The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
TRAVEL MACHINE LA. LLC CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-0635
VERSUS JUDGE JUNEAU
STATE FARM FIRE & CAS. CO. MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6)
[Doc. 14] filed by the defendant, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (“State Farm”).
Plaintiff, Travel Machine Louisiana LLC (“Travel Machine”) opposes the motion
[Doc. 17], and State Farm filed a reply brief [Doc. 24]. The motion was referred to
the undersigned magistrate judge for review, report, and recommendation in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of this
Court. Considering the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for
the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that State Farm’s Motion to
Dismiss be GRANTED.
Factual Background
The Covid-19 pandemic and the federal, state, and local governments’
responsive actions are well-known. Like most, if not all, other government leaders,
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Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards issued a series of executive orders directing
all but essential workers to stay home as the pandemic raged [25 JBE 2020, March
11, 2020, with supplementals notices at Doc. 14-5, 8, & 9]. The stay-home orders
have prompted a wave of litigation by business owners seeking compensation from
their insurers for business interruption and losses caused by their customers’,
clients’, and patients’ inability to conduct business. This is one such suit.
Plaintiff, a travel agency, filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in this
Court on March 11, 2021 [Doc. 1], seeking coverage under a business policy for
business losses due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the instant motion, State Farm
seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s suit on the grounds that the State Farm policy does not
provide coverage for the alleged loss of use or business interruption. State Farm’s
primary defense is that the Covid-19 virus did not cause a covered loss or property
damage to plaintiff’s business.
Law and Analysis
I. Applicable Law
“In diversity cases, a federal court must apply federal procedural rules and the
substantive law of the forum state.” Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d
506, 510 (5th Cir. 2007).
2
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6), the district court must limit itself to the contents of the
pleadings, including any attachments and exhibits thereto. Collins v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.2000); U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir.2004). The court must accept all well-
pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.2004)); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th
Cir.1996). Conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not
accepted as true, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677
F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power
Company, 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974)); Collins v. Morgan Stanley, 224 F.3d at
498. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 127 U.S. at 570. The
allegations must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”
and “the pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that
merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. at 555
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(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-
36 (3d ed. 2004)).
The Court must apply Louisiana substantive law relative to interpretation of
insurance contracts. The Fifth Circuit summarized applicable Louisiana insurance
interpretation law as follows:
“Under Louisiana law, insurance policies are contracts between the
parties and ‘should be construed by using the general rules of
interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.’”
“When interpreting a contract, the court must discern the parties’
common intent.” “The parties’ intent as reflected by the words in the
policy determine[s] the extent of coverage.”
Where the terms of the contract are clear and explicit and do not lead
to absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in
search of the intent of the parties.” “‘[W]ords of a contract must be
given their generally prevailing meaning,’ but ‘[w]ords of art and
technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the
contract involves a technical matter.’” “Each provision in [the] contract
must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given
the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.”
“An insurance policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or a
strained manner so as to enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what
is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd
conclusion.” “If the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously
expresses the parties’ intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as
written.”
“If the insurance contract terms are ambiguous, these ambiguities are
generally strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of
coverage.” “This rule of strict construction ‘applies only if the
ambiguous policy provision is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations; for the rule of strict construction to apply, the insurance
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policy must be not only susceptible to two or more interpretations, but
each of the alternative interpretations must be reasonable.’”
Richard v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 850 F.3d 701, 713 (5th Cir. 2017). (cleaned
up).
Considering the foregoing legal precepts, the Court shall consider whether
plaintiff’s claims justify a finding of coverage under its State Farm policy.
II. The Virus Exclusion
In the instant motion, State Farm argues that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by
the policy’s Virus Exclusion provision, which provides:
SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS1
1. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the
excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other
causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event
to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or
gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural
or external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of these:
…
j. Fungi, Virus or Bacteria
[. . .]
1 Ordinarily, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is limited to the allegations of the complaint
and any exhibits attached thereto; however, the court may also consider documents attached to the
defendant’s motion if they are referenced in the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claims. In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). The State Farm policy is referenced
in the complaint and is central to plaintiff’s claims.
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(2) Virus, bacteria or other microorganism that induces or is
capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease . . .2
In response, Travel Machine contends the Virus Exclusion does not bar
coverage, because Travel Machine is not alleging that the virus was present or
caused the shutdown of the plaintiff’s business. Rather, Travel Machine argues that
the governmental orders issued by the Governor caused the closure. Thus, Travel
Machine asserts that the Virus Exclusion bars only “viral contamination,” which is
distinct from the COVID-19 pandemic. Travel Machine also argues that COVID-
19 is a pandemic and the Policy does not exclude coverage for “Pandemic Events.”
The Court finds that the plain language of the Virus Exclusion precludes
Travel Machine’s claim for coverage. At least two Louisiana federal district courts
have come to similarly conclusions. In Muriel's New Orleans, LLC v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 2021 WL 1614812, at *9–10 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 2021), in response
to an identical argument, the court stated in dicta:3
Here, the Court finds that the Virus Exclusion unambiguously excludes
coverage for losses resulting from COVID-19. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) defines COVID-19 as “a new virus ...
‘CO’ stands for corona, ‘VI’ for virus, and ‘D’ for disease.”147
2 See Policy of Insurance, attached as Exhibit A to State Farm’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 14, at
pp. 5-6, Section 1 – Exclusions j(2).
3 In Muriel’s, Judge Brown noted that, because Muriel's did not adequately allege direct physical
loss to the covered property, the court did not need to determine whether the Virus Exclusion
precluded coverage in that case. However, the court noted that even if Muriel's had alleged direct
physical loss to the covered premises, the Virus Exclusion barred the plaintiffs’ claim. 2021 WL
1614812 at *9.
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Therefore, COVID-19 falls squarely within the language of the Virus
Exclusion. Notably, despite Muriel's assertion that the Virus Exclusion
requires “viral contamination,” the text of the Virus Exclusion includes
nothing about a contamination requirement.
[ . . . ]
Like in Spector, the Closure Orders issued by Mayor Cantrell and
Governor Edwards are derivative of the COVID-19 outbreak. Stated
differently, the Closure Orders were issued either concurrently, or in
sequence with, the spread of COVID-19 across the State of Louisiana.
Therefore, the excluded event—COVID-19—remains part of the causal
chain that resulted in Muriel's alleged losses and coverage is barred by
the Virus Exclusion.
Second, the Court disagrees with Muriel's argument that because the
Policy does not explicitly exclude “pandemics” or “communicable
diseases,” the Policy provides coverage for Muriel's alleged losses.
Although the exclusionary language could have been more clear, “[t]he
fact that an exclusion could have been worded more explicitly does not
necessarily make it ambiguous.”
Similarly, in Q Clothier New Orleans LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance
Co., 2021 WL 1600247 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2021), Judge Lemelle granted
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant insurer on nearly identical
claims. In Q Clothier, the plaintiff alleged that it sustained business losses as
a result of Louisiana government orders restricting the operations of non-
essential businesses that were issued to minimize the spread of COVID-19.
The court found that Q Clothier failed to allege that “its property sustained
physical and demonstrable alteration,” as required for coverage under the
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policy and Louisiana law. Id. at *7. The court also held that the policy’s virus
exclusion barred the plaintiff’s claims, as a matter of law, because the COVID-
19 virus was in the chain of causation since the government orders, as here,
were issued to reduce the spread of the virus. Id. at *7-9. Accord Diesel
Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F.Supp.3d 353 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13,
2020) (interpreting similar Texas insurance policy).
Considering the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the policy
does not provide coverage for the business losses claimed because the Virus
Exclusion unambiguously excludes loss caused by virus.
