Halsten v. Prompt Praxis Laboratories, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-10750-RGS

LOREN O.E. NIKOLAI HALSTEN

v.

PROMPT PRAXIS LABORATORIES, LLC and

LISA McCHESNEY-HARRIS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

April 11, 2024

STEARNS, D.J.

From January of 2019 to May of 2021, Loren Halsten was the National

Sales and Business Manager at Prompt Praxis Laboratories, LLC (PPL).

After PPL terminated her, Halsten sued PPL and its CEO, Lisa McChesney-

Harris, in Suffolk Superior Court, alleging that defendants retaliated against

her in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a), and

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A (Counts I, II, and IV), and failed to pay her

commissions earned in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 149, § 148 (Count III). Defendants timely removed the case to the

U.S. District Court. They now move for summary judgment. The court will

allow the motion in part and deny it in part.

BACKGROUND

PPL, a small lab testing company headquartered in suburban Chicago,

hired Halsten in January of 2019. She earned a base salary and was eligible

to receive commissions of 5% of new business revenue. Pl.’s Statement of

Genuine Issues of Material Facts (HSMF), Ex. B (Dkt. # 58-1). When

Halsten started at PPL, she lived in Tennessee. She moved to New York

shortly after and relocated to Massachusetts in March of 2020.

Halsten claims that soon after she started at PPL, her supervisor, Steve

Aragon, made unwelcome sexual comments to and about her.1 She reported

the harassment to PPL’s CEO Lisa McChesney-Harris and the human

resources department in October of 2019. After investigating the allegations,

PPL concluded that they were unsubstantiated,2 but it provided Aragon

counseling, required that he attend external sensitivity training, retrained

the staff on sensitivity, and updated its harassment policy. See Defs.’ Mem.

in Support of Their Mot. for Summ. J. (Mot.), Ex. 3 (Dkt. # 54-4).

1 She reported that Aragon (1) “made a comment of a salacious nature”

about the type of dessert a hotel was offering; (2) asked Halsten “why she did

not dress like that,” referring to a woman wearing a “short and tight skirt”;

and (3) intimated that Halsten needed to sleep with a potential client to

secure their business. Mot., Ex. 3 (Dkt. # 54-4).

2 Halsten also claims that McChesney-Harris told her that Aragon

“didn’t do those things,” and that the incidents were Halsten’s “perception

and not reality.” HSMF ¶ 4.

Around the same time, Halsten noticed that she was not receiving

commission payments she was due. HSMF ¶ 6. She reported the

nonpayment to McChesney-Harris, and PPL corrected the issue in January

of 2020. Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (DSMF) (Dkt. # 55) ¶ 20.

Halsten alleges that after she reported the harassment and unpaid

commissions, PPL began retaliating against her. According to Halsten,

McChesney-Harris was hostile toward her,3 failed to timely respond to

questions, and stopped providing her with client invoices. HSMF ¶¶ 6, 10-

12. She also claims that PPL failed to pay her commissions for revenues

generated by KRS Global Biotechnology (KRS), a new client that Halsten says

she recruited. Id. ¶ 8. Halsten reported the retaliatory behavior to Rebecca

Kolleng, PPL’s Human Resources Manager, on April 27, 2021. DSMF ¶ 22.

For their part, defendants claim that Halsten had serious performance

issues. For example, in April of 2020, Halsten emailed a potential client

criticizing his “chastising note” as “unbecoming and unnecessary.” Mot.,

Ex. 12 (Dkt. # 54-13). On January 18, 2021, McChesney-Harris notified

3 The record does not clearly spell out the treatment that Halsten

believes was hostile. An investigation report suggests McChesney-Harris

made an analogy involving cookies and girl scouts that Halsten felt was

“beyond the bounds of human decency,” and that Halsten believed

McChesney-Harris exhibited “relentless condescension” and “vitriol” when

asking about the status of a potential new client. Mot., Ex. 4 (Dkt. # 54-5).

Halsten that PPL was struggling financially and that Halsten needed to “yield

many more clients this year than last year.” Mot., Ex. 5 (Dkt. # 54-6). But

when McChesney-Harris and PPL’s Senior Vice President Cecilia Newcomb-

Evans reviewed Halsten’s performance in April of 2021, they “found an

alarming lack of progress.” Mot, Ex. 4. McChesney-Harris and Newcomb-

Evans decided to terminate Halsten in April of 2021. Id. As luck would have

it, Newcomb-Evans emailed Kolleng setting a timeframe to terminate

Halsten earlier on the same day that Halsten filed her complaint with

Kolleng. Id.

