record the physical documented Delegation of Authority to Proof of

Jurisdiction as required by Law per Article III Section I of the Unted States Republic Constitution

of North America.” Id. According to El-Bey, the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” entered into

by the United States with the Moorish Americans from 1787 to 1836 is “valid against the United

States under this Constitution as under the Confederation.” Id. at 3. He gleans from this assertion

that Moorish Americans are “Jus Sanguinis” and are “protected under International Law[,] The

Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1787-1836 and the Zodiac Constitution.” Id. at 4. He states that

Moorish Americans’ citizenship is not determined by their place of birth, but by being born to

parents who are Moorish American. Id. El-Bey concludes that if any Moorish American claims

to be kidnapped, held hostage, or any of their liberties are impaired, “lawsuit charges will be placed

on the individual personally in his private corporations[,] corporate entities representing the

individual in the civil suit amount of $300,000.” Id. at 9.

El-Bey alleges in his complaint against Debora Mormon that the lawsuit for $300,000 is

imperative because she is breaking the law by violating his civil rights, human rights, “Rights of

the Child, The Rights of aboriginal and indigenous People” seemingly due to the fact he was

arrested in his home. ECF No. 1. He includes disjointed phrases such as fraud, extortion, identity

theft, treason, and “warring against the People” and refers to the same citations included in the ten-

page document accompanying his complaint. Id. On its face, the complaint is non-sensical and

raises no legally cognizable cause of action.

Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A of 28 U.S.C. require this Court to conduct an initial

screening of complaints filed by prisoners and to dismiss any complaint that (i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b);

see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020). Here, the complaint is deficient because

the allegation that El-Bey is unlawfully detained is based on a theory that has been rejected by

every court that has considered it, i.e., that because El-Bey identifies as Moorish American the

State of Maryland may not prosecute him in the State courts for alleged criminal acts. See El v.

Mayor New York, No. 13–CV–4079 (SLT) (CLP), 2014 WL 4954476, at *5 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 30,

2014) (citation omitted); see Bond v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:14–cv–379–FDW, 2014 WL

5509057, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 31, 2014) (explaining that “courts have repeatedly rejected

arguments . . . by individuals who claim that they are not subject to the laws of the . . . individual

States by virtue of their ‘Moorish American’ citizenship”). “Regardless of an individual's claimed

status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood

human being,’ that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be

rejected summarily, however they are presented.” United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th

Cir. 2011); see United States v. White, 480 F. App’x. 193, 194 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Neither the

citizenship nor the heritage of a defendant constitutes a key ingredient to a ... court's jurisdiction

in criminal prosecutions....”).

El-Bey’s purported status as a Moorish–American citizen does not enable him to violate

state laws without consequence. Thus, “the argument that a person is entitled to ignore the laws

of the [State of Maryland] by claiming membership in the Moorish–American nation is without

merit....” El, 2014 WL 4954476, at *5 (omission in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted), see also Bey v. Genano, No. PWG-16-cv-2800, 2017 WL 1315530, at *2 n.7 (D.

Md. 2017) (“The legal assertions raised in the complaint and declaration involving [the

individual’s] Moorish-American descent amount to nonsensical gibberish.” (quoting Fullard v.

Maryland, 2015 WL 1517393, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015))); Bond v. N.C. Dep’t. of Corr.,

No. 3:14-cv-379-FDW, 2014 WL 5509057 at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2014) (stating that “courts

have repeatedly rejected arguments . . . by individuals who claim that they are not subject to the

laws of the . . . individual states by virtue of their ‘Moorish American citizenship’”), Hill-El v.

Johnson, No. TDC-18-1654, 2020 WL 6063469, at *3 (D. Md. 2020) (rejecting claim that Moorish

American status bars state courts from exercising jurisdiction because they are not Art. III federal

courts). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed:

Plaintiff’s contention that the South Carolina family court has no authority over

him because he is an “Indigenous American” who is not subject to state statutes

is illogical and has no basis in the law. Plaintiff’s argument simply defies the

reality of a State’s inherent power to enact legislation and the fundamental

principles of comity and federalism upon which the governing institutions of

this country are based.

Cruel-El v. South Carolina, No. 6:18-CV-1680-HMH-JDA, 2018 WL 3628844, at *4 (D.S.C. July

10, 2018), aff'd, 744 Fed. Appx. 185 (4th Cir. 2018).

When a complaint filed by a prisoner is dismissed in its entirety because it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim it qualifies as a “strike” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g). See Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 2013) (dismissal of complaint on

grounds enumerated in § 1915(g), and not procedural posture at dismissal, determines whether the

dismissal qualifies as a strike). Because this complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the

dismissal constitutes a strike. El-Bey is reminded that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) he will not be

granted in forma pauperis status if he has “on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless”

he can establish he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”

Accordingly, by separate Order which follows, the complaint shall be dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

____1.19.24______ _________/S/____________________

Date Julie R. Rubin

United States District Judge