Alpha Services LLC v. Looman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALPHA SERVICES, LLC, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS CASE NO. 23-2988

JESSICA LOOMAN, ET AL. SECTION: “G” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiffs Alpha Services, LLC, Robert Zaharie, NorTerra Services, LLC, and Terry Rice

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) seek declaratory relief and to enjoin administrative proceedings pending

against them before the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) on the basis that their Seventh

Amendment right to a trial by jury is allegedly being violated.1 The Chief Administrative Law

Judge of DOL referred the administrative proceedings to DOL’s Covington District Office in

Covington, Louisiana, on February 6, 2023.2 The administrative proceedings are currently ongoing

before the Covington District Office.3

Before the Court is Defendants Jessica Looman (Principal Deputy Administrator, Wage

and Hour Division, DOL) and Julie Su’s (Acting U.S. Secretary of Labor) (collectively the

“Government”) Motion to Transfer Venue.4 The Government argues that this action should be

transferred to either the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or the District of Idaho

since venue is proper and more convenient in either district based on the citizenship of the parties

and the occurrence of events.5 In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the Eastern District of Louisiana

1 Rec. Doc. 1.

2 Id. at 6.

3 Rec. Doc. 1 at 7.

4 Rec. Doc. 5.

5 Id.

is the proper venue because that is where the Government is allegedly violating Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights.6 In further support of the motion, the Government argues that Plaintiffs’

rights are not currently being violated in this District.7 For the reasons discussed in more detail

below, the Court finds that this District is a proper venue because the administrative proceedings

that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin are ongoing in this District. Thus, a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District. Additionally, all of the public

and private interest factors evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 are neutral. Therefore, the

Government has not demonstrated that another venue is clearly more convenient than this District.

Accordingly, having considered the motion, the opposition, the reply memorandum, the record,

and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Alpha Services, LLC (“Alpha”) is a reforestation company headquartered in Idaho

owned and managed by Plaintiff Robert Zaharie.8 Plaintiff NorTerra Services, LLC (“NorTerra”)

is a forestry company headquartered in Idaho owned and managed by Plaintiff Terry Rice.9

Defendant Jessica Looman is the Principal Deputy Administrator of DOL Wage and Hour

Division.10 Defendant Julie Su is the Acting U.S. Secretary of Labor, responsible for overseeing

DOL’s enforcement of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”)

and DOL’s administrative law judges.11

6 Rec. Doc. 15.

7 Rec. Doc. 20.

8 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

On June 16, 2022, DOL issued a Notice of Determination finding that Plaintiffs violated

the MSPA.12 The Notice of Determination assessed back wages and civil money penalties against

both Alpha and NorTerra.13 DOL also revoked and refused to renew Plaintiffs’ MSPA licenses.14

Plaintiffs appealed the Notice of Determination and requested a hearing before an administrative

law judge.15 Plaintiffs allege that filing the appeal should have stayed the Notice of Determination,

yet DOL began giving immediate effect to it resulting in Alpha instituting litigation in the U.S.

District Court of the District of Columbia.16 The litigation resulted in a settlement.17 When Alpha

Services appealed the Notice of Determination, the company demanded a jury trial on the back

wages and any other issues for which the Seventh Amendment provided the right to a jury trial.18

The Chief Administrative Law Judge of DOL referred the administrative proceedings to DOL’s

Covington District Office in Covington, Louisiana, and Administrative Law Judge Angela

Donaldson was assigned the matter on February 6, 2023.19

On February 10, 2023, Alpha filed a notice objecting to adjudication of the back wages,

civil money penalties, and related claims by a non-jury factfinder.20 On March 3, 2023, Alpha filed

12 Id. at 4.

13 Id. at 5.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 6.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

a motion to stay the proceedings.21 In response, Jessica Looman moved to change venue to Idaho.22

The motion to change venue was denied, because the Administrative Law Judge in Covington,

Louisiana, found that she had no authority to overturn the order of the Chief Administrative Law

