The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-10336-RWZ
MARK STEPHEN TAYLOR
Vv.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Commissioner of Social Security
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
February 22, 2023
ZOBEL, S.D.J.
Mark Stephen Taylor (“Plaintiff’) filed an application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”) and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) on February 8, 2019, alleging a
disability onset date of January 1, 2014. R. 172-184.’ His claims were denied in May
2019 and again upon reconsideration in September 2019. R. 12. Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Jason A. Miller held a hearing in July 2020 after which he found Plaintiff
was not disabled and could perform ‘jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy.” R. 12-28. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review of the ALJ
decision, which then became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner’ or “Defendant”), subject to judicial review. R. 1. Plaintiff
moves for summary judgment to vacate the Commissioner's decision on the grounds that
the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting Plaintiffs subjective complaints of limitation and (2)
impermissibly interpreting “bare medical records” that postdated the opinions of the non-
1“R.” refers to the administrative record, filed in this matter at Docket # 10.
examining review physicians. Docket ## 12-13. Defendant simultaneously moves for an
order affirming his decision. Docket ## 15-16. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
is denied and Defendant’s motion to affirm is allowed.
|. Standard of Review
The Commissioner's final decision, upholding the ALJ’s findings of fact, is
conclusive if based on the correct legal standard and supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). Substantial
evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). So long as the
Commissioner's determinations are “supported by substantial evidence,” they must be
affirmed, “even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion.” Rodriguez
Pagan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
Further, resolving credibility issues “and the drawing of permissible inference from
evidentiary facts are the prime responsibility of the [Commissioner].” Rodriquez v. Sec'y
of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Rodriguez v.
Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st Cir. 1965)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo.
Seavey, 276 F.3d at 9.
ll. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's subjective complaints
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his subjective complaints of
limitation. The social security regulations require an ALJ to evaluate a plaintiffs
subjective complaints pursuant to a two-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. First,
the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff has a “medically determinable impairment that
could reasonably be expected to produce [the] symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); see
also Brown v. Colvin, 111 F. Supp. 3d 89, 99 (D. Mass. 2015). The ALJ next considers
the “intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms’ to determine “the extent to which [the]
symptoms limit [Plaintiff's] capacity for work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); see also Brown,
11 F.Supp.3d at 99. That determination “must contain specific reasons for the finding on
credibility, supported by evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific and
clear to any subsequent reviewer.” Dias v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-13003-ADB, 2018 WL
988053, at *12 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)). The “ALJ’s
evaluation of complaints of pain” are given “particular attention” due to the “subjective
nature” of the complaints and the ALJ’s ability to “personally observel] [the] claimant at
the hearing.” See Falcon-Cartagena v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 21 F. Appx. 11, 13 (1st Cir.
2001).
ALJ Miller found that “claimant's medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence.” R. 22. He
explained in great detail the specific reasons for his credibility determination, including
the inconsistencies between Plaintiffs subjective testimony and the evidence of his
course of treatment, the objective medical findings, Plaintiffs daily activities, and the
agency assessments. R. 20-25. His credibility determination was based on substantial
evidence.
B. Interpretation of Plaintiff's Medical Records
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erred because he impermissibly interpreted “bare
medical findings” and deviated from the state agency physicians’ assessments when he
found “additional severe impairments and assessed limitations.” Docket # 13 at □□□□□□
Although an ALJ may not “assess residual functional capacity based on a bare medical
record,” he can “render[] common-sense judgments about functional capacity based on
medical findings,” “as long as [he] does not overstep the bounds of a lay person’s
competence and render a medical judgment.” Gordils v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,
921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Pereira v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-11855-FDS,
2017 WL 3567515, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2017) (quoting Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary
of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996)) (“Where the medical evidence
shows relatively little physical impairment, an ALJ permissibly can render commonsense
judgment about functional! capacity even without a physician’s assessment,’ as long as
the ALJ does not overstep the bounds of a lay person's competence and render a medical
judgment.”).
The medical records at issue here include treatment notes and MRI results related
to Plaintiffs shoulders. Docket # 13 at 15; R. 451-456. The records demonstrate that the
Plaintiff was not referred for surgery and that his shoulders had full range of motion, no
deformity, no swelling, and no instability. R. 25, 451-456. These records did not require
the ALJ to “overstep the bounds of a lay person’s competence.” Pereira, 2017 WL
3567515, at *8. Instead, the medical evidence showed ‘relatively little physical
impairment,” and allowed the “ALJ [to] permissibly [] render commonsense judgment
about functional capacity.” Id. ALJ Miller was able to review those medical findings, along
with “all of the relevant medical and other evidence” to render the “commonsense
judgment[]” that “additional functional restrictions [were] merited.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3); Gordils, 921 F.2d at 329; R. 25. The ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination was supported by substantial evidence.
lil. Conclusion
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #12) is DENIED and
Defendant's Motion to Affirm (Docket #15) is ALLOWED. Judgment may be entered
_ accordingly.
on) bel”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE