Dyette v. Shugrue

United States District Court

District of Massachusetts

)

Shaka U. Dyette, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

) 16-10202-NMG

Scott Black, Kurt S. DeMoura, )

William Shugrue )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

This case involves the alleged mistreatment of Shaka Dyette

(“plaintiff” or “Dyette”) by three employees (collectively

“defendants”) of the Massachusetts Department of Correction

while Dyette was incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction.

Dyette brings his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that 1) Lieutenant William J. Shugrue (“Shugrue”)

violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Shugrue accosted him,

2) Scott W. Black (“Black”) violated his incorporated First

Amendment rights when Black retaliated against Dyette for filing

a grievance against Shugrue and 3) Kurt Demoura (“Demoura”)

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by

obstructing Dyette’s attempt to obtain evidence of the alleged

battery. In addition, Dyette alleges that Shugrue, Black and

Demoura engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit the underlying

acts.

Pending before this Court is defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. For the following reasons, that motion will be allowed

with respect to plaintiff’s procedural due process claim but

will otherwise be denied.

I. Background

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was housed

by the Massachusetts Department of Correction at MCI-Cedar

Junction in Walpole, Massachusetts. On June 1, 2014, plaintiff

was order by Corrections Office Hope Hill to comply with a “pat

search” while he was leaving the dining area. During that

process, Shugrue approached the plaintiff and the two exchanged

words. Shugrue ordered plaintiff to enter a nearby room to be

strip searched. Plaintiff contends that, as he was complying

with that order, he was grabbed by Shugrue and other Corrections

Officers and then punched by Shugrue in the face (“the

incident”).

As a result of that incident, plaintiff was placed in

solitary confinement for 30 days and classified for placement in

a maximum security prison. Plaintiff filed a grievance

concerning the incident and the subsequent placement and

classification. That grievance was assigned to Black, a

Department of Correction investigator.

Plaintiff claims that Black attempted to coerce plaintiff

to drop the grievance in return for a guarantee that he would

not be classified for a maximum security prison. Dyette

declined that offer. Black filed a disciplinary report against

plaintiff that alleged that the initial grievance constituted

providing false information against a staff member.

As a part of his investigation for the grievance, plaintiff

requested a copy of the video tape of the incident. Plaintiff

asserts that DeMoura refused to provide that video in bad faith

and took actions to prevent plaintiff from obtaining the video.

II. Analysis

The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d

816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991). The burden is on the moving party to

show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material

fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact

in dispute “is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

If the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden

shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The Court must view the

entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's

favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in

the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A. Count I - Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff contends that Shugrue violated the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

Defendants respond that Shugrue’s use of force was reasonable,

and thus not in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in part

that “nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted.”

U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This prohibition includes the use of

excessive and unjustified physical force by prison officials

against inmates. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327

(1986). In that context, the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by

the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted).

An excessive force claim will lie where the force was

applied “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm.” See Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st

Cir. 2005) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). In contrast,

force applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline” does not constitute a violation. See id. (quoting

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).

Defendants assert that

no reasonable inference could be drawn, based upon a review

of [the] videotape, that defendants’ use of force was

unlawful.

The Court disagrees.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, this Court believes that a reasonable jury could find

that Shugrue did not act in a good-faith effort to maintain

discipline but rather maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. Conversely, a reasonable

jury could also find that Shugrue acted to restore and maintain

good order and discipline. Accordingly, a genuine issue of

material fact exists and summary judgment is inappropriate for

this claim.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will, with respect

to Count I, be denied.

B. Count II - Retaliation Claim

Dyette submits that Black retaliated against Dyette’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights by 1) suggesting that he

could avoid a maximum security classification by withdrawing his

grievance and 2) issuing a disciplinary ticket to Dyette for

“lying” about the Lt. Shugrue incident. Defendants rejoin that

Sgt. Black acted in good faith while reviewing the disciplinary

record and that Dyette would have been classified to a maximum-

security facility regardless of Sgt. Black’s actions.

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to petition the

prison for the redress of grievances and prison officials may

not retaliate against prisoners for exercising that right. Brown

v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D. Mass. 2009). To

establish a retaliation claim, the prisoner must demonstrate

that: 1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 2)

prison officials took adverse action against him, 3) with the

intent to retaliate against him for engaging in the

constitutionally protected conduct and 4) he would not have

suffered the adverse action “but for” the prison officials'

retaliatory motive. Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41,

51 (D. Mass. 2006).

Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot establish the “but

for” prong because plaintiff was classified for maximum security

before meeting with Black. Although defendants’ are correct

with respect to the attempted “deal” Black offered, they are

incorrect with respect to the disciplinary ticket that Black

issued. Plaintiff alleges Black promised him a medium security

classification if he would withdraw the grievance, that

plaintiff declined that “offer” and that, frustrated with that

result, Black issued a trumped-up disciplinary ticket. Because

a reasonable jury could find that the ticket would not have been

issued “but for” Black’s retaliatory motive, defendants’ motion

for summary judgment will, with respect to Count II, be denied.

C. Count III - Due Process Claim

Dyette asserts that DeMoura violated his right to due

process by intentionally obstructing him from obtaining video of

the incident. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim fails

as a matter of law because he was not deprived of a protected

liberty interest.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that

nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

To determine whether due process has been violated, the

Court considers whether: 1) the plaintiff has been deprived of a

protected interest and 2) if so, whether that deprivation was

accomplished without due process of law. Perez–Acevedo v.

Rivero–Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2008). A protected

liberty interest may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or

from state law. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

460 (1989). A liberty interest is defined as a change that

creates an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Plaintiff proffers two purported liberty interests: his

right to be free from incarceration in solitary confinement and

his right to be free from incarceration in a maximum security

prison. Those interests do not, however, constitute liberty

interests as a matter of law. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (30

days in solitary confinement does not constitute a liberty

interest); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160–61 (1st Cir.

1996) (transfer to more secure prison does not constitute

liberty interest).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will,

with respect to Count III, be allowed.

D. Count IV - Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff contends that defendants agreed to, and then did,

act in unison to commit the acts underlying counts I, II and

III. To succeed on a claim of conspiracy under Section 1983, a

plaintiff must prove both a conspiratorial agreement and an

actual deprivation of rights. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,

53 (1st Cir.2001). Accordingly, no conspiracy claim arising out

of Count III will lie.

As to Counts I and II, however, offers evidence, albeit

disputed, that DeMoura delivered the disciplinary ticket to

plaintiff while he was in solitary confinement and Black

attempted to coerce Dyette into withdrawing the grievance

against Shugrue from which a reasonable jury could infer that an

agreement existed between the defendants. Accordingly, a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants

DeMoura, Black and Shugrue entered a conspiratorial agreement to

deprive plaintiff of his Eighth and First Amendment rights.

While plaintiff’s chances of proof of such a conspiracy may

be tenuous, he has done enough to avoid summary judgment against

him.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will, with respect

to Count IV, be denied.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 56) is, with respect to Count III, ALLOWED,

but is otherwise DENIED.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton___

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated January 23, 2018