United States v. Charles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_________________________________

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , )

)

PLAINTIFF, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION

) NO. 18-11535-WGY

MYRLENE CHARLES, )

)

DEFENDANT. )

_________________________________)

YOUNG, D.J. April 22, 2020

FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS OF LAW, AND

ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

I have been an active United States District Judge for 35

years, yet I have never before handled a denaturalization case.

The Department of Justice is launching a new section for

denaturalization cases, placing at the forefront cases of

terrorists, war criminals, sex offenders, and also “other

fraudsters” (the first out of two examples provided for fraud

cases was a conspiracy to defraud a bank of millions of

dollars). The spirit of the new section, as was expressed by

Assistant Attorney General Jody Hunt, is to prosecute the most

serious criminals: “When a terrorist or sex offender becomes a

U.S. citizen under false pretenses, it is an affront to our

system -- and it is especially offensive to those who fall

victim to these criminals.” See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, The Department of Justice Creates Section Dedicated to

Denaturalization Cases (Feb. 26, 2020),

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-creates-

section-dedicated-denaturalization-cases; Katie Benner, Justice

Dept. Establishes Office to Denaturalize Immigrants, N.Y. Times

(Feb. 27, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/us/politics/denaturalization-

immigrants-justice-department.html. Is this such a case?

On July 23, 2018, the United States of America (“the

government”) commenced this action, seeking to revoke the

citizenship of Myrlene Charles (“Charles”), who was granted

lawful permanent residence status (“LPR”) in 1998 and was

naturalized in 2005. See generally Prelim. Statement Case

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1; see also Trial Ex. 9, Form I-485 Appl.

Register Permanent Residence; Trial Ex. 10, Form N-400 Appl.

Naturalization; Trial Tr. Excerpt (Jan. 7, 2020) (“Trial Tr.”)

28, 37, ECF No. 62.

The action turns upon Charles’s alleged ineligibility for

LPR (count 2) and commission of fraud or willful

misrepresentation during the adjustment of status and

naturalization (counts 1 and 3). Compl. ¶¶ 87-110. On

September 20, 2018, Charles filed an answer and an affirmative

defense. Answer, ECF No. 5.

On August 1, 2019, the government moved to deem requests

for admission admitted and for an order drawing adverse

inferences from Charles’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

Pl.’s Mot. Deem Reqs. Admis., ECF No. 28; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot.

Deem Reqs. Admis., Ex. A, Pl.’s First Set Req. Admis.

(“Admissions”), ECF No. 29-1. The Court granted the

government’s motion to deem its first set of requests for

admission admitted as Charles failed timely to answer.

Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 60. As for the motion to draw

adverse inferences from Charles’s assertion of the privilege

against self-incrimination, the Court allowed the parties the

opportunity to argue the matter during the bench trial, and now

renders its decision below.

On September 4, 2019, the government moved for summary

judgment, which was denied. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 31;

Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 32; Pl.’s Statement

Material Facts (“Pl.’s SOF”), ECF No. 33; Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No.

38; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 39; Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No.

44.

During a two-day bench trial on January 7 and 14, 2020, the

Court heard testimony from Michael Spaniol; Thomas L.

Liszkiewicz, a fingerprinting expert; Mirella Tiberi (“Tiberi”),

a senior official with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (“USCIS”)1; and Alcena Charlemont (“Charlemont”),

Charles’s ex-husband. Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 60; see

Trial Ex. 12, Expert Witness Report Thomas L. Liszkiewicz; Trial

Tr. 5-6, 111-13. After the government rested, Charles submitted

a packet of USCIS regulations, manuals, administrative

decisions, and answers to frequent questions, of which the Court

took judicial notice. Def.’s Closing Docs., ECF No. 64. Having

heard final arguments on the merits, this Court now makes the

following findings of fact and ruling of law.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT2

A. Charles’s Entry to the United States

On June 20, 1990, Charles arrived at Miami International

Airport. Admissions, No. 1; Trial Ex. 2, Form I-263 Record

Sworn Statement Dated June 20, 1990; Trial Tr. 10. Upon

arrival, Charles presented the Immigration and Naturalization

1 Tiberi was not involved in Charles’s immigration process,

but she is an experienced USCIS officer, whom the Court finds

credible and knowledgeable on the common practice of USCIS

throughout the nation. Fed. R. Evid. 406. The officers who

were involved in the process did not testify. In the instant

case, the Court determines that such testimony is insignificant

to the government’s case. The relevant documents are Charles’s

own statements under oath, which are clear on their face and

require no personal knowledge. Moreover, so many years have

passed that the officers involved would likely not remember the

particular events. See United States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711,

719 (11th Cir. 2020) (experienced officer testified instead of

the officers involved in the defendant’s immigration process).

2 Beside the trial exhibits and transcript, the Court

references what it deemed admitted under Admissions.

Service (“INS”) officers a photo-switched3 Haitian passport with

the name Mimose Delphonse and a date of birth in October 1953.

Admissions, No. 2; Trial Ex. 1, Haitian Passport No. 88465749;

Trial Ex. 2; Trial Ex. 3, Form I-110, Notice Appl. Admis. Detain

Hr’g; Trial Ex. 4, Form I-222, Notice Appl. Admis. Detain Hr’g;

Trial Tr. 10-11, 15-17. In accordance with her passport,

Charles represented to immigration officials that her name was

Mimose Delphonse and that she was born in October 1953 in Cayes,

Haiti. Trial Ex. 2. INS recorded Charles’s fingerprints on the

above date. Trial. Ex. 12. As Charles was attempting to enter

the country with a photo-switched passport without possessing a

valid immigration visa, INS detained her and placed her into

exclusion proceedings. Trial Exs. 3, 4; Trial Tr. 16-17.

