The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DWAYNE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS No. 23-1922
JASON WILLIAMS ET AL. SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendant Jason Williams (“defendant”). Dwayne
Williams (“plaintiff”) opposes the motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the
Court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder in Louisiana v.
Williams, Case No. 374-848, Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. After he spent
twenty-six years in prison, plaintiff’s conviction was vacated.2 Plaintiff alleges that
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office agreed that it possessed evidence
favorable to plaintiff during his trial that was not disclosed to plaintiff’s criminal
defense attorney.3
On June 7, 2023, plaintiff filed this action against defendant, in his official
capacity, pursuant to § 1983. Plaintiff alleges the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s
1 R. Doc. No. 7.
2 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 5.
3 Id.
office, at the time of his conviction, had a policy of suppressing evidence in violation
of the Constitution and that policy caused him injury.4
Defendant moves to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).5 Defendant argues that Louisiana district
attorneys act as state officers and that the state is responsible for the district
attorneys’ actions.6 Therefore, defendant argues that plaintiff has no claim against
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office.7 Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing
that defendant’s argument is precluded by controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.8
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
4 Id. ¶ 1.
5 R. Doc. 7.
6 R. Doc. No. 7-1, at 3.
7 R. Doc. No. 7, at 1.
8 R. Doc. No. 8, at 3.
has acted unlawfully.” Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the
plaintiffs’ claim.” Hi-Tech Elec., Inc v. T&B Constr. & Elec. Servs., Inc., No. 15-3034,
2017 WL 615414, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017) (Vance, J.) (emphasis added) (citing
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255–57 (5th Cir. 2009). A complaint is
insufficient if it contains “only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citation and internal quotations omitted). It “must provide the defendant with fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss, a court views the complaint “in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Lovick v. Ritemoney
Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 authorizes lawsuits for damages against any “person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
Municipalities, but not states, are included as “persons” to whom § 1983 applies.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “To
establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an official
policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind
the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
847 (5th Cir. 2009).
The parties dispute whether the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office
represented a local governmental entity when it allegedly failed to enact
constitutionally sufficient policies pursuant to Brady. Plaintiff argues that the U.S.
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, has already held
that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office acted as a local government entity
in failing to enact constitutionally sufficient Brady policies. 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th
Cir. 1999). Defendant argues that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office acts
as an arm of the state and relies on the Fifth Circuit’s more recent en banc opinion in
Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022) and panel decision in Arnone v.
Dallas County, 29 F.4th 262 (5th Cir. 2022). Four sections of this court have
considered defendant’s argument and rejected it.9 Defendant does not distinguish the
present case from those cases, but instead argues that each of the four cases was
wrongly decided and urges the Court to take a “careful, independent look.”10
9 Floyd v. Dillmann, 2023 WL 2375362 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2023) (Milazzo, J.); Smith v.
Williams, 2023 WL 2263841 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2023) (Brown, C.J.); Reeder v.
Williams, 2023 WL 2771481 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023) (Zainey, J.); Jones v. Williams,
2023 WL 3211865 (E.D. La. May 2, 2023) (Ashe, J.).
10 R. Doc. No. 7, at 2.
In Burge, the Fifth Circuit directly addressed whether Louisiana District
Attorney’s offices act as state or local entities. The court stated:
Considering the Louisiana constitutional and statutory law and tort
cases, we conclude that, in a suit against a district attorney in his official
capacity under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by the district
attorney's policies regarding the acquisition, security, and disclosure of
Brady material, a victory for the plaintiff imposes liability on the district
attorney's office as an independent local entity.
187 F.3d at 468. “For purposes of ‘official capacity’ suits under § 1983, the district
attorney's office resembles other local government entities.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has
not overturned Burge.
Notwithstanding, defendant contends that Daves modifies the analysis in
Burge and abrogates all pre-2022 jurisprudence that suggests Louisiana district
attorneys do not act on behalf of the state when prosecuting state law crimes.11 The
Daves court stated that “Section 1983 litigation requires us to identify the level of
government for which an official was acting when establishing the policy that is
relevant to the claims.” 22 F.4th at 534. Defendant argues that, because Burge does
not expressly answer this question, Daves calls into question the decision in Burge.
Both Burge and Daves rely on the analysis set forth in the Supreme Court case
McMillian v. Monroe County. The court in McMillian explained that:
In deciding this dispute, the question is not whether Alabama sheriffs
act as county or state officials in all of their official actions, but whom
they represent in a particular area or on a particular issue. This inquiry
is dependent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant
state law.
11 R. Doc. No. 7-1, at 14.
520 U.S. 781, 782 (1997). The relevant inquiry was the power exercised by the officer
in relation to the particular issue. Burge applied McMillian to find that Louisiana
district attorneys function as local officials when they make policies regarding the
“acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady material.” 187 F.3d at 469. Daves
applied McMillian to find that Texas county judges were exercising state power when
they created bail-setting policies. 22 F.4th 522 at 540. Arnone applied McMillian and
Daves to find that a Texas district attorney acted as a state policymaker pursuant to
Texas law when promulgating or acquiescing to the polygraph policy. 29 F.4th at 268.
McMillian, Burge, Daves, and Arnone all conduct the same inquiry. Arnone
says Daves “clarifies how to attribute a policymaker's actions under McMillian” by
instructing courts to examine the function the official is exercising and “what state
law provides as to the specific relevant function.” Arnone, 29 F.4th at 267. But this
has always been the inquiry pursuant to McMillian. McMillian expressly rejected an
“all or nothing” approach. 520 U.S. at 785.
Defendant also argues that Daves undermines Burge by stating that relying
on the Eleventh Amendment analysis “can be misleading in Section 1983 analysis.”
Daves, 22 F.4th at 533. The Daves court suggested that focusing on the Hudson
Eleventh Amendment factors, like funding of the office, will lead to generalizations
which are not helpful for analyzing the officer’s function in undertaking the specific
conduct at issue. Id. While the Burge court separately conducted an Eleventh
Amendment analysis, the Burge court also applied the McMillian framework to
determine whether Louisiana district attorneys are acting on behalf of local
government in creating Brady policies and how Louisiana law classifies Louisiana
district attorneys. Burge, 22 F.3d at 469. This is the same analysis set forth in
McMillian and echoed in Daves. Daves not change the inquiry under McMillian, and,
therefore, it does not undermine the analysis in Burge.
While defendant points to similarities between district attorneys and county
judges in Texas and district attorneys in Louisiana, these similarities are not
determinative. The court in McMillian said, “since it is entirely natural that both the
role of sheriffs and the importance of counties vary from State to State, there is no
inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county officers in
one State, and not in another.” 520 U.S. at 794. There is no need to conduct a
comprehensive comparison of the similarities and differences between district
attorneys in Texas and Louisiana because a separate analysis of each has previously
been conducted in Arnone and Burge. As the reasoning of Burge has not been
undermined, it remains binding precedent.
As stated, defendant also argues that each of the four cases addressing the
present question were wrongly decided by other sections of this court. Each of the
four cases concluded that Daves did not overrule Burge, and Burge remains binding
precedent. The Court does not take issue with the holdings of those cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on his argument that Daves
undermines Burge and accordingly, Burge should not apply. Based on a thorough
review of the jurisprudence, arguments, and prior court rulings, this Court finds that
defendant’s argument is without merit. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 20, 2023.
NCE M. RICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE