Nolan v. Judge Bright

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STEPHEN NOLAN, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. DKC-22-196

JUDGE BRIGHT, et al., *

Defendants. *

***

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented Plaintiff Stephen Nolan filed a complaint on January 26, 2022, seeking

injunctive relief and an emergency hearing regarding a “pending 20-million-dollar claim” under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Mr. Nolan subsequently paid the full filing fee and filed an amended

complaint against Defendants Judge Robin Bright, the Maryland Bar Association, The State of

Maryland, Aaron A. Naiman, Esq., and Victor O. Buente, Jr., Esq. ECF No. 3. Mr. Nolan claims

that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by improperly foreclosing upon his property in

Maryland state court, in Zakharin v. Noland [sic], Case No. CAE21-00505 (Cir. Ct. for Prince

George’s County). See id. at 3. For the reasons that follow, this case must be dismissed.

Discussion

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority

conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re

Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because questions of subject matter

jurisdiction concern the court’s power to hear the case, they must be resolved before the court can

turn to the sufficiency or merits of a claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter

springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible

without exception.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Federal courts have original

(1) under federal question jurisdiction, where the case involves an issue of federal law, see 28

U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) under diversity jurisdiction, where the parties in the case are citizens of

different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Moreover, complaints that so clearly fail to state a claim that it would be imprudent to

proceed to service of process should be dismissed at the outset:

[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of

the court, even when the filing fee has been paid. See, e.g., Mallard v. United States

Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989)

(“Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action,

but there is little doubt they would have the power to do so even in the absence of

this statutory provision.”); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d

Cir. 2000). In addition, because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an

obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.

See Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181–83 (7th Cir. 1989);

Franklin v. Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1981).

Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F. App'x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). A “frivolous” complaint

is one lacking an arguable basis either in law or in fact:

“[A] complaint, containing as it does, both factual allegations and legal

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neizke v. Williams, 409 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (discussing in detail the overlap and

differences between dismissing a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim, and determining that a claim must be dismissed because it

is frivolous, concluding “it is evident that the failure-to-state-a-claim standard of

Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivolousness standard of [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(d) were devised

to serve distinctive goals and that while the overlap between these two standards is

considerable, it does not follow that a complaint which falls afoul of the former

standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter.”). A claim is frivolous if it is

based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also ... [when its]

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Examples of the former class

are claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from

suit, and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does

not exist .... Examples of the latter class are claims describing fantastic

or delusional scenarios claims with which federal district judges are all

too familiar.

Neizke, 490 U.S. at 327–28 (internal citations omitted).

Magnas v. Perlman, No. 8:20-CV-2862-PWG, 2021 WL 915352, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2021).

1331 and § 1343.1 ECF No. 3 at 2. Foreclosure actions brought under state law do not give rise

to federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. See McNeely v. Moab Tiara Cherokee Kituwah

Nation Chief, 2008 WL 4166328 (W.D. N.C 2008) (nothing in “simple foreclosure action of real

property . . . suggests the presence of a federal question”). Moreover, “Section 1343 merely vests

the federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over certain civil rights claims.” Nott v.

Bunson, Civil Action No. WMN-09-2613, 2009 WL 3271285, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2009). Here,

Mr. Nolan alleges, as the basis for federal question jurisdiction, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and the Tucker Act. ECF No. 3 at 2, 9.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a plaintiff may file suit

against any “person” who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See,

e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); see also Graves v. Loi, 930 F.3d 307, 318-19 (4th Cir.

2019); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,

575 U.S. 983 (2015). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but provides

‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). In other words, § 1983

1 Mr. Nolan does not invoke diversity jurisdiction, nor does such jurisdiction appear to exist.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction exists when the parties are of diverse

citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge,

859 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1988); McDonald v. Patton, 240 F.2d 424, 425-26 (4th Cir. 1957).

Although Nolan seeks damages in excess of $75,000, see ECF No. 4, he has not shown that the

citizenship of the parties is diverse.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a “person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); see Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S.

823 (2011); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); Jenkins

v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).

Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies and

departments are immune from citizen suits in federal court absent state consent or Congressional

action. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State of

Maryland has not waived such immunity for claims brought pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, it

is immune from suit here.

Meanwhile, Defendant Bright is a Maryland state judge who Mr. Nolan is suing for

decisions made in her capacity as a judge. This cause of action cannot be maintained because it is

prohibited by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27

(1988) (“If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits,

most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid

rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.”). The doctrine of judicial immunity shields

judges from monetary claims against them in both their official and individual capacities. Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam). Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity; it does

not merely protect a defendant from assessment of damages, but also protects a judge from

damages suits entirely. Id. at 11. Moreover, “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction

are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their

U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); see Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that a

judge may not be attacked for exercising judicial authority even if done improperly). Regardless

of Mr. Nolan’s constitutional claims, he provides no grounds to defeat the judicial immunity that

applies to Judge Bright’s determinations in his foreclosure case.

With regard to the remaining Defendants, none may be plausibly considered state actors or

as having engaged in state action, necessary predicates for a constitutional claim. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th

Cir. 2001) (only state actors are proper defendants under § 1983). Defendants Naiman and Buente

appear to be private attorneys, and Mr. Nolan makes no allegations regarding the Maryland Bar

Association.

Thus, Mr. Nolan’s § 1983 claims cannot proceed.

B. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946

The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, “regulates the

administration and operation of federal agencies,” Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev.,

348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 418 (D. Md. 2005), and “requires federal courts to set aside federal agency

action that is ‘not in accordance with law,’” F.C.C. v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S.

293, 300 (2003) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). See also 5 U.S.C. § 551. As none of the named

Defendants are federal agencies, the Act is inapplicable to this case.

C. Tucker Act

The Tucker Act, codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) and 1491, has been

consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court “as having provided the consent of the United States

to be sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act.” United States v. Mitchell,

463 U.S. 206, 215 (1983) (citations omitted). In other words, “the Tucker Act effects a waiver of

jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States

for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Because the United

States is not a party to this case, the Tucker Act does not apply.

Conclusion

In sum, Mr. Nolan fails to state a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States, against any of the named Defendants and the complaint is frivolous.2

Accordingly, his complaint, as amended, must be dismissed. A separate Order follows.

March 10, 2022 /s/

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge

2 To the extent Mr. Nolan challenges the foreclosure itself, his claim fails. Where equitable

relief is sought regarding property that is already the subject of an ongoing in rem action in another

court, the court controlling the property for purposes of the earlier-filed suit has exclusive

jurisdiction over the property. See Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 3d 635,

641-42 (D. Md. 2015); see also Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466

(1939) (the jurisdiction of the second court must yield to the court where the matter was first

pending).