While in exclusion proceedings, on August 14, 1990, Charles

applied for asylum under the name Ivierta Dastino. Admissions,

No. 11; Trial Ex. 5, Form I-589 Appl. Asylum Withhold Removal;

Trial Tr. 19. In her asylum application, Charles admitted using

3 In a photo-switched passport, the photo depicts a person

other than the one whose identity and details appear on the

passport. See Trial Tr. 11; White v. Holder, No. 4:11CV212-

MP/WCS, 2011 WL 4809272, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2011), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 4:11-CV-00212-MP-WCS, 2011 WL

4809330 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2011) (“A photo switched passport

must necessarily show Petitioner’s image, but must list a

different name.”).

both names, Ivierta Dastino and Mimose Delphonse. Trial Ex. 5.

She also stated that she was born in May 1960 in Dauphin, Grande

Saline, Artibonite, Haiti. Id. On September 7, 1990, an

immigration hearing officer issued an order releasing Charles

from INS custody and granting Charles’s motion to change venue

to New York, where she planned to reside. Trial Ex. 6, Order

Mot. Change Venue; Trial Tr. 20. On September 24, 1992, an

immigration hearing officer denied Charles’s asylum application

and ordered her excluded and deported. Admissions, No. 13;

Trial Ex. 7, Mem. Decision Order; Trial Tr. 20-21. There is no

indication that Charles left the country under either of the

identities mentioned from the time the deportation order was

issued until the time she applied for LPR. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 3. On

her I-485 form, under the heading “Applicant’s Residence Last

Five Years,” Charles certified that she had resided in the

United States since 1990. Trial Ex. 9. Under the heading

“Applicant’s Last Address Outside the United States of More Than

One Year,” she stated “N/A.” Id.

Therefore, the Court finds that Charles remained in the

United States after she was ordered deported until she filed her

I-485.

B. Charles’s Adjustment to LPR

On March 12, 1993, a person named Antony Charles filed a

Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130”), as a LPR

seeking to have Charles classified as his unmarried daughter

(classification F24), in order to grant her LPR status. Trial

Ex. 8, Form I-797 Notice Action; Trial Tr. 20-21, 31-33. INS

approved Antony Charles’s petition in July 1993. Trial Ex. 8.

On May 25, 1996, Charles married Charlemont. Admissions, No.

10; Trial Ex. 10 at 4; Trial Tr. 112-13. On September 23, 1996,

Antony Charles was naturalized and became a U.S. citizen. Trial

Ex. 14, Certificate Naturalization Antony Louis Charles. On

December 26, 1996, Charles filed her I-485 under the name

“Myrlene Charles” premised on the approved I-130. Admissions,

No. 6; Trial Ex. 9. Charles stated on her I-485 that she was

born in May 1960 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Trial Ex. 9 at 1.

Charles represented that she had never been deported from the

United States. Id. at 3. Moreover, Charles represented that

she had never by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a

material fact sought to procure entry to the United States or

any other immigration benefit. Id. Charles signed her I-485

under penalty of perjury. Id. at 4. In 1997, Charles was

interviewed regarding her I-485 application, where she

represented that she was single and reaffirmed all her written

answers on the I-485. Admissions, No. 8, 9; Trial Ex. 9; Trial

Tr. 27, 44-45. On March 9, 1998, INS approved Charles’s I-485

and she became a LPR. Trial Ex. 9.

C. Charles’s Naturalization

On April 8, 2005, Charles applied for naturalization by

filing an N-400 form (“N-400”). Trial Ex. 10; Trial Tr. 37.

Charles represented in her N-400 that her name was Myrlene

Charles. Trial Ex. 10 at 1. Charles also represented in her N-

400 that she was born in May 1960. Id. at 2. Charles indicated

her marriage to Charlemont since May 25, 1996. Id. at 4.

Charles printed “N/A” next to the question of whether she ever

used other names. Id. She denied being detained by INS

officers for any reason, and denied ever providing false or

misleading information to any U.S. government official while

applying for any immigration benefit or to prevent deportation,

exclusion, or removal. Id. at 8. Charles further denied ever

lying to any U.S. government official to gain entry or admission

into the United States. Id. In addition, Charles denied being

ordered excluded or deported, and denied applying for any kind

of relief from exclusion or deportation. Id. at 9.

Charles signed her N-400 under penalty of perjury. Id. at

10. On September 6, 2005, Charles was interviewed by a USCIS

naturalization officer, affirming orally and under oath the

contents in her N-400. Id. at 10, Trial Tr. 38. At the end of

the interview, Charles signed the N-400 again in front of the

officer and certified the truth of the contents under penalty of

perjury. Trial Ex. 10 at 10. During the naturalization

process, Charles submitted fingerprints. Trial Ex. 12.

According to the government’s fingerprinting expert, Thomas

Liszkiewicz, these fingerprints are identical to the

fingerprints on file for Mimose Delphonse. Id. This Court

adopts the expert’s finding.

On September 6, 2005, USCIS approved Charles’s

naturalization application. Trial Ex. 10 at 1. On September

27, 2005, Charles took the oath of allegiance and was admitted

as a citizen of the United States. Trial Ex. 11, Certificate of

Naturalization No. 29358213; Trial Tr. 41.

III. RULINGS OF LAW

A. Charles’s Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

In response to the government’s interrogatories, requests

for production, and during her deposition, Charles extensively

invoked her right to remain silent, answering “I take the Fifth”

to virtually every question and production request. See

Admissions, No. 3; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Deem Reqs. Admis.

(“Pl.’s Mem.”), Ex. C, Dep. Tr. (“Deposition”), ECF No. 29-3.

In turn, the government moved that this Court draw adverse

inferences from Charles’s blanket silence. Pl.’s Mem. 7-11, ECF

No. 29.

