The opinion
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
ILYA LIVIZ, )
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION
v. ) NO. 19-10304-WGY
)
CHARLIE BAKER, et al., )
Defendants. )
)
YOUNG, D.J. February 21, 2019
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, the Court allows plaintiff’s
motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denies plaintiff’s
motion for injunctive relief, and directs plaintiff to file an
amended complaint.
I. Relevant Background
On February 19, 2019, Plaintiff Ilya Liviz (“Liviz”), filed a
complaint naming as defendants the governor for each state. Docket
No. 1. With the complaint, Liviz filed a motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Docket No. 2. The following day, on February 20,
2019, Liviz filed a corrected motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and an ex-parte application for temporary restraining order
and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not
issue. Docket Nos. 4, 5.
Plaintiff’s 32-page complaint is divided into 6 parts as
follows: Part I (federal court jurisdiction); Part II (civil action
general allegations); Part III (class-wide injury); Part IV
(relief sought). See Complaint (“Compl.”). In addition to asserting
constitutional and common-law claims, the complaint alleges
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.; the
Clayton Act; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 187(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1982; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; 42
U.S.C. § 1986. Id. at ¶¶ 120 - 180.
Through this purported class action, Liviz seeks to challenge
alleged discriminatory conduct concerning the right to travel. Id.
at ¶¶ 3, 48. Liviz alleges that his Massachusetts drivers’ license
was (1) deemed non-renewable based upon unpaid tickets, id. at ¶ 26,
and (2) suspended based upon three surchargable events. Id. at ¶ 28.
Plaintiff explains that by the paying applicable fees and completing
a driver retraining program, he could obtain a Massachusetts driver’s
license. Id. at ¶ 30. However, Liviz complains that that many of
the listed offenses are inaccurate and/or not within a 24-month
period. Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiff contends that because of his
indigence, his right to operate a motor vehicle is improperly
restricted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. at ¶ 39.
Plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, class certification and
injunctive relief. Id. at Part III (prayer for relief).
enjoining Governor Baker or any state agent from preventing plaintiff
from operating a motor vehicle. See Pl.’s Mot., 5-1 (proposed order).
II. Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed in forma pauperis
Upon review of Liviz’ motions for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court concludes that he is without income or assets to
pay the $400.00 filing fee. The motions are therefore granted.
III. Preliminary Screening of the Complaint
When a plaintiff seeks to file a complaint without prepayment of
the filing fee, summonses do not issue until the Court reviews the
complaint and determines that it satisfies the substantive
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915 authorizes federal
courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein lack
an arguable basis in law or in fact, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A. Standing
A federal court is empowered only to decide “cases” and
“controversies.” N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v.
Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing U.S. Const. art. III).
In order to establish standing, Liviz must show that (1) he
personally has suffered some actual or imminent injury as a result of
the challenged conduct; (2) the injury can fairly be traced to that
conduct; and (3) the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable
decision from the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
non-Massachusetts defendants caused the plaintiff any injury.
Conclusory assertions of harm in states other than Massachusetts do
not remedy this deficiency.
B. Rooker-Feldman doctrine
To the extent Liviz challenges the constitutionality of his
license suspension or non-renewal, federal district courts do not
have discretion to exercise jurisdiction “over cases brought by
‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, (2005)). The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes a federal action if the relief requested
would effectively reverse or void a state court decision, or if the
plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court action. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006
(1994). To the extent Liviz seeks to have this federal court review
the underlying motor vehicle infractions, find them incorrect and
reverse such decisions, there is no jurisdiction for such federal
court review.
C. Right to Travel
Liviz contends that the defendants deprived him of his
fundamental right to travel because of the suspension and non-renewal
of his Massachusetts driver’s license. However, enforcement of state
motor vehicle licensure requirements does not violate the United
constitutional right to travel. See Attorney General of New York v.
Soto–Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986). However, the constitutional
right to travel guarantees: (1) citizens of one State the right to
travel across borders into another State; (2) visiting citizens the
right to be treated as “a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly
alien”; and (3) newly-arrived residents the right to the same
privileges and immunities that longstanding citizens of the state
enjoy, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–05 (1999), but not the right
to drive a car without a license, Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202,
1205–06 (9th Cir. 1999).
Liviz contends that his liberty interest in traveling has been
impeded by the loss of driver’s license and that, but for his
inability to pay, he would have his driver’s license. This
allegation is insufficient to state a claim that the government
violated his right to travel. The right to travel protects how a
citizen in a state is treated by the government compared to other
citizens in that same state or another state. See Pelland v. Rhode
Island, 317 F.Supp.2d 86, 91–94 (D.R.I. 2004) (discussing cases where
state action has restricted person's right to travel. Liviz has not
alleged any action taken by the defendants that impermissibly
restricted his ability to travel.
D. Due Process
Because the requirements of procedural due process “apply only
to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the [Constitution’s]
interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite,” see
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972),
the “first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or
‘liberty,’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59
(1999). If an individual is deprived of a property or liberty
interest, “the question remains what process is due.” Collins v.
Univ. of N.H., 746 F.Supp.2d 358, 368 (D. N.H. 2010) (quoting FDIC v.
Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988)). If the court finds that the
plaintiff has been deprived of such an interest, it evaluates whether
the government’s procedures comport with due process. See Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co., 526 at 59.
Liviz contends that but for his inability to pay, he would have
his Massachusetts driver’s license restored. Given the multiple
procedures available to avoid suspension and/or non-renewal, the
allegations have not shown that the process for suspending
plaintiff’s license is constitutionally inadequate. There are
opportunities to challenge the factual premise for non-renewal and/or
suspension as well as avenues through which to avoid the loss of a
license.
To the extent Liviz alleges that a violation of substantive due
process, plaintiffs must “prove that they suffered the deprivation of
an established life, liberty or property interest, and that such
deprivation occurred through governmental action that shocks the
134, 145 (1st Cir. 2016)(citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in
original). To shock the conscience, the challenged conduct must be
“egregious” and “outrageous,” Melendez-Garcia v. Sanchez, 629 F.3d
25, 37 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation omitted), such as
conduct that is “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest.,” Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 3 91st
Cir. 2005) citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
No such offensive conduct is at issue here and the complaint fails to
allege inadequate process.
E. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Subject to Dismissal
In light of the foregoing, this action will be dismissed in 21
days unless Liviz files an Amended Complaint which cures the pleading
deficiencies noted herein. Any amended complaint must comply with
Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it
must clearly state the grounds for relief and include specific
factual allegations in support of those claims. The plaintiff must
clearly identify each named defendant and state the specific
allegations against each. The amended complaint must also
demonstrate how the plaintiff was harmed by each defendant’s actions.
IV. Motion for Injunctive Relief
“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is
(2015) (citation omitted). “Though each factor is important ...
‘[t]he sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of
success on the merits.’” Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores,
SEIU Local 1996 v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citation omitted). “To demonstrate likelihood of success on
the merits, plaintiffs must show ‘more than mere possibility’ of
success—rather, they must establish a ‘strong likelihood’ that they
will ultimately prevail.” Id. (citation omitted). The burden of proof
is on the movant. See Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d
13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).
Liviz has not shown that he has satisfied the prerequisites in
order to be entitled to an injunction. He has not shown a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits. In fact, his complaint is
subject to dismissal. Because Liviz has not shown a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, his motion is denied.
ORDER
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. Plaintiff's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket Nos. 2, 4) are granted.
2. Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief (Docket No. 5) is
denied.
3. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue this action, he must, within
thirty-five (35) days from the date of this Memorandum and
Order, file an amended complaint that cures the pleading
deficiencies noted above. Failure to comply with this
directive will subject this action to dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE