The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JEREMY COCHRAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. DKC-21-2404
BRUCE SMITH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jeremy Cochran, an inmate currently incarcerated at the North Branch
Correctional Institution, filed the above-captioned complaint, accompanied by a motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1 and 2. Because Mr. Cochran appears indigent, he shall
be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, for reasons stated below, the complaint
shall be dismissed.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this
court without prepaying the filing fee. Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A of 28 U.S.C. require the
court to conduct an initial screening of this complaint. The court is required to dismiss a complaint
if the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). When considering whether a claim is frivolous, § 1915(e)(2)
grants courts “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 327).
The complaint alleges that “On December 15th 2008 Bruce Smith had [Cochran] arrested
for sexual abuse charges, then on July 10th 2009 had them charges nolle processed, this was false
imprisonment and [cruel] and unusual punishment, he did not do a full and complete investigation
into these allegations.” (sic). ECF No. 1 at 2 (some alteration to capitalization). Mr. Cochran
maintains that if Mr. Smith had “done a full and complete investigation into these allegations [he]
would [have] been ruled out as a suspect….” Id. at 3. Mr. Cochran contends that Mr. Smith’s
conduct violated his constitutional rights and “slandered [his] name, false[ly] imprisoned [him],
put [him] through mental and emotional abuse, pain and suffering, mental anguish and under the
law committed malpractice, and violated [his] 8th Amendment right [cruel] and unusual
punishment.” Id.
This cause of action cannot be maintained because it is prohibited by the doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity. Maryland’s State’s Attorneys are quasi-judicial officers who enjoy
absolute immunity when performing prosecutorial functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 422-23 (1976); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018); Springmen v.
Williams, 122 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1997).
Absolute immunity is designed to protect judicial process. Thus, the inquiry is whether a
prosecutor’s actions are closely associated with judicial process. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
479 (1991) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23). The court must use a “functional approach” to
“determine whether a particular act is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase.’” Nero, 890
F.3d at 118 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The Fourth Circuit stated in Nero, 890 F.3d at 118:
“A prosecutor acts as an advocate when she professionally evaluates evidence assembled by the
police, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, decides to seek an arrest warrant, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130,
prepares and files charging documents, id., participates in a probable cause hearing, Burns, 500
U.S. at493, and presents evidence at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.”
The decisions as to whether, when, and how to prosecute pertain to the role of advocate.
Therefore, on the face of the suit, the prosecutorial defendant in the instant case enjoys absolute
immunity. See Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 376-77 (4th Cir. 1996).
Because the complaint fails to provide any information that might lead to a reasonable
conclusion that some plausible cause of action has accrued on Mr. Cochran’s behalf, it shall be
dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Mr. Cochran is forewarned that his right to pursue relief in
federal court at public expense will be greatly curtailed if he has three actions or appeals dismissed
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Specifically, if he
has “on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless” he can establish he
“is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Additionally,
dismissal with or without prejudice for any of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii) constitutes a “strike” under the Act. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, _U.S._,
140 S.Ct. 1721, 1724 (2020), see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A separate order follows.
September 28, 2021 /s/
Date DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge