Reynolds v. Angelloti

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________

)

DIANE MARIE REYNOLDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No.

v. ) 20-10165-FDS

)

JASON ANGELOTTI, )

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

SAYLOR, C.J.

This is a Bivens action filed by a pro se plaintiff. Diane Reynolds contends that Jason

Angelotti, a Disclosure Manager for the Internal Revenue Service, violated her federal

constitutional and statutory rights by, among other things, denying her request to amend her IRS

Individual Master File. Angelotti has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and insufficient service of

process.

For the reasons set forth below, that motion will be granted.

I. Background

The following facts are presented as alleged in the complaint unless otherwise noted.

Diane Reynolds is a resident of Massachusetts. (Am. Compl. at 2).1 Jason Angelotti is a

1 Reynolds has amended the first two pages of the complaint. Those amended pages correct the spelling of

Angelotti’s name. The Court will refer to the amended complaint when relying on the first two pages and will

otherwise refer to the original complaint.

Disclosure Manager for the Internal Revenue Service. (Id.). He works at a Disclosure Office for

the IRS in Florida. (Id.).

The allegations in the complaint center on correspondence between Reynolds and

Angelotti in 2018. That year, Angelotti allegedly refused to allow Reynolds to make

modifications to her Individual Master File.2 It appears that the modifications she tried to make

stem from her belief that she is a victim of identity theft. According to the complaint, “another

person/entity” used her “name control and SSN” to “establish a business entity” attached to her

Individual Master File. (Compl. Ex. 1, at 3; see also Compl. Ex. 4 (“Identity Theft Affidavit”)).3

Her Individual Master File allegedly “fail[s] the mandatory standard validation checks for [her]

name control and SSN.” (Compl. Ex. 1, at 3).

The complaint specifically alleges that Angelotti denied Reynolds of her right “to request

amendment of certain erroneous personal information” and her right “to appeal his adverse

determination of [her] request to amend.” (Compl. at 5). It further alleges that Angelotti refused

“to protect [her] from Identity Theft” and “to provide [her] with answers to [her] lawful

questions or to provide the name and address of the person that can answer [her] lawful

questions.” (Id.). Those events, according to the complaint, occurred at Angelotti’s office in

Florida. (Id. at 4).

On January 27, 2020, Reynolds filed this action against Angelotti in his individual

capacity under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971). The complaint alleges that he violated her constitutional rights under the First, Fifth,

2 According to Angelotti, the Individual Master File is “the record the IRS maintains on every individual

income tax filer.” (Def. Mem. at 2 n.3).

3 The complaint includes several exhibits, including one that further details Reynolds’s allegations against

Angelotti. The Court will consider those allegations to be part of her complaint.

and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 3-4). It further alleges that he violated her rights under the

Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (Id. at 4). It seeks, among other relief, “[a]n immediate

injunction barring the IRS from overriding the permanent invalid SSN freeze placed on the IMF

account regarding [Reynolds] due to failure of the Mandatory Standard Validation Check for

[her] name control/SSN.” (Id. at 5).4

Angelotti has moved to dismiss the complaint. He contends that it should be dismissed

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for

insufficient service of process, and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its

face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a claim to be plausible, the

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”

Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When

determining whether a complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth of all well-

pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ruiz v. Bally

4 An exhibit to the complaint indicates that money damages or punitive damages “will need to be

determined based on damages caused by the failure of the IRS to properly validate the IMF account it is maintaining

on [Reynolds], to inform [her] of who the other ‘taxpayer’ is using [her] name control and SSN so [she] may file a

formal police report, [and to take] action on an account known to be invalid for [her], and any other damages

associated with the use of an invalid account regarding [her].” (Compl. Ex. 1, at 4).

That exhibit also indicates that Reynolds seeks “a re-examination of [her] request to amend personal

information . . . , to be provided with information regarding who in the IRS can answer [her] lawful questions, and

to be provided [her] full rights under the Privacy Act.” (Id.). She further requests that the case be remanded to

Angelotti to correct his alleged errors. (Id.).

Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75,

77 (1st Cir. 1999)). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual

allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain

recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.

2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.

2005)).

A document filed by a pro se party should be “liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Specifically,

“a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”).

III. Analysis

Defendant first contends that the complaint must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has personal jurisdiction over a

defendant. See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50

(1st Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the court

may use several standards to assess whether a plaintiff has carried that burden: the “prima facie”

standard, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, or the “likelihood” standard. See id. at

50-51, 51 n.5; Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 145-46 (1st Cir.

1995). Where, as here, the court is called to make that assessment without first holding an

evidentiary hearing, the prima facie standard is applied. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank,

Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001).

Under that standard, the court takes the plaintiff’s “properly documented evidentiary

proffers as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff’s] jurisdictional

claim.” A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Phillips v.

Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). The plaintiff may not “rely on unsupported

allegations in its pleadings.” Id. (quoting Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118,

134 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal alteration omitted). Instead, the plaintiff “must put forward

‘evidence of specific facts’ to demonstrate that jurisdiction exists.” Id. (quoting Platten, 437

F.3d at 134). Facts offered by the defendant “become part of the mix only to the extent that they

are uncontradicted.” Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009)

(quoting Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be authorized by statute and

consistent with the due-process requirements of the United States Constitution. See A Corp., 812

F.3d at 58 (citing Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52). Consistent with those requirements, a court may

exercise either general or specific jurisdiction. See Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v.

Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2016).

Specific jurisdiction exists when there is a demonstrable nexus between a

plaintiff’s claims and a defendant’s forum-based activities. General jurisdiction

exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant’s forum-based

contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in continuous and systematic

activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.

Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 618 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As to general jurisdiction, the “paradigm forum” for an individual is his domicile.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). Here, the

complaint does not include any allegations concerning defendant’s domicile. It identifies his

address as an IRS Disclosure Office in Florida. (Am. Compl. at 2). Presumably, that is where he

lives. Furthermore, it does not otherwise allege any “continuous and systematic activity” by

defendant in Massachusetts such that the exercise of general jurisdiction over him would

comport with federal due-process demands. Accordingly, the Court may not exercise general

jurisdiction over defendant.

As to specific jurisdiction, due process requires that a plaintiff establish three conditions:

First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or relate to, the

defendant’s forum-state activities. Second, the defendant’s in-state contacts must

represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the

forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and

making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.

Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Phillips, 530

F.3d at 27) (internal alteration and citation omitted).

Here, the claims arise not out of defendant’s activities in Massachusetts, but out of events

that occurred at his office in Florida. (Compl. at 4). Indeed, plaintiff reiterates that allegation in

her opposition: “[A]s for the location of the violation of Plaintiff’s essential rights, those injuries

occurred at Mr. Angelotti’s place of business located in Plantation, Florida.” (Pl. Opp. at 5).

In any event, even assuming plaintiff has shown relatedness based on the fact that

defendant corresponded with plaintiff in Massachusetts, she has not shown purposeful availment.

See LP Sols. LLC v. Duchossois, 907 F.3d 95, 103 (1st Cir. 2018) (assuming that the plaintiff had

satisfied relatedness before concluding that it had not shown purposeful availment). Wholly

absent from the complaint are any allegations of defendant “purposefully and voluntarily”

directing his activities towards Massachusetts such that “he should expect, by virtue of the

benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction based on these contacts.” Id. (quoting

Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 624). “There is no indication nor even an allegation” that defendant

availed himself “of any of the protections of Massachusetts law or any other services provided

by the state.” Phillips, 530 F.3d at 29.

It appears that defendant’s only connection to Massachusetts is his correspondence with

plaintiff. It is true that purely remote contacts may be sufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction

under some circumstances. See C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d

59, 68 (1st Cir. 2014). But that conclusion depends on the “number and duration of the remote

contacts.” Id. Here, the letters sent by defendant in response to plaintiff’s inquiries do not

constitute the “substantial connection” necessary to find that defendant purposefully availed

himself of the benefits of conducting business in Massachusetts. See id. (quoting Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)); Phillips, 530 F.3d at 29 (“It stretches too far to

say that Prairie Eye, by mailing a contract with full terms to Massachusetts for signature and

following up with three e-mails concerning the logistics of signing the contract, should have

known that it was rendering itself liable to suit in Massachusetts.”).

Because plaintiff has not satisfied the purposeful-availment prong, the Court need not

consider whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction would be reasonable. See LP Sols. LLC,

907 F.3d at 107 n.8 (declining to consider reasonableness after assuming that plaintiff satisfied

the relatedness prong but concluding that it did not satisfy the purposeful-availment prong).

Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant would not comport with

due process. The Court will therefore grant defendant’s motion to dismiss.5

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

5 Because the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant would not satisfy due process, the Court need

not consider whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate under the potentially “more restrictive” Massachusetts

long-arm statute. See A Corp., 812 F.3d at 59. Likewise, it need not consider whether the complaint should also be

dismissed for failure to state a claim or insufficient service of process.

So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV

F. Dennis Saylor IV

Dated: April 5, 2021 Chief Judge, United States District Court