It is ultimately within the Court’s discretion whether to

allow this motion:

[I]n a civil proceeding, the drawing of a negative

inference is a permissible, but not an ineluctable,

concomitant of a party’s invocation of the Fifth

Amendment. While the law does not forbid adverse

inferences against civil litigants who refuse to

testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, it does not mandate

such inferences. When all is said and done, the trial

court has discretion over whether a negative inference

is an appropriate response to the invocation of the

Fifth Amendment in a particular civil case.

In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal citations

omitted).

This Court declines to draw negative inferences from

Charles’s utilization of her constitutional privilege in a

denaturalization proceeding where the government is charged with

a heightened burden of proof, Fedorenko v. United States, 449

U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (proof “must be ‘clear, unequivocal, and

convincing’ and not leave ‘the issue in doubt’” (citations

omitted)); the stakes for the nonmoving party are overwhelming,

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961) (“American

citizenship is a precious right. Severe consequences may attend

its loss, aggravated when the person has enjoyed his citizenship

for many years.”); and the government is not “unduly

disadvantaged,” Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st

Cir. 1996).

This Court has already deemed admitted the First Set of

Requests for Admission due to Charles’s untimely response to the

government’s questions.4 Additionally, the government has been

4 In United States v. Klimavicius, the First Circuit held

that while default judgment in denaturalization is improper,

able to present live testimony and exhibits, including Charles’s

sworn statements. Together, these provide the government with

sufficient material to build its case. Thus, Charles’s

assertion of the privilege has not unduly disadvantaged the

government, tilting the balance in favor of safeguarding the

Fifth Amendment protection:

We reiterate that the balance must be weighed to safeguard

the Fifth Amendment privilege: the burden on the party

asserting it should be no more than is necessary to prevent

unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other side. As

correctly delineated by the district court in this case,

“the Fifth Amendment privilege should be upheld unless

defendants have substantial need for particular information

and there is no other less burdensome effective means of

obtaining it.”

Serafino, 82 F.3d at 518 (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, the motion is denied.

B. The Standard of Review in Denaturalization

A court ought revoke United States citizenship and cancel a

Certificate of Naturalization if (1) the citizenship and

Certificate were “illegally procured” or (2) the person obtained

naturalization by “concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). United States

citizenship is said to be “the highest hope of civilized men”

and it “would be difficult to exaggerate its value and

other sanctions for non-compliance with discovery orders are

permissible, e.g., deeming certain facts admitted while allowing

the defendant to rebut such evidence at trial. 847 F.2d 28, 35

(1st Cir. 1988).

importance.” Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122

(1943). This “right once conferred should not be taken away

without the clearest sort of justification and proof.” Id. The

Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he right to acquire American citizenship is a

precious one and that once citizenship has been

acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling

consequences. For these reasons, we have held that the

Government “carries a heavy burden of proof in a

proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his

citizenship.” The evidence justifying revocation of

citizenship must be “‘clear, unequivocal, and

convincing’” and not leave “‘the issue in doubt.’” Any

less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the

importance of the right that is at stake in a

denaturalization proceeding.

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505–06 (internal citations omitted).

On the other hand, “the Supreme Court has consistently held that

‘[n]o alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all

statutory requirements are complied with.’” Koszelnik v.

Secretary of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 828 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir.

2016) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917)). Thus, the Supreme Court

has required “strict compliance with all the congressionally

imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship” and

held that “[f]ailure to comply with any of these conditions

renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally procured,’ and

naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside.”

Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).

Notably, once the government overcomes the requisite burden

of proof, district courts lack any discretion to avoid ordering

denaturalization. Id. at 517; Klimavicius, 847 F.2d at 32

(“[D]istrict courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from

revoking a certificate of naturalization once the government has

proven illegal procurement.”); United States v. Hsu, 695 F.

App’x 393, 396 (10th Cir. 2017).

C. Count 1: Illegal Procurement of Naturalization by

Commission of Fraud or Willful Misrepresentation at

the LPR Process

To succeed on this count, the government must show that

Charles fraudulently or willfully misrepresented material facts

to unlawfully procure her LPR, leading to illegal procurement of

her naturalization as well.5 Pl.’s Mem. 11; 8 U.S.C. §§

1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1427(a)(1), 1451(a); see Toribio-Chavez v.

Holder, 611 F.3d 57, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.

Zajanckauskas, 441 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2006); Mejia–Orellana

v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (deferring to Board

of Immigration Appeals interpretation holding that, for purposes

of cancellation of removal, an alien who “acquired permanent

5 “[N]o person shall be naturalized unless such person has

been ‘lawfully admitted [to the United States] for permanent

residence.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1). To meet that standard, an

individual must be in possession of a valid visa and be legally

eligible for that visa.” United States v. Zajanckauskas, 441

F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2006) (second alteration in original)

(citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515).

resident status by fraud or misrepresentation” has “not been

lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).

1. Misrepresentations

“A misrepresentation is a statement of fact that is untrue

or a failure to disclose a fact in response to a specific

question.” United States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 748 (8th Cir.

2016) (quoting Shipley v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 333

F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2003)).

The government presented ample evidence showing that from

the time she entered the United States in 1990 until becoming a

LPR in 1998 Charles repeatedly gave false statements to

immigration officials and concealed facts from them, including

under oath and under penalty of perjury. Charles represented

under penalty of perjury that she had never been deported from

the United States, Trial Ex. 9 at 3-4, failing to disclose that

she was ordered deported several years earlier. Admissions, No.

13; Trial Ex. 7; Trial Tr. 21. Charles also represented under

penalty of perjury that she had never, by fraud or willful

misrepresentation of a material fact, sought to procure entry to

the United States or other immigration benefit, Trial Ex. 9 at

3-4, failing to disclose that she sought to procure entry to the

United States by presenting a photo-switched passport containing

a different identity to immigration officials at the airport.

Admissions, No. 2; Trial Ex. 1-4; Trial Tr. 10-11, 15-17.

