The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RYAN HAYGOOD, DDS and CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0335
HAYGOOD DENTAL CARE, LLC
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
BRIAN BEGUE, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before this Court is a Determination of Attorney Fees, resulting from the prior
granting of Defendant H.O. Blackwood’s Motion for Attorney Fees. See Record
Documents 227 & 228. For the reasons that follow, Defendant H.O. Blackwood is
awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $64,285.52.
BACKGROUND
In March 2016, this Court granted Defendant H.O. Blackwood, D.D.S.’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the Haygood Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims as prescribed
and holding that the Sherman Act, state law defamation, and Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“LUTPA”) claims failed under Rule 12(b)(6) and the Twombly/Iqbal
standard. See Record Documents 182 & 183. All claims against the Defendant were
dismissed with prejudice. See id.
As to the Section 1983 claim, this Court held that the Defendant is entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees under Section 1988(b). See Record Document 227. Section
1988(b) provides, in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . ., the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988(b) “authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees
to a defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (citation
and internal quotation omitted). In finding the Haygood Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim
frivolous, this Court reasoned:
[A]lmost two years elapsed between the filing of the initial proceeding in state court
in September 2011 and the filing of the federal lawsuit in February 2013. This Court
holds that the Haygood Plaintiffs clearly knew, or should have known, of the overt
acts which might constitute a Section 1983 violation when the state court lawsuit
was filed in September 2011. This Court is also unconvinced that any of the
allegations in the state court petition were sufficient to interrupt prescription. See
Ford v. Stone, 599 F.Supp. 693 (M.D. La. 1984). Therefore, this Court finds that
the alleged wrongdoing under Section 1983 by the instant Defendant has
prescribed under Louisiana law.
. . .
. . . The Court additionally notes that even if this action was not prescribed, the
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion filed by the Dr. Blackwood nonetheless would be granted
because the bald conclusory allegations that he was involved in a conspiracy with
the Dental Board fails the plausibility standard established in Twombly and Iqbal.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Record Document 182 at 7-9.
As to the LUTPA claims, this Court held that the Defendant is entitled to reasonable
attorneys’ fees under La. R.S. 51:1409(A), which provides, in pertinent part:
Upon a finding by the court that an action under this Section was groundless and
brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court may award to the
defendant reasonable attorney fees and costs.
This Court found that the Haygood Plaintiffs’ LUTPA claim wholly failed to rise to the level
of facts necessary to support a claim under the LUTPA. See Record Document 182 at
15. Thus, the LUTPA claims were groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment, which entitled the Defendant to attorneys’ fees and costs under La. R.S.
51:1409(A).
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees was granted on March 12,
2018. See Record Document 227. Defendant timely filed Motions to Submit Detailed
Time Reports for the Determination of Attorney Fees. See Record Document 264. This
Court must now determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) authorizes a district court, in its discretion, to award a
reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party as part of the costs. Likewise, La. R.S.
51:1409(A) authorizes award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to a defendant
when a court finds that the litigation was brought in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment. In their submission of detailed time reports, H.O. Blackwood identified three
categories of attorneys’ fees and costs spent in this litigation: (1) attorney time expended
solely in defense of the instant suit, (2) time expended related to depositions relevant to
both federal and state litigation, and (3) expenses related to depositions relevant to both
federal and state litigation. See Record Document 264-1.
Regarding the first and second categories, reasonable attorney fee awards in
federal actions are determined by performing a two-step lodestar analysis. See Perdue
v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010), Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983), Calix v. Ashton Marine LLC,
No. 14-2430, 2016 WL 4194119, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2016). First, “[a] lodestar is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by an appropriate
hourly rate in the community for such work.” Heidtman v. Cty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038,
1043 (5th Cir. 1999). The lodestar is presumptively sufficient, 559 U.S. at 552, but may
then be decreased or enhanced based on the relative weights of the twelve factors set
forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Heidtman, 171 F.3d at 1043. The Johnson factors are: “(1) the time and labor
required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill required to perform the
legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed
by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) the
award in similar cases.” 488 F.2d at 717–19.
The prevailing party bears the burden of documenting and submitting the
appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437,
103 S.Ct. at 1941. Counsel for the prevailing party must make a good faith effort to
exclude excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unnecessary entries. See id. at 434, 103
S.Ct. at 1939–40. This Court, along with others within the Fifth Circuit, has noted that
“some cases . . . require that attorneys perform work on numerous claims, issues or even
proceedings, not all of which independently or standing alone give rise to a basis for an
award of attorney’s fees.” Sabre Industries, Inc. v. Module X Solutions, LLC, No. 15-2501,
2019 WL 4794103, at *1 (W.D. La. Sept. 30, 2019) (citing Cashman Equip. Corp. v. Smith
Marine Towing Corp., No. CV 12-945, 2013 WL 12229038, at *7 (E.D. La. June 27, 2013),
report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 12-945, 2013 WL 12228976 (E.D. La. July
12, 2013)); see also NOP, LLC v. Kansas, No. CIV.A. 101423, 2011 SL 1485287, at *5
(E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 10-1423, 2011
WL 1558687 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2011). In such cases, courts “need not segregate fees
when the facts and issues are so closely interwoven that they cannot be separated.” Id.
Rather, the determinative inquiry is whether the claims include a common core of facts or
were based on related legal theories linking them to the successful claim. See id. If the
facts and issues are closely interwoven, the prevailing party may recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees incurred to defend against the intertwined claims. See id.
In the instant case, the law from which the state defamation and Sherman Act
claims arise do not provide for award of attorneys’ fees. See 15 U.S.C. §1 and §2. Based
on review of the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that all of the
Plaintiff’s claims rest on a common core of operative facts such that it would be
impracticable to separate the hours attributable to each related claim. The Defendant has
also made a good faith effort to exclude unnecessary entries by reducing the attorneys’
fees related to depositions by fifty percent, as these fees were associated with both
federal and state depositions. See Record Document 264-1.
This Court notes that some entries included in Record Document 264 are for hours
that firm shareholder Madeline J. Lee and associate attorney Preston Mansour appeared
for/attended depositions. See Record Document 264 at 26. The Fifth Circuit has noted
that attorneys’ fees generally may not be recovered for attending, rather than participating
in, or conducting depositions when the time spent is duplicative and unnecessary. See
Coleman v. Houston Independent School Dist., 202 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1999). Given the
nature of Plaintiff’s claims and allegations of conspiracy, this Court finds the entries for
counsels’ separate attendance at co-defendants’ depositions reasonable. Thus, the
Defendant has exercised sound billing judgment in seeking this award of attorneys’ fees.
Based upon this Court’s review of the facts of this case and the Detailed Time Reports in
Record Document 264, this Court finds that the hours requested by the Defendant are
reasonable for purposes of the lodestar calculation.
This Court must also determine reasonable hourly rates for billing attorneys and
paralegals. A reasonable hourly rate is “to be calculated according to the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community” and is a rate “adequate to attract competent
counsel.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–97, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547–48. This Court
accepts that hourly rates of $140 for a partner with 27 years of experience, $125 for an
associate with 8-9 years of experience, $115 for an associate with 5-9 years of
experience, and $70 and $75 for two paralegals are acceptable rates within the Western
District of Louisiana. Such rates are also customary as to the fees normally charged by
the firm. See Record Document 264-1. Thus, the hourly rate is reasonable for purposes
of the lodestar calculation.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the lodestar is $54,058.25. There is a strong
presumption that this lodestar figure is reasonable, “but that presumption may be
overcome in rare circumstances where the lodestar does not adequately take into account
a factor that may be properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue, 559
U.S. at 554, 130 S.Ct. at 1673. The lodestar includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors
constituting a reasonable attorney fee. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566, 106 S.Ct 3088, 3098 (1986). Novelty and
complexity of issues, special skill and experience of counsel, quality of representation,
and results obtained from litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar and thus
cannot be independent bases upon which a court increases the lodestar. See Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. at 898–900, 104 S.Ct. at 1548–50. This Court finds that none of the
Johnson factors warrant an increase or decrease in the award sought by Defendant.
Under Rule 1.5(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, the factors to
be considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees are substantially
similar to those considered under the federal lodestar analysis. This Court likewise finds
that none of the Rule 1.5(a) factors warrant an adjustment to the award sought by the
Defendant.
As to the third category of costs relating to federal and state depositions identified
in Record Document 264-1, reasonable out-of-pocket expenses such as photocopying,
paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone are recoverable in cost awards. See
Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374,
380 (5th Cir. 1990). Ultimately, reasonableness of costs awarded is within the sound
discretion of the Court. See id.; see also La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1920.
Accordingly, this Court has reviewed the requested deposition expenses and
strikes Defendant’s request for meal expenses totaling $120.41. This Court otherwise
finds the requested expenses in Record Document 264 reasonable. Thus, the adjusted
total for deposition costs is $20,454.53. Given that the Defendant requested fifty percent
of costs and because the costs are applicable to federal and state suits, an award of fifty
percent of costs is reasonable. Thus, this Court awards the Defendant costs totaling
$10,227.27.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court finds attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$54,058.25 reasonable and costs in the amount of $10,227.27 to be reasonable.
Defendant H.O. Blackwood, D.D.S. is hereby awarded $64,285.52 in attorneys’ fees and
costs.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 17th day of August,
2021.
on [pele /
S. MAURICE HICKS, JR., CHIEF JUD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT