The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MAGNOLIA FLEET, LLC CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS No. 23-79
MARSH BUGGIES, INC. SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Magnolia Fleet, LLC’s (“Magnolia Fleet”) motion1
for default judgment against defendant, Marsh Buggies, Inc. (“Marsh Buggies”).
Magnolia Fleet requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor in the amount of
$6,428.12 and award post-judgment interest. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Magnolia Fleet alleges that it entered into an oral agreement with Marsh
Buggies in May 2020 “for the provision of pushboats, towage, and shifting services”
(the “Agreement”).2 Between May 17 and July 7, 2022, Magnolia Fleet performed
towage and shifting services for Marsh Buggies pursuant to the Agreement and
issued an invoice to Marsh Buggies for those services in the amount of $12,856.25 on
July 20, 2022.3 Magnolia Fleet made written demand for payment on November 23,
1 R. Doc. No. 12. Magnolia Fleet previously filed a motion for a default judgment on
May 17, 2023. R. Doc. No. 10. Magnolia Fleet filed the instant motion for default
judgment on June 7, 2023 to clarify the claim as to which it seeks default judgment.
2 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 6.
3 Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
2022, but alleges that a balance of $6,428.12 remains due and owing.4 Magnolia Fleet
filed this action on January 6, 2023, alleging causes of action for breach of maritime
contract and for open account, pursuant to La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781.5
The summons issued to Marsh Buggies on January 9, 20236 was returned
executed, and Marsh Buggies’ answer was due on February 2, 2023,7 but no answer
or responsive pleading was filed. Upon motion by Magnolia Fleet, the Clerk of Court
issued an entry of default against Marsh Buggies on March 7, 2023.8 On April 14,
2023, Magnolia Fleet effected service of the entry of default upon Marsh Buggies’
registered agent, Perry Autin.9 Plaintiff moved for a default judgment on May 17,
202310 and filed the instant motion for a default judgment on June 7, 2023.11 To date,
Marsh Buggies has filed no answer or responsive pleading.
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), the Court may enter a
default judgment against a party when it fails to plead or otherwise respond to the
plaintiff’s complaint within the required period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
A plaintiff who seeks a default judgment against an unresponsive defendant
must proceed with a two-step process. First, the plaintiff must petition the clerk for
4 Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
5 Id. ¶¶ 11–24.
6 R. Doc. No. 4.
7 R. Doc. No. 5.
8 R. Doc. No. 7.
9 R. Doc. No. 8.
10 R. Doc. No. 10.
11 R. Doc. No. 12.
an entry of default, which is simply “a notation of the party’s default on the clerk’s
record of the case.” Trahan v. PLC Fin., Inc., No. 18-859, 2018 WL 10758657, at *1
(E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2018) (Barbier, J.) (quoting Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar.
S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations omitted). Before the clerk
may enter the default, the plaintiff must show “by affidavit or otherwise” that the
defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
After the clerk has entered a default, the plaintiff may move for a default
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). Meyer v. Bayles, 559 F. App’x
312, 313 (5th Cir. 2014). At this point, “the court must accept the well-pleaded factual
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. (citing Nishimatsu Const. Co., Ltd. v.
Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). At the same time, the court
does not hold the defaulting defendant “to [have] admitt[ed] facts that are not well-
pleaded or to [have] admitt[ed] conclusions of law.” Wooten v. McDonald Transit
Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). The default judgment should not be entered unless the judgment is
“‘supported by well-pleaded allegations’ and . . . ha[s] ‘a sufficient basis in the
pleadings.’” Id. at 498 (quoting Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206).
If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain and the defendant has not made an
appearance in court, the clerk may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
In all other cases, “the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). No party is entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right. Lewis
v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). “Generally, the entry of
default judgment is committed to the discretion of the district judge.” Ameser v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 442 F. App’x 967, 969 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The Court is entitled to consider several factors when determining whether to
enter a default judgment, including, “whether material issues of fact are at issue,
whether there has been substantial prejudice, whether the grounds for default are
clearly established, whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or
excusable neglect, the harshness of a default judgment, and whether the court would
think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Lindsey v.
Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).
If the Court concludes that it is appropriate to enter a default judgment, it
must then “fix the amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover and give
judgment accordingly.” M C Bank & Trust Co. v. Suard Barge Serv., Inc., No. 16-
14311, 2017 WL 3991076, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2017) (Vance, J.) (quoting Pope v.
United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). “In ruling on such a motion [for a default
judgment], the court may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence to
determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.” Id. (quoting Int’l Painters
& Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Brighton Painting Co., 267 F.R.D. 426, 428
(D.D.C. 2010)). With respect to damages, the Court cannot enter a default judgment
without a hearing “unless the amount is liquidated or easily computable.” Richardson
v. Salvation Army S. Territory, USA, 161 F.3d 7, at *1 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished
opinion); see Duncan v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, No. 08-3840, 2009 WL 2514150,
at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2009) (Engelhardt, J.) (explaining that “[a] sum is certain
when the amount claimed is a liquidated one or is one that is capable of mathematical
calculation as, for example, an action on a promissory note”).
III. ANALYSIS
a. Breach of Maritime Contract
To determine whether a contract is a maritime contract, “the answer depends
upon . . . the nature and character of the contract, and the true criterion is whether
it has reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 24 (2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, a court
should focus its inquiry on whether maritime commerce is the principal objective of
the contract. Id. at 24–25. The Supreme Court has long held that a contract to tow
another vessel is a maritime contract and that fact is “too clear for argument.”
Knapp, Stout & Co. Company v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 643 (1900); see also
Kossick, 365 U.S. at 735 (“Without doubt a contract for hire either of a ship or of
the sailors and officers to man her is within the admiralty jurisdiction.”).
The contract at issue in this case was “for the provision of pushboats, towage,
and shifting services . . . pursuant to which the pushboat M/V ADELINE provided
services to [Marsh Buggies] and its vessels.”12 Therefore, the contract’s “‘purpose is
to effectuate maritime commerce—and thus it is a maritime contract.’” Barrios v.
Centaur, L.L.C., 942 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kirby, 543 U.S. at 27).
12 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 6.
Maritime contracts, such as the one at issue in the instant case, are governed
by general maritime law. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d
401, 412 (5th Cir. 1982); accord One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc.,
648 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011). It is a “given that admiralty jurisdiction exists for
an action involving the breach of a maritime contract.” Planned Premium Servs. of
La., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Agents, Inc., 928 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Kuehne &
Nagel v. Geosource, Inc., 874 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1989)).
“For maritime contract disputes, federal courts apply general principles of
contract construction and interpretation ‘that can be found in treaties or
restatements of the law.’” Superior Shipyard & Fabrication, Inc. v. M/V CECILE A.
FITCH, No. 22-1169, 2023 WL 3179680, at *3 (E.D. La. May 1, 2023) (Barbier, J.)
(quoting Int’l Marine, L.L.C. v. FDT, L.L.C., 619 F. App’x 342, 349 (5th Cir. 2015)).
“[O]ral contracts are generally regarded as valid by maritime law.” One Beacon Ins.
Co., 648 F.3d at 265 (quoting Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 734 (1961)).
“‘The elements for breach of contract in maritime . . . [cases are]: (1) contract;
(2) breach of that contract; and (3) damages.’” Mid-Gulf Shipping Co. Inc. v. Energy
Subsea LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 318, 324 (E.D. La. 2020) (Africk, J.) (quoting FEC
Heliports, LLC v. Hornbeck Offshore Operators, LLC, No. 15-4827, 2016 WL 5678557,
at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2016) (Feldman, J.)). The Court, taking Magnolia Fleet’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498, finds that Magnolia Fleet
has demonstrated that all elements necessary to prove a breach of maritime contract
have been met. First, there was an oral contract between Magnolia Fleet and Marsh
Buggies.13 See One Beacon Ins. Co., 648 F.3d at 265. Second, Magnolia Fleet sent
Marsh Buggies an invoice in the amount of $12,856.25 for the services Magnolia Fleet
performed pursuant to the contract,14 but Marsh Buggies paid only half.15 Third,
Marsh Buggies has not paid Magnolia Fleet the remaining balance of $6,428.12.16
Accordingly, the Court will enter a default judgment in favor of Magnolia Fleet and
against Marsh Buggies as to Magnolia Fleet’s claim for breach of maritime contract.17
b. Amount of Recovery
Having so concluded, the Court must “fix the amount which the plaintiff is
lawfully entitled to recover and give judgment accordingly.” M C Bank & Trust Co.,
2017 WL 3991076, at *5. In support of its motion, Magnolia Fleet submitted the
invoice provided to Marsh Buggies,18 the demand letter sent to Marsh Buggies,19 and
a sworn declaration,20 which establish the amount owed to Magnolia Fleet by Marsh
Buggies is $6,428.12. The Court concludes that the amount demanded is a sum
certain and that the evidence submitted by Magnolia Fleet reflects the amount owed
by Marsh Buggies. Therefore, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.
13 R. Doc. Nos. 1, ¶ 6, 1-2, at 1.
14 R. Doc. No. 1-1, at 1.
15 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 10.
16 Id.
17 Magnolia Fleet’s motion for default judgment “avers that [Magnolia Fleet’s] second
count, Open Account under Louisiana Open Accounts Statute, LA R.S. § 9:2781, may
be dismissed, and that Magnolia Fleet does not seek recovery of attorney’s fees or
costs.” R. Doc. No. 12-1, at 3.
18 R. Doc. No. 1-1.
19 R. Doc. No. 1-2.
20 R. Doc. No. 12-3.
Magnolia Fleet also requests post-judgment interest.21 “Federal law governs
post-judgment interest.” Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 173
(5th Cir. 2010). Magnolia Fleet may recover post-judgment interest pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1961, which provides that post-judgment interest “shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year
constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding . . . the date of the
judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered Magnolia Fleet’s motion and accompanying exhibits, as well
as the applicable law, the Court finds that there are no factors that weigh against
entering a default judgment against Marsh Buggies. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion22 for default judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall be entered in favor of
Magnolia Fleet and against Marsh Buggies in the principal amount of $6,428.12 and
post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magnolia Fleet’s remaining claim against
Marsh Buggies for open account under Louisiana law is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
21 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 22.
22 R. Doc. No. 12.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magnolia Fleet’s prior motion?? for default
judgment is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 12, 2023.
LANC . AFRICK
UNITED STAVES DISTRICT JUDGE
23 R. Doc. No. 10.