The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAWRENCE WATSON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 23-3228
CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, ET AL. SECTION: “A” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motions are before the Court: Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 20)
filed by the defendants, Christopher Wray, in his individual and official capacity,
Inspector General Michael Horowitz, in his individual and official capacity, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) (referred to
collectively as “the Federal Defendants”); Motion to Amend Complaint (Rec. Doc. 22)
filed by the plaintiff, Mr. Lawrence Watson, who is proceeding pro se. Both motions are
opposed. The motions, submitted for consideration on March 13, 2024, are before the
Court on the briefs without oral argument.
I.
Lawrence Watson filed the instant complaint against the Federal Defendants
seeking redress for their failure to investigate/ intervene in/ prevent an alleged decades-
long conspiracy by state actors of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to deprive
Watson of his constitutional rights. Watson’s 71-page complaint describes in minute
detail his interactions with officers of the Massachusetts judicial system and other
Massachusetts state officials—those interactions date back to 1995 and span through
2011. Watson alleges that the Massachusetts officials’ conduct toward him was
motivated by his opposition to their “discriminatory practices against males who are
engaged in domestic disputes with females, especially in the issuance of abuse
prevention orders and in the determination [of] child custody and child support in
probate courts of the Commonwealth.” (Rec. Doc. 4, Complaint ¶ 2). It would appear
from Watson’s detailed allegations that to his profound disappointment no court whether
in Massachusetts or elsewhere, whether civil or criminal, has ever credited his legal
conspiracy theories. Nonetheless, Watson’s claims against the Federal Defendants are
premised on his constitutional rights having been violated by state actors in
Massachusetts, with the basis for liability against the Federal Defendants being their
refusal to investigate those state actors, much less intervene on Watson’s behalf in
order to prevent the continuing torrent of constitutional abuses being inflicted on Watson
by the Massachusetts legal system.
Watson also alleges that as a result of his difficulties in Massachusetts, he has
been denied the right to bear arms. (Complaint ¶ 104). Watson complains that the FBI
and the Department of Justice refused to grant him security clearance to purchase a
firearm in April 2021. (Id. ¶ 32).
Watson’s claims against the Federal Defendants are brought for the most part
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Watson seeks a
panoply of relief, including $300,000,000.00 (three-hundred million dollars) in
compensatory damages, empanelment of a grand jury to determine whether federal
criminal charges can be brought against the Massachusetts state actors, and
appointment of a special prosecutor in the Department of Justice to investigate any
federal offenses that the Massachusetts state actors committed against Watson from
1995 to 2011. (Rec. Doc. 4, Complaint at 67-68).
The Federal Defendants now move to dismiss Watson’s complaint asserting a
litany of potentially meritorious defenses. In response to the Federal Defendants’
motion, Watson not only filed an opposition but he also separately moved for leave to
amend his complaint to add the United States as a party. Watson’s position is that
joining the United States as a party will satisfy the legal deficiencies raised in the motion
to dismiss.1
II.
Section 1983 is inapplicable to this case because the actions being challenged
are those of federal actors. Section 1983 only provides redress for actions taken under
color of state law, not under federal law. Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435
(5th Cir. 1983). Because pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Collins v. Dallas
Leadership Found., 77 F.4th 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972)), the Court will consider Watson’s claims as if he had brought them
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Bivens is the much narrower-in-scope federal analog to a § 1983 claim.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999)).
Bivens remains good law but the judicially-created Bivens action applies to a
narrow set of circumstances. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022). Bivens itself
dealt with a Fourth Amendment violation committed by federal officers and the Supreme
1 In the instant motion to dismiss, the Federal Defendants did not raise their objections to
improper venue, failure to join a party, and insufficient service of process (as to the
individual capacity claims) but instead expressly preserved those objections. (Rec. Doc. 20,
Motion to Dismiss). Those non-merits-based objections are rendered moot by this
dispositive ruling.
Court has repeatedly declined to extend the decision to new constitutional contexts. Id.
at 486. Thus, while an essential element of a Bivens action is that a federal agent has
allegedly violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188
F.3d 579, 590 (5th Cir. 1999), the violation must be one cognizable under the narrow
scope of rights to which Bivens applies.
As with actions under § 1983, in a Bivens action vicarious liability and the theory
of respondeat superior are inapplicable. Therefore, a Bivens plaintiff must plead facts
demonstrating that each government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). In other words, government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates. Id. Furthermore, a Bivens action cannot
be brought against a federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
Regardless of the constitutional violation relied upon, the claims against the FBI
and OIG are legally frivolous because a Bivens action cannot be brought against a
federal agency. Further, the agency chiefs named in this lawsuit had no personal
involvement in the federal decisions that Watson complains about. On these bases
alone, Watson’s constitutional claims against the Federal Defendants are subject to
dismissal.
To be clear, even if Watson had sued the specific federal employees who
refused to investigate his claims in Massachusetts, his Bivens action would fail
nonetheless because his allegations do not allow for the inference that any of his
constitutional rights were violated. The federal government’s authority and power to
investigate is discretionary, and the failure to conduct an investigation does not
constitute a violation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution.2 Wallace v. Wray, No.
