The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ABDUL JALEEL MAHDI, *
*
Petitioner, *
*
v. * Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-11905-IT
*
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, *
*
Respondent. *
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
April 30, 2024
TALWANI, D.J.
Petitioner Abdul Jaleel Mahdi filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.
Code § 2254 (“Petition”) [Doc. No. 1] alleging unlawful detention and constitutional violations
surrounding his 1968 indictment and conviction. Pending before the court is Respondent
Department of Correction’s (“DOC”) Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11]. For the reasons set forth
below, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider this “second or successive” petition not authorized
by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and accordingly, the Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED.
I. Background
A. Petitioner’s Convictions and Custody Status
Petitioner was convicted in Hampden County Superior Court of first-degree murder,
assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of armed robbery on May 28, 1968. Petition at 22-
24 [Doc. No. 1]. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the
murder conviction and an 18-20 years concurrent sentence for the assault with a deadly weapon
and armed robbery convictions, to run after the sentence on the murder conviction.
Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 448 N.E.2d 704 (1983); Respondent’s Mem. of Law
ISO the Motion to Dismiss (“Resp’t Mem.”), Ex. N. (Review Hearing Decision) [Doc. No. 11-
14]. On April 8, 1983, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment and set
aside Petitioner’s convictions. 388 Mass. at 699. Petitioner was indicted again on March 15,
1984, based on the same underlying facts. Petition at 25 [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner pled guilty to
second degree murder, armed assault with intent to murder, and two counts of armed robbery, for
which he received a life sentence with the possibility of parole and two concurrent sentences of
18-20 years. Review Hearing Decisions at 1-2 [Doc. No. 11-14].
Following a hearing on March 19, 2019, Petitioner’s request for parole was denied.
Review Hearing Decision [Doc. No. 11-14]. On April 16, 2020, Petitioner was released on
medical parole. Id., Ex. O (Certificate of Parole) [Doc. No. 11-15].1
B. Prior Petitions
Since being resentenced following his guilty plea, Petitioner has made several filings and
appeals in Massachusetts state courts, none of which resulted in relief. See, e.g., Petition at 49-60
[Doc. No. 1]; Resp’t Mem., Ex. D [Doc. No. 11-4]; Ex. E [Doc. No. 11-5]; Ex. G [Doc. No. 11-
7]; Ex. H [Doc. No. 11-8]; Ex. J [Doc. No. 11-10]; Ex. K [Doc. No. 11-11] (non-exhaustive list).
Respondent has also identified two petitions filed by Petitioner in this court in the 1990s.
The first petition (“1995 Petition”) was dismissed on February 7, 1995. See Resp’t Mem., Ex. U
(Docket Sheet, Mahdi v. Duval, 1:95-cv-10209-REK) [Doc. No. 11-21] at Docket Entry 4. On
March 30, 1995, the court entered a final order denying Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of
probable cause to appeal (“CPC”). Id. at Docket Entry 10-11. Petitioner’s motions to vacate the
1 Respondent correctly notes that Petitioner improperly named the Department of Corrections as
Respondent where the Massachusetts Parole Board now has custody over him. Resp’t Mem. at 1,
n.1 [Doc. No. 12].
final order and seeking another CPC were both denied on May 8, 1995, id. at Docket Entry 17-
18, and his June 8, 1995 appeal to the First Circuit was denied and the action terminated on June
29, 1995. Resp’t Mem., Ex. V (Docket Sheet, Mahdi v. Duval, 95-1605) [Doc. No. 11-22].
On February 26, 1996, Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief under
§ 2254. Id., Ex. W (Docket Sheet, Mahdi v. Marshall, 4:96-cv-40054-NMG) (“1996 Petition”)
[Doc. No. 11-23]. The 1996 Petition asserted five claims: “(1) the Indictment issued against him
was fatally defective in that it was not properly signed as required by Massachusetts law; (2) the
prosecutors committed fraud upon the trial courts by asserting that the charging instruments were
‘True Bills of Indictment’; (3) the warrant of commitment was null and void on its face because
it was not signed by the judge; (4) Petitioner’s rights were violated in 1972 by his temporary
transfer to prisons located outside of Massachusetts; and (5) the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over his case because the charging instruments were missing the wafer seal of the
court.” Mahdi v. Marshall, 976 F. Supp. 93, 94-95 (D. Mass. 1997). The petition was dismissed
on May 30, 1997. Id. at 94. Petitioner then requested a CPC, which was treated as a motion for
certificate of appealability (“COA”) by the court. Id.2 Concluding Petitioner “failed ‘to make a
substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right’ or of denial of any other federal right,” the
court denied the motion. Id. at 95.