Further, in her 1997 interview regarding her I-485 application,

Charles represented that she was single and reaffirmed her

written answers on the I-485 form, Admissions, Nos. 8-9, Trial

Ex. 9, Trial Tr. 27, failing to disclose her marriage to

Charlemont in May 1996, which preceded the interview and even

the filing of her I-485. Admissions, Nos. 6, 10; Trial Ex. 9;

Trial Ex. 10, at 4; Trial Tr. 112-13.

2. Materiality

“In assessing materiality, the test is whether the

misrepresentation ‘had a natural tendency to influence’ the

INS’s decisions.” Toribio-Chavez, 611 F.3d at 63 (quoting

Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988)). “[F]inding

that a misrepresentation is material does not require concluding

that it necessarily would have changed the relevant decision.”

Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311,

316 (4th Cir. 2013). To determine the natural tendency of a

misrepresentation to affect a decision under § 1451(a), the

question is “what would have ensued from official knowledge of

the misrepresented fact” rather than “what would have ensued

from official knowledge of inconsistency between a posited

assertion of the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood.”

Kungys, 485 U.S. at 775.

“[A] person whose lies throw investigators off a trail

leading to disqualifying facts gets her citizenship by means of

those lies -- no less than if she had denied the damning facts

at the very end of the trail.” Maslenjak v. United States, 137

S. Ct. 1918, 1929 (2017). “A misrepresentation is material if

it ‘tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the

alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a

proper determination that he be excluded.’” Koszelnik, 828 F.3d

at 180–81 (quoting Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I. & N. Dec. 288,

289 (B.I.A. 1975)). This can be done through “conflicting

representations and documentation provided by the applicant,”

which frustrates “appropriate investigation and vetting.” Mann

v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-1926 AWI BAM, 2014 WL 4795032, at *6

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014); see United States v. Alrasheedi, 953

F. Supp. 2d 112, 114 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that defendant

committed material misrepresentation by denying in application

for LPR ever having used other names, and by omitting any

mention of a prior asylum application or order of removal);

United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1958)

(holding that concealment of identity in naturalization process

was material “inasmuch as concealment of one’s true name is an

effective impediment to an investigation or inquiry”).

Here, the misrepresentations were material as they had a

natural tendency to affect the immigration officers’ decision-

making about Charles’s status. Charles’s lies and concealment

covered up disqualifying facts that would have precluded her

from gaining LPR as well as citizenship.

a. The Marriage

If the truth about her marriage had been revealed before

she adjusted her status under a category reserved for unmarried

persons, Charles’s application would had been denied. That is

because the act of marriage automatically revoked the

application based on that specific category, and because no

other application under a different category was ever filed on

Charles’s behalf. Trial Tr. 33, 54, 62, 64; see 8 C.F.R. §

1205.1. USCIS needed neither initiate any action nor

acknowledge the marriage because the revocation was automatic.

See Trial Tr. 33, 41-42, 48, 109. Charles presented herself

single throughout the LPR process, thus blinding the adjudicator

to the disqualifying fact of marriage. Trial Ex. 9; Trial Tr.

at 44. As a result, she also prevented the adjudicator from

employing his discretion to determine if granting a waiver would

be appropriate under the circumstances. Charles’s LPR,

regardless the approval stamp, was void ab initio.

To challenge the materiality of hiding the marriage from

the authorities, Charles contends that she could easily fit into

alternative categories for LPR, e.g., under her U.S. citizen

husband or U.S. citizen father. The problem is no actual

alternative application or notification was ever filed in her

case, and the Court cannot speculate how USCIS would have

decided under its broad discretion. Trial Tr. 54, 62. See

Closing Docs. 33 (explaining that in order for a LPR to upgrade

her beneficiary’s I-130 after becoming a U.S. citizen, she must

notify the government); see also Trial Tr. 103.6 Also, Charles

married in May 1996, several months before her father became a

U.S. citizen in September 1996. Trial Ex. 14. Thus, the I-130

was already automatically revoked by the act of marriage before

Charles’s father gained the special status allowing an upgrade.

Trial Tr. 109. A new action on Charles’s behalf was required to

revive her immigration process; however, this was never done.

At trial, Charlemont testified that Charles’s father told

him, in 1996, that Charles’s lawyer stated there was no need for

Charlemont to apply on Charles’s behalf because she was already

approved under her father’s sponsorship. Trial Tr. 114-16.

This hearsay statement (to which no objection was raised) could

arguably show Charlemont’s state of mind, but not Charles’s,

since she was not a party to this conversation. Notably, the

application was still pending in 1996. Charles attended the

preapproval interview in 1997 and the application was approved

only in 1998. Trial Ex. 9.

6 It is not entirely clear what difference the upgrade would

have made, since Charles was married and only unmarried children

under age 21 receive preferential access to visas. See Closing

Docs. 33.

Additionally, Charles claims that her then-lawyer was

incompetent because he did not advise her to “convert” her

application or to file an alternative one following her marriage

to a U.S. citizen. This is mere speculation, as this Court has

no admissible evidence regarding the lawyer’s conduct. There is

no evidence that the lawyer was aware of the marriage that

happened a few months before the submission of the I-485. The

lawyer did not write any answer to the question about the

marital status on the I-485, which was left blank.7 Charles

herself answered the question orally in her interview in 1997.

See Trial Ex. 9 at 2; Trial Tr. 27, 44-45.

In any event, even were Charles able to convert her

sponsorship, that, in itself, could not cure her other

misconduct and misrepresentations she committed during her

immigration process. The Court now analyzes these other

matters.

b. The Use of a Fraudulent Passport and the False

Statements to the Government

Had Charles not concealed the illegal use of a fraudulent

passport to gain entry to the United States, as well as the use

7 This Court did not see any evidence or heard any argument

regarding the practice of lawyers to leave some unanswered

questions on application forms. Thus, the Court is not equipped

to decide whether it was appropriate or negligent to do so here.

Charles’s application was processed, suggesting it was fine to

leave this one question to be answered later in the interview.

of another identity to request asylum and the fact that she had

been ordered deported under that identity, she likely would have

been disapproved. Because Charles was ordered deported (which

is equivalent to being ordered removed8) under the name Iviarta

Dastino, INS had no authority to grant her an immigration

benefit such as the LPR status under a different name. See

United States v. Alindor, No. 18-12586, 2020 WL 132442, at *3

(11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2020) (“[O]nce an alien has been ordered

removed, USCIS has no authority to grant the alien immigration

benefits under a different name.”). At trial, Tiberi testified

that had Charles admitted having a prior order of deportation,

an adjudicator would have asked follow-up questions to determine

eligibility. Trial Tr. 40. Tiberi further testified that she

would not immediately approve an application had the applicant

previously presented a photo-switched passport to unlawfully

gain entrance to the United States. Trial Tr. 30, 47-49.

Charles contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove

she used the fraudulent passport to gain entry because there is

no indication as to exactly when she presented it to officials

and whether it was attached to the benefit of gaining entry to

the United States. She also argues that she immediately asked

8 Instead of “deportation,” Congress now uses the term

“removal.” See Calcano–Martinez v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 348, 350

n.1 (2001).

for asylum to show she did not intend to use the fraudulent

passport to be admitted to the United States.

Charles’s claims do not hold water. Charles was deemed to

admit that she “attempted to enter the United States using a

Haitian Passport under the name of Mimose Deiphonse.”

Admissions, No. 2. Additionally, the notice of her detention

clearly states she was being detained because she “sought to

enter the United States by fraud . . . [and] presented a

photoswitched . . . Haitian Passport.” Trial Ex. 3. Moreover,

Charles did not apply for asylum “immediately”. She was

detained in June 1990, but submitted the asylum application a

couple of months later in August 1990. Trial Exs. 3-5. The

Court cannot seriously credit Charles’s claim that she obtained

the Haitian Passport lawfully through the Haitian Consulate,

when the passport contains her photo while the name, date, and

place of birth are different than those she provided in her LPR

and naturalization process. Trial Exs. 1, 9, 10.

Charles claims that the government is responsible for

erroneously granting her the LPR, as it failed to investigate

and to match fingerprints.

This claim cannot stand. Charles’s concealment of

material facts caused it to deem such an investigation

unnecessary. At the relevant time, the fingerprinting system

was not as fully computerized and automatic as it is today and

was activated only upon specific suspicion. Trial Tr. 79.

Likewise, the Attorney General at the time had no apparent

reason to commence rescission9 of her LPR as a result, once

again, of Charles’s misconduct.

c. The Court Cannot Usurp the Government’s

Discretion Regarding Waivers

To show that her misrepresentations and concealment were

not in fact material, Charles claims that several waivers were

available to her. The problem is Charles did not apply for any

of them. The grant of waivers is within USCIS’ or the Attorney

General’s discretion, Trial Tr. 76, and the Court cannot step

into their shoes. Otherwise, it could give unfair leverage to

those who do not apply for waivers for whatever reason.

Accepting Charles’s argument would also disregard the

requirement to charge the applicant for a waiver with the burden

of proving eligibility to the appropriate tribunal. A decision

by INS’ Administrative Appeals Office, which Charles has

provided to the Court, see Closing Docs. 27-30, states: “In

proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of

9 “If, at any time within five years after the status of a

person has been otherwise adjusted . . . to that of an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . it shall appear

to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the person was

not in fact eligible for such adjustment of status, the Attorney

General shall rescind the action taken granting an adjustment of

status . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a).

inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the [Immigration and

Nationality] Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains

entirely with the applicant.” In re: Applicant, 2013 WL

8284909, at *3 (INS Oct. 1, 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361).

Tiberi testified that an applicant must demonstrate extreme

hardship in order to obtain a 212(i) waiver and multiple factors

ought be considered. Trial Tr. 35, 69-70. Tiberi agreed that

in Charles’s case the USCIS could consider that Charles came

from Haiti, a country associated with extreme poverty, wars, and

lack of medical care. Id. at 72. Tiberi also agreed that some

asylum applicants who flee persecution would often need to take

extreme measures like fabricating documents, and the government

will sometimes grant them a waiver. Id. at 73-74. All that

notwithstanding, Charles did not apply for this particular

waiver. The Court cannot speculate what would have happened if

Charles’s did, especially since the decisions in waivers are

subjective to every adjudicating officer and the discretion is

so broad. See Gina L. Signorelli, Immigration Waivers and the

Psychological Effects on Family Members Throughout Their Loved

One's Legalization Process, 46 S.U. L. Rev. 195, 213 (2019).

Notably, Charles’s asylum application stated she was persecuted

in her country, Haiti, and this application was nevertheless

denied. Thus, it is doubtful that she could have obtained this

type of waiver. Trial Ex. 5.

Tiberi also testified that USCIS officers may, in their

discretion, approve the I-485 in spite of an applicant’s

deportability with a section 237(a)(1)(H) waiver. Trial Tr.

104; see San Pedro v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1156, 1157–58 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Although there are nondiscretionary eligibility elements

that must be met under § 237(a)(1)(H) . . . the ultimate

authority whether to grant the waiver rests entirely in the

discretion of the Attorney General.”) (internal citation,

quotation marks, and alteration omitted).10 In addition, Tiberi

testified that when an applicant files an I-601 form to receive

a waiver for fraud or willful misrepresentation, it may be

considered in the officer’s discretion. Trial Tr. 31. As a

prerequisite for this waiver, however, the applicant first must

admit to committing the fraud. Id. at 50.

The immigration authorities treat aliens more favorably,

finding no fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), when despite

using fraudulent documentation to arrive to the United States,

upon their arrival, they immediately surrender the false

documents to the U.S. immigration officials and reveal their

true identity before applying for asylum. See Bueno v.

10 Although in the Fu case, referenced by Charles, the Board

of Immigration Appeals ruled the applicant to be statutorily

eligible for the waiver, the discretion ultimately rested with

the Attorney General. Accordingly, the case was remanded “for

further consideration of his waiver application.” In re Guang

Li Fu, 23 I. & N. Dec. 985, 988 (BIA 2006).

Davidson, No. 14-CV-23654, 2018 WL 7077958, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May

16, 2018)(citing Matter of D-L & A-M, 20 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA

1991)); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996); Matter of

Y-G, 20 I. & N. Dec. 794 (BIA 1994)). Here, however, Charles

did not voluntarily surrender her false document and did not

reveal her true identity. It is therefore unlikely the

discretionary waiver or waivers would have been granted.

d. “Without Inspection” Waiver

Finally, Charles certified in her I-485 that she last

entered the United States without inspection, seeking and

obtaining a waiver for this fault specifically. This was,

however, yet another means to conceal her deportation order and

the fraudulent behavior that preceded it. Trial Ex. 9; Trial

Tr. 67-68. As Tiberi testified, “without inspection” would

apply to applicants who do not have documentation to prove they

were inspected upon entering the United States. Here, not only

was Charles inspected, she was heavily inspected upon the

discovery of her fraud, ultimately resulting in her being

ordered deported.

Charles’s suggestion that her attempt to gain entry using

another identity could be viewed as entry without inspection is

illogical and baseless. As opposed to fraudulently passing

inspection, a person who evades inspection “did not attempt to

obtain a visa or any other documentation from immigration

officials, nor was she seeking to be admitted into the United

States, as she was already in the country after having entered

without inspection.” See In re: Applicant, 2013 WL 8284909, at

*2; Closing Docs. 29. Charles, in contrast, sought to gain

admission to the United States by fraud.

Charles’s claim that this kind of waiver is commonly

considered a forgiveness program for all kinds of unlawful

entries, rather than only for persons who entered without

inspection, lacks any factual basis. Charles refers to a single

sentence from the USCIS website. See Closing Docs. 19, Ex. B,

Green Card Through LIFE Act (245(i) Adjustment) (aliens may

adjust their status “regardless of: The manner they entered the

United States”). Later in the same document, however, under the

heading “Adjustment of Status Under Section 245(i) of the INA

and LIFE Act Provisions,” it unequivocally states that this

waiver is not amnesty or forgiveness, and it may not prevent

deportation or other consequences of unlawful presence in the

United States. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Green

Card Through LIFE Act (245(i) Adjustment),

https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/life-act-245i-adjustment (last

visited Mar. 5, 2020).11

11 Courts may take judicial notice of the contents of federal

agencies’ websites that are not subject to reasonable dispute.

See Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir.

2010).

Therefore, the Court finds that the government has met the

heavy burden to show that the misrepresentations were material.

3. The “Willful” Element

“[T]he ‘element of willfulness is satisfied by a finding

that the misrepresentation was deliberate and voluntary.’”

Toribio-Chavez, 611 F.3d at 63 (quoting Mwongera v. I.N.S., 187

F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 1999) and citing Parlak v. Holder, 578

F.3d 457, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2009)). “An intent to deceive is not

necessary; rather, knowledge of the falsity is sufficient.” Id.

(citing Forbes v. I.N.S., 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Wen Zhong Li v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 127, 131 (1st Cir. 2016). “The

government is not required to prove intent to deceive, but

rather must demonstrate only that an applicant willfully made a

representation that does not accord with the facts.” United

States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 749 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing

Espinoza-Espinoza v. I.N.S., 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977));

see Parlak, 578 F.3d at 463. In Hirani, the applicant’s false

representation of his name, under penalty of perjury,

demonstrated that the misrepresentation was willful. 824 F.3d

at 749.

Here, there is sufficient evidence of willfulness. Charles

knew the representations were false; some of the misstatements

are about personal facts12 that Charles must have known, such as

her date and place of birth, her use of other names, and her

marital status. See Bazzi v. Holder, 746 F.3d 640, 646 (6th

Cir. 2013) (“[The applicant] knew the reality of his marital

status and for him to have conveyed any impression to the

contrary . . . was to willfully misrepresent the truth.”); see

also Toribio-Chavez, 611 F.3d at 63. Moreover, the fact that

Charles moved the immigration court for a change of venue shows

she knew of the deportation proceedings. See Trial Ex. 6.

Additionally, Charles was aware that she used a passport

containing her photo but not her own personal information.

Charles presented the immigration officials the false passport,

12 Charles cites Nowak and Maisenberg for the proposition

that the government’s evidence regarding events that happened

many years ago should be scrutinized with the utmost care,

suggesting that the government’s evidence here should be

discredited. See Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958),

Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958). While it is

always a good idea to scrutinize evidence with the utmost care -

- indeed it is this Court’s consistent aspiration -- this case

is highly distinguishable from Nowak and Maisenberg. In the

above-mentioned cases, the evidence in question consisted of the

live testimony of witnesses about equivocal expressions made

years prior. Here, the evidence consists mostly of government

records, including statements under oath, as well as the

testimony of an officer regarding immigration processes and an

explanation of the documentation. The only live testimony, that

of Charles’s ex-husband, sought to establish the fact of their

marriage. Also, the court in Nowak determined that the question

to which Nowak answered that the government considered a

misrepresentation was vague, so Nowak’s answer could not be a

misrepresentation. See Nowak, 356 U.S. at 663-65. Here,

questions about marital status, names, place of birth, and the

like, are clear.

she was barred admission, and then was denied asylum and ordered

deported. Trial Exs. 1, 3, 4; Admissions, Nos. 2, 13; Trial Tr.

15-17. “A person who knowingly presents a false passport as if

it were genuine has engaged in a willful misrepresentation.”

Ymeri v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing

Esposito v. I.N.S., 936 F.2d 911, 912 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991)).

Furthermore, the repetition and consistency of the

misrepresentations as to specific subjects -- e.g., indicating

she had never been ordered deported, never lied to the

government, and never misrepresented to procure immigration

benefits both in her I-485 and N-400 -- negate a finding of

mistake. The fact that Charles was under penalty of perjury

served to put her on notice of the importance of truthful

answers and to avoid unintentional misstatements. What’s more,

during the interviews with officials Charles went through her

answers on the I-485 and N-400 and could have changed any

inaccurate answers, but she did not. Trial Tr. 27-29. Charles

had multiple opportunities to rescind, but she chose not to do

so. Finally, any suggestion that Charles’s misstatements were

due to poor English skills should fail, as Charles’s I-485 was

filled by a lawyer on her behalf. Trial Ex. 9; Trial Tr. 104.

4. Procurement of Citizenship

The last element the government must prove is that Charles

procured citizenship as a result of her misrepresentation or

concealment. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 767. “At the end of the

day, then, the government only wins if it shows that the citizen

misrepresented a material fact and it is ‘fair to infer that the

citizen was actually ineligible.’” United States v. Mensah, 737

F.3d 789, 808 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Latchin,

554 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 2009) & Kungys, 485 U.S. at 784

(Brennan, J., concurring)). The standard is not whether the

application would have been denied “but for” the

misrepresentation, but whether a court could fairly infer the

applicant would have been ineligible. Id. at 809.

As noted above, due to her marital status, Charles was

ineligible to apply for LPR under a category reserved only for

unmarried individuals. At the time she applied, Charles could

not have legally acquired LPR status and consequently she could

not have been naturalized. See Trial Tr. 32-33, 41-47, 5-64.

Thus, it is fair to infer that Charles was granted the

immigration benefit of LPR status as a result of her

misrepresentation that she was single, despite being ineligible.

See Hirani, 824 F.3d at 752 (“Because [the applicant’s] material

misrepresentations concealed his statutory ineligibility to

naturalize, [he] procured his naturalization on the basis of

those misrepresentations.”).

Further, if Charles’s immigration history dating back to

the early 1990s -- when she presented the fraudulent passport at

the airport and was later ordered deported under other

identities -- was known to immigration officials, these acts of

fraud would have afforded them the discretion to deny Charles’s

immigration benefits. See Trial Tr. 11-18, 30-31, 40-49, 76,

104; see also United States v. Alindor, No. 8:17-CR-270-T-33MAP,

2018 WL 1705647, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-

12586, 2020 WL 132442 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2020) (holding, in a

criminal denaturalization context,13 that when an applicant “did

not reveal in her naturalization paperwork or interview that she

. . . had been ordered deported, a reasonable jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] procured her

naturalization by those false statements.”). “In short, when

the defendant misrepresents facts that the law deems

incompatible with citizenship, her lie must have played a role

in her naturalization.” Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1928–29.

This Court thus finds that the government has met its heavy

burden of demonstrating clear, unequivocal, and convincing

evidence, that Charles illegally procured her citizenship by

willfully misrepresenting material facts at the adjustment of

status phase.

13 “[T]he civil and criminal statutes both require a

material misrepresentation and procurement of citizenship.”

United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009).

D. Count 3: Procurement of U.S. Citizenship by

Concealment of a Material Fact or Willful

Misrepresentation at the Naturalization14.

This count focuses on the naturalization process and,

similar to count 1, “contains four independent requirements: the

naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some

fact, the misrepresentation or concealment must have been

willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized

citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the

misrepresentation or concealment.” Kungys, 485 U.S. at 767; see

Pl.’s Reply ¶¶ 12-13.

The government has proved that during the naturalization

process, on her N-400, and in the following interview, Charles

misrepresented and concealed under penalty of perjury her past

use of different names, Trial Ex. 10, at 4, 10, as well as her

immigration history, including her detention, asylum petition,

and deportation order, id. at 8-10. Additionally, Charles

falsely claimed, under penalty of perjury, to have never

provided false or misleading information to any U.S. government

official while applying for any immigration benefit or to

prevent deportation, exclusion, or removal. Id.

14 The Court addresses count 3 before count 2, as count 3

requires analysis virtually identical to count 1.

The same analysis for count 1 applies here regarding

materiality, willfulness, and procurement. See Hirani, 824 F.3d

at 749–50 (internal citation omitted) (concealment of identity

under penalty of perjury was willful and material); United

States v. Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *5

(D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018) (false statements and concealments under

penalty of perjury were willful). To become eligible for

naturalization, Charles had to prove her English proficiency or

to qualify for an exemption.15 On her N400 she checked “no” when

asked if she needed a waiver for the English requirement. Trial

Ex. 10 at 2. Thus, Charles clearly understood what she was

asked and could answer accurately, but chose otherwise.

As for procurement, like in count 1, Charles’s concealment

and lies hid her ineligibility to adjust status, which is a

prerequisite for naturalization. Thus, it is fair to infer that

Charles’s misconduct was the reason she was naturalized despite

her disqualification.

Therefore, the Court finds that the government has shown

clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that Charles

illegally procured her citizenship by willfully misrepresenting

material facts during her naturalization process.

15 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Policy

Manual, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-e-

chapter-2 (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).

