Opinion

Kersey v. Trump

Court
District Court, D. Massachusetts
Filed
Dec 18, 2017
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.6%

“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” (internal citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • “The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” (internal citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

GEORGE KERSEY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.

) 17-11635-ADB

v. )

)

DONALD J. TRUMP, )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BURROUGHS, D.J.

For the reasons stated below, the Court allows plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis [ECF No. 2], dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and

certifies that any appeal would be futile and thus not “taken in good faith” within the meaning of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2017, Plaintiff George A. Kersey (“Kersey”) filed a self-prepared, class

action complaint naming Donald J. Trump, individually, as the sole defendant [ECF No. 1]

(“Compl.”). With the complaint, Kersey also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court

without Prepaying Fees or Costs [ECF No. 2].

Kersey alleges that he is a citizen of Rhode Island and that he receives mail at post office

boxes in Framingham, Massachusetts, and Narragansett, Rhode Island [Complaint ¶ 9]. Kersey

alleges that he “participated in the Second World War against Nazism” and now files this action

“to defend the Constitution and to remove [the Defendant] from office” [Id.]. Kersey seeks to

1

bring this suit as a class action on behalf of more than 100 proposed class members [Id. ¶ 16]

pursuant to the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution [Id. ¶ 11].1 In the section of

the Complaint titled “IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS” plaintiff alleges:

22. Defendant is a well-known business entrepreneur. It would appear that his

principal present goals are to engage in atomic warfare with [N]orth Korea and promote

his business interests in the Soviet Union, where he [is] more popular than in the United

States, with the blessing of his friend and war-criminal Putin. Defendant is know[n] for

his many business activities, many of which fail and have to be rescued by others. It is

time to rescue the United States.

Id.

The Court’s records indicate that Kersey has appeared in this Court both as an attorney2

and as a pro se litigant. See e.g. Kersey v. Staples, 17-11267-NMG (pending); Kersey v. Am.

Honda Fin. Corp., 16-12631-FDS (pending); Kersey v. Peoples’ United Bank, et al., 16-12414-

PBS (closed); Kersey v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 16-10495-LTS (closed); Kersey, et al. v.

Prudential Ins. Agency LLC, 15-14186-GAO (closed); Fraser, et al. v. Gortons, 12-10479-RGS

(closed); Kersey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 08-11720-RWZ (closed); and Kersey v. Sears

Roebuck & Co., 08-10800-RWZ (closed). Kersey has since been disbarred. In re George E.

Kersey, 444 Mass. 65 (2005).

DISCUSSION

Upon review of Kersey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court concludes that

he is without income or assets to pay the $400.00 filing fee. Since plaintiff is proceeding pro se,

1 The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the

people.” Const. Amend. X.

2 See, e.g. Brown v. Flood, 97-12645-EFH; Bonis v. Kaplan, 97-12522-EFH; Costello v.

McManus, 94-10552-NG; and Defazio v. Delta Air Lines, 92-13000-RCL.

2

the Court will construe his complaint generously. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction.

See McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). A federal court is a court of limited

jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only those cases authorized by the Constitution and by

Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“The

objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a

court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of

judgment.” (internal citation omitted)).

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases or

controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. These prerequisites reflect the “common

understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). Consequently, Kersey must show that: (1) he personally has

suffered some actual or imminent injury as a result of the challenged conduct; (2) the injury can

fairly be traced to that conduct; and (3) the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision

from the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “‘The party

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing’ standing.” Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411-12 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561); see also Simon v.

Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class

action, however, adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who

3

represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has

been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they

purport to represent.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). “Plaintiffs may not establish their

standing to bring suit merely because they disagree with a government policy or because they

share the ‘generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.’” Moss et al. v.

Spartanburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlesinger

v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)). If a plaintiff does not have

standing to bring suit, then the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the case on its merits. United

States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1992).

Here, the Court concludes that Kersey’s attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court

falls short of the constitutional requirements for standing. Kersey has failed to allege any direct

personal injury, actual or imminent, that he has suffered as a result of Defendant’s alleged

actions. Despite Kersey’s numerous allegations concerning President Trump’s fitness for office

and the damage allegedly caused, Kersey’s challenge is essentially a statement of dissatisfaction

with various political decisions and actions taken by President Trump. Although Kersey

describes harm that has been done to others, including an allegation that the Defendant is partly

responsible for injuries sustained during recent protests in Charlottsville, Virginia, as well as

generalized harms, the complaint fails to show how President Trump specifically injured Kersey

in a manner apart from the general population. For example, alleging that President Trump is

opposed to climate change and was not elected by popular vote, Compl. at 4, is not enough to

demonstrate that Kersey has standing to file this lawsuit. Thus, the complaint must be dismissed

for lack of standing.

4

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is granted.

2. This action is dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

3. The Court finds, and hereby certifies, that any appeal by Kersey of the matters discussed

in this Memorandum and Order would be futile, and therefore not “taken in good faith”

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Allison D. Burroughs

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

December 18, 2017

5

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.