Jackson v. Carin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Southern Division

ANGELO LAMONT JACKSON, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Case No.: 8:19-cv-00564-PWG

MICHAEL CARIN, *

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Angelo Lamont Jackson filed this lawsuit against Detective Michael Carin of the

Montgomery County Police Department (“MCPD”), claiming violations of the Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights, and asserting a Maryland state law claim for gross negligence in connection

with Detective Carin’s application for a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest, which Mr. Jackson

alleges was not supported by probable cause. Pending before me are the Parties’ Cross-Motions

for Summary Judgment, which are fully briefed.1 No hearing is necessary to resolve the pending

Motions. Local Rule 106.5 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons explained below, Mr. Jackson’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Detective Carin’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1 ECF No. 37, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. MSJ”); ECF No. 34,

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to Def. MSJ (“Pl.

MSJ/Opp.”); ECF No. 39, Defendant’s Reply and Opposition to Pl. MSJ (“Def. Reply/Opp.”);

ECF No. 40, Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Reply”).

On January 10, 2017, two individuals were stabbed to death at the Westfield Shopping

Center in Wheaton, Maryland. Detective Carin responded to the scene of the double-homicide

along with several other members of the MCPD. While at the mall, Detective Carin spoke to at

least one eyewitness and viewed the mall’s video surveillance footage, which had captured most

of the crime, including an image of the suspected perpetrator. Detective Carin took a photo of the

suspect as shown on the surveillance video to aid in his investigation.

MCPD Detective Brendon Johnston also responded to the scene and was shown “an image

of the suspect on the mall video recording.” ECF No. 37-7 (Affidavit of Detective Johnston).

Detective Johnston took a picture of that image, and texted it to his colleagues in the Criminal

Street Gang Unit to see if they might be of any assistance in identifying the suspect. Id. Detective

Johnston’s notes from the day of the stabbing indicate that a detective with the Criminal Street

Gang Unit, Detective Juan Lozano, “immediately knew the suspect as Angelo Jackson,” who was

known to the Criminal Street Gang Unit “as an associate of [a gang called] Hittsquad.” Id.

Detective Lozano sent Detective Carin an email the following day confirming that he recognized

“the suspect as being Angelo Jackson a previously validated gang member of the Hittsquad Gang.”

ECF No. 37-9 (Jan. 11, 2017, Email from Det. Lozano to Det. Carin). On Detective Carin’s request,

Detective Lozano wrote a “more detailed statement” on January 12, 2017, which noted that the

picture Detective Johnston sent to him “was of a light skinned male wearing what appeared to be

a black coat and a purple sweater underneath” and that “the subject resembled a male that is known

to associate with the Hittsquad gang, Angelo Jackson.” ECF 38-2 (Lozano Statement). Detective

Lozano explained:

Hittsquad is a gang that we have dealt with on a frequent basis since the time I have

been with the Gang Unit. Angelo Jackson is a validated member of the gang and I

see his photograph any time that we use the Hittsquad Gang flyer for reference or

when we update the flyer. A local rapper, Simba, who is also part of Hittsquad

frequently post rap videos on to Youtube. I view these videos in order to see if I

can identify any members of the gang in them. Angelo Jackson is in at least one of

these Youtube videos. In August of 2016, during the Montgomery County

Agricultural fair, I observed Angelo Jackson in person walking around the fair. I

recognized Angelo Jackson from the pictures we have used of him on the Hittsquad

flyer and his involvement in Simba's rap video.

Id.

Detective Carin testified that when he was departing the mall on January 10, 2017, MCPD

Detective Drew approached his car and informed him that the suspect had been identified as

Angelo Jackson. ECF No. 37-3 (Carin Dep. at 33:19–34:3). More specifically, Detective Carin

“was told that the corporal from the gang unit whose name was Brendan Johnston sent it out to the

gang officers, and there was a detective participating in another homicide that was out of state at

the time, and he indicated that the suspect was Angelo Jackson.” Id. at 34:10–17. Detective Carin

then clarified that the detective who identified Mr. Jackson was Detective Lozano. Id.

Years later, when he was deposed in connection with this case, Detective Lozano

acknowledged that he had misidentified Mr. Jackson as the individual in the surveillance video in

January 2017. ECF No. 37-8 (Lozano Dep. at 21:1–20). Detective Lozano testified that, at the time

he made his mistaken identification, he had seen Mr. Jackson in person only once, when the two

men were, by happenstance, at a county fair at the same time. Id. 9:18–10:2. He recognized Mr.