E. Count 2: Illegal Procurement of Naturalization - Not

Lawfully Admitted for Permanent Residence

At oral argument, the government asserted that under count

2, the law requires no culpability whatsoever on the part of a

defendant who failed to strictly comply with the naturalization

requirements. As the Court has already found grounds for

denaturalization under counts 1 and 3, and absent any binding

precedent agreeing with the government,16 this Court will not

address count 2. The Court, however, is troubled by the

government’s interpretation of the law and rejects it. This

Court is reluctant to adhere to the view of the several courts

that any innocent, technical problem with the immigration

process must result in denaturalization. Cf. Koszelnik, 828

F.3d at 180. The stringent burden of proof on the government’s

shoulders, which resembles the criminal burden of proof,17 along

16 The Court finds that while some of the cases listed on

the government’s Notice of Additional Authority, ECF No. 65, are

simply not persuasive, others are inapplicable as they involve

defendants who were determined ineligible because of commission

of serious crimes. To this Court, such circumstances differ

dramatically from the current case of non-fault ineligibility.

17 As stated in Klapprott v. United States:

[B]ecause of the grave consequences incident to

denaturalization proceedings we have held that a burden

rests on the government to prove its charges in such cases

by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which does not

leave the issue in doubt. This burden is substantially

identical with that required in criminal cases-proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.

with the harsh consequences of a revocation of citizenship that

may surpass criminal sanction,18 are inconsistent with this

stance. Moreover, the natural reading of the statute suggests

that the conduct under “illegal procurement” ought be as serious

as “willful misrepresentation” or fraud, simply because it is

offered as an alternative. Why would the same law that targets

blameworthy acts, such as fraud, also target innocent errors?

In his concurring opinion in Kungys, Justice Stevens observed

that by adding “illegal procurement” to the statute, Congress

intended to include severe crimes other than fraud or willful

misrepresentation that nonetheless warrant denaturalization

(e.g., rape). See 485 U.S. at 799 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring

in the judgment). Justice Stevens then refused to construe

“illegal procurement” to encompass “trivialities” and

335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (internal citation omitted).

18 See Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 611 (“Denaturalization

consequences may be more grave than consequences that flow from

conviction for crimes.”); see also Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at

122:

This is not a naturalization proceeding in which the

Government is being asked to confer the privilege of

citizenship upon an applicant. Instead the Government seeks

to turn the clock back twelve years after full citizenship

was conferred upon petitioner by a judicial decree, and to

deprive him of the priceless benefits that derive from that

status. In its consequences it is more serious than a

taking of one’s property, or the imposition of a fine or

other penalty.

insignificant non-compliance with the naturalization process.

Id. This view resonates with the Court.19

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court finds and rules that on counts

1 and 3, the government has met its heightened burden of proof,

showing clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly that Charles’s

naturalization was procured unlawfully by concealment and

misrepresentation of material facts at the adjustment of status

and the naturalization stages. Since the Court has no equitable

discretion in this matter, an order of denaturalization must be

entered.

The Court makes the following acknowledgment. Charles is a

sixty-year-old woman who has lived half her life in the United

States. She works as an accountant and, since she was

naturalized fifteen years ago, has been a law-abiding American

citizen. There is no contention to the contrary. Charles

committed a low-level fraud. In a case such as this, to truly

administer justice, the legal tools of statute of limitations

and judicial discretion are most needed, yet absent. See United

19 Although the Supreme Court in Fedorenko ruled that any

failure to satisfy a statutory requirement may justify stripping

of citizenship, see Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514, it never said

that the defendant’s mental state is unimportant to the

consideration. Notably, the Supreme Court found that Fedorenko

committed willful misrepresentation. See

id.

States v. Rebelo, 394 F. App’x 850, 853 (3d Cir. 2010) (federal

catch-all limitations period did not apply to denaturalization

proceeding). Curiously, civil denaturalization has a more

responsible sibling in criminal denaturalization. Criminal

denaturalization provides much more protection to the

naturalized citizen. First, there is a statute of limitations

of ten years. See United States v. Chahla, 752 F.3d 939, 946

n.6 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3291 provides a

ten-year statute of limitations for violations of § 1425).

Second, the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Mensah, 737 F.3d at 809. Third, all criminal law

safeguards apply, including the right to a jury trial and the

Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. See e.g.

id. at 792. Under this legal regime, it may be more

advantageous for the government to be less diligent, to wait

until the passage of ten years, in order to commence civil

denaturalization instead of the stricter criminal process. For

the law to condone this opportunity for governmental abuse of

power is a promotion of injustice. Civil and criminal

denaturalization are substantively comparable, as both may arise

from the same conduct (e.g., providing false statements to the

government in naturalization process as in Maslenjak); both

require similar legal analysis (see supra note 12); and the

relief the government seeks is often the same -- revocation of

citizenship. See Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122 (noting that

denaturalization may be more harsh than a criminal penalty: “In

its consequences it is more serious than a taking of one’s

property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty.”);

Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1918; United States v. Djanson, 578 F.

App’x 238, 241 (4th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the same handy legal

tools, especially a statute of limitations, are warranted in

both actions. The Court is concerned that the law presently

allows this disparity.

Judgment will enter for the government as follows:

1) Charles’s United States citizenship is revoked and the

Order of United States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting

in Boston, Massachusetts, dated September 27, 2005 admitting

Charles to citizenship is vacated. Charles’s Certificate of

Naturalization No. 29358213 (the “Certificate”), issued pursuant

to that Order, is cancelled and void.

2) Charles is permanently enjoined from claiming any

rights, privileges, benefits, or advantages related to her

September 27, 2005 naturalization.

3) Charles shall surrender and deliver, within ten days of

entry of judgment, the Certificate and all copies thereof in her

possession and make good faith efforts to recover and surrender

copies in possession of others, to the Attorney General.

4) Charles shall surrender and deliver, within ten days of

entry of judgment, any other indicia of U.S. citizenship,

including any U.S. passports and voter registration cards, and

all copies thereof in her possession and to make good faith

efforts to recover and surrender copies in possession of others,

to the Attorney General.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young

WILLIAM G. YOUNG

DISTRICT JUDGE