The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-10346
C.D., by and through her PARENTS
and NEXT FRIENDS, M.D. and P.D.,
and M.D. and P.D., for themselves
v.
NATICK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
October 27, 2021
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiffs C.D., by and through her parents and next friends, M.D. and
P.D., and M.D. and P.D. (collectively, Plaintiffs), bring this action against
defendant Natick Public School District (Natick) to recover attorneys’ fees
and costs incurred in a proceeding before the Board of Special Education
Appeals (BSEA). The court previously allowed in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs were
entitled to some measure of fees and costs, but reserving any determination
on the amount of a reasonable and proportionate award until Plaintiffs
submitted documentation as to the rates charged by their attorneys and the
number of hours these attorneys billed. Plaintiffs have now supplemented
the record with the requested documentation.
DISCUSSION
“A reasonable fee typically is determined through the lodestar method,
which involves multiplying the number of hours productively spent by a
reasonable hourly rate to calculate a base figure.” Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-
Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 2008). “In implementing this lodestar
approach, the judge calculates the time counsel spent on the case, subtracts
duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours, and then applies prevailing
rates in the community (taking into account the qualifications, experience,
and specialized competence of the attorneys involved).” Gay Officers Action
League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs assert, and the court agrees, that the billing rates charged by
Attorney Laurie Martucci are fair and reasonable and within the range
customarily charged by other attorneys of comparable experience for similar
claims. They concede, however, that some measure of reduction in the
number of hours spent on the case is warranted to account for “redundant or
excessive” work and their limited success on the merits of the claims. Pls.’
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Mem. (Dkt # 26) at 5. In that vein, Plaintiffs only seek 30% of their total fees
and costs.
Natick contends that a 70% reduction would still result in an excessive
fee because Plaintiffs achieved limited relief related to only one of their
claims. Natick calculates the fees attributable to Martucci’s work for that
single claim as $16,297.50. Alternatively, Natick argues that if the court
cannot determine which billing entries are attributable to the prevailing
claim, the court should deduct time that is excessive or improperly billed and
then reduce the remainder by 95%.
After considering the relevant factors, the court concludes that neither
party’s proposal would result in a reasonable and proportionate award under
the circumstances present here, and will instead impose an 85% reduction
from its calculation of the total billed amount. Martucci billed well over a
thousand hours over the course of five years. Even accepting that some of
the costs for these hours were deferred on a contingency basis, the court
cannot consider this figure to be anything but unreasonable given the
explanations provided for much of the work performed. In 19-cv-12427, for
example, although the case involved an appeal of a BSEA decision (i.e., the
issues had already been researched and argued), the billing records indicate
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that Martucci spent more than 50 hours conducting legal research for and
drafting the Complaint, see Ex. E-3 (Dkt # 19) at Invoice # 51, and more than
70 hours conducting legal research for and drafting Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, see Ex. E-2 (Dkt # 18) at Invoice # 62. Further, as
Natick points out, Martucci’s invoices contain irregularities that make
assessing their accuracy challenging, including billing 85 hours spent on
preparing a closing argument in one day. See Ex. E-3 (Dkt. #19) at Invoice
# 45. An 85% reduction renders the hours count for each of these (and
comparable1) tasks significantly more plausible.
That Plaintiffs achieved only a moderate degree of success on their
claims likewise weighs in favor of an 85% reduction. Plaintiffs prevailed only
with respect to one school year for one of the seven claims brought in this
case, and their victory only came on procedural grounds and not on the
merits of whether placement in the ACCESS program provided C.D. with a
FAPE. They thus did not accomplish the main goal of their litigation.
1 Because the record is rife with comparable examples, see, e.g., Ex. E-
1 at Invoice # 70 (more than 50 hours researching and drafting motion for
fees), the court will not list every instance of inefficiency.
4
The significance of Natick’s procedural violation cannot, of course, be
ignored. As noted in the court’s prior Order, school districts must provide a
formal IEP to students with disabilities each and every school year, and the
failure to comply with this mandate in any given year warrants a remedy (if
nothing else, to deter Natick and other schools from committing a similar
violation in the future). However, the court recognizes that the violation
appears to have been the result of inadvertence on Natick’s part, not one
involving any intentional wrongdoing, and that it did not cause C.D. any
tangible educational harm.2
Finally, although counsel spent a significant amount of time and effort
litigating Plaintiffs’ claims (the propriety of a reduction in hours
notwithstanding) and deferred roughly $40,000 of her fees on a contingent
basis, the legal issue underlying the procedural claim was not “particularly
novel” or “difficult.” Pls.’ Mem. (Dkt # 26) at 11. This claim, moreover, relied
on a factual background distinct from that of the FAPE claims – the failure
to provide any IEP for the 2015-2016 school year – meaning only a limited
portion of the extensive discovery process can be attributed to it. In light of
2 As the BSEA noted, the ACCESS program was available to C.D. at all
points during the 2015-2016 school year, despite the lack of a formal IEP.
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these (and other) circumstances, the court is convinced that an 85%
reduction is appropriate.
Plaintiffs list their attorneys’ fees variously as $378,583.09, Ex. 5 to
Pls.’ Suppl. (Dkt # 29-5) at 2, and $364,833.09,3 Ex. 6 to Pls.’ Suppl. (Dkt #
29-6) at 2; and their costs as $3,222.80, Ex. 5 to Pls.’ Suppl. at 2, and
$3,605.50,4 Ex. 6 to Pls.’ Suppl. at 2. Having reviewed the billing records,
however, and subtracting the unsupported fees and costs,5 the court
calculates the correct sums to be $331,020.52 and $2,980.50, respectively.
A 15% share of these figures equates to $49,653.08 in attorneys’ fees and
$447.08 in costs. The court accordingly will award Plaintiffs $50,100.16 as
the total award.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for
attorneys’ fees is ALLOWED. Plaintiffs are awarded $50,100.16 in attorneys’
fees and costs.
3 The total of $232,119.44, $114,106.99, and $18,606.66.
4 The total of $2,680.50, $400.00, and $525.00.
5 Invoice # 18 from 2018 is entirely missing, and there are errors in the
calculations associated with several other invoices, e.g., Invoice # 27 from
that same year.
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns____________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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