“If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such. - suits.”
How later courts described this case
- “If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such. - suits.”
- stating that a judge may not be attacked for exercising judicial authority even if done improperly
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT .
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JEREMY COCHRAN;
Plaintiff, ,
ve Civil Action No. JKB-21-2313
__KEVINJ. MAHONEY, :
Defendant. , □
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Jeremy Cochran, an inmate currently incarcerated at the North Branch _
- Correctional Institution, filed the above-captioned Complaint, accompanied by a Motion for Leave
to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 2. Because Cochran appears indigent, he shall be
granted leave to. proceed in forma pauperis. However, for reasons stated below, the Complaint
shall be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in this court
without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A require the Court to
conduct an initial screening of this complaint. The Court is required to dismiss a complaint if the
action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(iti) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 USC.
§§.1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). When considering whether a claim-is frivolous, § 1915(e)(2)
grants courts “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and |
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
’ The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Plaintiff's name.
319, 327 (1989). A complaint is frivolous where “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” MeLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Neitzke, 490 US.
at 327).
. The Complaint alleges that state court Judge Kevin J. Mahoney. violated Cochran’s
“constitutional rights by denying [him] relief under Maryland law and the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland rulings.” ECF No, 1 at 2. Cochran alleges that Judge Mahoney denied him “relief
under prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of the trial judge’s discretion.” Jd. at 3. He further
alleges that Judge Mahoney is biased against him, that he is actually innocent of the crimes for
which he was convicted and sentenced to 80 years’ incarceration, fd. Cochran seeks 2.4 million
dollars in damages. Id.
This cause of action cannot be maintained because it is prohibited by the doctrine of judicial
immunity. See Forrester y. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (“If judges were personally liable
for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious,
would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such.
- suits.”). os
. The doctrine of judicial immunity shields judges from monetary claims against them in
both their official and individual capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 US. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam).
Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity; it does not merely protect a defendant from assessment
of damages, but also protects a judge from damages suits entirely. /d. at 11. An actis still judicial,
and immunity applies, even if the judge commits grave procedural errors,’” Id. (quoting Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). Moreover, “judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess
of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump, 435 US.
, .
at 355-56; see Dean y. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that a judge may not be
attacked for exercising judicial authority even if done improperly); Green v. North Carolina, No.
4:08-CV-135-H, 2010 WL 3743767, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 21, 2010).
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S, 547 (1967), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorart
to consider whether a judge was liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional
conviction. The Court explained the rationale for judicial immunity, id. at 553-54:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity
of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction .... This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it “is not for the protection or benefit of a
malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and. without fear of consequences” .... It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases □
within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases
that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected
on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound
him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on
judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation. -
Here, Cochran seeks to hold Judge Mahoney liable for conduct undertaken during
Cochran’s criminal trial. Such claims are not permissible. Because the Complaint fails to provide
any information that might lead to 4 reasonable conclusion that some plausible cause of action has
accrued on Cochran’s behalf, it shall be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Cochran is forewarned □
that his right to pursue relief in federal court at public expense will be greatly curtailed if he has
three actions or appeals dismissed under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)G) or (i).
Specifically, if he has “on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”
he will be unable to bring claims in forma pauperis, unless he can establish that he “is under
.
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Additionally, dismissal with
or without prejudice for any of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii)
constitutes a “strike” under the Act. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, U.S._, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1724
(2020), see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A separate order follows.
Dated this A day of Dept , 2021.
FOR THE COURT:
James K. Bredar
Chief Judge
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