Doe v. Brandeis University

United States District Court

District of Massachusetts

)

ALAN THOMAS OMORI and LINFEI YANG, )

individually and on behalf of all )

others similarly situated, )

)

PlaintiffS, ) Civil Action No.

) 20-11021-NMG

v. )

)

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

This case arises out of the retention by Brandeis

University (“Brandeis”, “the University” or “defendant”) of the

full amount of tuition and fees collected from students for the

Spring, 2020 semester despite the closing of its on-campus

facilities and conversion to online learning in response to the

COVID-19 pandemic.

Plaintiffs Alan T. Omori (“Omori”) and Linfei Yang (“Yang”)

(collectively, “plaintiffs” or “the students”) assert that the

failure of Brandeis to reimburse students for the alleged

inferior value of online education, as well as for certain fees,

constitutes breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Pending before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on all remaining claims (Docket No. 154). For the

reasons set forth below, that motion will be allowed.

I. Background

At the beginning of the Spring, 2020 academic term,

plaintiffs were enrolled as full-time undergraduate students at

Brandeis, a private university in Waltham, Massachusetts. The

students had registered and paid for in-person courses,

purportedly expecting to receive access to on-campus

instruction, facilities and experience.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Brandeis provided its

students with an on-campus, in-person educational experience

with only a few online graduate courses. On March 11, 2020,

however, Brandeis announced that all its classes would be

conducted in an online format due to the spread of the novel

coronavirus. In the following days, Brandeis closed its library

and other campus facilities, cancelled all in-person meetings

and events, required all non-exempt students to move off campus

and declared that remote-only instruction would continue for the

remainder of the semester. It offered students prorated refunds

of room and board but declined to refund tuition and other fees.

In response, plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf

of other students similarly situated, brought a four-count

complaint, alleging breach of contract, both express and implied

(Counts I & II), unjust enrichment (Count III) and conversion

(Count IV). They seek to recover from Brandeis tuition and fees

allegedly paid in consideration for “in-person instruction and

use of campus facilities” which were denied during the second

half of the Spring, 2020 academic term.

In November, 2020, Brandeis moved to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim. That motion was allowed with

respect to Count IV but otherwise denied. Plaintiffs’ remaining

claims were further narrowed in October, 2022 when this Court

allowed summary judgment as to Counts I, III and part of Count

II, leaving only plaintiffs’ claim for breach of implied

contract as to tuition and the “Studio Fee” associated with

studio arts classes.

In May, 2023, this Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to

certify a class as to the remaining breach of implied contract

claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (“First Circuit”)

later denied plaintiffs’ petition for an interlocutory appeal of

that denial of class certification.

Several months later, the Massachusetts legislature enacted

and Governor Maura Healey signed into law the Commonwealth’s

fiscal year 2024 budget. The budget contains a provision

granting institutions of higher learning retroactive immunity

from claims for monetary relief made in connection with, inter

alia:

tuition or fees paid to the institution of higher

education for the spring academic term of 2020 [so

long as the institution] offered online and otherwise

remote learning options that allowed students to

complete the coursework . . . .

Mass. St, c. 28 § 80(b) (“Section 80(b)”). Institutions are not

immune if “the damage alleged was caused by an act or omission .

. . that was malicious or in bad faith.” Id. § 80(c) (“Section

80(c)”).

Brandeis now moves for summary judgment once more on the

remaining claim based on Section 80(b) immunity. Plaintiffs

protest that the immunity provision is unconstitutional.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d

816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,

895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). The burden is on the moving

party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits,

“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material

fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact

in dispute “is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts

to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all

reasonable inferences in that party's favor. O'Connor v.

Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is

appropriate if, after viewing the record in the non-moving

party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of

material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

B. Analysis

The parties agree that Section 80(b) applies retroactively.

The plain language of that section immunizes Brandeis for

liability on plaintiffs’ remaining claim which concerns

“tuition...paid to the institution of higher education for the

spring academic term of 2020.” Mass. St, c. 28 § 80(b).

Plaintiffs contend, however, that Section 80(b) is

unconstitutional because it is impermissibly retroactive and

constitutes special legislation under the Massachusetts

Constitution, and also violates the Contracts Clause of the

United States Constitution. The Court will address each

argument in turn.

1. Retroactivity

When a statute has retroactive application in

Massachusetts,

[o]nly those statutes which, on a balancing of

opposing considerations, are deemed to be

unreasonable, are held to be unconstitutional.

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass.

181, 189-90 (1978). Courts apply every rational presumption in

favor of a statute’s constitutionality and the challenging party

bears a heavy burden in proving otherwise. Sliney v. Previte,

473 Mass. 283, 291 (2015).

To determine whether the statute is reasonable, courts

consider three factors:

(1) the nature of the public interest which motivated

the Legislature to enact the statute; (2) the nature

of the rights affected; and (3) the extent or scope of

the statutory effect or impact.

Koe v. Commissioner of Probation, 478 Mass. 12, 17 (2017). In

Rodrigues v. Boston College, this Court considered a similar

retroactivity challenge to Section 80(b). Rodrigues v. Boston

College, No. 20-11662, slip op. (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2024). This

Court held that several rational bases advancing the public

interest support the statute including the prediction that

colleges and universities are more likely to respond

appropriately to future health crises and comply with

federal, state and local guidance if they believe that

their choices will not expose them to legal liability.

Id. at 7.

In addition, this Court found that by limiting civil

immunity to just the Spring 2020 semester and excluding harms

that resulted from malice or bad faith, Section 80(b) is

narrowly drawn and appropriately balances competing interests.

Id. at 10-11.

As to the nature of the right retroactively affected, there

are some differences between the facts of this case and those

undergirding the analysis in Boston College. Here, this Court

denied, in part, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the

breach of contract claim concerning tuition. See Omori v.

Brandeis Univ., 635 F. Supp. 3d 47 (D. Mass. 2022). This Court

rejected the reservation of discretion defense offered by

Brandeis and held that the University’s Bulletin and Handbook do

not afford it so much discretion as “to allow it to alter the

character of its core educational offerings so fundamentally.”

Id. at 55-56. The right of students here to pursue a contract

cause of action against Brandeis is stronger than the

concomitant right of the Boston College plaintiffs in that the

underlying breach of contract claim is more viable.

A viable claim for breach of contract is, however,

insufficient to overcome the rational bases supporting Section

80(b) and its narrow tailoring to the specific difficulties

posed by COVID-19 in the first several months of the pandemic.

Consideration of the totality of the factors compels the

conclusion that Section 80(b) is valid against a retroactivity

challenge.

2. Contracts Clause

The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution

provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Law

impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." U.S. Const. art.

I., § 10, cl. 1. In a statutory challenge under the Contracts

Clause, a court must determine 1) whether the law substantially

impairs a contractual relationship and 2) whether that

impairment is “reasonable and necessary to serve an important

government purpose.” In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 979 F.3d

10, 16 (1st Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). State action that

impairs private contractual rights is afforded considerable

deference. United Auto., Aerospace, Agr. Implement Workers of

Am. Int'l Union v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2011).

There is no need to undergo a separate analysis in response

to plaintiffs’ Contracts Clause argument. See In re Liquidation

of Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 272, 282 n.11 (2001)

(noting courts apply the same test of reasonableness under the

Contracts Clause and cognate state and federal due process

clauses). Even if Section 80(b) substantially impairs

plaintiffs’ contractual rights, that impairment is reasonable

given the important and well-tailored government interests

discussed supra.

3. Special Legislation

Plaintiffs also assert that Section 80(b) violates the

provisions of Article 10 of the Massachusetts Constitution

concerning special legislation by conferring privileges to

universities at the expense of their students.

Article 10 prohibits enacting special legislation that

“single[s] out any person for special privileges or advantages

at the expense of the rights of another[.]” City of Boston v.

Keene Corp., 547 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Mass. 1989). That

constitutional provision is not, however, to be applied

mechanically. Id. Rather, special legislation will be upheld as

long as it is

for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth as to

which the Legislature's judgment will weigh heavily.

Id. at 332 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Defendant contends that Section 80(b)is not special

legislation because it confers a benefit on a large class of

educational institutions and not individual persons and that

even if Section 80(b) is special legislation, there are rational

policies that justify its enactment.

Assuming, arguendo, Section 80(b) is special legislation

the Court is satisfied that the several public policy rationales

discussed supra establish that the provision is “for the good

and welfare of the Commonwealth.” The Court need go no further.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 154) is ALLOWED.

So ordered.

_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton__

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated: January 11, 2024