The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOWANNA LAQUETTA BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (CR-02-22-F)
Submitted: May 26, 2006 Decided: June 22, 2006
Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terence Lee Taylor, CANON & TAYLOR, L.L.P., Greenville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney,
Anne M. Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jowanna Laquetta Brown appeals from her 78-month sentence
imposed after remand pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005). On appeal, Brown asserts that her sentence was
unreasonable because the trial court did not explicitly ascertain
an advisory guideline range and because the district court’s bare
statement that it considered the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005) factors was insufficient to show that the court did a
proper analysis. We affirm.
Although the trial court did not state the advisory
guideline range, it is clear that the court adopted the range used
at Brown’s initial sentencing. The court readopted the original
presentence report and stated that it calculated the advisory
guideline range based on the findings in the report. In addition,
the Government stated that “the Fourth Circuit did not direct
[Brown’s] guideline calculations be redone,” and the court stated
“well, I understand that. I think that’s what we’ve done. We just
imposed a sentence indicating that we have considered that the
guidelines are not mandatory.” Moreover, the statement of reasons
included in Brown’s criminal judgment shows that the guideline
range was determined to be 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment, the range
used at Brown’s first sentencing. Thus, there was no error in
failing to explicitly restate the guideline range.
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Turning to Brown’s second argument, her sentence, which
was imposed within the advisory guideline range, was presumptively
reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 2006 WL 1057741 (U.S. May 22, 2006) (No.
05-10474). A defendant can only rebut this presumption by showing
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375 (4th Cir.
2006). In addition, a sentence may be procedurally unreasonable
when the district court provides an inadequate statement of
reasons. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 2006 WL 1022030 (U.S. May 15, 2006) (No.
05-10393). However, a court need not “robotically tick through
§ 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss every
§ 3553(a) factor on the record.” United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2006).
Brown does not argue that there was any specific factor
in her case that was not considered. Instead, she focuses her
argument on the fact that the district court did not conduct a
proper analysis. We find that the district court’s explanations of
its reasons for sentencing Brown were sufficient. The court
expressly stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors, and it heard
Brown’s allocution. In addition, the written judgment shows that
the district court exempted Brown from the drug testing requirement
because she posed a low risk of future substance abuse and from
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paying a fine because she lacked the ability to do so. Moreover,
the presentence report, which the court adopted, addressed Brown’s
education, financial situation, and her obligations to her
daughter. Finally, at Brown’s initial sentencing, she moved for a
downward departure based on aberrant behavior, her recent college
graduation, and her lack of criminal history, and the district
court denied the motion.
Thus, we hold that the court, over the course of both
sentencings, considered all the relevant § 3553 factors before
imposing sentence. While the court could have been more explicit
in its findings and reasoning, there was no reversible error. The
court stated that it considered the § 3553 factors, Brown did not
argue for special consideration of any factors, and Brown was
sentenced to the low end of the guideline range. We conclude that
Brown’s sentence was reasonable.
Thus, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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