D. v. Natick Public School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-10346

C.D., by and through her PARENTS

and NEXT FRIENDS, M.D. and P.D.,

and M.D. and P.D., for themselves

v.

NATICK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

September 2, 2021

STEARNS, D.J.

Plaintiffs C.D., by and through her parents and next friends, M.D. and

P.D., and M.D. and P.D. (collectively, Plaintiffs), bring this action against

defendant Natick Public School District (Natick) to recover attorneys’ fees

and costs incurred in a proceeding before the Board of Special Education

Appeals (BSEA). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorneys’ fees. For the following

reasons, the court will ALLOW IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiffs’

motion and DENY Natick’s motion.

DISCUSSION

The court assumes familiarity with the factual background and

procedural history of this case. See C.D. by & through M.D. v. Natick Pub.

Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 7632260 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2020). It thus will move

directly to the issue of whether to award attorneys’ fees.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400, et seq., grants a court discretion to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees

as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with

a disability.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs

are eligible under this provision. Plaintiffs contend that they qualify as the

“prevailing party” in the BSEA proceeding. Natick disagrees.

“For purposes of a federal fee-shifting statute, a prevailing party is any

party who ‘succeed[s] on any significant issue . . . which achieves some of the

benefits plaintiffs sought in bringing suit.’” Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35

v. Mr. R., 321 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) (alterations in original), quoting

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “The party’s success cannot

be a hollow victory; it must materially alter the litigants’ legal relationship by

modifying one party’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the other” to

render a party “prevailing.” Id., citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-

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112 (1992); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of

Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).

BSEA found in Plaintiffs’ favor on one of their seven claims. It

concluded that Natick’s failure to propose an IEP for the 2015-2016 school

year impeded Plaintiffs’ ability to participate meaningfully in educational

planning for C.D. and awarded Plaintiffs the actual cost of private education

for that year as a remedy. Because an order to pay a year’s tuition for private

education cannot be considered a “hollow” or de minimis victory, see id.; cf.

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113 (“A judgment for damages in any amount, whether

compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant’s behavior for the

plaintiff’s benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he

otherwise would not pay.”), the court concludes that Plaintiffs qualify as a

prevailing party within the scope of the IDEA fee-shifting provision.

Having determined that Plaintiffs are eligible for an award of attorneys’

fees, the court next must determine what amount, if any, is appropriate.

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for all fees incurred during the litigation.

Natick asks the court to exercise its discretion and refuse to confer any award

at all.

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The court believes that the reasonable path lies somewhere between

these opposite poles. The Supreme Court has stated that “‘the most critical

factor’ in determining the reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of

success obtained.’” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at

436. To measure the degree of success, courts look at factors such as “the

difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought,” “the

significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed,” or “the public

purpose of the litigation.” Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L. on Behalf

of Brock L., 102 F.3d 895, 907 (7th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiffs accomplished one of their goals: They received

reimbursement for the cost of private education for one of the four school

years at issue in the case. Plaintiffs did not, however, succeed with respect

to their primary goal. BSEA ultimately determined that placement in the

ACCESS program (which was offered in the 2016-2017, 2017-2018, and

2018-2019 IEPs, and which was available to C.D. at any time during the

2015-2016 school year despite the lack of a formal IEP given a prior stay put

order) provided C.D. with a FAPE. The award for the 2015-2016 school year,

in other words, arose because of a procedural violation, not because C.D.

lacked an adequate placement on the merits. And while the court does not

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mean to minimize the significance of that procedural violation – school

districts must provide a formal IEP to students with disability each and every

school year, and the failure to comply with this mandate in any given year

warrants remedy (if nothing else, to serve as deterrence for future violations

and to further the public good) – the fact that BSEA ultimately found that

C.D. did not actually suffer “any educational harm as a result of Natick’s

failure to propose a 2015-2016 IEP” weighs against awarding Plaintiffs the

full sum of their attorneys’ fees. BSEA Decision at 16.

Equity also weighs against giving Plaintiffs all that they seek. First, as

noted above, C.D. did not suffer any educational harm from failing to have

an IEP. The ACCESS program was available to her at all points during the

2015-2016 school year given the stay put order. Second, it is not clear how

much Plaintiffs reasonably should have expected their FAPE claims to

succeed. M.D. and P.D. had a long history of litigating IEPs proposed by

Natick for C.D., and BSEA and the courts had consistently found in Natick’s

favor in these challenges. Third, this one lapse notwithstanding, Natick

generally was responsive to Plaintiffs’ “frequent, and frequently confusing,

communications.” Id. at 17. Plaintiffs, in contrast, “appeared to be

motivated more by a desire to obstruct Natick’s efforts to address [C.D.’s]

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remaining functional gaps than to actually address them.” Id. at 14. Finally,

the claim on which Plaintiffs prevailed (i.e., the claim asserting a procedural

“misstep,” see id. at 16) was factually distinct from the FAPE claims and

legally more straightforward.

Weighing these factors, the court determines that, although Plaintiffs

are entitled to some measure of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA, a reduction

of that fee award is appropriate under these circumstances. It cannot,

however, determine the precise amount of that reduction at this juncture.

Plaintiffs have not submitted any documentation as to the rates charged by

their attorneys or the number of hours those attorneys billed. See Pls.’ Mem.

in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. # 8) at 13 n.2. Nor have Plaintiffs

explained the nature of the work performed by their attorneys for each hour

billed. Without that information, the court cannot determine the amount of

a reasonable and proportionate fee award. The court accordingly reserves

ruling on the issue until Plaintiffs supplement the record.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is

ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Natick’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED. Plaintiffs will receive some award of

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attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the proceeding before the BSEA, but

the exact amount remains to be determined. Plaintiffs are directed to file

another motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on the docket within fourteen

(14) days of this Order that includes “billing records and additional

documentation in support of the reasonableness of the attorney’s [sic] fees

and costs incurred.” Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 13 n.2.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns____________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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