II. Accidental, direct physical loss
State Farm also argues that Travel Machine’s claim fails because the plaintiff
has not alleged it suffered the required “accidental direct physical loss” to Covered
Property. “Section I – PROPERTY” of the Policy states:
When a Limit Of Insurance is shown in the Declarations for that type
of property as described under Coverage A – Buildings, Coverage B
– Business Personal Property, or both, we will pay for accidental
direct physical loss to that Covered Property at the premises described
in the Declarations caused by any loss as described under SECTION I
— COVERED CAUSES OF LOSS.4
[ . . . ]
4 See Policy, at p.3, Section I - PROPERTY.
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We insure for accidental direct physical loss to Covered Property unless
the loss is:
1. Excluded in SECTION I — EXCLUSIONS; or
2. Limited in the Property Subject To Limitations provision.
The Policy Endorsement entitled “Loss of Income and Extra Expense” – under
which the plaintiff sues – specifically conditions business interruption coverage on
“accidental direct physical loss” to Covered Property, as follows:
COVERAGES
1. Loss of Income
a. We will pay for the actual “Loss Of Income” you sustain due
to the necessary “suspension” of your “operations” during the
“period of restoration”. The “suspension” must be caused by
accidental direct physical loss to property at the described
premises. The loss must be caused by a Covered Cause Of
Loss.5
Travel Machine acknowledges that it did not suffer physical damage to the
covered property, but it argues that “physical damage” is only one cause of “physical
loss” of property. Travel Machine argues that its physical location was unable to be
used for everyday business, and because it was shuttered by the stay-home order, the
structure itself became useless and uninhabitable.
Multiple courts within the Fifth Circuit have addressed this issue and found
that the presence of the virus in a building did not cause or equate to physical damage
5 See CMP-4705.2 Loss of Income and Extra Expense Endorsement to Policy, p. 1 of 4.
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or loss sufficient to trigger coverage. See e.g. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, Inc. v.
Transportation Ins. Co., No. 6:21-CV-00317, 2021 WL 1740466, at *3 (W.D. La.
May 3, 2021); Diesel Barbershop LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F.Supp.3d 353,
360 (W.D. Tex. 2020); Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., –
–– F. Supp. 3d. ––––, 2021 WL 972878, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2021); and St. Pierre v.
Transportation Ins. Co., No. 6:20-CV-01660, 2021 WL 1709380, at *3 (W.D. La.
Apr. 29, 2021), citing cases.
This Court agrees with the foregoing line of cases that the presence of the
virus does not constitute physical loss or damage sufficient to trigger coverage. This
Court agrees with Judge Cain’s analysis of a similar policy involving nearly identical
claims:
This court finds no ambiguity in the requirement that the premises
suffer a physical loss or damage (regardless of whether “physical”
modifies just loss), or in its implications for coverage in this matter. As
the Fifth Circuit has noted, “property insurance coverage is triggered
by some threshold concept of physical loss or damage to the covered
property.” Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.,
181 F. App'x 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006). It has also observed that “[t]he
language ‘physical loss or damage’ strongly implies that there was an
initial satisfactory state that was changed by some external event into
an unsatisfactory state—for example, the car was undamaged before
the collision dented the bumper.” Trinity Indus. Inc., v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 916 F.2d 267, 270–71 (5th Cir. 1990). To this end courts within
the Fifth Circuit have required a “distinct, demonstrable, physical
alteration of the property” to trigger coverage. Diesel Barbershop LLC
v. State Farm Lloyds, 479 F.Supp.3d 353, 360 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
(quoting Hartford, 181 F. App'x at 470). Accordingly, every district
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court within the circuit to address the issue has determined that a
building's exposure to the coronavirus does not meet this requirement.
Id.; see also Terry Black's Barbecue, LLC v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
––– F. Supp. 3d. ––––, 2021 WL 972878, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2021).
LBJC fails to advance any new argument compelling the court to depart
from this interpretation, and therefore cannot state a plausible claim for
relief under the Business Income/Extra Expense endorsements.
Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic, Inc., 2021 WL 1740466, at *3. See also Diesel
Barbershop, LLC v. State Farm Lloyds, 2020 WL 4724305 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13,
2020) (court finds that the line of cases requiring tangible injury to property are more
persuasive and that the other cases are distinguishable) and St. Pierre v. Transp. Ins.
Co., 2021 WL 1709380, at *2-4 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2021) (plaintiff failed to state a
claim because it did not allege that any insured property was damaged as required
by the policy). To the extent plaintiff relies on Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 478 F. Supp. 3d 794, 800 (W.D. Mo. 2020), the Court finds Studio 417
unpersuasive in light of the above-cited jurisprudence from district courts within the
Fifth Circuit.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that coverage for the
plaintiff’s claims does not exist in the absence of physical damage to the property in
question.
III. Civil authority
State Farm further asserts that Travel Machine fails to state a claim for
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coverage under the Civil Authority Endorsement to the Policy.6 The Civil Authority
Endorsement provides as follows:
4. Civil Authority
a. When a Covered Cause Of Loss causes damage to property other than
property at the described premises, we will pay for the actual “Loss Of
Income” you sustain and necessary “Extra Expense” caused by action
of civil authority that prohibits access to the described premises,
provided that both of the following apply: (1) Access to the area
immediately surrounding the damaged property is prohibited by civil
authority as a result of the damage, and the described premises are
within that area but are not more than one mile from the damaged
property; and (2) The action of civil authority is taken in response to
dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage or
continuation of the Covered Cause Of Loss that caused the damage, or
the action is taken to enable a civil authority to have unimpeded access
to the damaged property.7
Thus, the Civil Authority Provision provides coverage for loss of income
where damage to other property caused by a covered risk causes a civil authority to
prohibit access to the insured property, causing loss of income to the insured. State
Farm argues the plaintiff has not pled facts that meet the requisite elements to trigger
the Civil Authority Provision, and that the Virus Exclusion bars coverage under the
Civil Authority Provision, which requires an already Covered Cause of Loss.
Here, the undersigned finds that the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong of the
Civil Authority Provision. First, the plaintiff fails to identify damage to a specific
6 See Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 31, 63-75, Doc. 1.
7 See CMP-4705.2 “Loss of Income and Extra Expense” Endorsement.
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nearby property from a Covered Cause of Loss. Additionally, the plaintiff fails to
identify “dangerous physical conditions resulting from the damage or continuation
of the Covered Cause of Loss that caused the damage” or actions “taken to enable a
civil authority to have unimpeded access to the damaged property.”
In Dickie Brennan & Co., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 683 (5th Cir.
2011), the court addressed the issue of insurance coverage for a type of business
interruption insurance. In that lawsuit, the plaintiffs sued their insurer when
Lexington denied coverage for the Brennans' losses incurred when they were unable
to conduct business during a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans due to a
hurricane. In Dickie Brennan, the Fifth Circuit stated, generally, that “civil authority
coverage is intended to apply to situations where access to an insured’s property is
prevented or prohibited by an order of civil authority issued as a direct result of
physical damage to other premises in the proximity of the insured’s property.” 636
F.3d at 686-87 (citations omitted); see also Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Armond
McCowan & Jarman, LLP v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2489711, at *3 (M.D.
La. Aug. 29, 2007) (denying civil authority coverage under Louisiana law); Jones,
Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP v. Chubb Corp., 2010 WL
4026375, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 2010) (Louisiana law) (denying civil authority
coverage under Louisiana law).
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In Pappy’s Barber Shops, Inc. v. Framers Grp., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 3d 937,
945 (S.D. Cal. 2020), the plaintiffs made a claim under an insurance policy issued
by defendants for business income losses they incurred as a result of the COVID-19
Civil Authority Orders issued by the mayor of San Diego and the governor of
California. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that coverage existed under the policy’s
Civil Authority provision. Although the Civil Authority provision in the Pappy’s
case is not identical to the provision in the instant case, the Pappy’s provision is
similar, requiring the following:
To trigger coverage under this provision, there must be an “action of
civil authority that prohibits access to the described premises due to
direct physical loss of or damage to property, other than at the
described premises, caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of
Loss.” Thus, to survive dismissal, the complaint must, at a minimum,
allege that the government (1) prohibited Plaintiffs from accessing their
premises (2) due to direct physical loss of or damage to property
elsewhere. The allegations in the complaint do not satisfy either
requirement.
487 F.Supp.3d at 944-45.
After consideration of the parties’ arguments, the court found no coverage,
explaining:
First, the complaint does not allege that any COVID-19 Civil Authority
Orders prohibited Plaintiffs from access to their business premises.
Rather, it only alleges that Plaintiffs were prohibited from operating
their businesses at their premises. Plaintiffs fail to make any distinction
between their place of business (i.e., the physical premises where they
operate their business), and the business itself, but this distinction is
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relevant to coverage under the Policy. The Policy insures property, in
this case Plaintiffs’ property and physical places of business, and not
Plaintiff's business itself. To that end, the civil authority coverage
provision only provides coverage to the extent that access to Plaintiff's
physical premises is prohibited, and not if Plaintiff's are simply
prohibited from operating their business. The government orders
alleged in the complaint prohibit the operation of Plaintiff's business;
they do not prohibit access to Plaintiffs’ place of business.
Second, even if the government orders alleged in the complaint could
be construed as prohibiting Plaintiffs from accessing their premises, the
orders were not issued due to direct physical loss of or damage to
property other than at Plaintiffs’ premises. Just as the complaint does
not plausibly allege any direct physical loss of Plaintiff's property, it
also does not allege any direct physical loss or damage to property not
at Plaintiffs’ places of business. In the opposition, Plaintiff does not
argue otherwise, referring only to its arguments under the business
income and extra expense provisions that the complaint alleges direct
physical loss of or damage to Plaintiffs’ property. [Doc. No. 18 at 16];
see generally, 10E, LLC, 2020 WL 5359653, at *5-6 (finding no civil
authority coverage as a result of COVID-19 Civil Authority Orders
requiring restaurant to cease indoor operations).
Id. at 944–45.
Similarly, the undersigned finds that access to the covered premises was not
denied in the instant case, and the plaintiff has not alleged that access was denied.
Rather, the plaintiff alleges that it could not conduct its business because of the
government ordinance. However, none of the government orders at issue in this case
precluded access to the insured premises by owners. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to
satisfy the requirements for coverage under the Civil Authority Provision of the
policy.
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IV. “Loss of Income” and “Extra Expense” Coverage
Plaintiff alleges that it is entitled to coverage under the Loss of Income and
Extra Expense provisions provided by the Endorsement.8 State Farm argues
that under both provisions, coverage is only available where there has been
“accidental direct physical loss to property,” which does not exist in this case.
State Farm further argues that coverage under both of these provisions is barred
by the policy’s Virus Exclusion, which provides that State Farm “do[es] not
insure under any coverage for any loss which would not have occurred in the
absence of ... Virus.”
The plaintiff’s position is that the Virus Exclusion does not apply, and
that “damage” under the policy is not limited to accidental physical damage.
However, the undersigned has rejected both of these arguments hereinabove.
Additionally, a review of the policy shows that Loss of Income and Extra
Expense coverage applies only to loss of income and extra expenses sustained
due to a “’necessary suspension’ of [the insured’s] ‘operations’ during the
‘period of restoration.’”9 The “period of restoration” is defined as the period
8 See Complaint at ¶¶ 37-39, 50-52, 65-66, Doc. 1.
9 See CMP-4705.2 “Loss of Income and Extra Expense” Endorsement.
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during which the property is “repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable
speed and similar quality” or until “business is resumed at a new permanent
location.”10 In the Complaint, the plaintiff does not allege that any repairs,
rebuilding or replacement of any part of the property were made, or that
plaintiff moved its businesses to a new permanent location. Thus, Loss of
Income and Extra Expense coverage is not available for a suspension of
operations where, as here, a shutdown is due to government orders.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that there is no coverage
under the Loss of Income and Extra Expense provisions provided by the
Endorsement.
Conclusion
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Motion
to Dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) [Doc. 14] filed by the defendant, State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., be GRANTED.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b),
parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen days from service of this
report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of
10 Id.
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Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days after
being served with of a copy of any objections or responses to the district judge at the
time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in the report and recommendation within
fourteen days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized
by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual
findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds
of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d
1415 (5" Cir.1996).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Lafayette, Louisiana, this 14" day of
October, 2021.
wth &
CAROL B. WHITEHURST ——t«™
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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