05-6773, 2006 WL 8459727, at *5 (E.D. Penn. June 16, 2006) (citing Russo v. Glasser,
279 F. Supp. 2d 136, 145 (D. Conn. 2003; Burchett v. Self, No. 94-5058, 1994 WL
276865, at *2 (6th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Johnson, No. Civ. A. 3:05CV261S, 2005 WL
1214254, at *5 (May 19, 2005, W.D. Ky.)); see also Lovoi v. F.B.I., No. 99-3563, 2000
WL 33671769, at *2 n.4 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2000) (citing , Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d
1005 (9th Cir.1985); Dunyan v. FBI, No. 92–0598, 1992 WL 25777 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5,
1992); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C.1963)).
Likewise for the firearm claim, the federal agencies (FBI and OIG) and the
agency chiefs who had no personal involvement in the matter, cannot be sued under
Bivens. But even beyond that, Bivens has never been extended to allow a claim against
federal officers related to the issuance of gun permits. See, e.g., Meeks v. Larsen, 611
Fed. Appx. 277 (6th Cir. 2015) (not published).
And Watson’s motion to amend his complaint does not cure any of the problems
discussed above. The motion to amend seeking to add the United States as a
defendant can only be directed at the FTCA claim because Bivens claims are only
2 Aside from there being no constitutional right to have the FBI or OIG investigate claims of
unconstitutional treatment by state actors, no court has ever determined that Watson’s
constitutional rights were violated by Massachusetts actors, which is the premise upon
which Watson’s entire lawsuit is based. The Federal Defendants posit that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applies to prohibit Watson from collaterally attacking the adverse prior
state court judgments rendered against him in Massachusetts. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is more nuanced than res judicata (civil judgments) or Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) (criminal convictions) because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that
federal district courts lack jurisdiction to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court
judgments. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 244-45 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting). If the
losing party in a state judicial proceeding seeks redress for a state judgment that itself
violates his federal rights his only remedy in the federal system is to seek review in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 245.
cognizable against individual federal officers, not the United States, which has
sovereign immunity. The proper defendant in a FTCA suit is the United States—not a
federal agency or its head. See Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860
F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988). But the fatal problem with Watson’s FTCA claim is not his
failure to name the proper defendant but rather that the conduct that he challenges, i.e.,
the failure to investigate Massachusetts state officials at Watson’s request, is strictly
discretionary in nature and therefore expressly exempted from the scope of the FTCA
by the discretionary function exception.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (excepting “[a]ny
claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused”).
In sum, Watson’s lawsuit against the Federal Defendants is legally frivolous
insofar as he fails to state a claim against them under any legal theory.4
3 Of course, even before considering the exceptions to the Act, a claim must fall within the
scope of the Act which covers “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). The reference in the statute to “the law of the place” means
the law of the state where the act or omission occurred. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477-78. The
source of substantive liability under the FTCA is state law. Id. at 478. Federal agents are not
answerable in tort under state law for refusing to conduct an investigation that falls solely
within their discretion under federal law.
4 Another argument that the Federal Defendants have raised is that Watson’s claims are
time-barred. In his complaint, Watson states that he began contacting the FBI in Boston in
the year 2000, and the Department of Justice starting in 2007 regarding the conduct of
Massachusetts state officials. (Rec. Doc. 4, Complaint ¶¶ 20, 26). No one responded to
Watson’s requests for an investigation. This lawsuit was filed on August 3, 2023.
Bivens actions, like § 1983 actions, borrow the statute of limitations from the
applicable state law. See Malachowski v. United States, No. 20-190, 2023 WL 3119680, at
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 20) filed by the
defendants, Christopher Wray, in his individual and official capacity, Inspector General
Michael Horowitz, in his individual and official capacity, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), and Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), is GRANTED. The
complaint filed by Lawrence Watson is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Amend Complaint (Rec. Doc.
22) filed by the plaintiff, Lawrence Watson, is DENIED.
March 27, 2024
C ¢
YC.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2023) (citing Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 590 (5th Cir.
1999); Starks v. Hollier, 295 F. App'x 664, 665 (5th Cir. 2008)). In this forum, Louisiana law
provides a one-year limitations period. See Alford v. United States, 693 F.2d 498, 499 (5th
Cir. 1982) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 3536 (now article 3492)). Under Massachusetts law the
applicable period would be three-years. Verrier v. Beth Israel Deaconess Hosp. -Plymouth,
Inc., No. CV 22-11855-NMG, 2023 WL 8544988, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 11, 2023) (citing
M.G.L. c. 260, § 2A; Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 2003)). But regardless of
which state’s statute of limitations would apply, accrual of the cause of action is governed
by federal law. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235 (2023) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 388 (2007)). A cause of action accrues, under federal law, “when the plaintiff Knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Brown v. Nationsbank
Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620-—
21 (5th Cir.1994)). Assuming arguendo that Watson had a claim based on the failure to
investigate, he knew well before the years immediately preceding this lawsuit that the
federal agencies that he had contacted were not responding to his repeated requests for
assistance. Watson cannot circumvent the statute of limitations based on his allegation that
he contacted the FBI again in April 2021 to re-urge his prior requests for an investigation of
what occurred in Massachusetts from 1995-2011. (Complaint 7 33).