holding that a plaintiff only has standing if she has suffered an injury which is “(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a plaintiff only has standing if she has suffered an injury which is “(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
PAUL J. McMANN, EILEEN R. )
McMANN, individually and on behalf )
of all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil No. 18-11550-LTS
)
CHARLES BAKER, et. al. )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 23)
March 25, 2019
SOROKIN, J.
Plaintiffs Paul and Eileen McMann filed a pro se complaint against various
Massachusetts officials including the Governor, Secretary of Transportation, and Attorney
General. Doc. No. 1. The McManns challenge the constitutionality of two Massachusetts
statutes: Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 62C § 47B, which authorizes the suspension, revocation, non-
issuance, or non-renewal of a delinquent taxpayer’s driver’s license or vehicle registration, and
Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 62C § 47A, which authorizes the suspension or revocation and non-
renewal of a delinquent taxpayer’s professional licenses. Essentially, the McManns contend that
the United States Constitution bars the revocation or suspension of these various state issued
licenses when, as they allege is the case here, the McManns have no funds with which to pay
their outstanding tax debts. The complaint also purports to bring a class action on the same
bases.
The McManns lack standing to bring the claims challenging § 47B (“the driver’s license
claims”). Both plaintiffs had their driver’s licenses reinstated pursuant to hardship status prior to
serving the complaint on the defendants. See Doc. No. 23-6. As defendants note, because the
McManns had not yet received the confirmation of hardship status at the time they filed the
complaint, the notice granting hardship would have mooted the case if there was in fact standing
to begin with. Doc. No. 23-1 at 7 n.6. No matter the status at the outset of the case, it is
undisputed that both McManns are currently approved for hardship status and their driver’s
licenses have been reinstated. Doc. No. 30-1 (approving the McManns for an additional period
of hardship status beginning February 20, 2019). Though the McManns assert that their hardship
status is only temporary, the possibility that this status will not be renewed is merely speculative
harm, which is not sufficient to confer standing. Without an active injury, the plaintiffs may not
properly assert a claim. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that a
plaintiff only has standing if she has suffered an injury which is “(a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”). The driver’s license claims are
therefore DISMISSED for lack of standing, or alternatively, as moot.
The claims relating to § 47A (“the professional license claims”) only relate to Mr.
McMann insofar as the complaint asserts that he is the only one of the two named plaintiffs who
had a professional license revoked. However, Mr. McMann also lacks standing to assert the
professional license claims. The Court takes judicial notice of Mr. McMann’s 2013 criminal
conviction1 and recognizes that Massachusetts law allows professional boards to suspend or
revoke a license of someone who has been convicted of a criminal offense. See Mass. Gen.
Laws. ch. 112, § 61(4). In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show that it is “likely, as
1 United States v. Paul J. McMann, No. 10-CR-10387-RWZ (D. Mass.).
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Given his criminal conviction, Mr.
McMann has not alleged sufficient facts to support plausibly the conclusion that his injury (the
suspension or revocation of his professional license) is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision by this Court, and therefore, he does not have standing to bring the professional license
claims. Furthermore, the professional license claims are not ripe for the reasons discussed in the
defendants’ memorandum. Doc. No. 23-1 at 12-14. Accordingly, the professional license claims
are DISMISSED.
“In a class action suit with multiple claims, at least one named class representative must
have standing with respect to each claim.” William Rubenstein, 1 Newberg on Class Actions §
2:5 (5th ed.). Because neither plaintiff has standing with respect to any of the claims in the
complaint, there may be no class action. See Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class action, however, adds nothing to the
question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that
they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”).
The Court further notes that the McManns filed the complaint pro se, but a class can only
be represented by counsel who is qualified to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss, Doc. No. 23, is ALLOWED in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge