Guillory v. Borel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KEVIN WAYNE GUILLORY, JR. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER 23-3302

JAZE BOREL, ET AL. DIVISION “5”

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Jaze Borel, Trent

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Lottinger, Jordan Darcey, Brendon Hebert, and Rashawn Brown (collectively, “Defendants”).

(Rec. doc. 18). Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion in accordance with the local

rI.u les ofB tahcisk Cgoruorutn. dHaving reviewed the pleading and the case law, the Court rules as follows.

Plaintiff was a Department of Corrections prisoner housed in the Terrebonne Parish

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Criminal Justice Complex (“TPCJC”) at the time he filed his Complaint. (Rec. doc. 3). On July

31, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with his cellmate, Rodney Charles

Reed, at the TPCJC. (Rec. doc. 3-2 at 1). Plaintiff maintains that he later learned that Reed

was a pre-trial detainee and should not haIvde been housed with Plaintiff – a convicted

prisoner – in his cell, Dorm C-100, Cell 103. ( ).

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“Jordan Darcey” is actually “Jordan Dorsey.” (Rec. doc. 18-7). For ease of reference, the Court will refer to him

a2s named in Plaintiff’s Complaint, “Jorden Darcey.”

Plaintiff has since been transferred to the West Baton Rouge Detention Center. (Rec. doc. 19). Defendants

filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on December 21, 2023. (Rec. doc. 18). On December 22, 2023 and

January 2, 2024, this Court received a notice of change of address from Plaintiff, informing the Court of his

transfer to the West Baton Rouge Detention Center. (Rec. docs. 19, 20). Out of an abundance of caution and to

All five Defendants are Correctional Officers at the TPCJC. Defendants Lottinger and

Borel were called to respond to the altercation between Plaintiff and Reed. (Rec. doc. 18-4

at 1). Defendant Hebert also responded to the altercation but did not participate in

Lottinger’s and Borel’s actions. (Rec. doc. 18-8 at 1-2). Lottinger and Borel attest to – and

Hebert corroborates – the following sequence of events during the incident between Plaintiff

and Reed. (Rec. docs. 18-4 at 1, 18-5 at 1-2, 18-8 at 1-2).

Lottinger aIndd. Borel ordered Plaintiff and Reed to cease fighting, but Plaintiff and Reed

did not comply. ( at 2). Lottinger and Borel decided to pepper spray the two inmates and

administered one or Itdw.o bursts on the men after they again refused to comply with the

oIfdfi.cers’ commands. ( ). The inmates then became compliant, and the officers cuffed them.

( ). By this time, Defendant Darcey appears to have arrived and helped handcuff the

inmates, who were then escorted by Defendant Brown to medical to be examined for any

injuries. (Rec. docs. 18n-o6 iantj u2r, i1e8s-7 at 1-2). Plaintiff admits that he and Reed “were escorted

out of lockdown with .” (Rec. doc. 3-2 at 1) (emphasis added). Defendant Brown

later provided Plaintiff with a disciplinary report related to the incident, which Plaintiff

alleges failed to include Reed’s name and that he was a pre-trial detainee at the time of the

incident. (Rec. doc. 3-2 at 1). Plaintiff does not specifically mention Defendant Hebert in his

Complaint, except for his conclusory insertion as a Defendant.

On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed his corrected Complaint in which he sues all five

officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Rec. doc. 3). Plaintiff challenges the conditions of his

confinement because he, a convicted prisoner, should not have been housed with Reed, a

pre-trial detainee, in the first instance. (Rec. doc. 3-2 at 1).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as toC ealnotye mx Caoterrpi.a vl .f aCcatt raentdt that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)). “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element eIsds.e ntial to that party's case, and on which the party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” A party moving for summary judgment bears the

initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those

portions of the record, discovery, Iadn.d any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is

no genuine issue of material fact. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, then the

nonmoving party must marshal evidence coIdg.nizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact. at 324.

A genuine issue oSfe em Aantedreiraslo fna cvt. eLxiibsetrst iyf aL orbebays,o Innacb.le jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Id. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The

substantive law identifies which facts are material. Material facts are not genuinely

disputed when a rational trier ofS feaec Mt caotusuldsh nitoat Efilnedc. fIonrd tuhse. Cnoo. nvm. Zoevniinthg Rpaadrtiyo uCporopn. a review

of the record takenE qausa al wEmhopl'et . O pportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986); , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th

Cir. 2014). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,” “conclusory allegations,” andS meee Arenldye crsoolonrable

factual bases areH ionpspuefrfi cvi.e Fnrta tnok defeat a motion for summary judgment. , 477

U.S. at 249-50; , 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary

See Delta &

jPuidneg mLeanntd mCoot. iov.n ,N aa ctioounrwt imdea yA ngoritb ruessionlevses cIrnesd. iCboi.lity issues or weigh evidence.

, 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).

Further, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate

inferences bSeaes eTdo loann t vh. eC eovttiodnence in the light most favoraDbalen tieol st hve. Cpiatyr toyf oAprplinogsitnogn summary

judgment. , 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); , 246 F.3d

500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). A court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmovant “when there is an actLuiatlt lceo vn. tLrioqvueirds Ay,i rt hCaotr pis., when both parties have submitted

evidencLeu ojafn c ovn. Ntraatd'li cWtoilrdyl iffaec Ftse.d” ' n , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)

(citing , 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant

must articulate specific facts and pointS teoe Lsuynpcpho rPtrinopgs, .,c Ionmc.p ve. tPeontto emvaidc eInncse. Ctoh. aotf mIlla.y be

presented in a form admissible at trial. , 140

F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(M2)a.t s Suushchit afacts must create

more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” , 475 U.S. at 586.

When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the

moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essenStieael

eCleelmoteenxt of the nonmovant's claim in order to satisfy its summary judgment burden.

, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial

that couldSe seu Lpitptolert a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be

gIIrIa. ntedL. a w and An, 3a7ly Fs.i3sd at 1075-76.

Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or

statutory rights under color of state law:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of

authority to deprive individuals oWf yfaetdte vra. lClyo leguaranteed rights and to provide rCealireefy tvo.

vPiicpthimuss if such deterrence fails.” , 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing

, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)).

A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish Section 1983 liability:

(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law;

(2) that occurred under color of state law; and

Victoria( 3W) w. va.s Lcaarupseendt ebry a state actor.

, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Because

Section 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights, rather than creating any

substantiveH arirgrhintsg,t o“ann v .u Hnadrerrilsying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to

liability.” , 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). This

requires a plaintiff to identify bFoltahg tgh Be rcoosn., sItnictu. vti. oBnraolo vkisolation and the responsible person

acting under color of state law. , 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).

At first blush, Plaintiff’s claim fails for one simple reason: None of the Defendants had

any responsibility for the initial classification of Plaintiff or Reed when they entered the

TPCJC or their placement in a lockdown cell with each other. (Rec. docs. 18-4 at 2, 18-5 at 2,

18-6 at 2, 18-7 at 2, 18-8 at 2). The classification and placSeeme eind.t of Plaintiff and Reed were

not part of Defendants’ duties as Correctional Officers. ( ). Plaintiff does not allege

claims for being pepper sprayed or for being handcuffed and he readily admits in his

Complaint that he was uninjured when he was escorted to medical. (Rec. doc. 3-2 at 1). In

other words, Plaintiff does not sue Defendants for any actions in which they were personally

iTnhvoomlvpesdo.n “vP. eStreseolneal involvement is an essential elemeRnizt zoof va. Gciovoidl erights cause of action.”

, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) ( , 423 U.S. 362, 371-72,

377 (1976) (noting that affirmative link needed between injury and conduct of defendant)).

Accordingly, there was simply no deprivation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional or federal right to

prisoner classification and placement in which Defendants were personally involved.

Jones v.M Doiraemoovnedr, the classification of inmates is an admoivneirsrturaletdiv oe nf uonthcteiro ng roofu nthdes pbyri sInotn'l.

Woodworkers of A, m63., 6A FFL.2-CdI O13 &6 4it,s 1 L3o7c6. N (o5.t 5h- 3C7ir6. v1.9 C8h1a)m, pion Int'l Corp.

, 790 F.2d 1174 (5th

Cir. 1986). Courts accord great deference to prison officials' administrative decisionBse alln vd.

wWiolll fnisoht interfere with legitimate admSinmisitthra vti. oBnin wghitahmout a constitutional violation.

, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); , 914 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1990).

“Inmates have a federal right to due process at prison classification . . . only if state law

contains ‘substantive predicatReisc’k leimr vit. iLnega tphleey prison administrators' discretion to claacscsoifryd,

aWsosiogdns, va.n Edd pwuanridssh inmates.” , 25 F.C3adn 1te4r0i6n,o 1 v4. 0W9i l(s8otnh Cir. 1994);

, 51 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 1995); , 869 F.2d 948, 953

(6th Cir. 1989). “Classification of inmates in Louisiana is a duty oWf tohoed s[jailer] and an inmate

has no right to a particular classification under state law.” , 51 F.3d at 581-82

(quotation omitted).

InmatesW itlhsouns vh. Bauved nenyo protectable property or libertyM oiondteyr ve.s Bt akine r custodial

classification. , 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992); , 857 F.2d

256, 257-58 (5th CiMr.c 1C9o8rd8 )v. . TMhaeg gcliaossification of prisoners is a matter within the discretion

of prison officials. , 910 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th Cir. 1990). Absent an abuse

of discretion, federaSle ec oJaucrktss oanr ev .l oCaatinh to interfere with custodial classifications established

by prison officials. , 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989).

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that the housing decisions within the jail were

made indiscriminately or without justification or that his housing assignment was made with

an intent to punish him or with deliberate indifference to his safety. Therefore, his

conclusory and unsupported housing claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s last claim is that Brown failed to note on the incident report that Reed was

a pre-trial detainee at the time that he was housed with Plaintiff. This Court cannot discern

how such an innocuous omission violated Plaintiff’s rights as secured by the Constitution or

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IfeVd. eralC laownc. lTuhsiiso nclaim is simply frivolous.

FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons, GRANTED

thDaItS tMhIeS MSEoDti oWn IfToHr SPuRmEmJUaDryI CJuEdgment (rec. doc. 18) is ,

and Plaintiff’s claims are 20th Feb. ruary

New Orleans, Louisiana this _________ day of __________________, 2024.

___________________________________________

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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