overturning decision of the Dorchester Division of the Massachusetts District Court Department concerning appellant’s eligibility for unemployment benefits
How later courts described this case
- overturning decision of the Dorchester Division of the Massachusetts District Court Department concerning appellant’s eligibility for unemployment benefits
- plaintiff brought an action in the District Court seeking equitable relief unavailable in that forum
- plaintiff incorrectly brought the personal injury action in the Superior Court instead of the District Court
- plaintiff had brought an action in the District Court instead of the Superior Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction of tort actions brought against a public employer
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
MARY LAMEIRAS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil No. 23-12664-RGS
)
DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT )
ASSISTANCE, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
November 7, 2023
STEARNS, J.
For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2023, plaintiff Mary Lameiras filed a self-prepared complaint in which
she alleges that the Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development Board of Review of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the “Board of Review”) wrongfully denied her application
for unemployment benefits. Doc. No. 1. Lameiras filed an Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs.1 Doc. No. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
A court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject-matter jurisdiction.
See McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2004). Federal courts are courts of limited
1 Because this court is without subject matter jurisdiction, no action will be taken on Lameiras’
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs.
jurisdiction, and “[t]he existence of subject-matter jurisdiction ‘is never presumed.’ ” Fafel v.
Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st
Cir.1998)). Rather, federal courts “must satisfy themselves that subject-matter jurisdiction has
been established.” Id. “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Here, the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Under Massachusetts law, a person seeking to challenge the decision of the Board of Review
must file, within thirty days of the date of mailing of the Board of Review’s decision, a “civil
action in the district court within the judicial district in which he lives, or is or was last
employed, or has his usual place of business.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 42. “District court,”
as used in this statute, refers to a state district court, not a federal district court. See, e.g., Dowd v.
Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 390 Mass. 767, 459 N.E.2d 471 (1984) (overturning
decision of the Dorchester Division of the Massachusetts District Court Department concerning
appellant’s eligibility for unemployment benefits). In enacting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 42,
the legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts gave a state district court, not a federal
district court, authority to hear an appeal of the Board of Review. A federal district court lacks
jurisdiction over an appeal of a decision of the Board of Review.
It appears that the plaintiff simply erred in filing this action in federal district court rather
than in state district court. Although the 30–day deadline for filing an appeal of the decision of
the Board of Review will soon expire, Lameiras’ claim should not be time-barred in state court
because her claim may be saved by the Massachusetts Savings Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260,
§ 32.2 That statute permits refiling, within one year, of an action that was timely brought but
dismissed “for any matter of form.” Here, the dismissal does not concern the substance of
Lameiras’ claim. Dismissing an action for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because it is
brought in the wrong court is plainly “a matter of form” within the meaning of ch. 260, § 32.
Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir.2004) citing Ciampa v.
Beverly Airport Comm’n, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 974, 974–75, 650 N.E.2d 816 (1995). See, e.g.,
Corliss v. City of Fall River, 397 F.Supp.2d 260, 266 (D.Mass.2005) (federal district court’s
dismissal of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was a dismissal for “a matter of form”
within the meaning of ch. 260, § 32); Loomer v. Dionne, 338 Mass. 348, 351–52, 155 N.E.2d
411 (1959) (plaintiff incorrectly brought the personal injury action in the Superior Court instead
of the District Court); Boutiette v. Dickinson, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 817, 768 N.E.2d 562 (2002)
(plaintiff brought an action in the District Court seeking equitable relief unavailable in that
forum); Carroll v. City of Worcester, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 628, 678 N.E.2d 1344 (1997) (plaintiff
had brought an action in the District Court instead of the Superior Court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction of tort actions brought against a public employer).
If Lameiras wishes to pursue her appeal of the decision of the Board of Review, she
should promptly file an action in state district court. Based on the residential address the plaintiff
has provided, it appears that one of the state district courts in which she may file her appeal is the
Stoughton District Court.
2 Chapter 260, § 32 reads in relevant part as follows: “If an action duly commenced within the
time limited in this chapter is dismissed ... for any matter of form ... the plaintiff ... may
commence a new action for the same cause within one year after the dismissal ... of the original
action.”
III. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
Richard G. Stearns
United States District Judge