Jackson on that occasion because he had been “identified as a member of the Hit Squad gang, a

neighborhood gang in Gaithersburg,” and Detective Lozano had seen Mr. Jackson on fliers, on

social media, and featured in the background of rap videos made by a local musician. Id. at 10:4–

11; 14:15–21. Detective Lozano testified repeatedly that, although he was incorrect, he believed

at the time of his initial identification that the individual shown on the surveillance video was Mr.

Jackson. Id. at 27:5–29:7.

Detective Carin departed the Wheaton Mall after learning of Detective Lozano’s

identification. ECF No. 37-6 (Carin Answers to Int.) at 4. Upon his return to his office, Detective

Carin “was informed that Angelo Jackson had previously been arrested by School Resource

Officer George Hyson.” Id. Detective Carin “sent Officer Hyson a still picture of the suspect from

the surveillance video” to see if Officer Hyson recognized him. Id. Detective Carin testified that

Officer Hyson “identified the person in the photo as Angelo Jackson.” Carin Dep. at 39:4–5. When

pressed for specifics, Detective Carin explained that Officer Hyson first texted him stating that the

suspect in the still picture looked familiar, and later texted Detective Carin pictures that he

understood to confirm the identification. Id. at 41:2–42:15. Detective Carin also testified that he

spoke to Officer Hyson on the phone the same evening and that Officer Hyson identified Mr.

Jackson as the individual in the picture and “remembered him from [an] incident that occurred at

the high school” where he worked. Id. at 41:19–42:13.

The text exchange between Detective Carin and Officer Hyson partially confirms Detective

Carin’s testimony. See ECF No. 37-11 (Carin-Hyson Text Exchange). On a Tuesday at 8:58 PM,

Detective Hyson received a still picture of the suspect as shown on the surveillance video (January

10, 2017 was a Tuesday). Id. Detective Hyson responded to the message stating: “Looks familiar,

not sure at the moment. Face is familiar to me.” Detective Carin then texted: “Ok if you can check

your yearbooks and get back to me. Thank you in advance,” to which Officer Hyson responded:

“Most definitely will do.” Id. The next messages in the exchange are four pictures, apparently sent

by Officer Hyson, which show a Maryland driver’s license for Charlene Young, a Clarksburg High

School student ID card for Angelo Jackson, and two photos of a young black man in a t-shirt and

jeans standing against a white wall. Id.

During his deposition, Officer Hyson recalled that he was contacted by text message by

“someone from homicide” while he was on duty at a high school basketball game. ECF No. 37-10

(Hyson Dep.) at 26:15–27:8. The messages Officer Hyson received contained a still picture of a

young black man wearing a jacket and a hood. Id.2 Officer Hyson replied to the text message

stating that the individual looked familiar to him but that he was “not sure.” Id. at 32:22–33:9.

Officer Hyson testified that, although he said he would do so, he did not ultimately check any

yearbooks to determine the suspect’s identity. Id. 36:7–17. Officer Hyson identified the four

pictures at the end of the text exchange as “the pictures that [he] had in [his] case file from when

[he] arrested Mr. Jackson” in a prior unrelated incident. Id. at 29:10–19. Officer Hyson did not

remember if he had sent the pictures in the text exchange or if they had been sent to him, but

recalled that they were pictures that he had taken himself in connection with the prior arrest. Id. at

39:1–5.3

Officer Hyson also recalled that he spoke to someone—he could not recall whether it was

Detective Carin—on the phone the same evening of the text exchange, and that he thought the

phone call was after he had responded to the initial text message, though he was not certain. Id. at

37:3–6. Officer Hyson described the phone call and surrounding events as follows:

Q Okay. And what did you talk about on the phone call about the picture?

A I don't recall. I just think it was – I don't recall. Gosh, it was -- you

know, I remember getting a picture. I remember looking at it, you

know. I remember saying it looked familiar, face looked familiar. At

some point, whenever I got the phone call, I remember, you know, only

being asked -- like, I think it was, you know, did you ever have any

dealings with this person. And it was Angelo Jackson. And I said, oh,

2 Officer Hyson explained that it was common for him to receive texts asking him to identify

juveniles because, as a school resource officer, he was familiar with the student body at Watkins

Mill High School. Id. at 27:14–28:2.

3 Detective Carin testified that Officer Hyson sent the pictures to him. Carin Dep. at 45:10–

11; 55:14–15. The position of the pictures in the text exchange appear to confirm that.

yes. And I recall that. And I was, like, yes, you know, here is my report.