Petitioner appealed to the First Circuit, on August 4, 1997. Resp’t Mem., Ex. Y (Docket
Sheet, Mahdi v. Marshall, 97-1866) [Doc. No. 11-25]. In denying Petitioner’s request for a CPC
to appeal the denial of habeas corpus relief, the First Circuit found that:
Petitioner presents the identical claims he raised in the habeas petition he filed in
1995; these claims were rejected on the merits by the district court and by this
2 The court explained that “Mahdi's petition for habeas corpus was filed before enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253 and thus before the COA prerequisite replaced the earlier CPC prerequisite.” Id.
court when we denied petitioner’s request for a CPC. . . . In order for a court to
reach the merits of petitioner's successive claims, then, he is required to establish
cause and prejudice. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992). As for
cause, petitioner does not give any reasons -- such as new caselaw -- for again
raising the same claims. Rather, he just avers that the claims are meritorious and
have never been decided on the merits. However, this does not present cause since
the claims were decided on the merits and were found to be lacking. Petitioner
therefore also has failed to show any prejudice.
Id. The Second Petition was terminated on February 27, 1998. Id.
C. The Instant Petition
Petitioner filed the instant Petition [Doc. No. 1] on August 21, 2023, seeking relief on
four grounds. First, Petitioner alleges fraud upon the court because the original grand jury
indictment was not signed by the jury foreman. Id. at 7-8. Second, Petitioner alleges unlawful
detention in state prison by court personnel acting without authority. Id. at 8. Next, he alleges
that neither the commitment warrant nor the warrant to execute his sentence was properly
authenticated. Id. Finally, Petitioner asserts he was improperly detained in state prison “in
violation of statutory law.” Id. at 9.
Prior to filing his Petition, Petitioner did not file a motion in the First Circuit, or any U.S.
Court of Appeals, seeking permission to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A).
II. Discussion
28 U.S.C. § 2244 limits the jurisdiction of both district and circuit courts to hear “second
or successive” petitions for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Before any second or successive petition is filed in district court, the applicant “shall
move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). This “gatekeeping” mechanism of § 2244(b)(3) serves
to restrain abuse of the writ of habeas corpus, Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 652 (1996), and
“further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
945 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)). Petitioner concedes he did
not file a motion in the First Circuit seeking permission to file a second or successive petition for
writ of habeas corpus before filing the instant petition. Petition at 5 [Doc. No. 1]. Accordingly,
this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Petition and Respondent’s Motion [Doc. No. 11]
must be granted.
Nor does it appear likely that Petitioner would be able to obtain an order from the First
Circuit authorizing this district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)
mandates that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive petition under section 2254 that was
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” Here, the grounds set forth in the Petition are
substantively identical to the five allegations made in the Second Petition. See Mahdi v.
Marshall, 976 F. Supp. at 94-95.
Petitioner argues that the Petition [Doc. No. 1] nonetheless is not second or successive
“because [his] habeas corpus has never been fully adjudicated on its merits.” Petitioner’s
Response to the D.O.C.’s Motion to Dismiss at 9-10 [Doc. No. 15]. Petitioner is correct that a
seemingly duplicative petition is not considered to be second or successive “where the earlier
petition [was] terminated without a judgment on the merits.” Sustache-Rivera v. U.S., 221 F.3d
8, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). But here, the First Circuit has explicitly
concluded that the claims raised in the 1996 Petition were also raised in the 1995 Petition and
were “rejected on the merits.” Resp’t Mem., Ex. Y [11-25].3
3 Because the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition, the court does not address
Respondent’s statute of limitations argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED
and Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
April 30, 2024 /s/Indira Talwani
United States District Judge