Judge.23

On July 14, 2023, the Administrative Law Judge denied the motion to stay proceedings,

reasoning that the proceedings were constitutional because they were authorized by statute and

regulation.24 The administrative review proceedings are ongoing before DOL.25

On August 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief in this

Court against Defendants alleging that the administrative proceeding must be enjoined since

Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury was being violated.26 Both government

Defendants were sued in their official capacities.27 On September 13, 2023, the Government filed

the instant Motion to Transfer Venue.28 Plaintiffs filed an opposition on September 26, 2023.29

The Government filed a reply on October 3, 2023.30

21 Id.

22 Id. at 7.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Rec. Doc. 1.

27 Id. at 2.

28 Rec. Doc. 5.

29 Rec. Doc. 15.

30 Rec. Doc. 20.

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. The Government’s Arguments in Support of Motion

The Government argues that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this Court should transfer

the matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, or alternatively, the District of

Idaho for the convenience of the parties.31 The Government asserts that venue is proper in both the

District of Columbia and the District of Idaho.32 The Government submits that venue would be

proper in the District of Columbia because that is where the federal defendants reside.33 The

Government contends that venue is also proper in the District of Idaho, where the corporate

Plaintiffs have their principal place of business and hence reside.34

The Government asserts that public interest factors favor transfer since the Eastern District

of Louisiana has 16,488 pending cases, while the District of Columbia has 6,152 pending cases,

and Idaho had 1,104 cases.35 The Government argues that there is not a particularly “local interest”

in having this case decided in the Eastern District of Louisiana.36 The Government contends that

the only connection this District has to the matter is that the administrative proceedings were

assigned to a judge seated in Louisiana, and that neither Plaintiff identified any specific connection

with this District in requesting a “south-central” assignment of the administrative proceedings.37

31 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 7.

32 Id. at 8.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 9.

36 Id. at 10.

37 Id. at 12.

The Government submits that both Defendants reside in the District of Columbia, Plaintiffs

reside in Idaho, and the events underlying the MSPA violations all occurred in Washington State

or Idaho.38 As such, the Government moves this Court to exercise its discretion and transfer the

matter.39

Alternatively, the Government argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) venue is not proper

in this District because neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs reside here and a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim did not occurred here either.40 The Government

contends that the lone fact that the case has been assigned to an administrative law judge sitting in

this District is not substantial, and that no live proceedings have yet occurred in this District.41

B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana

because that is where the Government is allegedly violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.42

Plaintiffs assert that the Government’s motion should be denied because it has not clearly

demonstrated a transfer is justified.43 Plaintiffs submit that the only action that gave rise to

Plaintiffs’ claims is the DOL hearing common law claims against Plaintiffs without a jury, which

is ongoing in Covington, Louisiana.44 Plaintiffs contend that the Government faces no unfair

inconvenience in litigating this case in the same district where they are allegedly violating

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 14.

41 Id.

42 Rec. Doc. 15 at 1.

43 Id. at 3.

44 Id.

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.45 Plaintiffs allege that venue would not be appropriate in the

District of Columbia because that is merely the location of DOL headquarters.46 Plaintiffs further

contend that Idaho is not a better choice because Plaintiffs claim no need to litigate this case near

their residence, and the Government has no right to force this supposed convenience upon them.47

Plaintiffs assert that the impact of the Court’s decision will be keenly felt in Louisiana since

Alpha has done business in Louisiana for many years and much of their profits are derived from

Louisiana.48 Plaintiffs argues that there is a local interest in ensuring that federal government

officers are not violating individuals’ constitutional rights in this District.49 Plaintiffs contend that

the Government has not met its burden to justify a change of venue.50 As such, Plaintiffs urge this

Court to deny the motion to transfer venue.51

C. The Government’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion

The Government submits that Plaintiffs’ opposition fails to establish that venue is proper

here, nor does it rebut that convenience and public interest favor transfer of the case.52 The

Government argues that Plaintiffs are wrong that their Seventh Amendment right is currently being

violated in this District since Plaintiffs have not yet appeared at a hearing in Covington,

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id. at 5.

49 Id. at 8.

50 Id. at 8.

51 Id. at 9.

52 Rec. Doc. 20 at 1.

Louisiana.53 The Government asserts that the current pre-trial proceedings being conducted at the

administrative level do not implicate the Seventh Amendment.54 The Government further contends

that if a hearing occurs, it is likely to occur in Dallas, Texas, or by video.55 Thus, the Government

moves for this Court to grant the motion.56

III. Legal Standard

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1406

Section 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of

justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” This

question—whether venue is “wrong” or “improper”—is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

That provision states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law . . . this section shall govern

the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States.”57 It further provides

an action where defendant is officer or employee of the United States may be brought in any

judicial district where:

(A) a defendant in the action resides;

(B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is subject of the action

is situated; or

(C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.58

53 Id.

54 Id. at 2.

55 Id.

56 Id. at 5.

57 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (emphasis added).

58 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls within one of these

three categories. If it does, venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the case must be

dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a).

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1404

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division

where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have

consented.”59 Thus, there exists a threshold inquiry of whether the suit originally could have been

brought in the venue where the action is sought to be transferred.60 “[T]he movants have the prima

facie burden to prove that both personal jurisdiction and venue are appropriate for all defendants

in the transferee court.”61

After it has been established that venue in the transferee district is proper, the Court must

next consider whether the transfer would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and

the interest of justice.62 In doing so, the Court considers private and public interest factors first

outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.63 These private and

public interest factors are “appropriate for most transfer cases,” but they “are not necessarily

59 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

60 In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Volkswagen I”) (“In applying the provisions of

§ 1404(a), we have suggested that the first determination to be made is whether the judicial district to which transfer

is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been filed.”).

61 Wellogix Technology Licensing LLC v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., No. 6:11401, 2013 WL 1729606,

at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar 19, 2013) (citing Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984),

overruled on other grounds by In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987)).

62 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

63 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). See also In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008)

(en banc) (“Volkswagen II”).

exhaustive or exclusive,” and no one factor is dispositive.64 “Also, importantly, the plaintiff’s

choice of venue is not a factor in the analysis; rather, it contributes to the defendant’s burden in

proving that the transferee venue is ‘clearly more convenient’ than the transferor venue.”65 The

private interest factors include: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the

availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance

for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious

and inexpensive.”66 The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing

from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the

familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of

unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.”67

IV. Analysis

A. Proper Venue

The Government seeks to transfer this matter to either the District of Columbia or Idaho.

Before addressing whether this suit could have been filed originally in Idaho or the District of

Columbia, the Court addresses the Government’s argument that the Eastern District of Louisiana

is an improper venue.

64 Id. (“Moreover, we noted that ‘none . . . can be said to be of dispositive weight.’”) (quoting Action Indus.,

Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004)).

65 Tegrity Contractors, Inc. v. Spectra Grp., Inc., No. 12-2555, 2013 WL 654924, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 21,

2013) (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315).

66 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

67 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. Whether Venue is Proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana

The Government argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) the case should be dismissed or

transferred because venue is not proper in this District.68 The Government submits that neither

Defendants nor Plaintiffs reside here and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise

to the claim did not occurred here either.69 The Government contends that the lone fact that the

case has been assigned to an administrative law judge sitting in this District is not substantial, and

that no live proceedings have yet occurred in this District.70 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that

venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana because that is where the Government is

allegedly violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.71

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to Plaintiffs’ claim are occurring in this District. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and to enjoin

the administrative proceedings pending against them before DOL in Covington, Louisiana.72 The

relief sought in this case is limited to an order: (1) “[d]eclaring that the administrative proceedings

pending before DOL violate Plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment;” (2)

“[e]njoining the administrative proceedings;” (3) “[a]warding plaintiff reasonable costs and fees

under the Equal Access to Justice Act;” and (4) “[g]ranting such other relief at law and in equity

as justice may require.”73 Therefore, the crux of this litigation is whether Plaintiffs’ right to a jury

trial is being violated by the administrative proceedings ongoing in this District.

68 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 14.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 Rec. Doc. 15 at 1.

72 Rec. Doc. 1.

73 Id. at 8.

The Government disputes that Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are being violated. That is a

substantive argument, and it does not change the fact that the acts or omissions giving rise to

Plaintiffs’ claims are occurring in this District. The Chief Administrative Law Judge of DOL

referred the administrative proceedings to DOL’s Covington District Office in Covington,

Louisiana. Thus, the decision to assign the case to Louisiana was made by the DOL. It is

disingenuous for the DOL to now argue that this case cannot be litigated here. The administrative

proceedings that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin are currently ongoing before the Covington District

Office.74 Therefore, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that the Eastern District of

Louisiana is an improper venue and finds that transfer would not be appropriate under § 1406(a).

The Government also argues that the case should be transferred to either the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia or the District of Idaho for the convenience of the parties under

§ 1404(a). Thus, the Court proceeds with the threshold inquiry of whether the suit originally could

have been brought in those venues.75

2. Whether Venue is Proper in the District of Columbia

The Government argues that venue is proper in the District of Columbia because both

federal defendants are citizens of the District of Columbia.76 Plaintiffs argue that it is improper to

sue a federal defendant in the district where the only connection to the district is the headquarters

of a government agency.77 As stated above, venue is proper in any judicial district in which a

defendant in the action resides.78 For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), the residence of federal

74 Rec. Doc. 1 at 7.

75 Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 203.

76 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 8.

77 Rec. Doc. 15 at 7.

78 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

officers is that place where the officers perform their official duties.79 The “residence” of a federal

agency is ordinarily limited to the District of Columbia.80 However, district courts in the District

of Columbia have held that where, as here, “the only real connection [the] lawsuit has to the

District of Columbia is that a federal agency headquartered here is charged with generally

regulating and overseeing the [administrative] process, venue is not appropriate in the District of

Columbia.”81 The Government argues that all of the events underlying the administrative

proceedings occurred in Idaho and Washington State.82 The Summary of Violations regarding the

underlying administrative proceedings state that at least one violation occurred in Okanogan,

Washington.83 As such, the only connection to the District of Columbia would be that the DOL is

headquartered there. Thus, this Court does not take the position that venue would have been proper

in the District of Columbia.84

3. Whether Venue is Proper in the District of Idaho

The Government also argues that venue is proper in Idaho because Plaintiffs reside there,

as their headquarters are in Idaho.85 In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that they do not wish to litigate

in Idaho, and any such convenience cannot be forced upon them by Defendants.86 As stated above,

79 See Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 264, 266 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978).

80 Reuben, 580 F.2d at 267.

81 Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff, 564 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Abusadeh v. Chertoff, No. 06–2014,

2007 WL 2111036, at *6–7 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007)); see also Shawnee Tribe, 298 F.Supp.2d at 25–

26 (quoting DeLoach v. Phillip Morris Co., Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2000)).

82 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 1.

83 Rec. Doc. 5-3 at 15.

84 Even assuming that the District of Columbia is a proper venue, all of the public and private interest factors

discussed below are also neutral when applied to the District of Columbia.

85 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 8.

86 Rec. Doc. 15 at 7.

venue is proper in a judicial district where a plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the

action.87 Plaintiffs Alpha Services and NorTerra are both LLCs. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(c)(2), for venue purposes, a plaintiff entity with the capacity to sue in its common name,

whether or not incorporated, “shall be deemed to reside . . . in the judicial district in which it

maintains its principal place of business.” Plaintiffs do not dispute that both LLCs maintain their

principal place of business in Idaho. As such, venue would have been proper in Idaho based upon

the citizenship of Plaintiffs.

B. Private Interest Factors

The Government has established that venue is proper in Idaho. Therefore, the Court must

next consider whether the transfer would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and

the interest of justice.88 First, the Court considers the private interest factors, which include: “(1)

the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure

the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other

practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”89

The Government contends that all of the private interest factors are neutral because this

case involves a single legal issue, centering on a matter of constitutional interpretation, likely to

be decided on summary judgment.90 Presumably, Plaintiffs concede with this notion since their

opposition does not address private interest factors at all.

87 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).

88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

89 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315.

90 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 9.

The Court agrees that these private interest factors have little bearing to this case. The sole

issue in this case is whether the administrative proceedings pending before the DOL violate

Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. This is a legal issue that can likely be

decided on summary judgment, without need for presentation of factual evidence. Therefore, the

private interest factors, which are primarily concerned with convenience of the parties and

witnesses, are neutral.

C. Public Interest Factors

Next, the Court considers the public interest factors. As stated above, the public interest

factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local

interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law

that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in]

the application of foreign law.”91 Accordingly, the Court will evaluate each of these factors in turn.

1. Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion

First, considering the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, the

Government argues that the District of Idaho is less congested that this District.92 Plaintiffs argue

that any delay resulting from the speed of the case should be addressed in a motion to expedite.93

As of June 2023, this District had 16,488 pending civil cases for 11 judges and three senior judges,

and Idaho had 1,104 cases among 2 judges and one senior judge.94 However, the total number of

pending civil cases in this District includes well over 14,000 cases that are either part of an MDL

91 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315.

92 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 9.

93 Rec. Doc. 15 at 3.

94 See U.S. District Courts, Judicial Caseload Profile, June 2023.

or are Hurricane Ida first-party property insurance cases subject to a streamlined settlement

program. The median time from filing to trial in this District was 25.9 months, whereas the median

time from filing to trial in the District of Idaho was 35.7 months.95 Although this District has more

cases pending than the District of Idaho, this Court is capable of expeditiously deciding matters.

Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.

2. Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home

Next, the Court must consider the local interest in having localized interests decided at

home. The Government argues that there is not have a local interest in having this matter decided

in the Eastern District of Louisiana.96 Plaintiffs contend that since their rights are being violated

in Louisiana, there is a local interest in having this matter decided in Louisiana.97 The Government

asserts that Plaintiffs rights are not being violated in Louisiana as there has not yet been a hearing

in Louisiana, nor will a hearing ever take place in Louisiana.98 This Court does not find a local

interest in having the case decided in Louisiana. Similarly, there is not a local interest in having

the case decided in Idaho, as the only issue raised is a question of federal constitutional law. Thus,

this factor is neutral.

3. The Familiarity of the Forum with the Law that Will Govern the Case and

Unnecessary Problems of Conflicts of Laws or Application of Foreign Law

Finally, the Court considers the familiarity of the forum with governing law and avoidance

of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws. The Government contends that these factors are

95 Id.

96 Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 10.

97 Rec. Doc. 15 at 3.

98 Rec. Doc. 20 at 4.

neutral.”’ Plaintiffs do not address these factors. These factors are neutral because the only issue

presented is a question of federal constitutional law.

¥. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that this District is a proper venue because

the administrative proceedings that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin are ongoing in this District. Thus, a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred in this District.

Therefore, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that the Eastern District of Louisiana is

an improper venue and finds that transfer would not be appropriate under § 1406(a). Additionally,

all of the public and private interest factors evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) are neutral.

Therefore, the Government has not demonstrated that another venue is clearly more convenient

than this District.!°°

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Government’s Motion to Transfer Venue!®! is

DENIED.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 1 3th day of October, 2023.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

» Rec. Doc. 5-1 at 10.

100 Volkswagen IT, 545 F.3d at 315.

10! Rec. Doc. 5.

17