Sreedhar v. Google, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-10322-RGS

SRIKANTH SREEDHAR

v.

GOOGLE LLC, PARSONS CORPORATION, KPMG LLP, RAVI DUVVURI,

US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EBSA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR W&H DIVISION, TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES, and DSS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

May 16, 2022

For the reasons set forth below, the court grants plaintiff’s motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and denies plaintiff’s motions to appoint

counsel and to remove from Northeast Housing Court. Defendants Tata

Consultancy Services, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United

States Department of Labor EBSA, the United States Department of Labor

W&H Division, and DSS [the State Department] are dismissed because,

other than being named in the case caption of the complaint, there are no

factual allegations concerning these defendants. As to defendants Google,

LLC, Parsons Corporation, KPMG LLP and Ravi Duvvuri, if plaintiff wishes

to proceed with this action, the court grants him time to file an amended

complaint that cures the pleading deficiencies noted below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Srikanth Sreedhar (“Sreedhar”) filed a pro se complaint on the

preprinted Pro Se 1 form provided by the Administrative Office of the United

States Courts. See Docket No. 1. Named as defendants are Google, Inc.;

Parsons Corporation; KPMG LLP; Ravi Duvvuri; United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services; the Employee Benefits Security Administration of

the United States Department of Labor; the United States Department of

Labor Wage and Hour Division; Tata Consultancy Services and DSS

[Department of State]. Id. at case caption, ¶ I(B), ¶ II(B)(2), p. 6 - 10.1

Sreedhar checked the boxes indicating “federal question” and “diversity of

citizenship” jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ II (basis for jurisdiction).

Sreedhar alleges that the defendants violated his federal rights under

“18 USC 1542, a ‘violation of the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et

seq, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 631 and 632;

the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502,

eq seq; Invasion of Privacy; Intrusion Upon Seclusion; Breach of Contract;

and California Business & Professions Code § 22576.’ SAC ¶¶¶ 279, 281.

Diminution-career https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-

1 Citations to page numbers on documents appearing on the court’s

electronic docket reference the document and page numbers assigned by

CM/ECF.

content/uploads/2021/12/brown-google-incognito-mtd-order.pdf.” Id. at ¶

II(A) (if the basis for jurisdiction is a federal question).

Sreedhar identifies himself as a citizen of India and a Resident of

Massachusetts. Id. at ¶ II(B) (if the basis for jurisdiction is a diversity of

citizenship). Defendant Duvvuri is identified as a citizen either of California

or India, id. at ¶ II(B) (2)(a), and Defendant Parsons is identified as

incorporated under the laws of Virginia and having its principal place of

business in Virginia. Id. at ¶ II(B) (2)(b). Streedhar states that the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000 because “Parsons owes $1820000

(APPROXIMATELY) as it includes ESOP Shares both before and after a 3-

way-split.” Id. at ¶ II(B) (3) (the amount in controversy).

For relief, Streedhar seeks “return to [his] home in Malden, MA [to

secure] ESOP/Compensation as promised by the Employer (approx.

$1,820,000)[,] Protection of privacy on the Internet[,] Recovery of due

amount from Duvvuri[, an order for] Google to make complete disclosure to

the Delhi High Court as it involves probe into the death of a student at NITK.”

Id. at ¶ IV (relief). In his statement for relief, Streedhar explains that he is

“facing a prospect of a 3-months-jail in India for making defamatory

complaints but [he stands by his] complaint of Institutional Murder,

Corruption, Stalking, Attempted Murder, Privacy Violations.” Id.

Additionally, Streedhar states that he requests “the court to take

cognizance of the conduct of the Northeast Housing Court staff, who refused

to ensure entering [Streedhar’s] case as a Criminal Case through the

limitations of the eFileMA prevent [Streedhar] from filing criminal case

[pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1542].” Id. Streedhar speculates that “[h]ad the

Housing Court Staff followed General Laws Part II Title I Chapter 185C

Section 20 & Rule 3.2 of Judicial Conduct Guidelines, perhaps [Streedhar]

would have [received] justice sooner.” Id. Streedhar explains that he doesn’t

“have financial means to approach US Court and requested employer several

times by email to act.” Id. He also states that “[h]ad Northeast Housing

Court staff cooperated by following rules, then the matter would have

entered AUTOMATICALLY in the Appeals Court in Massachusetts for

Criminal Cases as Housing Court Cases go to Appeals Court and not to

Superior Court.” Id.

Streedhar’s statement of claim consists of ten sentences. Id. at ¶ III

(statement of claim). As to Defendant Duvvuri, Streedhar alleges that he

“lent money to Duvvuri as he was a student [and roommate who] promised

to return on getting job but didn’t.” Id. As to Defendant Google, Streedhar

alleges that it “violated [his] privacy in incognito mode besides informing the

Delhi High Court that there are no Indian Internet Privacy laws [and by

displaying] a link to [Streedhar’s] marks secured in an undergrad course.”

Id. Streedhar contends that the “link is blocked in the European Union

region” and that “Google failed to make complete disclosure to Delhi High

Court.” Id. As to Parsons, Streedhar alleges that it “owes [Streedhar]

approximately $1,820,000 for ESOP Benefits and Compensation until [his]

return to [his] home happens.” Id. Sreedhar alleges that “Parsons, KPMG

caused filing of incorrect tax returns in Canada.” Id.

Attached to the complaint are copies of several employment related

documents. Docket No. 1-1.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Upon review of Plaintiff’s financial disclosures in his motion for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis, the court concludes that he has adequately

demonstrated that he is without income or assets to pay the filing fee.

Accordingly, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

To the extent Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel, his request is

denied without prejudice. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the court “may

request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). However, a civil plaintiff lacks a constitutional right to

free counsel. Desrosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir.1991). At this

early stage of the proceedings, and because the complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff’s motion for appointment

of counsel is denied, without prejudice.

MOTION TO REMOVE

To the extent plaintiff seeks to remove Sreedhar v. Carol S. Hamilton

Agent for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, et al., No. 21H77CV000187, from Eastern

Housing Court, the state court docket indicates that the case was dismissed

on November 23, 2021, several months before plaintiff filed the instant

action.2 Docket No. 3, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remove.

Removal is only appropriate when the case might have originally been

brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). Additionally, only a

defendant has the power of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; see also, e.g.,

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941) (it is just and

proper to require plaintiff to abide by initial selection of forum; plaintiff

cannot remove case based on federal question counterclaim).

2 The Court takes judicial notice of Sreedhar v. Carol S. Hamilton

Agent for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, et al., No. 21H77CV000187 (Northeast

Housing Court complaint filed Oct. 5, 2021). “It is well-accepted that federal

courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of those

proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand.” Rodi v. New Eng. Sch.

of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d

299, 305 (1st Cir.1990)).

Although Sreedhar’s purpose in seeking remove is not entirely clear,

it appears that he may seek to have this court review a final state court

decision. If so, such review is prohibited by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,

which precludes a litigant who was unsuccessful in state court from seeking

reversal of that decision in federal court once the state court litigation is

completed. See Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Registration of Psychologists,

604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). Thus, this court lacks appellate

jurisdiction over the housing court case, and the removal of that closed case

to this court would be improper.

SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Because Sreedhar is proceeding without the prepayment of the filing

fee, the complaint is subject to review to determine if it satisfies the

requirements 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis). Section

1915 authorizes the federal courts to dismiss an action in which a plaintiff

seeks to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee if the action lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989), or if the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,

32-33 (1992).

When examining the sufficiency of the pleadings, the court considers

whether the plaintiff has pled “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

Because Sreedhar is proceeding pro se, the court will construe his

complaint generously. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);

Rodi v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004).

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO COMPLY

WITH THE BASIC PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “fundamental purpose” of

this pleading rule “is to protect a defendant’s inalienable right to know in

advance the nature of the cause of action being asserted against him.”

Martinez v. Petrenko, 792 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2015 (quoting Ruiz Rivera

v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008)); see Twombly, 550

at 555 (stating that Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only a ‘short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))). “The statement should be plain

because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to

give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him

to answer and prepare for trial.” Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Huczko, 810 Fed.

App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). The “complaint should at least set forth

minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why—

although why, when why means the actor's state of mind, can be averred

generally.” Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d

61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004).

The claims must be “set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Because it promotes clarity, “each claim founded on a separate transaction

or occurrence. . . must be stated in a separate count.” Id. In essence, the

complaint must succinctly set forth as to each defendant what he claims

they did (or failed to do), where it occurred, when it occurred, and the relief

he seeks as to each defendant. Put another way, a complaint must clearly

identify the claims and relief Sreedhar seeks as to each defendant, and

provide sufficient factual bases for each of the elements of the claims that

he asserts. The caption must identify all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).

The complaint only refers to Tata Consultancy Services, US

Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United States Department of

Labor EBSA, the United States Department of Labor W&H Division, and

DSS [the State Department] in the case caption. The rest of the complaint

makes reference to defendants Google, LLC, Parsons Corporation, KPMG

LLP and Ravi Duvvuri. Because of this, defendants Tata Consultancy

Services, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United States

Department of Labor EBSA, the United States Department of Labor W&H

Division, and DSS [the State Department] are dismissed. Morabito v.

Blum, 528 F. Supp. 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (when a “complaint names a

defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating how the

defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff,” the plaintiff fails to state

a plausible claim to relief against that defendant); Douglas v. Yates, 535

F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that named defendants were

properly dismissed when the complaint's factual allegations did not

associate those defendants with the constitutional violation alleged).

As to the remaining defendants, the major deficiency with Sreedhar’s

complaint is that the factual allegations as to Google, LLC, Parsons

Corporation, KPMG LLP and Ravi Duvvuri are conclusory and fail to

identify which specific facts are attributed to which claim. Sreedhar

combines several different causes of action against multiple defendants. He

alleges state and federal statutory violations without stating which facts

relate to which claim or how the facts relate to the legal claims raised. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place the onus on Sreedhar to submit a

pleading that identifies and sets forth, in an organized fashion, the legal

causes of action he seeks to assert against each defendant, and the factual

grounds therefore. Here, it is unclear what legal claims are asserted against

which defendants, which would make it difficult for the defendants to file a

meaningful response.

Additionally, Sreedhar seeks to bring in one complaint several

different claims against unrelated defendants. While Rule 18(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits Streedhar “to bring multiple

claims against a defendant in a single action . . . it does not permit the

joinder of unrelated claims against different defendants.” Chase v. Chafee,

No. 11-586ML, 2011 WL 6826504, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2011), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 11-586 ML, 2011 WL 6826629 (D.R.I. Dec.

28, 2011); see Spencer v. Bender, No. 08–11528–RGS, 2010 WL 1740957 at

*2 (D. Mass. April 28, 2010) (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607

(7th Cir. 2007)). Instead, Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that separate defendants “may be joined in one action as

defendants if. . . any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . .

any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). While there might be overlap with some

of the parties, Sreedhar is cautioned that it is impermissible to bring

multiple unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action.

ORDER

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED

1. Plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 2) for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 3) to remove from Northeast

Housing Court is denied.

3. Plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 4) to appoint counsel is denied.

4. Defendants Tata Consultancy Services, US Citizenship and

Immigration Services, the United States Department of Labor EBSA, the

United States Department of Labor W&H Division, and DSS [the State

Department] are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If plaintiff wishes

to proceed with his claims against Google, LLC, Parsons Corporation, KPMG

LLP and Ravi Duvvuri, he must file, within 42 days of the date of this

Memorandum and Order, an amended complaint curing the pleading

deficiencies of the original complaint and setting forth plausible claims upon

which relief may be granted.3 Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of

the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2)(B)(ii).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 If plaintiff files an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended

complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint.

Brait Builders Corp. v. Massachusetts, Div. of Capital Asset Mgt., 644 F.3d

5, 9 (1st Cir. 2011).