The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
RICHARD SIMONE, JR., )
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION
)
v. ) NO. 4:19-11070-TSH
)
)
ANDREW MONACO, JOSEPH FLYNN, )
ROBERT QUINN, RICHARD MCKEON, )
THOMAS LENCKI, JR., MARK )
SUTTMEIER, CLARK GEPHARDT, )
JOSHUA TREFRY, STEVEN HALLAM, )
JAMES TOLLNER, JONATHAN )
BOURGET, JONATHAN SANTIMORE, )
DAVID ARMSTONG, & JARROD )
WOELLER, )
Defendants. )
______________________________________ )
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket
No. 31)
November 12, 2019
HILLMAN, D.J.
Richard Simone, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for battery and
violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Docket No. 1). Trooper Andrew
Monaco (“Trooper Monaco”) of the New Hampshire State Police moves to dismiss the claims
against him for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket No. 31). Because Plaintiff has not shown that the
Trooper Monaco is subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts, the Court grants the motion
to dismiss.
Background
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Docket No. 1) and assumed
true for the purposes of this motion.
On May 5, 2016, the Worcester District Court issued a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest after
he failed to appear at a probation hearing. (Docket No. 1 at 6). Six days later, as Massachusetts
police officers tried to arrest Plaintiff, Plaintiff drove over the border into New Hampshire.
(Docket No. 1 at 7–8). The Massachusetts police officers coordinated with New Hampshire
police officers to continue pursuing Plaintiff. (Docket No. 1 at 8). The pursuit ended when
Plaintiff stopped his vehicle on a residential dead-end street in Nashua, New Hampshire.
(Docket No. 1 at 8).
Plaintiff remained in his vehicle as officers from Massachusetts State Police, New
Hampshire State Police, Holden Police Department, and Nashua Police Department surrounded
him. (Docket No. 1 at 8). Trooper Andrew Monaco was among those present. (Docket No. 1 at
8). Plaintiff complied with an officer’s order to exit the vehicle and get on the ground. (Docket
No. 1 at 8–9). After his surrender, Trooper Andrew Monaco and Massachusetts State Police
Trooper Joseph Flynn began to strike Plaintiff’s body repeatedly. (Docket No. 1 at 10). Plaintiff
was eventually taken to a hospital in New Hampshire to treat the injuries he sustained during this
beating.
On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 action against, among others, Trooper Monaco.
(Docket No. 1). Count I alleges that Trooper Monaco struck Plaintiff in violation of his Fourth
and Fourteenth amendment rights. (Docket No. 1 at 16). Count III alleges that Trooper Monaco
battered Plaintiff. (Docket No. 1 at 18). Trooper Monaco moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction on September 16, 2019. (Docket No. 31).
Legal Standard
A plaintiff bears “the burden of establishing that jurisdiction over the defendant lies in the
forum state.” Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st
Cir. 2016). When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), “the court may proceed to adjudication by one or another
among several different methods.” Boit v. Gar-Tec Prod., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 674 (1st Cir.
1992). The most commonly used standard, applicable here, is the prima facie standard. Id. at
675. Under the prima facie standard, a court considers “whether the plaintiff has proffered
evidence that, if credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential to personal
jurisdiction.” Id. A plaintiff “ordinarily cannot rest upon the pleadings, but is obliged to adduce
evidence of specific facts” supporting jurisdiction. Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995).
Discussion
To establish personal jurisdiction over Trooper Monaco, Plaintiff “must meet the
requirements of both the Massachusetts long-arm statute and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” See A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir.
2016). “The jurisdictional requirements imposed by the Massachusetts long-arm statute are quite
similar to, though not completely congruent with, the jurisdictional requirements imposed by the
Due Process Clause.” Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34. In this case, the differences between the
requirements of the Massachusetts long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause are not relevant.
There are two types of personal jurisdiction available: general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. Neither applies here.
1. General Jurisdiction
“General jurisdiction exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant’s
forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in continuous and systematic
activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.” United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St.
Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992). To assert general jurisdiction over a defendant, the
defendant must “essentially [be] at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tire
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
Trooper Monaco is not “at home” in Massachusetts. He is a resident of New Hampshire
who works in New Hampshire. (Docket Nos. 32-1 at 1). He does not own any property in
Massachusetts or regularly enter Massachusetts in the course of his duties. (Docket No. 32-1 at
2). Thus, this Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Trooper Monaco.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
To assess whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider “(1) whether the claim
‘directly arise[s] out of, or relate[s] to, the defendant’s forum state activities;’ (2) whether the
defendant’s in-state contacts ‘represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and
making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable;’ and (3)
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.” Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 825 F.3d at 35
(quoting C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of the Trooper Monaco’s contacts with Massachusetts,
nor is there any indication that Trooper Monaco purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Massachusetts. He pursued the Plaintiff in New Hampshire, arrested him
in New Hampshire, and allegedly battered him in New Hampshire. The relevant contacts, in
other words, pertain only to New Hampshire.
At oral argument, Plaintiff argued that the satisfaction of the Gestalt reasonableness
factors can remedy the failure to demonstrate relatedness or purposeful availment. But the First
Circuit has rejected this premise. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 63
Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992). In United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, for example, the First Circuit declined to consider the second or
third prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis for the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim where
plaintiff failed to meet the relatedness prong. See id. at 1089–90. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to
introduce any evidence of relatedness or purposeful availment is fatal to his claim, and the Court
cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over the Trooper Monaco.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Trooper Monaco’s motion is granted. (Docket No. 31).
SO ORDERED
/s/ Timothy S. Hillman
TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE