“There is no sound reason why conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”
How later courts described this case
- “There is no sound reason why conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: THE MATTER OF CIVIL ACTION
FMT INDUSTRIES, LLC ET AL.
No. 23-2388
c/w 23-2426
REF: ALL CASES
SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 for partial summary judgment filed by third-
party defendant PBC Management, LLC (“PBC Management”). Claimant Dustin
Harris (“Harris”) opposes the motion.2 PBC Management filed a reply.3 For the
reasons that follow, the Court grants PBC Management’s motion for summary
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a collision between the M/V CAROL MCMANUS, a
vessel owned and operated by Ingram Barge Company, LLC (“Ingram”), and the M/V
BIG D, a vessel owned by FMT Industries, L.L.C. and operated by Florida Marine,
LLC (collectively, “Florida Marine”).4 Harris was employed by PBC Management as
a deckhand aboard the M/V BIG D at the time of the collision.5 Harris’s complaint
1 R. Doc. No. 111.
2 R. Doc. No. 113.
3 R. Doc. No. 114.
4 Ingram and Florida Marine are collectively referred to as the “petitioners.”
5 R. Doc. No. 101 (this Court’s previous order and reasons explaining the background
of this matter), at 2.
alleges that he was seriously injured after suffering a fall caused by the collision.6
Harris contends that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Ingram and Florida
Marine, as well as the unseaworthiness of the M/V BIG D.7 Harris also claims that
he is entitled to maintenance and cure benefits.8
This Court recently issued an order granting summary judgment with respect
to Harris’s claims for negligence and unseaworthiness.9 In that order, the Court
explained that Harris had changed his allegations regarding the timing of the
accident following the production of contrary video evidence.10 However, even
accepting Harris’s new allegations, this Court stated that “Harris has provided no
evidence that his injuries occurred during or right before the collision.”11
Furthermore, the video evidence demonstrating that there was not enough time for
the accident to have occurred as Harris now suggested it had, the statements by the
captain of the vessel, and the petitioners’ expert’s report entitled the petitioners’ to
summary judgment on Harris’s Jones Act claim. Additionally, Harris conceded that
the M/V BIG D was not unseaworthy at the time of the accident and, therefore, the
Court granted summary judgment with respect to his unseaworthiness claim.12
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See generally id. The order also granted summary judgment with respect to claimant
Robert Flynt’s (“Flynt”) claim for maintenance and cure. Id.
10 Id. at 28.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 29.
In its present motion for partial summary judgment, PBC Management argues
that Harris is not entitled to maintenance and cure because he cannot prove that his
injury occurred while in service of the vessel.13 PBC Management also notes that it
has already paid maintenance and cure on behalf of Harris and nothing further is
due.14
In response, Harris argues that it is clear that he suffered an injury while
working aboard the M/V BIG D because of video footage from the vessel showing him
walking with a limp while disembarking the M/V BIG D and because of his medical
records reflecting treatment after he disembarked from the vessel.15 Harris contends
that he has met the slight burden of proof required for a maintenance and cure
claim.16
In reply, PBC Management argues that Harris is merely attempting to
repackage an issue that the Court has already decided.17 PBC Management contends
that the evidence demonstrates that the incident never occurred and there is no
genuine issue of material fact.18 PBC Management also argues that Harris did not
respond to its argument that PBC Management has already paid $31,030.08 in
maintenance and cure and that Harris has not demonstrated that he is entitled to
anything further.
13 R. Doc. No. 111-1, at 6.
14 Id. at 10.
15 R. Doc. No. 113, at 4.
16 Id. at 5.
17 R. Doc. No. 114, at 4.
18 Id. at 7.
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the materials in the
record, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record]
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need
not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out
the absence of evidence supporting the other party’s case. Id.; see also Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195–96 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sound reason why
conclusory allegations should suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to
support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”).
Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by
creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory
allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a
genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the movant’s story is “blatantly contradicted by the record”—including a
videotape—such that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” the court should “view[]
the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–
81 (2007). If the nonmovant fails to meet its burden of showing a genuine issue for
trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment
must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075–76.
The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party’s evidence, however, “is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party’s]
favor.” Id. at 255. “Although the substance or content of the evidence submitted to
support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . . the material
may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at trial.” JW Dev.,
LLC v. Indep. Specialty Ins. Co., No. CV 22-390, 2022 WL 3139133, at *1 (E.D. La.
Aug. 5, 2022) (Africk, J.) (quoting Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., LLC, 859 F.3d
353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017)).
III. ANALYSIS
The duty of maintenance and cure “obligates [maritime employers] to pay for
the lost wages, medical care, food, lodging, and other incidental expenses of a mariner
who falls ill or is injured while in the service of the vessel.” Johnson v. Cenac Towing,
Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (E.D. La. 2009) (Vance, J.). “The duty is practically
absolute.” Id. “Unlike an employer’s duties under the Jones Act, for example, liability
for maintenance and cure is ‘in no sense . . . predicated on the fault or negligence of
the shipowner.” Id. (quoting Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724, 730
(1943)).
“Before a seaman can recover maintenance and cure, he must prove (1) that he
was employed as a seaman[;] (2) that his injury occurred, was aggravated[,] or
manifested itself while in the ship’s service[;] (3) the wages to which he may be
entitled[;] and (4) the expenditures or liability that he incurred for medicines, nursing
care, board and lodging.” Messer v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., No. CIV.A.03-
3287, 2005 WL 1400439, at *2 (E.D. La. June 6, 2005) (Vance, J.). While “the
shipowner’s duty to provide maintenance and cure is quite broad, the seaman,
nonetheless, bears the burden of alleging and proving facts entitling him to be
included within its scope.” Stewart v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 288 F. Supp. 629, 634
(E.D. La. 1968) (Boyle, J.), aff’d, 409 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Court notes that “in bench-trial cases[,] the district court has greater
discretion to grant summary judgment.” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 323
(5th Cir. 2019). Specifically, the Court may “decide that the same evidence, presented
to him [ ] as a trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different
result.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Diversicare Afton Oaks, LLC, 597 F.3d 673, 676 (5th
Cir. 2010)).
As this Court discussed at length in a previous order, Harris “provided no
evidence that his injuries occurred during or right before the collision” as he alleged.19
In fact, Harris’s allegations are plainly contradicted by the video evidence, his
previous testimony, the vessel captain’s statements, and the petitioners’ expert’s
report.20 Importantly, while Harris has presented evidence showing that he was
injured at some point, he has not demonstrated that his injury occurred while in the
service of the M/V BIG D as required to recover maintenance and cure. See Reed v.
Ensco Offshore Co., No. CIV.A.CV04-2034, 2008 WL 1733663, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr.
10, 2008) (explaining that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintenance and cure
where the court found that the plaintiff was not injured during the alleged accident
and the plaintiff provided no evidence of other accidents which could have caused his
injuries).
Therefore, after considering all the evidence, the Court finds that PBC
Management has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to Harris’s request for maintenance and cure and more specifically, whether
Harris was injured as he alleged. In response, Harris did not present specific facts
showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact, and summary judgment is
appropriate.21
19 R. Doc. No. 101.
20 Id. at 28–29.
21 The Court also notes that Harris did not respond to PBC Management’s argument
that it has already paid $31,030.08 in maintenance and cure and that Harris has not
established that anything more is due. Because the Court finds that Harris is not
entitled to maintenance and cure as he has not demonstrated that he was injured in
the service of the vessel, the Court need not address this argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that PBC Management’s motion for partial summary
judgment is GRANTED. Harris’s claim for maintenance and cure is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harris’s and Flynt’s motions? to bifurcate
are DISMISSED AS MOOT.?23
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 18, 2024.
ANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22 R. Doc. Nos. 95, 96.
23 Flynt settled his remaining claims. R. Doc. No. 105. Harris’s only remaining claim
was for maintenance and cure, which has been dismissed pursuant to this order.
Accordingly, neither Flynt nor Harris have pending claims in this matter, and
dismissal of their motions to bifurcate is now appropriate.