Brox v. Wood's Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-10242-RGS

CAPTAIN ALBERT BROX et al.

v.

THE WOODS HOLE, MARTHA’S VINEYARD, AND

NANTUCKET STEAMSHIP AUTHORITY and

JANICE KENNEFICK

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

March 10, 2022

STEARNS, D.J.

Plaintiffs, who are employees of the Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard,

and Nantucket Steamship Authority (the Authority), seek preliminary

injunctive relief from the Authority’s policy mandating vaccination against

COVID-19 as a condition of their continued employment. The Authority’s

policy, according to plaintiffs, violates their statutory and constitutional

rights. After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the court will DENY

plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

Since its detection in late 2019, the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2

(COVID-19) has metamorphosized into the deadliest worldwide pandemic

since the 1918 outbreak of Spanish flu. As of the date of this order, COVID-19

has caused the deaths of over six million persons worldwide, including

959,533 Americans, 22,944 of whom are citizens of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts.

To protect against the spread of COVID-19 and to reduce the risk of

severe illness and death for persons infected with the virus, the Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) has given full approval to two COVID-19

vaccines manufactured by the pharmaceutical companies Pfizer/BioNTech

and Moderna. “Full FDA approval takes place when enough data

demonstrate that the vaccines are safe and effective for most people who

receive them, and when the FDA has had an opportunity to review and

approve the whole vaccine manufacturing process and facilities.”1 The

1 Maragakis & Kelen, Full FDA Approval of a COVID-19 Vaccine: What

You Should Know, Johns Hopkins Med. (Feb. 14, 2022),

https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/

coronavirus/full-fda-approval-of-a-covid-19-vaccine-what-you-should-

know. The FDA has also given emergency use authorization to Johnson &

Johnson’s Janssen COVID-19 vaccine. See Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine, US

Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-

response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/janssen-covid-19-vaccine

(last visited March 9, 2022).

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states that “[p]eople who

are up to date on vaccines, including booster doses when eligible[,] are likely

to have stronger protection against COVID-19 variants,” including the now-

dominant omicron variant. Kennefick Decl. (Dkt # 16) Ex. E at 62.

The Authority, which was created by the Massachusetts Legislature in

1960 to provide ferry service to the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and

Nantucket, “services members from all walks of life, including young

children, elderly individuals[,] and the immunocompromised.” Kennefick

Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, 11. Because the Authority’s mission is to provide public

transportation, many of the Authority’s 750 employees, “including each of

the [p]laintiffs, regularly interact with fellow employees, customers[,] and/or

vendors as part of their core job responsibilities.” Id. ¶ 20.

On January 3, 2022, the Authority issued a COVID-19 Vaccination

Verification Policy (the Policy) covering all employees. Id. ¶ 27. The Policy

is modeled on Governor Charles Baker’s Executive Order No. 595, which

declares that “widespread vaccination is the only means the Commonwealth

has over the long-term to ensure protection from COVID-19 in all its

variations and to end the many negative consequences COVID-19 produces

in our daily lives,” id. ¶ 21-22, and “encourages” independent state agencies

and authorities to adopt a similar omnibus policy. Id. ¶ 23.

The Policy states that “all employees must receive at least one (1) dose

of a COVID-19 vaccine by January 5, 2022 and must be fully vaccinated by

February 16, 2022.” Id. ¶ 28. Employees who refuse the vaccine are subject

to progressive disciplinary steps, up to and including termination.2 Id. ¶ 30.

The Policy allowed for employees to seek medical or religious

accommodations on a case-by-case basis. Id. ¶ 29.3

Most of the plaintiffs sought religious exemptions from the vaccination

Policy. Id. ¶ 35. After a review of the plaintiffs’ requests, which included the

completion of a comprehensive questionnaire and a face-to-face interview,

the Authority rejected the accommodation requests as imposing an undue

hardship on day-to-day operations. Id. ¶¶ 35-51. More specifically, the

Authority found that because of plaintiffs’ public-facing roles, the requested

2 At the outset, noncompliant employees are given the opportunity to

voluntarily resign or request a voluntary unpaid leave of absence up to one

year and placement on a recall list in the event they ultimately choose to be

vaccinated. Id. ¶ 31. Nonexempt employees who do not resign are suspended

without pay – initially for five days, and then for ten days. Id. ¶ 32. These

employees receive a hearing before their ten-day suspension. Id.

3 Teamsters Union Local No. 59 – which represents all the plaintiffs –

bargained on plaintiffs’ behalf and eventually entered a Memorandum of

Understanding with the Authority stating that “[e]ffective February 16, 2022,

COVID-19 vaccination will be considered part of an employee’s fitness for

duty.” Id. ¶ 33. The Memorandum continues: “Only fully vaccinated

employees may be permitted to work at the Authority’s vessels or facilities.”

Id.

exemptions would “unreasonably risk” the health and safety of fellow

employees, customers, vendors, and the plaintiffs themselves, and thereby

“undermine public trust and confidence in the safety of the Authority’s

facilities and vessels.” Id. ¶ 52.

On February 11, 2022, plaintiffs filed an action in Barnstable Superior

Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The Authority then removed

the case to this federal district court. Plaintiffs now renew their motion for

preliminary injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’”

that is “never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690-691

(2008) (internal citation omitted). In determining whether to grant a

preliminary injunction, the court must weigh: “(1) the likelihood of the

movant’s success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm to the

movant; (3) a balancing of the relevant equities . . . ; and (4) the effect on the

public interest of a grant or denial of the injunction.” Gately v.

Commonwealth of Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1224 (1st Cir. 1993). That said, the

“sine qua non of [the preliminary injunction standard] is whether the

plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.” Weaver v. Henderson, 984

F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993).

Plaintiffs allege that the Authority’s Policy violates four of their

statutory and constitutional rights under state and federal law: (1) the right

to religious worship secured by Article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights; (2) the right to free religious exercise guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the right to be free of

religious discrimination as guaranteed by Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4; and

(4) the rights to privacy, personal autonomy, and personal identity secured

under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court discusses the likelihood of

success on each claim in turn.

Count I – Article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights

Article 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides:

[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person,

liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season

most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his

religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb

the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.

Plaintiffs’ reading of this provision as encompassing protection over

the free exercise of religion essentially conflates Article 2 with the Free

Exercise Clause of Article 46, § 1, of the Massachusetts Constitution – an

approach that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has expressly

rejected. See Soc’y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Comm., 441 Mass. 662, 676

(2004) (“This expansive reading of art. 2 would conflate it with the free

exercise clause of art. 46, § 1, and effectively render the free exercise clause

superfluous.”).4

Moreover, not all actions grounded on religious belief qualify as

“worship[]” under Article 2. Id. at 677. Indeed, “the essentially absolute

protection of [Article 2 is] directed at the ritual and ceremonial aspects of

‘worship[].’” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not allege that the Policy

trenches on any religious ritual. Thus, their prospects for success on their

Article 2 claim are negligible at best.5

Count II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Exercise Under First Amendment)

Plaintiffs next contend that the Policy – as well as the Authority’s

denial of plaintiffs’ request for religious exemptions – contravenes their right

to the free exercise of religion secured by the First Amendment, in violation

4 Plaintiffs do not assert a free exercise claim under the Massachusetts

Constitution in their Complaint.

5 Alternatively, the Authority argues that plaintiffs’ claim is barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See O’Brien v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 162 F.3d

40, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is not the proper purview of a federal court to

supervise state officials’ compliance with state law.”). Plaintiffs counter that

because the Authority is a “public instrumentality of the Commonwealth,”

and not a state executive or administrative agency, the Eleventh Amendment

does not apply. Reply (Dkt # 17) at 16. The court need not resolve this issue,

because the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claim fails whether or not it is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 Under the Free Exercise Clause, the government may

not “(1) compel affirmation of religious beliefs; (2) punish the expression of

religious doctrines it believes to be false; (3) impose special disabilities on

the basis of religious views or religious status; or (4) lend its power to one

side or the other in controversies over religious authorities or dogma.”

Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 103 (1st Cir. 2008). “The First Amendment’s

prohibition on laws ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion is incorporated

against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Freedom from Religion

Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010), quoting Cantwell

v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

As another judge of this court has concluded in a similar case, the

Commonwealth (and, by extension, the Authority) “is under no

constitutional obligation to offer a religious exemption to its [v]accine

[r]equirement.” Harris v. Univ. of Mass., Lowell, 2021 WL3848012, at *7

(D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2021), citing Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir.

6 The Authority raises another substantial threshold matter as a bar to

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims – namely, that the Authority, as a state agency, as

well as co-defendant Janice Kennefick, in her official capacity as a state

official, are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and thus are immune

from suit. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Plaintiffs again argue that the Authority is an independent entity from the

Commonwealth and therefore not shielded by the Eleventh Amendment.

The court again need not resolve this issue as the First Amendment claims

fail in either instance.

2017); Phillips v. City of N.Y., 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015); Workman v.

Mingo Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2011); Whitlow v.

Cal., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2016).

Of course, where – as here – a state agency “offers religious

exemptions, it must not administer them in an unconstitutional way.”

Harris, 2021 WL 3848012, at *7. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that

suggest that the Authority has “administered its religious exemption policy

in a way that burdens some religions but not others, or that [the Authority

has] coerced [plaintiffs] in [their] religious practices.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). Thus, plaintiffs’ free exercise claim fails at this stage.

Count III – Religious Discrimination Under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B

Plaintiffs maintain that the Authority’s failure to accommodate their

religious objections to the Policy amounts to religious discrimination under

Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, § 4. Chapter 151B utilizes an evaluative framework

identical to the one applied in federal Title VII accommodation cases. See

Mekonnen v. OTG Mgmt., LLC, 394 F. Supp. 3d 134, 157 (D. Mass. 2019).

“The employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that

the employer required the employee to violate a required religious practice,”

and “‘that he or she gave the employer the required notice of the religious

obligations.’” Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 452 Mass. 674, 676 (2008),

quoting N.Y. & Mass. Motor Serv., Inc. v. Mass. Comm’n Against

Discrimination, 401 Mass. 566, 576 (1988). The plaintiff must assert “that a

bona fide religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and

was the reason for the adverse employment action.” Sanchez-Rodriguez v.

AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). A bona fide practice

is one that is both “religious” and “sincerely held.” EEOC v. Union

Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P.R., 279

F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002). “If the employee makes this prima facie case, the

burden then shifts to the employer ‘to prove that accommodation of the

[employee’s] religious obligations would impose . . . an undue hardship’

pursuant to the statute.” Brown, 452 Mass. at 676, quoting N.Y. & Mass.

Motor Serv., Inc., 401 Mass. at 576.

At the outset, the record suggests that plaintiffs’ opposition to receiving

the COVID-19 vaccine is based primarily on “philosophical, medical, or

scientific beliefs, or personal fears or anxieties” rather than bona fide

religious practices. Together Employees v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 2021

WL 5234394, at *16 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2021) (rejecting preliminary relief for

employees who were denied a religious exemption from the hospital’s

COVID-19 vaccination policy).7

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs have established a prima facie

case of religious discrimination, the Authority has readily demonstrated that

accommodating plaintiffs’ religious obligations would impose an undue

hardship. “An accommodation constitutes an ‘undue hardship’ if it would

impose more than a de minimis cost on the employer.” Cloutier v. Costco

Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 134 (1st Cir. 2004). In conducting an undue

hardship inquiry, the court must consider “not only include direct economic

costs, but indirect ones related to health and safety.” Together Employees,

2021 WL 5234394, at *11.

In rejecting plaintiffs’ requests for religious exemptions, the Authority

“determined that the [p]laintiffs’ unvaccinated status would compromise the

7 The reasons offered by plaintiffs in explaining their opposition to the

Policy have no grounding in religious practice but are rather expressions of

idiosyncratic personal belief. They include: “Jesus tells me that it is unwise

to put the COVID vaccine into my body, his creation;” “I am afraid that it will

kill me;” “Using genetically engineered envelopes such as mRNA that has

shown ineffectiveness to work as intended to trick our bodies to fight

somethings [sic] that we were made to defend goes against why God created

us the way He did;” “I believe my God will guide me and protect me and

[God] has told me not to get the vaccine at this time;” “I worship nature and

believe in the use of natural medicine to keep myself healthy;” and “I have a

strong belief thant [sic] natural & ancient remedies are what God intended

me to use, to prevent and help cure illness.” See Compl. (Dkt # 1) Exs. 3 & 4.

health, safety and well-being of other employees, customers and vendors,

and undermine trust and confidence in the safety of its facilities and vessels.”

Opp’n (Dkt # 15) at 26. The Authority has articulated harms that it would

incur in exposing its patrons to unvaccinated employees, including the risk

to public health and safety, the Authority’s reputation as a steward of the

public welfare, and its financial interests,8 harms that cannot be dismissed

as de minimis. Plaintiffs thus are unlikely to prevail on their failure to

accommodate claim. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 134.

Count IV - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment)

Finally, plaintiffs allege that the Policy violates their rights to privacy,

personal autonomy, and personal identity under the Fourteenth

Amendment, in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are mistaken.

In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court

“rejected the idea of a fundamental right to refuse vaccination.” See Mass.

Corr. Officers Federated Union v. Baker, 2021 WL 4822154, at *6 (D. Mass.

Oct. 15, 2021). Justice Harlan, in explaining the Court’s reasoning for

8 The Authority also cites the costs it would incur in paying personnel

to “police” the faithful wearing of masks by unvaccinated employees, as well

as the costs of paying employees overtime for filling in for unvaccinated

employees who test positive for COVID-19 (unvaccinated employees who test

positive must immediately leave work and cannot return until they present a

negative PCR test). See Opp’n at 27.

rejecting a Cambridge resident’s request to avoid vaccination against

smallpox, stated bluntly:

We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or

remaining in any city or town where smallpox is prevalent, and

enjoying the general protection afforded by an organized local

government, may thus defy the will of its constituted authorities,

acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the

state. If such be the privilege of the minority, then a like privilege

would belong to each individual of the community, and the

spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an

entire population being subordinated to the notions of a single

individual who chooses to remain party of that population. We

are unwilling to hold it to be an element in the liberty secured

by the Constitution of the United States that one person, or a

minority of persons, residing in any community and enjoying

the benefits of its local government, should have the power thus

to dominate the majority when supported in their action by the

authority of the state.

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37-38 (emphasis added); see Klaasen v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (in light of Jacobson, “there can’t be

a constitutional problem with vaccination against SARS-CoV-2”).

This case is even more straightforward. The Authority is not requiring

“every adult member of the public to be vaccinated, as Massachusetts did in

Jacobson.” Klaassen, 7 F.4th at 593. Rather, vaccination is a “condition” of

employment with the Authority. Id. “People who do not want to be

vaccinated may want to go elsewhere. Many [employers] require vaccination

against SARS-CoV-2, but many others do not. Plaintiffs have ample

[employment] opportunities.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. In a puzzling

and misplaced reliance on Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), the

seminal case in which the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have a

fundamental right to marry, plaintiffs maintain that they have a similar

fundamental right to assert their personal identity and autonomy by refusing

the COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiffs point to the Court’s statement that

fundamental liberties under the Due Process Clause “extend to certain

personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including

intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.” Id. at 663. From

that language, they conflate the right to marry (which implicates no public or

personal risk) with the right to refuse vaccination (which does). Plaintiffs

ignore the Court’s earlier teaching that “[h]istory and tradition,” which

“guide and discipline [the] inquiry” into whether a personal interest

implicates a fundamental right, essentially foreclose the recognition of

vaccine aversion as a fundamental liberty interest. Id.; see also Jacobson,

197 U.S. at 31-32 (“[T]he principle of vaccination as a means to prevent the

spread of smallpox has been enforced in many states by statutes making the

vaccination of children a condition of their right to enter or remain in public

schools.”); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (“[I]t is within the police

power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination.”); Klaassen, 7 F.4th

at 593 (“[V]accination requirements, like other public-health measures, have

been common in this nation.”).

Plaintiffs’ contention that they have a fundamental right of bodily

integrity in refusing the COVID-19 vaccine is equally faulty. In support of

their position, plaintiffs point to United States v. E. Husband, 226 F.3d 626

(7th Cir. 2000), in which the Seventh Circuit stated that “[b]ecause any

medical procedure implicates an individual’s liberty interests in personal

privacy and bodily integrity, the Supreme Court has indicated that there is ‘a

general liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.’” Id. at 632, quoting

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).

Plaintiffs have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s recognition of a

“general liberty interest in refusing medical treatment” as a fundamental

liberty interest. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added). The difference

is significant. Where – as here – the court evaluates the constitutionality of

a potential encroachment upon a general liberty interest, the court need only

consider whether the Policy “lacks a ‘real or substantial relation’ to public

health and safety, whether the . . . Policy is ‘beyond all question, a plain

palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental law’ and whether it is so

arbitrary and oppressive as to warrant judicial interference.” Harris, 2021

WL 3848012, at *6, quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.

The court has no doubt that the Policy has a “real and substantial

relation” to public health and safety and is not a “palpable invasion of

[plaintiffs’] rights.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. “Stemming the spread of

COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.” Roman Catholic

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam). And

the Policy, which is crafted to protect the Authority’s staff and patrons from

COVID-19, unquestionably bears a substantial relation to that interest.

Moreover, the Policy does not invade plaintiffs’ rights to refuse medical

treatment as “nothing in the [P]olicy compels employees to submit to

vaccination.” Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Unit v. Mass. Bay Transp.

Auth., 2021 WL 6210665, at *6 (Mass. Super. Dec. 22, 2021). “Rather, the

[P]olicy coerces employees to be vaccinated but does not force them.” Id.

Because the Policy does not violate any of plaintiffs’ fundamental rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs’ claim cannot succeed.

Irreparable Harm, Balance of Harms, and Public Interest

As plaintiffs “cannot demonstrate that [they are] likely to succeed in

[their] quest [for injunctive relief], the remaining factors become matters of

idle curiosity.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287

F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, the court will briefly touch on these

factors, noting that they do not weigh in favor of granting plaintiffs’ motion.

Although several plaintiffs will be terminated (harmed) if they continue to

defy the Policy, four of the eleven plaintiffs are now vaccinated and will not

be terminated. See Kinnefick Decl. ¶¶ 57-60. Additionally, “the balance of

equities tips in [the Authority’s] favor given the strong public interest they

are promoting” – protecting the health and safety of their crews and

passengers from the spread and severity of COVID-19. Harris, 2021 WL

3848012, at *8. Finally, the public interest in safely accessing ferry service

to Nantucket Island and Martha’s Vineyard without the fear of contracting

COVID-19 from the Authority’s unvaccinated employees is profound.

A final word. Undergirding much of the plaintiffs’ quest for injunctive

relief is the scientifically unsupportable theory that the COVID-19 vaccines

are, at best, wholly ineffective or, at worst, a hoax. Indeed, plaintiffs refuse

to even recognize the vaccines as vaccines. See Reply at 9 n.3. At the

extreme, plaintiffs advance the fabulous proposition that vaccinated persons

are at higher risk of contracting COVID-19 than those who are not. Id. at 10

(“[A]fter 3 months, the vaccinated were more likely to contract COVID-19.”).

It is a matter of utmost urgency that these dangerous and fallacious

assertions be laid to rest. The CDC has determined – and no responsible

world health organization or scientific body disagrees – that the COVID-19

vaccines are safe and effective against the virus and its variants, especially in

protecting against “severe illness, hospitalization, and death.” Kennefick

Decl. Ex. E at 61.9 The danger to the public is not the vaccine but persons

who, like the plaintiffs, insist on behaviors that endanger all those with

whom they have contact. Although perhaps wrongly attributed to the great

Justice Holmes, there is Holmesian wisdom in the adage that “your liberty

to swing your fist ends where my nose begins.”

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ renewed motion for preliminary

injunctive relief is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns__________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9 Plaintiffs’ assertion that “[n]one of the available COVID-19 vaccines

prevent viral infection and/or transmission,” Compl. at 16, is confounded by

the opinion piece that plaintiffs cite in support of that proposition. See

Montagnier & Rubenfeld, Opinion, Omicron Makes Biden’s Vaccine

Mandates Obsolete, Wall St. J. (Jan. 9, 2022) (“There is some early evidence

that boosters may reduce Omicron infections . . . .”).