Shaw v. Alpha Air Heating & Air Conditioning LLC

UNITED STATES D ISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRIC T OF LOUISIANA

MARK SHAW, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 22-3953

ALPHA AIR & HEATING, L.L.C., ET AL. SECTION: “D”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. (Rec. doc. 45).

Defendants filed no opposition to the motion. Having reviewed the motion and the case

lIa. w, theB Caocukrgtr rouulensd as follows.

Plaintiffs Mark Shaw and Daniel Oquendo (“Plaintiffs”) filed this Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) lawsuit against their former employers, Alpha Air Heating & Air

Conditioning, L.L.C. (“Alpha Air”) and Derek Granger (“Granger”) (collectively,

“Defendants”) to recover allegedly unpaid wages, including unpaid overtime wages. (Rec.

doc. 1). In their Verified Complaint filed on October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs asserted an FLSA

claim for failure to pay overtime wages, an FLSA claim for failure to pay minimum wage,

and a Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”) claim for failure to pay wIdag. es and

commissions within 15 days after an employee’s separation from his employer. ( ).

Alpha Air – a residential heating, air conditioning, and ventilation installer and

service provider in southeast Louisiana – hired Plaintiffs Shaw and OIqd.uendo in January

2022 as a full time “Service Professional” and “Installer,” respectively. ( at ¶¶ 14, 23-24).

Plaintiffs alleged that Granger, Alpha Air’s owner and sole member, controlled all aspects of

their employment including which jobIsd .they performed, how they performed their jobs,

and where they performed their jobs. ( at ¶ 27). Id.

Plaintiffs were paid an hourly wage and never received any overtime payment. (

at ¶¶ 36, 46, 55, 64). Specifically, Shaw alleged that he was paid $20.00 per hour on a

weekly basisId a.nd despite working an average of 55 hours per week, was never paid any

overtime. ( at ¶¶ 39-40). According to Shaw, Defendants not only failed to pay him

overtime wages but they alIsdo. failed to pay him certain regular wages he was owed as well

as earned commissions. ( at ¶¶ 43, 45-46). Shaw alleged that Defendants owed him

$3,500.00 in unpaid reguIlda.r wages, $2,500.00 in unpaid commissions, and $4,950.00 in

unpaid oIvde.rtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 49-50). Shaw resigned from Alpha Air on September 11,

2022. ( at ¶ 42). As for Oquendo, he was paid $25.00 per hour Iodn. a weekly basis by

Defendants, and he too worked an average of 55 hours per week. ( at ¶¶58-59). Like

Shaw, Oquendo alleged thIda.t Defendants failed to pay him certain regular wages and failed

to pay overtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 62, 64-65). Oquendo estimated that DefIedn.dants failed to

pay him $2,000.00 in regular wages and $3,750.I0d0. in overtime wages. ( at ¶¶ 66-67).

Oquendo resigned from Alpha Air in June 2022. ( at ¶ 61).

After discovery and motion practice – including Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, granted in their favor (rec. doc. 30) – the District Court held a one-day

bench trial on January 22, 2024. (Rec. doc. 41). Two days later, the District Court entered

its findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench. (Rec. doc. 43). Ultimately, the

District Court awarded $30,212.00 to Shaw, $28,660.00 to Oquendo, plus interest, and

awarded each Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees, plus reimbursement of his reasonable

litigation costs. (Rec. doc. 44). This fee application follo wed, in which Plaintiffs seek a total

oIIf. $36,2T2h5e.0 L0o idne astttaorr nAepypsr’ ofeaecsh and $1,436.22 in costs.

The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have often repeaHteedn stlheya t va.

rEecqkuerehsat rtfor attorneys' fees should Anssootc isapteadw Bnu imldaejrosr & aCnocniltlraarcyt olrist iogfa tLiao.n, .I n c. v. Orleans

Par. Schoo, l4 6B1d .U.S. 424, 437 (1983);

, 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990). A court's discretion in fashi.ieo.ning a

reasonable attorney's fee is broad and reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, , it will

not be reversed unless there is stronHg eenvsildeeynce that it is excessivHeo powr oinoadd ve. qSutaattee , oof rT tehxe.

amount chosen is clearly erroneous. , 461 U.S. at 436-37; ,

236 F.3d 256, 277 n.79 (5th Cir. 2000).

To determine a reasonable fee, the Court must provide a concise but clear

explanation of its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations

regarding whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reported

bHye ncsoleuynsel were duplicativeA, susnocnieacteesds Baruyi,l doerr su &n rCeolantterda cttoo rsthe purposes of the lawsuit.

, 461 U.S. at 437-39; , 919 F.2d at 379. The Fifth

Circuit has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the

findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court

hBaras nutlseeyd v .p Sruorpleesr factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.”

, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986).

In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the Court must first determine

the "lodestar" by multiplying the reasonable Sneuem Hbeenrs olefy hours expended anGdre tehne vr.e Aadsomn’rasb olef

hourly rate for each participating attorney. , 461 U.S. at 433;

the Tulane Educ. Fund overruled on other grounds by

Burlington N. & Santa F, e2 R8a4i lFw.3ayd C6o4. 2v,. W66h1it e(5th Cir. 2002), Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc.

La. Pow, 5e4r8 & U L.Sig. 5h3t C(2o0. v0.6 K);e llstrom ,

135 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); , 50 F.3d 319, 324

(5th Cir. 1995). The lodestar is presumeJodh rnesaosnonable, butF ae scsloeurr vt . mPaoyrc tehlaenna e Cnohraonncae Doer

1

dMeecxriecaos, eS .Ait. aDfete Cr .Vco. nsidering the twelve factors. Combs v. City of Huntington

, 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing ,

829 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2016)). “‘[T]Choem mbsost critical factor’ in determHineninsgle ay reasonable

fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” , 829 F.3d at 394 (quoting , 461 U.S. at

436). The fee applicant bears the burden of proof on the lodeJsothanr soisnsue, but once

calculated, thSee ep aFretsys lseereking modificatio nR iolef yt hve. Cloitdye osft aJar cuknsodner the factors bears

the burKdeelnls. t rom , 23 F.4thI na tr e4 1S6m;ith , 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir.

1996); A. Re,a 5s0o nFa.3bdl ea tH 3o2u4r; ly Rates , 996 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1992).

“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates M‘acrCe ltaoin b ve. cLaulfckuilna tIendd uasc.c, oInrcd.ing to the prevailing market

rates in the relevBalnutm c ovm. Smteunnsiotyn.’” , 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir.

2011) (quoting , 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “[T]he burden is on the fee

applicant to produce satisfactory evidence – in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits –

that the requested rates are in line with those prevailBinlug min the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill.” , 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “An

attorney’s requested hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when [he] requests that the

lodestar be computed at [his] ‘customary billing rateW,’ hthitee vra. Itme pise rwiailt Ahidnju tshtme ernatn Cgoer po.f

prevailing market rates and the rate is not contested.” ,

See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. abrogated on other grounds by

1Blanchard v. Bergeron

La. Power

No. 99s-e3e8 a0l4s,o 2 L0a0. 5P oWwLe r1 &57 L8i8g1ht0, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing , 50 F.3d at

328); , 50 F.3d at 328 (“Generally, when an attorney's customary

billing rate is the rate at which the attorney requests the lodestar to be computed and that

rate is within the range of prevailing market rates, the court should consider this rate when

fixing the houDrluyr erantee v .t oB rbinek earll oLwa.e Idn.c . When that rate is not contested, it is prima facie

reasonable.”); , No. CV 21-01568, 2022 WL 2828831, at *2 (E.D. La.

July 20, 2022) (“In this caJsoeh nthsoe nr avt.e Bs iogf Lthoets b Siltloinregs a, tItnocr.neys are not contested, and they are

therefore reasonable.”); , 639 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (E.D. La.

2009) (“When an attorney's requested rate is his customary billing rate and within the

range of prevailing market rates, the court should consider the rate prima facie reasonable

if not contested.”).

However, the Court may reduce the hourly rateR iifc ihta drdet ve.r Smt.i nTeasm tmhaatn tyh Pea rre. qShueersitfef'ds

rDaetpe' tis not within the range of prevailing market rates. appeal dismissed

sub n, oNmo.. CRVic h1a7r-9d 7v0.3 S, m20it2h2 WL 4534728, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2022),

, No. 22-30497, 2023 WL 2845201 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023).

Plaintiffs offer the Declaration of Kevin S. Vogeltanz (rec. doc. 45-5) bBuatr ddaol enso tv .p Froovnitdaen aa n&y

oFtohnetra neav,i Ld.eLn.Cc.e of prevailing market rates in this community. In

, the district court held:

While Plaintiffs provided information regarding the qualifications, skill, and

experience of Mr. Bragg, they failed to provide any information regarding the

prevailing market rate for lawyers of similar skill, experience, and reputation

to Mr. Bragg in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Specifically, Plaintiffs did

not offer affidavits from other attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of

Louisiana and, instead, rely upon Mr. Bragg's own assertions in his

Declarationi nt htahti sh icso rmamteus nairtey rfeoar ssoinmaiblaler. s Terhvuicse, sPlaintiffs did not meet their

burden to show that Mr. Bragg's requested rate is in line with those

prevailing by lawyers of reasonably

No. CV 19-340, 2021 WL 2328382, at *3 (E.D. La. June 8, 2021) (Vitter, J.) (emphasis in

original). A similar finding would be appropriate here but for the following case law.

Although Plaintiffs do not offer affidavits from other attorneys in the Eastern

District of Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit has clarified that the district court “is itself an expert

on the question [of reasonable billing rates] and may consider its own knowledge and

experience concerning reasonable and properC faemesp abnedll vm. aGyr efoenrm an independent judgment

either with or without the aid of testimony.” , 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.

1940). Having reviewed the most recent case law from this District, the Court finds that

some of the requested hourly rates do not reflect the prevailing rates in this community.

Plaintiffs seek fees for two attorneys: Kevin Vogeltanz and Alec Szczechowski, both

attorneys at the Law Office of Kevin S. Vogeltanz, L.L.C. (Rec. doc. 45-5 at 3). Vogeltanz –

the founding member of the law office of his own name – is an attorney with 13 to 14 years

of experience at the timeI do.f this lawsuit, and Szczechowski is an attorney with less than five

years of experience. ( ; Rec. doc. 45-1 at 2). Plaintiffs seek $500.00 per hour for

Vogeltanz and $200.00 per hour for Szczechowski. Vogeltanz practices mainly in the area

of labor and employment law and is board certified as an employment law specialist by the

Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization. (Rec. doc. 45-5 at 63).

Having reviewed the case law, the Court finds that the prevailing market rates in

this communeiety D faonro as tvto. rPnaenyesl Swpiethci aelxisptes,r iIenncc.e similar to that of Vogeltanz cover a wide

spectrum. S inter alia , Civ. A. No. 22-14, 2023 WL 6167152, at *2

(E.D. La. July 24, 2023) (approving, , aBna hrdoaulrelsy vr.a Fteo notfa $n3a5 &0 .0Fo0n itna nand, FLL.LS.AC .lawsuit

for an attorney with 16 years of experience); , Civ. A.

Ill. Cent.

$R4.R5. 0C.0o.0 v p. Berh dh. oouf rL tooc o$m40ot0i.v0e0 E pnegri nheoeursr &fo Tr raatitnomrneeny with 40 years of experience);

, No. CV 20-1717, 2021 WL 65648, at *2

(E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2021) (awarding attorneys’ fees at the requested billing rate of $275.00 per

hour for attorneys with 21 years and 3 yBeaadrosn o fv .e Bxpeerrryie'sn cRee laianbdl e$ 2R0e0s..,0 0L. Lp.Cer. hour for an

attorney with 30 years of experience); , No. CV 19-

12317, 2020 WL 9440406, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2020) (reducing the billing rate for an

attorneNyo wrriitsh v1. 4C ayuesaerys of experience from the requested $350.00 per hour to $300.00 per

hour); , No. CV 14-1598, 2016 WL 1046101, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2016)

(finding rates of $250.00, $200.00, and $15J0ef.0fe0r swone rve. rBeaayswonaatberle D forirl laintgto, rLn.Ley.Cs. with 31, 12,

and 8 years of experience, respectively); , No. CV 14-

1711, 2015 WL 7281612, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2015) (affirming magistrate judge's report

and recommendation finding that rates of $500.00 and $450.00 per hour were reasonable

for two attorneys with 40 years of experience in maritime litigation and that $240.00 per

hAoduarm ws va.s C rietya soof nNaebwle O frolre aanns attorney with seven years’ experience in maritime litigation);

, No. Civ. A. 13-6779, 2015 WL 4606223, at *3 (E.D. La. July 30,

2015) (findinEgn Vreante E noef rg$y3 5V0e.n0t0u rpese,r L .hLo.Cu. rv . rBelaascokn Ealbkl eE nfeorrg ya nO ffasthtoorren eOyp ewraitthio n2s9, Ly.Le.aCr.s of

experience); , No.

14-424, 2015 WL 3505099, at *1-3 (E.D. La. June 3, 2015) (approving hourly rate of

$325.00 for an attorney with twenty years of experience, $300.00 for an attorney with ten

years of experience, and $275.00 for an attorney with seven years of experience). Based on

this case law, the Court finds an hourly rate of $325.00 reasonable for an attorney with 13

to 14 years of experience at the time of this litigation.

Vogeltanz raises two arguments to justify his request for $500.00 per hour. He

argues:

Decisional law suggests a base rate of $350 for Vogeltanz because of his 13 to

14 years of experience during the case and his status as owner and founder

of his firm. Plaintiffs suggest, however, that Vogeltanz should also be

awarded a premium on top of his base rate. First, Vogeltanz is one of only

apparently three plaintiff’s attorneys in Louisiana board certified in

employment law by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization. Plaintiffs

suggest such a rare accreditation is worth an additional $100 per hour in our

market. Second, plaintiffs take the position that FLSA plaintiffs (and

employment-law plaintiffs in general) are underserved in the Louisiana legal

community, and because the FLSA has long been described as a remedial

statute, plaintiffs suggest Vogeltanz (and any plaintiff’s attorney who

undertakes an FLSA case) should be awarded a modest premium of $50 per

hour to incentivize lawyers to take on that work.

(Rec. doc. 45-1 at 2-3). Plaintiff cites no case law – and this Court has found none – that

would support an additional $150.00 per hour based on Plaintiffs’ two arguments.

However, and perhaps without realizing it, Plaintiffs appear to raise an argument

that the Court shouldJo hennhsoannce the Jaomhnosuonnt awarded based on the relative weight of certain

factors set forth in . The factors are: (1) the time and labor required to

represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the

skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other

employment by the attorney; (5) the customary fee charged for those services in the

relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations

imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the

case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relatJioohnnsshoinp with the client; and (12)

awards in similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-19. “[O]f the factors, the court should

give special heed to the time and labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved

Saizan v.

aDnedlt at hCeo nrecrseutlet Porbotdai. nCeod., and the experience, reputation and abilMityig oisf vc.o Puenasrelel. ”V ision, Inc.

, 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson,

135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998)). The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a

factor, however, if the creation of the lodestar amouIdn.t already took that factor into account;

to do so would be impermissible double counting.

Reframing Plaintiffs’ arguments, the issue then becomes whether this Court should

enhance the lodestar amount basedi.e o. n the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel

and the undesirability of the case ( , the underservice by the Louisiana legal community

of FLSA plaintiffs). After due consideration, the Court finds that these factors warrant no

enhancement. Cutting against Plaintiffs’ argument that FLSA plaintiffs are underserviced in

this District and attorneys who prosecute such casesm manedriatt oarny enhancement is the simple

fact that reasonable attorney’s fees and costs are under the FLSA (and the

Louisiana Wage Payment Act) when a plaintiff prevails. This fee-shifting statute in and of

itself already encourages attorneys to represent FLSA plaintiffs in any district. This Court

is cognizant of numerous FLSA lawsuits in this Court and of other lawyers and law firms

who often represent FLSA plaintiffs in this District. Indeed, that the FLSAS eceo Fnetgailenys va.

Hmiagngdinastory fee provision incentivizes lawyers to represent FLSA plaintiffs.

, 19 F.3d 1126, 1134 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of the FLSA attorney fees

provision is to insure effective access to the judicial prHocaeusssc hbiyld p vr.o Uvniditiendg Sattattoersney fees for

prevailing plaintiffs with wage and hour grievances.”); , 53 Fed. Cl.

134, 146 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (“the purpose of the FLSA attorneys' fee provision is to provide an

adequate economic incentive for private attorneys to take employment discrimination

cases and thereby to ensure competent legal representation of legitimate claims”) (internal

Tovar v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P.

citation omitted); , No. 3:20-CV-1455-B, 2022 WL 2306926, at *6

(N.D. Tex. June 27, 2022) (“Due to the nature of the FLSA attorneys' fee provision, which

provides an incentive for attorneys to take up meritorious claims that would ordinarily

result in relatively small awards. . . .”). Granting an hourly enhancement for representing

underserviced plaintiffs in an area of law that already rewards counsel for representing

underserviced plaintiffs seems far too much to the Court like double-dipping.

Moreover, this Court does not dispute that specialization in any type of law is

admirable, but the number of FLSA lawsuits in this District in which the plaintiff prevails

Sbeeeli eDsa annoys argument that specialization is necessary to adequately represent one’s client.

, 2023 WL 6B1a6d7o1n5 v2., Bate r*r1y ’(sn Roetilniagb lteh aRte ps.l,a Lin.Lt.iCff.s prevailed in their FLSA lawsuit

through settlement); , Civ. A. No. 19-12317, 2023 WL

395181, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2023) (noting that plaintiffs prevailed in their lawsuit after a

2

jury trial). This Court is unwilling to set the precedent that any specialist (in any area of

law) is automatically entitled to an increase in his or her hourly rate. An enhancement of

$150.00 per hour is thus not warranted.

This Court takes no issue with the hourly rate requested by Szczechowski, an

attorney with less than five years of experience at the time of this litigation. “Judges in this

district award attorney's fees in the amGouirnotd oLfo $a2n0 C0o .f,o Lr. Lw.Co. rvk. Hpeeirsfloerrmed by an associate

with less than five years of experience.” Batiste v. Lewis , No. 19-13150, 2020

WL 3605947, at *8 (E.D. La. July 2, 2020) (citing , No. 17-4435, 2019 WL

1591951, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2019) (awarding $200.00 per hour to attorney with five

2

Given that Plaintiffs’ counsel has informed the Court – and this Court has Dvearniofised – tBhaatd ohne is only one of

three attorneys board certified in employment law by the Louisiana Board of Legal Specialization (rec. doc.

years of experience)). Accordingly, the Court finds $200.00 per hour to be a reasonable

billing rBa.t e forR Sezaczseocnhaobwles kHi’os ucrosn Etrxibpuetniodne dto this litigation.

The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting and supHpeonrstlienyg the

reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. , 461

U.S. at 437. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to excludIde.

from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary . . .”

at 434. HouIrds. t hat are not properly billed to one’s client are not properly billed to one’s

adversary. The Supreme CouIdr.t calls on fee applicants to make a fee request that

demonstrates “billing judgment.” The remedy for failing tIod .exercise “Wbiallliknegr j uvd. gCmiteyn ot”f

iMs etsoq ueitxeclude hours that were not reasonably expeWndaeldke. r v. H aUtD 434;

, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting , 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th

Cir. 1996)) (“If there is bnuot eav irdeednuccet ioofn boilfl i‘nthge j uhdogumrse anwt, ahrodwede vbeyr ,a t hpeenr ctehnet apgreo pinetre rnedmede dtyo

issu bnsottit uat ed efonria tlh oe fe fxeeersc,i se of billing judgment.

’” (emphasSiese a Gdrdeeedn)). Alternatively, thCiasm Ceoruornt

cva. Gn rceoantedru Ncte aw l iOnrele-bayn-sl iFneed a. nCraelydsitis U onfi othne time report. , 284 F.3d at 662;

, Civ. A. No. 16-8514, 2017 WL 1426970, at *2 (E.D.

La. Apr. 21, 2017).

Attached to Plaintiffs’ motion is the Declaration of Kevin S. Vogeltanz (rec. doc. 45-5)

and the relevant billing records. (Rec. doc. 45-3). I dIn. total, Plaintiffs’ counsel expended a

combined 81.75 total hours litigating this case. ( ). Vogeltanz billed 66.25 hours, and

Szczechowski billed 15.5 hours. In calculating the hours, counsel exercised billing

judgment by taking affirmative steps to excise all time entries for telephone calls and email

3

correspondence. In the course of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel drafted the complaint,

drafted a motion to compel (which this Court granted), drafted their witness and exhibit

lists, and drafted a motion for partial summary judgment (which the District Court

granted). Plaintiffs’ counsel also drafted two motions for sanctions, one when Defendants

failed to appear for their depositions, and one when Defendants still failed to sit for their

depositions after this Court ordered them to do so. Plaintiffs drafted the pre-trial order,

which the District Court adopted, and participated in the one-day trial, after which they

prevailed. Having reviewed the docket sheet and the billing records – which reflect the

efforts exerted by Plaintiffs’ counsel – the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel have exercised

billing judgment.

However, there are two entries that this Court will excise given that it cannot

determine what legal tasks were performed in conjunction with the entries. On July 24,

2023, counsel entered 7.75 hours but listed only the word “counsel” as the task performed.

In addition, on December 12, 2023, counsel expended 0.5 hours but listed only the word

“record” as the task performed. The Court cannot award these 8.25 hours given that there

is no description of the legal services performed. After subtracting these two entries, the

CIIoI.u rt fiCnodsst tshat Vogeltanz expended 58 hours, and Szczechowski expended 15.5 hours.

Plaintiffs seek costs in the amount of $1,436.22, which is comprised of $402.00 for

the filing fee, $190.00 to serve Defendants, and $844.22 for court-reporter fees for the two

occasions at which Defendants failed to appear for their depositions. Filing fees and fees

for service of process (that are cheaper than those charged by the U.S. Marshal) are

Gros v. New Orleans City

generally recoverable. on reconsideratio, nN oin. Cpiva.r tA. 12-2322, 2014 WL 2506464, at

*16 (E.D. La. June 3, 2014), Marsala v. Mayo , No. Civ. A. 12-2322, 2014 WL

3894371 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2014); , No. 06–3846, 2014 WL 1276187, at *4

(E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2014). The Court will award these costs.

GenerallyS, otihse vc. oCstrse srceelnatte Dd rtioll itnhge c&a nPcreoldla.,t iIonnc .of a deposition are not taxable under

Section 1920. report and, Nreoc.o SmAm-1e9n-dCaVt-io0n1 1a9d4o-pFtBe,d 2s0u2b3 n oWmL.

8So7l0is7 4v.2 C1r, eastc e*n6t (DWri.lDli.n gT e&x .P Orocdt.. , 1I9n,c .2023),

ee also E.A.F.,F N. ov.. CUVn iStAed-1 S9t-aCtAe-s1194-FB, 2023 WL 8704782 (W.D.

Tex. Dec. 15, 2023); s , No. SA-08-CA-124-XR, 2014 WL

2155263, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2014) (holding a fee for a certificate of non-appearance

is not allowed because a certificate oShf anwon v-a. pHpaeradrbaenrcgee irs not a deposition transcript and is

not authorized by Section 1920); , No. SA-06-CV-751-XR, 2010 WL

1424726, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010) (“Section 1920 does not authorize costs for

certificates of nonappearance.”).

However, fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript

necessarily obtained for use in the case are taxable under Section 1920(2). Here, Plaintiffs

used the transcripts of Defendants’ non-appearance as exhibits to their motions for

sanctions for Defendants’ failure to appear at their properly-noticed depositions. (Rec.

docs. 29-2, 35-2). The Court finds that these fees were thus necessarily obtained for use in

this case. Accordingly, the Court will tax these costs to Defendants and award Plaintiffs a

tIoVt.a l ofC $o1n,4c3lu6s.2io2n in costs.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED

GRANTED IN PART that the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (rec. doc. 45)

is , and Plaintiffs be awarded $21,950.00 in fees and $1,436.22 in

costs for a total of $23,386.22. 10th April

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2024.

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE