The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL MARSHALL, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff
VERSUS NO. 23-1319
CRAIG WEBRE, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (1)
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the second motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Correcthealth, LLC (“CH”) and Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC (“CHL”).1 Plaintiff Michael
Marshall filed an opposition to the motion.2 Defendants filed a reply.3 For the following
reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to CH and DENIED as to CHL, except
as to the claim regarding understaffing, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff Michael Marshall was incarcerated at the Lafourche Parish Detention
Center (“LPDC”) at the time of the events in question.5 Mr. Marshall alleges that he did
not receive appropriate medical care at LPDC following complaints of back pain, difficulty
walking, and a subsequent fall that rendered him partially paralyzed and incontinent.6
Prior to his incarceration, Mr. Marshall was diagnosed with metastatic prostate
cancer.7 This diagnosis was known to employees of CH and CHL at LPDC.8 On or about
1 R. Doc. 26.
2 R. Doc. 28.
3 R. Doc. 32.
4 The background facts are taken from the allegations in the second amended complaint. R. Doc. 19.
5 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 4.
6 Id. at ¶¶ 5-9.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id.
March 30, 2022, Mr. Marshall alleges he began having back pain, which worsened over
the next several days.9 When Mr. Marshall was seen by a CH/CHL nurse on April 1, 2022,
he claims that he indicated his back pain had worsened and he was having trouble walking
and moving his lower extremities.10 The nurse provided ibuprofen.11
On April 2, 2022, Mr. Marshall fell while attempting to urinate, due to the
difficulties with moving his lower extremities.12 Plaintiff alleges that his body became
paralyzed after the fall, and he began experiencing urinary incontinence and the inability
to defecate.13 After informing a CH/CHL nurse of his condition, Mr. Marshall alleges he
was instructed to “lay [sic] in bed.”14 Four days after the fall, on April 6, 2022, Plaintiff
was transported to Chabert Medical Center for treatment of the injuries he sustained as a
result of the fall.15 Plaintiff was subsequently taken by helicopter to University Medical
Center, where he underwent emergency surgery.16
Plaintiff sues Craig Webre in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lafourche Parish, the
Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”), Archie Chaisson III in his official capacity as
Lafourche Parish President, Lafourche Parish, and CH/CHL in its individual and official
capacity for compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to adequate medical care while detained.17
Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.18
9 Id. at ¶ 5.
10 Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
11 Id. at ¶ 6.
12 Id. at ¶ 7.
13 Id.
14 Id. at ¶¶ 7-7(a)
15 Id. at ¶ 8.
16 Id.
17 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 16-17, 30
18 Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiff originally filed a Petition for Damages against Defendants in state court
on March 22, 2023.19 Defendants removed the matter to the United States Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana on April 20, 2023 on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.20 On May 19, 2023, CH and CHL filed their first
motion to dismiss.21 On July 11, 2023, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a second
amended complaint,22 which Plaintiff filed on July 25, 2023.23 The Court then denied
Defendants’ first motion to dismiss without prejudice.24 CH and CHL now move to
dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against them in the second amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.25 Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against CH and CHL are set forth below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may only
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the
plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief.26 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”27 “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”28
19 R. Doc. 1-1.
20 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4.
21 R. Doc. 5.
22 R. Doc. 18.
23 R. Doc. 19.
24 R. Doc. 18.
25 R. Doc. 26-1.
26 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
27 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory
statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”29 “[T]hreadbare recitals of
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.30
However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, [if] they
[are] supported by factual allegations.”31 “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”32 Moreover, claims of
municipal liability under § 1983 are not subject to a more heightened pleading standard
that other types of clams.33
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that it is the policy, practice, or custom of CH and CHL, among
other defendants, to “ignore legitimate and serious complaints of pain by inmates and to
fail to provide necessary and basic medical care to inmates.”34 Moreover, Plaintiff alleges
that CH and CHL, among other defendants, had no established policies or rules which
provided that inmates at LPDC were entitled to receive prompt medical care for serious
medical conditions, such as Plaintiff’s condition following his fall.35
29 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
30 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 679.
32 Id.
33 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993).
34 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 9.
35 Id. at ¶ 14.
Plaintiff further alleges that CH and CHL, among other defendants, were aware of
the inadequate staffing, training, and supervision of medical and correctional staff with
regard to medical care and treatment of sick and/or injured inmates.36 Plaintiff avers that
CH and CHL were ultimately responsible for hiring, training, supervising, disciplining,
and/or retaining all CH/CHL employees.37 The Court addresses each of these claims in
turn.
I. Correcthealth, LLC (CH) is an improper party to the suit.
Plaintiff names both Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC (“CHL”) and Correcthealth,
LLC (“CH”) in his amended complaint.38 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue
that CH is an improper party to the suit because only CHL (not CH) entered into a contract
with LPSO to provide mental and medical services at LPDC.39 The Court agrees.
Defendants CH and CHL attached a copy of the contract between CHL and LPSO
as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss.40 While generally a district court may only
consider the contents of the pleading and attachments thereto when considering a motion
to dismiss, “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered
part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to
her claim.”41 In this case, Plaintiff referred to a contract between Lafourche Parish/LPSO
and CH/CHL in his amended complaint.42 Accordingly, it is proper for the Court to
consider the contract attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
36 Id. at ¶ 10.
37 Id. at ¶ 13.
38 Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff refers to these two entities collectively as “Correcthealth,” but they will be distinguished
as separate entities for the purpose of this order.
39 R. Doc. 26-1 at 17.
40 R. Doc. 26-2.
41 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000).
42 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 2.
The only parties to the contract at issue are CHL and LPSO.43 Since there is no
contract between CH and LPSO, CH cannot be considered a state actor for the purposes
of § 1983 liability.44 Accordingly, CH is an improperly named party to this action, and all
claims against CH must be dismissed.
II. The Application of § 1983 Municipal Liability to a Private Entity Is Distinct
from the Issue of Capacity.
Plaintiff sues CHL, a private entity, in its official and individual capacities.45
Defendants do not address the issue of capacity in their motion to dismiss, but the Court
provides clarity on capacity vis-à-vis municipal liability as a threshold matter.
Monell did not address capacities; it held only that “Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort.” It makes sense not to identify the capacity in which
a defendant is acting when the defendant is a government entity, as “official-capacity suits
‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent,’” while “[p]ersonal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose
individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.”46
However, when applying the rule from Monell to a private company such as CHL, the
question of capacity is less clear, and courts have wrestled with the issue.47
43 R. Doc. 26-2.
44 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55 (1988) (finding that a medical provider under contract with the state is a
state actor for the purposes of § 1983 liability).
45 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 1.
46 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
47 See, e.g., Groom v. Safeway, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 987, 992 n. 5 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“The distinction between
official-capacity/municipal and individual-capacity actions that arises in the context in which a public entity
is being sued is yet another illustration of how case law from that context does not fit where the defendant
is a private corporation. Should Safeway have been held liable in its ‘individual’ or its ‘official’ capacity? It
would seem clear that Safeway, as a private employer, has no ‘official’-capacity, or ‘municipal,’ liability, and
yet the ‘rule’ against holding Safeway vicariously liable for its employee's actions is borrowed from the
official-capacity/municipal liability context, in which a plaintiff seeks to hold a public entity liable for the
actions of its employees. . . . In any event . . . Plaintiff's theory could have supported a finding of liability
The recent approach has been to treat the application of § 1983 municipal liability
to a private entity as distinct from the issue of capacity. In Davison v. Rios, the “Plaintiff
name[d] Defendant CCS in its individual and official capacities.”48 However, the court
reasoned, “CCS is a private entity and lacks a traditional individual or official capacity;”
instead, “a party may sue Defendant CCS for municipal liability.”49 In Mitchell v. GEO
Group, Inc., the court similarly held while “Plaintiff seeks liability against Defendant GEO
in both its individual and official capacities[,] . . . as a private entity, GEO lacks a
traditional individual or official capacity.”50 “Even so,” the court held, “Defendant GEO
may be sued under a theory of municipal liability.”51
Other courts have come to the same result without explicitly stating their
reasoning. In Sims v. Wexford Health, the plaintiff sued all defendants, including the
private company Wexford Health, “in their individual and official capacities.”52 In
addressing Wexford Health’s liability, the court simply stated, “Wexford is treated as a
government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.”53 Similarly, in Fields v. Trinity
Food Service, the plaintiff sued all defendants, including the private companies CoreCivic
and Trinity Food Service, “in their individual and official capacities,” but in addressing
CoreCivic’s and Trinity Food Service’s liability, the court simply stated courts have
under either the individual-capacity standard, on which the jury was instructed, or under the standard for
official-capacity/municipal liability, which requires a policy or custom that causes the harm.”); see also
Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Corporations, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 35, 71 n. 250 (2004)
(“[The distinction between official and individual capacity suits that was important in municipal liability
law ‘is yet another illustration of how case law from that context does not fit where the defendant is a private
corporation.’ . . . It appears that no court has actually used capacity analysis in determining the liability of
a private corporation.” (quoting Groom, 973 F. Supp. at 992 n. 5)).
48 Davison v. Rios, No. CIV-16-374-HE, 2017 WL 9477746, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2017), report and
recommendations adopted, No. CIV-16-374-HE, 2017 WL 1843308 (W.D. Okla. May 5, 2017).
49 Id.
50 Mitchell v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. CIV-19-40-G, 2019 WL 4923986, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 2019), report
and recommendations adopted, No. CIV-19-40-G, 2019 WL 4918775 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2019).
51 Id.
52 Sims v. Wexford Health, No. 1:19-cv-01030-TWP-TAB, 2019 WL 2514832, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2019).
53 Id.
“applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private
corporations that operate prisons or provide medical care or food services to prisoners.”54
This approach, treating the question of municipal liability as separate from the
question of in which capacity the private corporation is acting, is consistent with the way
the Fifth Circuit has treated § 1983 claims: “Claims under § 1983 may be brought against
persons in their individual or official capacity, or against a governmental entity.”55 In
fact, the Fifth Circuit in Baughman recently analyzed a claim against a county, nominally
in its individual and official capacities, the same as any other municipal liability claim.56
The plaintiff alleged “the County, Dr. Guice [the jail’s executive director of health
services], and Sheriff Hickman are liable ‘in their Official Capacities and Individual
Capacities.’”57 However, in addressing these claims, the court simply stated, “These
claims, whether seeking official or individual liability, require Baughman to connect the
existence of a policy, widespread and settled practice, or a failure to train to a
constitutional violation.”58
54 Fields v. Trinity Food Servs., No. 17-1190-JDT-cgc, 2019 WL 5268565, at *2, 5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2019)
55 Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Another approach courts
have taken to the issue of private company capacity under § 1983 is to treat municipal liability as an
“individual capacity” theory. See, e.g., Brown v. Taylor, No. EP-13-CV-00017-FM, 2017 WL 11449893, at
*5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2017) (“Additionally, although ostensibly suing the Avalon Defendants in their
official capacities, these Defendants consist of a private corporation and private individuals. Private
corporations and individuals do not have ‘official capacities’ for purposes of § 1983.”); Smith v. Aramark
Corp., No. 1:20-cv-00393-JPH-DML, 2020 WL 1433864, at *2 n. 1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2020) (alterations
in original) (citations omitted) (“Mr. Smith seeks to sue each defendant in his or her individual and official
capacities. However, ‘[o]fficial capacity suits, . . . “generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”’ ‘[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other
than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.’ Thus, the official capacity claims are dismissed.”
(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985))); Atkins v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00103,
2021 WL 4773080, at *3 & n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 12, 2021) (first alteration in original) (“The FAC specifically
states that ‘[a]ll defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.’ . . . That statement makes
no sense, insofar as it applies to CoreCivic (or Hardeman County), because entities cannot be sued in a
representative capacity.”). However, this approach conflicts with how the Fifth Circuit classifies municipal
liability separately from individual and official capacity claims. See Goodman, 571 F.3d at 395.
56 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 311.
57 Id.
58 Id.
For these reasons, the Court will not label Plaintiffs’ claims CHL as individual or
official capacity claims. Such a label is unhelpful; the practical result of Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims against a private entity such as CHL that perform a traditional government
function is that the rules for municipal liability under Monell apply.
III. Plaintiff has Alleged Sufficient Facts to State a Municipal Liability Claim
Against CHL.
Municipal liability under § 1983, or Monell liability, requires proof of three
elements: 1) a policymaker, 2) an official policy or custom, and 3) a violation of
constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.59 Defendants do not
contest that CHL was a policymaker as to the provision of medical care in LPDC. Thus,
the Court finds the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim as to this element.
A. Plaintiff has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Claim of Official
Policies and/or Customs Attributable to CHL.
For purposes of Monell liability, an official policy may be either 1) “policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated
by the municipality’s lawmaking officers” or 2) “A persistent, widespread practice […]
which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.”60 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff avers CHL has maintained persistent
widespread practices regarding the provision of healthcare and the staffing and training
of CHL employees at LPDC, which amount to de facto municipal policies.61
59 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
60 Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.).
61 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 13-14, 19.
1. De Facto Policies Regarding Failure to Provide Adequate Medical
Care
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges CHL maintained persistent,
widespread practices of 1) failing to provide adequate, necessary, and/or basic medical
attention to inmates at LPDC62 and 2) ignoring legitimate and serious medical needs
and/or complaints of pain by inmates.63 Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges CHL failed to establish
a policy or rule which mandated that inmates of the jail were to receive prompt medical
attention relative to their serious medical needs.64 CHL argues Plaintiff has failed to
allege sufficient facts to support a claim that these policies existed because Plaintiff has
failed to plead “sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”65
However, the case cited by CHL to support this proposition was decided on appeal
from a judgment entered on a jury verdict, not at the pleading stage.66 The Court knows
of no case suggesting this level of factual support is required at the pleading stage. Rather,
the relevant pleading standard, as defined by Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), provides “legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual
allegations.”67
For the reasons described fully in its Order and Reasons denying Sheriff Webre’s
motion to dismiss,68 the Court “draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense”69
to find Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a claim that CHL
62 Id. at ¶¶ 9, 23.
63 Id. at ¶¶ 9, 23.
64 Id. at ¶ 14.
65 R. Doc. 26-1 at 15, citing McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir.1989).
66 Id.
67 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
68 See R. Doc. 34 at 10-12.
69 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
maintained insufficient policies and/or failed to maintain any policies regarding the
adequate provision of healthcare at LPDC.
2. De Facto Policies Regarding Understaffing and Failure to Train
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff further alleges CHL maintained persistent,
widespread practices of 1) failing to train and/or supervise the CHL employees of LPDC
with regard to the medical care and treatment of sick and/or injured inmates70 and,
relatedly, 2) inadequately staffing LPDC.71
CHL does not contest the allegations that CHL maintained policies or practices
regarding failure to train and/or inadequate staffing.72 For the reasons described in its
Order and Reasons regarding Sheriff Webre’s motion to dismiss,73 the Court “draw[s] on
its judicial experience and common sense”74 to find Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges
sufficient facts to support a claim that CHL maintained a policy of failing to train or
supervise the medical employees at LPDC. However, as discussed in the foregoing Order
and Reasons,75 the Court finds that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts of understaffing
to support a claim of this policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against CHL regarding
understaffing is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Plaintiff has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Support a Claim of Deliberate
Indifference Against CHL.
The third element of a Monell claim is proof of a violation of constitutional rights
whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.76 Mr. Marshall alleges violations of both his
70 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10, 13, 28(b).
71 Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11, 28(b).
72 See generally, R. Doc. 26-1. Defendants claim Plaintiff’s amended complaint “vaguely refers to, without
formal allegation, an issue with inadequate staffing.” (R. Doc. 26-1 at 4). Beyond this statement, Defendants’
motion focuses almost entirely on the issue of deliberate indifference.
73 See R. Doc. 34 at 13-14.
74 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
75 See R. Doc. 34 at 14.
76 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of the de facto policies and/or
customs of CHL.77
“The Eighth Amendment ensures the safety of convicted prisoners while due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees.”78 In this case, Mr.
Marshall appears to have been a pretrial detainee.79 Nevertheless, “[t]he proper analysis
of each category of claims is the same, as [the Fifth Circuit’s] ‘Fourteenth Amendment
case law concerning pretrial detainees [is based] on the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment precedent concerning prisoners.’”80
A pretrial detainee may prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating either
“an unconstitutional condition of confinement” or an “unconstitutional episodic act or
omission.”81 These two avenues for § 1983 claims come with separate inquiries.82 Plaintiff
has clarified in his opposition to the instant motion that he alleges a violation based on
an unconstitutional episodic act or omission.83
“To establish municipal liability in an episodic-act case, a plaintiff must show ‘(1)
that the municipal employee violated [the pretrial detainee's] clearly established
constitutional rights with subjective deliberate indifference; and (2) that this violation
77 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 17-20.
78 Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (citing Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996)).
79 R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 18. The allegations provided in Plaintiff’s amended complaint do not explicitly address
whether Mr. Marshall was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged injury.
However, his amended complaint appears to distinguish his position from “convicted prisoners” at ¶ 18. As
such, the Court assumes Mr. Marshall was a pretrial detainee for the purposes of this ruling.
80 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 306 (third alteration in original) (quoting Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626,
634 (5th Cir. 2019)).
81 Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020).
82 Id.
83 R. Doc. 25 at 5.
resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted and maintained with objective
deliberate indifference.’”84
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges CHL maintained the de facto policies
regarding the provision of health care and the deficient training of employees at LPSO,
discussed above, with deliberate indifference.85 “To succeed on a deliberate-indifference
claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) the official was ‘aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ and (2) the official
actually drew that inference.”86 “[O]fficial conduct must be ‘wanton,’ which is defined to
mean ‘reckless.’”87 Deliberate indifference “requires that the defendant act with
‘something more than mere negligence’ but ‘less than acts or omissions for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’”88
1. Plaintiff Has Alleged CHL’s Policies Regarding Failure to Provide
Adequate Medical Care Were Adopted with Deliberate Indifference.
Plaintiff alleges CHL maintained the inadequate policies regarding the provision
of medical care, discussed above, with deliberate indifference.89 Plaintiff avers that CHL’s
knowledge that the deficient policies were “inadequate and posed a danger of serious
bodily harm to inmates at LPDC,” and its refusal to “take action to correct these policies,”
indicate “deliberate indifference to the serious risks to inmates.”90 The Court agrees.
84 Cadena, 946 F.3d at 728 (alteration in original) (quoting Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir.
2008)).
85 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10, 13-14, 21, 28; see discussion supra Sec. I(B).
86 Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 239
F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)).
87 Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307 (quoting Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th
Cir. 2017)).
88 Cadena, 946 F.3d at 728 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).
89 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 15, 20, 23.
90 Id. at ¶ 15.
CHL argues that its conduct, even if negligent, did not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.91 To support this contention, CHL details the contents of medical records.92
In his opposition, Plaintiff correctly notes that for documents to be considered at the
pleading stage they must be attached to the pleadings or referenced therein.93 Plaintiff
made no reference to the medical records in his amended complaint.94 Accordingly, the
Court will not consider the medical records in deciding the instant motion to dismiss.
For the reasons described fully in its Order and Reasons regarding Sheriff
Webre’s motion to dismiss,95 the Court finds Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges
sufficient facts to support a claim that CHL maintained insufficient policies and/or
failed to maintain any policies regarding the adequate provision of healthcare at LPDC
with knowledge that a serious risk of harm existed. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that CHL maintained the policies
regarding failure to provide adequate medical care with deliberate indifference.
2. Plaintiff Has Alleged CHL’s Policies Regarding Failure to Train
Were Adopted with Deliberate Indifference.
Plaintiff alleges CHL was deliberately indifferent in its failure to train the
employees of LPDC.96 CHL does not directly address this allegation in its motion to
dismiss.97 However, assuming, CHL failed to properly train the healthcare employees of
LPDC as to the provision of necessary medical treatment, as alleged, the Court may
properly infer that the existence of this deficiency in training was reckless, in and of itself,
91 R. Doc. 26-1 at 11-13.
92 Id. at 5-7.
93 R. Doc. 28 at 5; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
94 See generally R. Doc. 19.
95 See R. Doc. 34 at 17.
96 R. Doc. 19 at ¶¶ 10, 28(b).
97 See generally R. Doc. 26-1.
since it involved such a crucial issue of safety for the jail. Accordingly, the Court finds
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that CHL maintained the policies
regarding failure to train with deliberate indifference.
IV. Punitive Damages Are Not Available Against a Private Entity Such as CHL
Performing a Traditional Governmental Function.
Plaintiffs seek punitive damages from CHL.98 CHL argues punitive damages are
not available against private companies treated as municipal entities.99 The Court agrees.
In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., the Supreme Court held that punitive
damages are not available against a municipality for several reasons.100 First, allowing
punitive damages against a municipality would harm innocent taxpayers “because such
awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer
was being chastised.”101 Second, punitive damages typically seek “to punish the tortfeasor
whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from
similar extreme conduct,” but this purpose breaks down when punitive damages are
sought against an entity rather than an individual because a “municipality . . . can have
no malice independent of the malice of its officials.”102 Finally, the deterrent purpose of
§ 1983 would not be advanced by assessing punitive damages against a municipality,
when that purpose could be satisfied fully by assessing those damages against the
individuals who may have committed the constitutional violations at issue.103
Two district courts in this Circuit have extended the reasoning of City of Newport
to private entities performing government functions. In Moore v. LaSalle Corrections,
98 Id. at ¶ 72.
99 R. Doc. 26-1 at 16, citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260 (1981).
100 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
101 Id. at 263.
102 Id. at 266-67.
103 Id. at 669-70.
Inc., the Western District of Louisiana, faced with an issue of first impression, held that
the Supreme Court’s reasons for denying punitive damages against a municipality compel
the same result for a private entity which has assumed a traditionally governmental
role.104 Considering the nature of the private prison industry, awarding punitive damages
against a private prison would harm the public because “that award, and the threat of
future punitive damage awards, necessarily increases the costs of maintaining that
agreement.”105 “Further, just like a municipality, a private entity like LaSalle is incapable
of malicious action outside of its employees,” and “[j]ust like a municipality, a company
has employees against whom the deterrent purpose of § 1983 may be actually effective.”106
Faced with the same issue of § 1983 punitive damages claims against a private company,
the Middle District of Louisiana in Carter v. Gautreaux, citing Moore, held “punitive
damages are not available in this case.”107
The Court finds the reasoning in Moore persuasive. For the reasons stated therein,
punitive damages are not available against a private entity such as CHL performing the
traditional governmental function of operating the medical facilities of a prison. Plaintiffs’
claims for punitive damages against CHL must be dismissed.108
104 Moore v. LaSalle Corr., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 3d 285, 289 (W.D. La. 2019), appeal filed, No. 20-30739 (5th
Cir. Nov. 24, 2020).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Carter v. Gautreaux, No. 19-105-SDD-EWD, 2021 WL 2785332, at *6 (M.D. La. July 2, 2021).
108 Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against Sheriff Craig Webre, Archie Chaisson, and Lafourche
Parish (see R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 20) must also be dismissed sua sponte. While Sheriff Webre did not raise this
issue in his motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 21-1), the Sheriff is sued in his official capacity and therefore the suit
is treated as a suit against the municipal entity of LPSO (see R. Doc. 34, Order and Reasons, at 6). Mr.
Chaisson is also sued in his official capacity as President of Lafourche Parish (R. Doc. 19 at ¶ 1) and therefore
the suit is treated as a suit against the municipal entity of the Parish. For the reasons discussed supra,
Section IV, a municipal entity may not be subject to the imposition of punitive damages. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages against Sheriff Webre, Archie Chaisson, and Lafourche Parish are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss!°9 is GRANTED as to Defendant
Correcthealth, LLC (CH) and DENIED as to Defendant Correcthealth Lafourche, LLC
(CHL), except as to the claim regarding understaffing, which is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Claims by Plaintiff for punitive damages against all defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of September, 2023.
SUSIE nage
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
109 R, Doc. 21-1.
17