But I don't -- you know, I was, like, I remember, because I remember

him so vividly from what had happened, the report and everything that

happened. And that's all I remember talking about at that point. I don't

recall -- I just don't remember what came first. I think -- I remember

seeing a picture, I remember getting a picture. I remember, you know,

like, this guy is familiar. This is familiar. It looked familiar. And yes,

this is pretty much it, I think.

Q So is it fair to say that you felt the picture was familiar, but you didn't

immediately connect the dots that it was Angelo Jackson?

A Correct. I didn't immediately think – I did not immediately say this is

Angelo Jackson, correct.

Q Okay. At any point in time that night, did an officer say, do you think this

is Angelo Jackson, you know, in not so many words, but did they ask you

point blank, is this person Angelo Jackson?

A I don't recall.

***

Q Okay. In Detective Carin's discovery, he says that, and I am going to

continue. It says: Afterwards, I sent Officer Hyson a still picture of the

suspect from a surveillance video. Officer Hyson identified the suspect as

Angelo Jackson. So you don't recall identifying this subject as Angelo

Jackson to Detective Carin, do you?

A I don't recall identifying him to Detective Carin. Again, I remember --

you know, I don't. I don't recall just saying this is Angelo Jackson. I do

not recall that.

Q Okay. So you do remember that you did not definitively say this is Angelo

Jackson the night that you were contacted around 9:00 p.m.?

A Yes. I don't recall saying this is definitively him. I remember -- I don't

recall -- I don't recall actually, like you said, that definitive answer, I

do not recall. I did not give a definitive answer.

Q So you did not give Detective Carin a definitive answer regarding the

identification of this photo that night?

A Correct.

Id. at 37:7–40:19. Notwithstanding the testimony reproduced above, Officer Hyson also testified

that he believed on the night of January 10, 2018, that the individual shown in the picture sent by

Detective Carin was Mr. Jackson:

Q: Okay. But did you – at some point, did you believe that that was – that night,

did you believe that that was Angelo Jackson?

A: That night, did I believe it was Angelo Jackson? Yes. At some point,

yes.

Id. at 36:18–22.4

Detective Carin testified that after communicating with Officer Hyson, he spoke on the

phone to Assistant State’s Attorney Peter Feeney, who “indicated that he believed we had enough

probable cause to go ahead and apply for an arrest warrant.” Carin Dep. ay 47:3–5. Detective Carin

explained that he consulted with Mr. Feeney “because it was a homicide investigation and we had

to consult with the state’s attorney, and we are not going to get an arrest warrant without the

blessing of the state’s attorney.” Id. at 47:11–15. Detective Carin then affirmed the following,

under penalty of perjury, in his Application for Statement of Charges in the District Court of

Maryland for Montgomery County:

Your affiant is Detective Michael Carin, presently assigned to the Homicide

Section of the Montgomery County Department of Police.

On January 10, 2017 at approximately 1518 hours, officers from the

Montgomery County Police were dispatched to Westfield Shopping Center located

at 11160 Veirs Mill Road Wheaton, Montgomery County, Maryland, for a report

of a subject that was stabbed in the abdomen. Upon arrival, officers discovered two

Hispanic male victims suffering from stab wounds. Both subjects were transported

to a local hospital and later pronounced deceased.

As of this writing the victims have not been positively identified. The

victims will be referred to as: Victim I and Victim 2.

4 Officer Hyson recalled definitively identifying the individual in the surveillance video as

Mr. Jackson when he was called in to view the video the following morning. Hyson Dep. at 41:17–

44:18.

Investigators interviewed a number of witnesses to the assaults and also

learned that the assaults were captured on the mall security video system. The video

depicts a black male suspect armed with a knife assaulting both victims.

The suspect was identified by Montgomery County Police officers who

have had prior law enforcement contacts with the suspect. The officers identified

the suspect as Angelo Lamont Jackson (B/M; DOB [redacted]). Investigators

obtained photograph of Angelo Lamont Jackson. That photograph matched the

suspect depicted in the video.

This writer is requesting an arrest warrant be issued for two counts of First

Degree Murder (Section 2-201).

All the above events occurred in Montgomery County, Maryland.

ECF No. 37-2, (the “Warrant Application”).

Detective Carin confirmed during his deposition that the two identifications he referred to

in the Warrant Application were Detective Lozano’s and Officer Hyson’s. Carin Dep. at 45:20–

46:1 (“My arrest warrant is based on what Hyson said and on what Lozano said. I have no opinion.

I did not identify Jackson. The identification was made by Hyson and Lozano.”). He clarified

further that his Application relied on the identifications of the other officers—not of his own

comparison of the surveillance footage to the photos of Mr. Jackson that he testified he obtained

from Officer Hyson. Id. at 55:8–15. He explained:“I think Angelo Jackson looks like the guy in

the video, but I did not ID Angelo Jackson. Hyson identified Angelo Jackson and Lozano identified

Angelo Jackson, and so they are the ones that [are] telling me it’s him. I’ve never met Angelo

Jackson, I have no prior contacts with Angelo Jackson, and the first photo I saw of Angelo Jackson

was the photo that Hyson sent us.” Id. A commissioner issued a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest

issued based on the Warrant Application, and Mr. Jackson was arrested on January 11, 2017.

On January 26, 2017, Detective Carin testified before the grand jury regarding the Wheaton

Mall stabbings. His testimony, in relevant part, was as follows:

Q: And did your investigation involve identifying [the suspect]? . . . .

A: Yes. So we reviewed the videotape and we obtained a still photo of the

suspect. The still photo was sent to a Montgomery County police officer

who had no idea of the incident that we were investigating and had no idea

why we were sending him the photo. And he was able to get back to us due

to prior police contacts and identify the suspect as Angelo Jackson, a black

male, date of birth [redacted]. And his mug shot matches the image that’s

in the video.

Q Was further identification also made?

A Yes. We have a civilian witness that observed the incident and we did a

photo array, a blind photo array, which means the detective and the person

that’s trying to do the identification don’t know where the photo of the

suspect is, and he was able to identify the suspect in that photo array.[5]

ECF No. 38-8 at 5–6.

The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Jackson for two counts of murder on January 26, 2017. ECF

No. 37-13 (“Indictment”). As the investigation continued, however, the evidence began to cast

doubt on Mr. Jackson’s involvement in the January 10 homicides. Several other officers who had

prior interactions with Mr. Jackson were shown an enhanced version of the surveillance video and

either stated that they did not think it was Mr. Jackson, or that that they were not sure whether it

was him or not. Carin Dep. at 67:4–68:3. Mr. Jackson’s phone records did not place him at the

mall at the time of the stabbings. Additionally, several witnesses confirmed Mr. Jackson’s alibi—

that he was with local rapper Shilo Young, Shilo Young’s manager, and a videographer, who were

planning to make a music video on the afternoon of January 10. Finally, DNA evidence collected

from the crime scene excluded Mr. Jackson as a suspect. ECF 37-20 (Forensic Biology Report).

Mr. Jackson was released from custody on or about March 16, 2017. See ECF No. 37-18 at 15

(Expert Report of Charles J. Key, Sr.).

5 An eyewitness had identified Mr. Jackson as the suspect in a photo array conducted on

January 24, 2017. See Carin Int. at 4.

Mr. Jackson filed the Complaint in this action on February 22, 2019. The Complaint

alleges, in sum, that Detective Carin intentionally misrepresented the nature of Detective Lozano’s

and Officer Hyson’s identifications of Mr. Jackson on January 10, 2017, and that he omitted

relevant exculpatory information, in both his Application for an arrest warrant and in his testimony

before the Grand Jury. The Complaint alleges in Count I that Detective Carin knowingly sought a

warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest without probable cause and thus unlawfully detained Mr. Jackson

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Count II alleges that

Detective Carin is liable for that alleged Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ¶¶

106–137. Count III of the Complaint states a second §1983 claim against Detective Carin, alleging

that he maliciously prosecuted Mr. Jackson by initiating proceedings against Mr. Jackson “with

malice or a [] primary purpose other than bringing [Mr. Jackson] to justice since [Detective Carin]

knew, or should have known, that the allegations against [Mr. Jackson] were without merit.” Id.

¶¶ 138–151. Count IV alleges that Detective Carin’s conduct violated Mr. Jackson’s rights under

Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. ¶¶ 152–160. And finally, Count V

alleges that Detective Carin was grossly negligent in his investigation of Mr. Jackson and that his

misrepresentation of the facts and omission of exculpatory information was the proximate cause

of Mr. Jackson’s “emotional distress while incarcerated, loss of reputation, and other serious

injuries.” Id. ¶ 166–67. Detective Carin filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was

denied. See ECF No. 17. Now, both parties seek summary judgment in their favor.

Additional facts will be provided below as needed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through “particular

parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro,

714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there

is no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 & n.10 (1986). “A fact is material if it

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d

685, 691 (4th Cir. 2016). The existence of only a “scintilla of evidence” is not enough to defeat a

motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Instead,

the evidentiary materials submitted must show facts from which the finder of fact reasonably could

find for the party opposing summary judgment. Id. In reviewing the evidence related to a motion

for summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (U.S. 2009); George & Co., LLC v. Imagination

Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 391–92 (4th Cir. 2009); Dean v. Martinez, 336 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480

(D. Md. 2004). “When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review

each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves

judgment as a matter of law.’” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997)).

ANALYSIS

Mr. Jackson asserts that Detective Carin violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

unlawfully detaining him “based on reckless disregard, fabrication or concealment of evidence to

obtain warrant or indictment.” Compl. at 11. Mr. Jackson asserts two separate claims under 18

U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations — one based on unlawful detention

and the other based on malicious prosecution. Id. at 14–16. To prevail on those claims, Mr. Jackson

must establish that Detective Carin violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and more specifically,

that the warrant Detective Carin obtained for Mr. Jackson’s arrest was not supported by probable

cause. See Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012) (to prevail on a malicious

prosecution claim “the plaintiff must demonstrate both an unreasonable seizure and a favorable

termination of the criminal proceeding flowing from the seizure.”); Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill.,

580 U.S. 357 (2017) (holding “that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial

detention even beyond the start of legal process”).

Probable cause for an arrest “exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]

knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves

to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed

by the person to be arrested.” Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979) (citations,

quotation marks, and original brackets omitted). “Probable cause is determined from the totality

of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d

362, 367–68 (4th Cir. 2002). “For probable cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to

warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being committed; evidence

sufficient to convict is not required.” Id.

It has long been settled by the Supreme Court that, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,’

returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,’ conclusively determines the existence of probable

cause.” Durham, 690 F.3d at 189 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.3 (1975)).

However, “a grand jury’s decision to indict will not shield a police officer who deliberately

supplied misleading information that influenced the decision.” Id. A plaintiff who disputes

probable cause despite the issuance of a facially valid indictment must establish that the arresting

officer “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in

[the] affidavit” supporting his warrant application, or that he “omitted from that affidavit material

facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit

misleading.” Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). Such reckless disregard is established when, considering all the

evidence, “the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had

obvious reason to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Russo,

212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)). With respect to any alleged factual omissions, the plaintiff must

show that “a police officer failed to inform the judicial officer” who issued the warrant “of facts

that he knew would negate probable cause.” Id. (quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Inc.,

320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003)). Such false statements or omissions are “material” if correcting

the false statements and including the omitted facts would have defeated probable cause. Id.

When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, each party’s motion must be

considered separately with the facts construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

See Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d at 523. I will begin with Mr. Jackson’s Motion, construing

the facts in favor of Detective Carin.

I. Mr. Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Mr. Jackson moves for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts I–IV, which are

his state and federal constitutional claims, and the two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that correspond

with the alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Jackson acknowledges that the probable

cause determination is dispositive with respect to all four counts.6

Mr. Jackson argues that the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Detective Carin

lacked probable cause when he sought a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest, and that he is entitled to

judgment against Detective Carin as a matter of law. Mr. Jackson contends that Detective Carin’s

Warrant Application “deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made material, false

statements in an affidavit or omitted material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless

disregard that it would make, [his] affidavit misleading.” Pl. MSJ at 9 (citing Humbert v. Mayor

& City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017).

More specifically, Mr. Jackson argues that Detective Carin’s statements that Detective Lozano and

Officer Hyson identified him as the suspect in the surveillance video was “exaggerated” and

“misleading,” and that providing an accurate account of those identifications would negate

probable cause.7

With respect to Officer Hyson, Mr. Jackson claims that “Hyson testified that he merely

recalls viewing the photo while working a J.V. basketball game, and thinking that the photo looked

familiar. Hyson was then told that the photo was Plaintiff and was asked if he had had any prior

dealings with Plaintiff. Hyson sent his report along as a result. While the Defendant recalls the

6 The parties agree that Mr. Jackson’s “state constitutional claims are construed in pari

materia to his Fourth Amendment claim.” Pl. Motion at 20; Def. Motion at 24.

7 Mr. Jackson also complains that Detective Carin’s Application, and his Grand Jury

testimony, stated that the photos he obtained of Mr. Jackson “matched the suspect depicted in the

video,” but that he “neglected to tell [the Grand Jury] that that he did not personally make this

observation.” Pl. MSJ at 6. Finally, he argues that Detective Carin failed to conduct a sufficient

investigation and failed to apprise the Grand Jury of exculpatory information. Id. at 17.

conversation in a much more favorable light to himself, an examination of the text messages

exchanged between Defendant and Hyson reveals no positive identification.” Pl. MSJ at 10.

Based on the inconsistencies between Officer Hyson’s testimony and Detective Carin’s,

Mr. Jackson argues that the Court “may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account” by

Detective Carin when Officer Hyson’s version of the events calls the timing of his identification

into question. Id. (citing Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195–96 (4th Cir. 2006)). That is true as far

as it goes, but it does not follow from there that the Court can simply reject Detective Carin’s

testimony and enter judgment for Mr. Jackson as a matter of law.

With respect to Detective Lozano, Mr. Jackson claims that he “merely suggested” that the

surveillance footage “strongly resemble[d]” Mr. Jackson, but did not actually identify Mr. Jackson

prior to his arrest. Id. at 10. Mr. Jackson also questions the validity of that supposed resemblance

because at the time he made that statement, Detective Lozano had “only had a single, literally

passing encounter with the Plaintiff that occurred a year before the incident.” Id.

The record before me contradicts Mr. Jackson’s argument challenging Detective Lozano’s

identification. Detective Lozano was a member of a team dedicated to investigating the activity of

local street gangs, including the gang known as the “Hit Squad,” of which Mr. Jackson was a

“validated member.” Detective Lozano was familiar with Mr. Jackson from fliers that were

regularly used in the course of his police work, from social media, and from music videos in which

Mr. Jackson had appeared. Detective Johnston’s notes from the day of the stabbing indicate that

Detective Lozano “immediately knew the suspect as Angelo Jackson.” ECF No. 37-7. The fact

that, the day after the warrant had issued, Detective Lozano’s more detailed statement qualified

his identification by stating the suspect “strongly resembled” Angelo Jackson has no bearing on

Detective Carin’s representation to the court when he authored the Warrant Application, nor does

that fact that Detective Lozano later explained that he had only once seen Mr. Jackson in person.

Mr. Jackson has not identified any undisputed facts that demonstrate that the statements in

Detective Carin’s warrant Application were in any way false or misleading. It is undisputed that

Detective Lozano had identified the suspect as Angelo Jackson at the time Detective Carin

authored the warrant application. And whether Officer Hyson had, in fact, independently identified

Mr. Jackson at the time Detective Carin sought the arrest warrant is a fact in dispute due to the

inconsistent testimony of Officer Hyson and Detective Carin.

Furthermore, Mr. Jackson points to no facts whatsoever that indicate that Detective Carin

made any statements in the Warrant Application with “reckless disregard” for the truth. Miller,

475 F.3d at 627. Reckless disregard is established when an officer acts “with a high degree of

awareness of a statement’s probable falsity” that he “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of

his statements” or that he had “obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he

reported.” Id. The record is devoid of any facts that indicate that Detective Carin’s acted with

reckless disregard for the truth with respect to his fellow officers’ identification of the suspect as

Mr. Jackson. Detective Carin had no reason to doubt his colleagues identification at that time, and

even if it is true that Officer Hyson did not definitively identify Mr. Jackson as the suspect on the

night of January 10, Mr. Jackson points to no evidence that Detective Carin’s misrepresentation

was intentional.

For those reasons, Mr. Jackson’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.8

II. Detective Carin’s Motion for Summary Judgment

8 Mr. Jackson seeks summary judgment solely on the theory that Detective Carin lacked

probable cause to seek a warrant for his arrest. He addresses qualified immunity only in the portion

of his brief that opposes Detective Carin’s Motion. See Pl. MSJ.

Detective Carin argues he is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed facts

demonstrate that he had probable cause to seek a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest. Even if he fails

to establish that he had probable cause, Detective Carin argues that he is entitled to summary

judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity. For the reasons explained below, I agree with

Detective Carin on both counts.

For the purposes of resolving Detective Carin’s Motion, the relevant facts must be

construed in favor of Mr. Jackson. See Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866

F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 22, 2017). As discussed above, the undisputed

facts of this case establish that Detective Lozano identified the suspect in the surveillance footage

as Mr. Jackson, and that Detective Carin relied on that identification in seeking the warrant for Mr.

Jackson’s arrest. See Section II, above. The Parties dispute whether Officer Hyson identified Mr.

Jackson prior to his arrest, or whether he simply confirmed that he had had prior dealings with Mr.

Jackson and sent Detective Carin the photos of Mr. Jackson he had in his file. Id. Mr. Jackson

claims that Detective Carin’s omission of certain details from the Warrant Application was a

strategic maneuver because Detective Carin had “convinced himself that [Mr. Jackson] was

guilty,” and therefore excluded information that he “knew would negate any possible probable

cause.” Pl. MSJ at 12–13. Specifically, Mr. Jackson argues that Detective Carin’s failure to provide

the issuing commissioner with a detailed description of how Detective Lozano and Officer Hyson

identified Mr. Jackson violated the Fourth Amendment because the addition of those details would

have negated probable cause.

“An officer who intentionally or recklessly puts lies before a [judicial officer], or hides

facts from him, violates the Constitution unless the untainted facts themselves provide probable

cause.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 559. That said, “an investigation need not be perfect” to pass

constitutional muster. Id. “Not every mix-up in the issuance of an arrest warrant, even though it

leads to the arrest of the wrong person with attendant inconvenience and humiliation, automatically

constitutes a constitutional violation for which a remedy may be sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Thompson v. Prince William Cnty., 753 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). To recover under § 1983, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged warrant application was authored with deliberate or

reckless disregard for the truth, and that “the false statement or omission is material, that is,

necessary to the neutral and disinterested [judicial officer’s] finding of probable cause.” Humbert,

866 F. 3d at 556 (cleaned up).

For the purposes of resolving Detective Carin’s Motion, I momentarily will assume that

Officer Hyson did not, in fact, identify Mr. Jackson until after his arrest, and that his identification

therefore should not have been included in the Warrant Application. Excising Officer Hyson’s

identification from the Warrant Application requires revising it to refer to a single identification

by law enforcement, rather than multiple. With the offending identification removed, the Warrant

Application would read as follows (additions underlined and deletions stricken through):

Your affiant is Detective Michael Carin, presently assigned to the Homicide

Section of the Montgomery County Department of Police.

On January 10, 2017 at approximately 1518 hours, officers from the

Montgomery County Police were dispatched to Westfield Shopping Center located

at 11160 Veirs Mill Road Wheaton, Montgomery County, Maryland, for a report

of a subject that was stabbed in the abdomen. Upon arrival, officers discovered two

Hispanic male victims suffering from stab wounds. Both subjects were transported

to a local hospital and later pronounced deceased.

As of this writing the victims have not been positively identified. The

victims will be referred to as: Victim I and Victim 2.

Investigators interviewed a number of witnesses to the assaults and also

learned that the assaults were captured on the mall security video system. The video

depicts a black male suspect armed with a knife assaulting both victims.

The suspect was identified by a Montgomery County Police officers who

have has had prior law enforcement contacts with the suspect. The officers

identified the suspect as Angelo Lamont Jackson (B/M; DOB [redacted]).

Investigators obtained photograph of Angelo Lamont Jackson. That photograph

matched the suspect depicted in the video.

This writer is requesting an arrest warrant be issued for two counts of First

Degree Murder (Section 2-201).

All the above events occurred in Montgomery County, Maryland.

Warrant Application (alterations added).

Under the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the alterations identified above do

not negate probable cause. Probable cause is not an onerous standard—it requires only that the

“facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent

person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has

committed . . .an offense.” United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2004). Here,

the events of the subject offense were captured on surveillance video, which Detective Carin

viewed. He noted that the suspect in the video was a black male. A fellow law enforcement officer

then identified the suspect in the surveillance video as Mr. Jackson based on his personal

knowledge of Mr. Jackson from prior police work. Detective Carin then obtained photos of Mr.

Jackson from another law enforcement officer with prior contact with Mr. Jackson, and confirmed

that he resembled the individual shown in the surveillance footage. All of that information is

included in the revised Warrant Application, and it is sufficient to warrant a reasonable and prudent

person in believing that Mr. Jackson was the individual who committed the fatal assaults captured

on the mall surveillance footage. In other words, the Warrant Application establishes probable

cause even without Officer Hyson’s disputed identification.9

9 Regarding Detective Carin’s alleged omission of “context and exculpatory evidence,” it is

not clear to me what Detective Carin omitted that was known to him at the time he authored the

Moreover, even if I were to conclude that excising reference to multiple officer

identifications did negate probable cause (which I do not), Detective Carin would still be shielded

from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity ensures that police “can perform their duties free from the specter of

endless and debilitating lawsuits.” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1991).

“These concerns are particularly acute when the officials are police officers investigating a crime

of violence” because “police must have the ability to move quickly to solve the crime before the

evidence becomes stale, a victim-witness dies, or the perpetrator has a chance to repeat the crime.”

Id. “The ability of police officers to protect the public can be severely hampered, however, if their

every decision is subject to second-guessing in a lawsuit.” Id.

“Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866-67 (2017). “To determine whether a given

officer falls into either of those two categories, a court must ask whether it would have been clear

to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.

“Under this formulation, a plaintiff may prove that an official has violated his rights, but an official

is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable person in the official's position could

have failed to appreciate that his conduct would violate those rights.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 261.

Warrant Application—the exculpatory evidence that led to Mr. Jackson’s eventual release

developed after the warrant had issued and Mr. Jackson had been arrested. See Brown v. Gilmore,

278 F.3d 362, 367–68 (4th Cir. 2002). In any event, this Court has previously noted that

“imposition of broad liability for omissions in warrant applications would paralyze law

enforcement by requiring that a warrant application contain a complete, voluminous recitation of

every fact known to the police which could be exculpatory, rather than a simple statement of facts

establishing probable cause.” Smith v. Reddy, 882 F. Supp. 497, 501 (D. Md. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d

351 (4th Cir. 1996).

Detective Carin’s actions in this case were reasonable. He was called to the scene of a

sudden and violent stabbing in a public shopping mall, much of which was captured on the mall’s

video surveillance system. Detective Carin and his fellow investigating officers, in effort to quickly

identify the suspect, circulated images from that footage to other MCPD officers, including the

street gang unit. A member of that unit immediately identified the suspect as Mr. Jackson, who

was a known affiliate of a street gang, and whose image he later testified he had seen multiple

times and in multiple contexts. Detective Carin was then informed that another officer, Officer

Hyson, had prior dealings with Mr. Jackson. Detective Carin reached out to Officer Hyson and

asked him if he recognized the image from the surveillance footage. The facts are murky with

respect to the exchange that followed, but it is undisputed that after a phone call with Detective

Carin, Officer Hyson sent Detective Carin photographs of Mr. Jackson from his previous encounter

with him. Detective Carin believed those pictures of Mr. Jackson resembled the suspect in the

surveillance footage. Based on that information, he sought a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s arrest.

Under the circumstances of this case, I struggle to see how Detective Carin’s actions show

either incompetence or disregard for the law. To the contrary, I conclude that his actions were

those of a reasonable officer working quickly to investigate a double homicide with the evidence

available to him at the time. There is no dispute that Detective Carin and the officers who identified

Mr. Jackson as the suspect made a mistake. And there is no question that that mistake caused

significant distress to Mr. Jackson and to his family. But “the fact that a mistake was made cannot

be dispositive of the issue of qualified immunity.” Gooden v. Howard Cnty., Md., 954 F.2d 960,

966 (4th Cir. 1992). “It is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably

but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641

(1987), and “if reasonable mistakes were actionable, difficult questions of discretion [by law

enforcement officers] would always be resolved in favor of inaction, and effective law

enforcement would be lost.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 261. And by the same token, while it is true

that Detective Carin could have investigated further before seeking a warrant for Mr. Jackson’s

arrest, his decision to go forward with seeking an arrest warrant was a reasonable exercise of his

judgment as a homicide detective for which he cannot be held liable.10

It is regrettable that Mr. Jackson, who was only 17 years old at the time, was falsely accused

of such serious crimes, and that he was forced to spend over two months in custody as a result.

That experience was undoubtedly frightening, even traumatizing, not only for Mr. Jackson, but for

his family as well. But those lamentable facts alone do not suffice to establish either a Fourth

Amendment violation or liability for Detective Carin.

For those reasons, Detective Carin’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with

respect to Counts I–IV. And because there is no indication in the record that Detective Carin

engaged in “willful and wanton misconduct” or that he “inflict[ed] injury intentionally or [was] so

utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he act[ed] as if such rights did not exist,” as required

to constitute gross negligence, his Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Count V is

likewise GRANTED. Wells v. State, 642 A.2d 879, 884 (1994); Torbit v. Baltimore City Police

Dep't, 153 A.3d 847, 856 (Md. 2017).

10 It is not clear whether Mr. Jackson also seeks relief based on Detective Carin’s grand jury

testimony, or whether he simply references the grand jury testimony to illustrate Detective Carin’s

alleged bias toward Mr. Jackson and his continuing alleged misconduct in the investigation. See

Pl. MSJ/Opp. at 18 n. 10. But because Detective Carin’s grand jury testimony was not false or

misleading, the reason for its inclusion in Mr. Jackson’s arguments does not matter. During his

brief testimony, Detective Carin reiterated that two officers had identified Mr. Jackson, and added

that Mr. Jackson had also been identified by an eyewitness to the stabbings. All of that was true.

By the time Detective Carin testified before the grand jury, Officer Hyson had definitively,

identified Mr. Jackson as the individual in the surveillance video, and an eyewitness to the stabbing

had identified Mr. Jackson in a photo array.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons identified in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, Mr. Jackson’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 38, is DENIED, and Detective Carin’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, ECF No. 37, is GRANTED. A separate Order follows.

Dated: December 19, 2022 /S/

Paul W. Grimm

Senior United States District Judge