The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
JAMES MURRAY, )
also known as JAMES HINES, )
)
Petitioner, ) Civil Action No.
) 19-12179-FDS
v. )
)
STATE WARDEN )
and COMMONWEALTH OF )
MASSACHUSETTS, )
)
Respondents. )
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SAYLOR, C.J.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner in federal custody. Petitioner
James Murray, also known as James Hines, is an inmate at a federal penitentiary in Colorado.
He is serving a sentence of fifteen years to life stemming from a conviction for crimes committed
in the District of Columbia. Because he was convicted and sentenced in 1980, he is subject to
the sentencing framework as it existed at the time, which includes the possibility of parole.
Upon his release or parole from federal custody, he is subject to a detainer to serve
sentences for two 1982 Massachusetts convictions: one for armed robbery (11 to 14 years) and
one for escape (4 to 7 years). Although he has been eligible to seek parole on his District of
Columbia sentence since at least 2003, he has declined to be released because he does not wish
to return to Massachusetts to serve his state-court sentences.
On October 21, 2019, Murray filed this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
petition alleges that the Commonwealth has wrongfully denied him parole or any credit toward
his state sentences based on an arbitrary criterion in violation of equal protection, a claim he
analogizes to those in Beauchamp v. Murphy, 37 F.3d 700 (1st Cir. 1994) and Thompson v.
Missouri Board of Parole, 929 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1991). The Commonwealth has filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that this is a “second or
successive” petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and Murray has not obtained the requisite
authorization from the Court of Appeals. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss
will be granted.
I. Background
The following facts are taken primarily from the opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Murray v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 451 Mass. 1002 (2008) (“Murray I”);
Murray v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 481 Mass. 1019 (2018) (“Murray II”); and the opinion
of this court in Hines v. Shannon, No. 89-CV-740-MA (D. Mass. July 5, 1989).1
On December 12, 1977, James Murray was indicted on various charges in
Massachusetts state court, including armed robbery. Hines at 2. While awaiting trial, he escaped
from the Suffolk County Jail. Id. He was arrested in the District of Columbia in 1978 and
charged with new armed robbery offenses. Id. On May 23, 1980, he was convicted in the
District of Columbia and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. Id. While awaiting trial in
the District of Columbia, he requested a speedy trial on all charges then pending against him in
Massachusetts. Id. Those requests were unsuccessful. He then filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. Id. That motion was
denied. Id.
1 This opinion is unpublished but available as Respondent’s Exhibit 2.
After his conviction and sentencing in the District of Columbia, he was transferred to
Massachusetts on October 28, 1981, for trial on the state-law charges. Id. at 1. On January 2,
1982, he was convicted in Massachusetts of escape and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
four to seven years. Id. On February 2, 1982, he was convicted of armed robbery and received a
sentence of imprisonment of eleven to fourteen years. Id. Those sentences were to be served
consecutive to his District of Columbia sentence. Murray II, 481 Mass. at 1019.
Murray then appealed from his Massachusetts convictions, citing a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial under the federal and state constitutions as one of the
grounds. Hines at 2. On October 25, 1983, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed his
convictions. Id. His application for leave to obtain further appellate review was denied. Id.
In 1989, he filed a habeas corpus petition in this court alleging the denial of his right to a
speedy trial. Id. at 1-4. That petition was denied on the merits. The First Circuit then affirmed
that denial. Hines v. Shannon, 893 F.2d 1326 (1st Cir. 1989).
In 1992, he “sought unsuccessfully to obtain an order directing the District of Columbia
Parole Board to aggregate his District of Columbia sentences with his Massachusetts sentences.”
Murray I, 451 Mass. at 1003.
In 1993, he filed a habeas petition with the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia contending that his Massachusetts trial was prejudiced by the delays that occurred due
to being in federal custody, violating both the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. Murray v. District of Columbia, 826 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D.D.C.
1993). The district court granted summary judgment to the respondent and dismissed the
petition on its merits. Id. at 9-10.
In 2003, Murray became eligible for parole from federal prison. Murray I, 451 Mass. at
1003. However, he declined to be released because he did not want to return to Massachusetts to
serve his state sentences. Murray II, 481 Mass. at 1019. His refusal to sign his parole
certificates granting the Massachusetts detainer was backed in part by his belief that “the
imposition of a consecutive sentence in these circumstances was an abuse of discretion and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions.”
Hines v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1004, 1004 (1996). He has refused to sign parole papers
multiple times, deeming himself to be a “person who will not back down when he believes he is
right.” (Pet. at 4).
In 2010 and 2011, Murray filed two habeas corpus petitions in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Murray v. Bledsoe, 2012 WL 3987353, at *2 (D.
Mass. Sept. 11, 2012). Both petitions were transferred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), where they were considered together and denied on the basis that they were “second or
successive” petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Id.
Although Murray has not yet begun to serve his Massachusetts sentences, in 2006 he
filed a petition for equitable relief in Superior Court, essentially seeking an order requiring that
he be considered for parole in Massachusetts, citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 134(c) and
general principles of equity. Murray II, 481 Mass. at 1019-20. That petition was denied. He
then appealed that denial. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court stated on appeal that “[t]o the extent
that the petitioner seeks credit toward satisfaction of his Massachusetts sentences for the time he
has remained incarcerated in Federal prison since he was granted but refused release on parole,
such relief is not available because he is not currently serving his Massachusetts sentences; the
[Massachusetts Parole] [B]oard is authorized to make parole decisions affecting only ‘prisoners
in state and county correctional institutions.’” Id. at 1020 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, §
128).
Currently, Murray is an inmate at a federal penitentiary in Colorado, serving the sentence
resulting from his District of Columbia convictions. (Resp’t Mem. at 1). As noted, upon his
release from federal custody, he is subject to a detainer stemming from his 1982 Massachusetts
convictions. (Id.).
On October 21, 2019, Murray filed the present petition pro se. (Pet. at 8). He contends
that the detainer should be set aside and that he should be released because he has been
constructively serving his Massachusetts sentences since becoming eligible for parole in 2003.
(Id. at 5).
II. Analysis
Because petitioner is proceeding pro se, his pleadings must be construed more leniently
than those drafted by an attorney. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Nevertheless, a petitioner’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying with procedural
and substantive requirements of the law. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997).
A federal court may not entertain a “second or successive” habeas petition under § 2254
unless it meets the strict requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If a petitioner “presented” his
claim in a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it must be dismissed pursuant to §
2244(b)(1). If the claim was not presented in a prior application, it must satisfy the substantive
requirements set forth in § 2244(b)(2),2 and the petitioner must also meet the procedural
2 A petitioner must show either (1) that his “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or (2) that “the
factual predicate for his claim could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence” and “the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
requirements set forth in § 2244(b)(3).3 Those requirements apply to any successive petition
challenging state custody, “no matter what statutory label a prisoner uses,” and if either
requirement is missing the claim “shall be dismissed” under § 2244(b)(2). See Gonzalez–
Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 875 n.9 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Brennan v. Wall, 100 F. App'x
4, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).
The petition at issue here is neither the first challenge to his Massachusetts sentences
filed by Murray, nor the first such challenge that has been examined by this court. Again, he
unsuccessfully challenged his Massachusetts convictions by habeas petition in this court in 1989.
See Hines v. Shannon, No. 89-CV-740-MA. In 2012, this court also denied two additional
habeas petitions challenging those same convictions, adjudging them “second or successive” and
dismissing them for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3). Murray v. Bledsoe, 2012 WL 3987353 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2012). Accordingly, this
petition is a “second or successive” petition and must comply with both the substantive and
procedural requirements in §§ 2244(b)(2) and 2244(b)(3) to be considered by this court.
However, there is no evidence that the claims here comply with such requirements.
Murray’s claims were not presented in his previous petition in 1989, and do not appear to arise
out of new circumstances that might qualify under the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). See
Hines v. Shannon, No. 89-CV-740-MA. His petition neither relies on a new, retroactively
applicable rule of constitutional law, nor introduces new facts that establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
him guilty of the offenses of armed robbery and escape. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder could have found the
applicant guilty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
3 “Before a second or successive application” is permitted, “the applicant shall move in the appropriate
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).
Furthermore, and more importantly, Murray has not obtained an order from the First Circuit
allowing a successive petition, without which this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
petitioner’s claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Therefore, the claim must be dismissed, and
neither the additional requirements of habeas petitions generally nor the merits of the claim need
be considered here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).
Murray argues that his habeas petition is not “second or successive” because his 2010 and
2011 petitions were originally filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, and thus were not successive. (Pet. Reply at 2-3). But even if those petitions had
never been filed, this petition would still be a “second or successive” petition for the purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), because he previously filed a petition with this court in 1989 to challenge
his Massachusetts convictions. See Hines v. Shannon, No. 89-CV-740-MA. Furthermore,
Murray’s 1993 petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia also challenged his
Massachusetts convictions. See Murray v. District of Columbia, 826 F. Supp. at 6-7. Thus, the
requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) apply to the petitioner’s claim here as “second or
successive,” and the failure to comply with these requirements necessitates that the claim be
dismissed.
It perhaps bears noting that petitioner’s refusal to be considered for parole at any time in
the last 17 years appears to be entirely self-defeating. In all likelihood, if he had been paroled,
he would have completed his sentences long ago. Nonetheless, this Court is without the power
to force him to be considered for parole, and indeed is without subject-matter jurisdiction over
this matter. The Court therefore has no option but to dismiss the petition.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor, IV
F. Dennis Saylor, IV
Dated: July 22, 2020 Chief Judge, United States District Court