Despite having decided to terminate Halsten, Kolleng investigated her

complaints. Kolleng interviewed and collected documentation from Halsten

and McChesney-Harris and requested data from Halsten’s email and

SalesForce accounts. See id. After reviewing emails between Halsten and

McChesney-Harris, Kolleng found no evidence of retaliatory harassment.

See id. She also concluded that Halsten was not entitled to commission on

the KRS account because Halsten did not bring in KRS as a client. See id.

PPL terminated Halsten on May 10, 2021.

Nine days after her termination, Halsten filed a small claims complaint

against PPL in the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) seeking to collect on wages

owed to her on the day of her termination. See Mot., Ex. 9 (Dkt. # 54-10).

The BMC found that PPL failed to pay uncontested wages owed to her on the

day of her termination.4

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is warranted where the movant demonstrates that

the record, “construed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant,

‘presents no genuine issue as to any material fact and reflects the movant’s

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’” Lawless v. Steward Health

Care Sys., 894 F.3d 9, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2018), quoting McKenney v. Mangino,

873 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2017). A factual dispute is “genuine” if there is

“sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute . . . to require a

jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of truth at trial.” First

Nat. Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968).

Choice of Law

Defendants first contend that Halsten cannot seek the protection of the

Massachusetts Wage Act because she was not a resident of Massachusetts

when she engaged in protected activity.5 Massachusetts choice of law rules

4 Defendants contend that Halsten also sought to recover unpaid

commissions before the BMC. The court has already rejected this argument.

See Halsten v. Prompt Praxis Lab’ys, LLC, 2023 WL 4471831, at *2-3.

5 The court does not understand defendants to be raising this as a

personal jurisdiction defense, but to the extent that they are, such a defense

is waived as untimely. See Rule 12(b).

guide the analysis. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017).

Although Halsten’s claims arise under different substantive bodies of law

(her unpaid commission claim sounds in contract, but her retaliation claims

sound in tort), the analysis is essentially the same for all claims. See Bushkin

Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 632 (1985) (where a contract does

not specify choice of law, question is what state has the “most significant

relationship” to the contract); Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 417 Mass.

643, 647 (1994) (choice of law for tort claims asks which state has a “more

significant relationship” to the occurrence).

Considering the relevant factors, the court concludes that Halsten may

avail herself of Massachusetts law. It is true that defendants are located in

Illinois, and Halsten was not a Massachusetts resident at the time she

entered her employment contract. However, her performance that gave rise

to the allegedly unpaid commissions occurred in Massachusetts, and her

alleged protected conduct occurred while she was in Massachusetts.

Massachusetts public policy also favors application of Massachusetts law:

while Illinois law allows limited punitive damages for wage claims,

Massachusetts law provides for treble damages.6 Compare, e.g., 820 Ill.

6 While policy considerations would not be relevant if Massachusetts

“ha[d] no interest in the case apart from the fact that it is the place of the trial

of the action,” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. e, Halsten

Comp. Stat. 115, with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. PPL permitted Halsten

to work where she wished, and it acknowledged that different states have

different employment laws. See HSMF, Ex. Q. It thus had no justified

expectation that Illinois law would apply to an employment dispute. See

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(d). And dismissing

Halsten’s claims, leaving her “without an effective remedy,” “would lead to a

result contrary to [Massachusetts’s] fundamental policy” of fairly

compensating employees. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 208 (2009).

Counts I, II, and IV: Retaliation

Halsten’s retaliation claims proceed under the burden-shifting

framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Halsten must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by

showing that “she undertook protected conduct,” defendants “took a

material adverse action against her,” and “a causal nexus exists between

elements one and two.” Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 139 (1st

Cir. 2013); see also Mole v. Univ. of Massachuestts, 442 Mass. 582, 591-592

(2004). If she makes this showing, the burden shifts to defendants to

articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for their actions. See

was a resident of Massachusetts and paying taxes to the Commonwealth

when she alleges she was not paid commissions due, see HSMF ¶ 27.

Planadeball v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d 169, 175 (1st Cir.

2015). If they do so, the burden shifts back to Halsten to show defendants’

reason is pretextual. See id. Halsten must “point to some evidence of

retaliation by a pertinent decisionmaker.”7 Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d

857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997).

The temporal proximity between Halsten’s April 27 complaint and

May 10 termination is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of

retaliation.8 See Planadeball, 793 F.3d at 178. Defendants also carry their

counter-burden. Halsten’s April 2020 email to a potential PPL client and the

evidence that she was lagging in sales are legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons to terminate her. See id. at 179.

The court finds, after exercising “particular caution” and viewing the

record in the light most favorable to Halsten, that there is no genuine

question of material fact on Halsten’s claim of pretext. See Ray v. Ropes &

Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 116 (1st Cir. 2015), quoting Straughn v. Delta Air

7 For her federal claim, Halsten must show retaliatory animus at the

third step, but for her state claims, she need not offer evidence of animus.

See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir. 2004); Blare

v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 441 (1995).

8 Halsten contends she complained to McChesney-Harris in 2020 and

2021. This is protected conduct, but complaints from 2020 are insufficiently

proximate to infer retaliation. See Pena v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 923 F.3d 18,

32 (1st Cir. 2019) (four-month gap insufficient to infer causal nexus).

Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2001). Halsten points to several facts

she believes show pretext: temporal proximity between her complaints and

her termination, her belief that McChesney-Harris became hostile after her

sexual harassment complaint, and their previous disputes over the KRS

account commission. None is availing.

To the extent that McChesney-Harris was hostile to Halsten (and

defendants dispute that she was), the three examples cited by Halsten appear

to be “petty slights” and “simple lack of good manners.” See Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). No reasonable juror

could conclude from three comments made to Halsten over an 18-month

period, two of which had nothing to do with her complaints, that McChesney-

Harris was retaliating against her.9 Further, it is not clear (nor does Halsten

explain) how McChesney-Harris denying her a commission on the KRS

account shows pretext. And as Halsten’s first two arguments fail, her

temporal proximity must also fail. See Planadeball, 793 F.3d at 179

(temporal proximity, standing alone, does not show pretext); Mole, 442

Mass. at 595 (same).

9 The only comment relating to Halsten’s complaints – McChesney-

Harris allegedly telling Halsten that the incidents with Aragon were her

“perception and not reality” – is disputed by defendants, uncorroborated by

the record, and occurred more than one year before Halsten was terminated.

This conclusion is further bolstered by Halsten’s performance issues

percolating in the background and by the fact that PPL had decided to

terminate her before she made the April 27 complaint. Indeed, she does not

identify a single positive performance review. Although she likely

experienced occasionally less-than-ideal treatment from her supervisor, this

does not show pretext. Accordingly, Counts I, II, and IV are dismissed.

Count III: Unpaid Commissions

Halsten alleges that PPL underpaid her for two commissions – one for

revenue generated by a BayCare Health Systems account, and one for

revenue generated by an SCA Pharmaceuticals account – and that she

received no commission on the KRS account. Defendants’ motion does not

address her claims regarding BayCare and SCA.10 And the parties genuinely

dispute whether Halsten brought in KRS as a client.11 Although Kolleng

10 In their Reply, defendants argue that Halsten is not entitled to

commissions for the BayCare and SCA accounts. These arguments are

waived. See Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1999). And even

if they were not, in both instances, defendants wrongfully shift the burden to

Halsten to show, in the first instance, that she is owed commissions. E.g.,

Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt.

# 60-1) at 9 n.3.

11 Halsten did not, as defendants argue, “admit[] during an

investigation into this allegation that any issue with payment ‘was resolved.’”

See Mot. at 12. She stated that the commission payment issue she reported

in 2019 was resolved, but she maintained that she was owed commissions

from the KRS account.

determined that Halsten was not entitled to a commission from the KRS

account, Halsten raises a triable question of fact of whether she initiated

negotiations with KRS. See HSMF, Ex. B. Halsten’s employment contract is

very thin on the requirements for a commission payment, further

exacerbating the issue. Her contract provides for payment of 5% of “new

business revenue based on paid invoices,” but it does not state what she must

do to secure a commission. Id. Summary judgment thus cannot be granted

on Count III.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counts I, II, and IV are

hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns__________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE